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Defendants 6, 8 and 9 appealed from the decree as to house No. 1 which was dismissed by the Divisional Judge on 28th June 1889. They applied for revision in the Chief Court but were unsuccessful.

Plaintiffs applied for execution in 1893 in respect of house No. 1, but their application was rejected by the first Court and the Divisional Judge. It was, however, accepted by the Chief Court and remanded to the lower Court. In consequence of an expression of opinion in the judgment that defendants 6, 8 and 9 might apply for revision of the order of the Chief Court, an application for review was filed which was accepted and the case remanded for redecision, by the Divisional Judge, of the first appeal to the Divisional Court by order, dated 21st June 1899. The Divisional Judge Mr. A. Kensington, after a remand for further enquiry, upheld the previous order dismissing the appeal of defendants 6, 8 and 9, though on different grounds, on 31st March 1901. This decree was maintained by the Chief Court.

On 7th February 1902 plaintiffs asked for execution of the decree in respect of house No. 2. Their application was dismissed in default and on 17th June the present application was filed.

The only question argued before me was whether or not the application is barred by time. The lower Courts have held that it is not. This is the only point for determination.

Defendant 4 is the only appellant before me. He is jointly interested in house No. 2 and has no interest in house No. 1, but he has been a party to all the proceedings mentioned before.

The argument for the appellant divided itself into two heads-(1) that the present application is barred under Section 230, Civil Procedure Code, and (2) that it is barred under Article 179 of the Indian Limitation Act, XV of 1877.

Both contentions appear to me to be untenable. The order in appeal taking the language of clause (a) of Section 230, Civil Procedure Code, literally, was passed on 31st March 1901 when the Divisional Judge, after a remand by the Chief Court and after a fresh inquiry by the first Court, upheld the original decree of the Divisional Judge passed in appeal in 1889. Appellant contends that he was not interested in the application of the plaintiffs for execution in which the Chief Court's order for remand was passed as he had no share in house No. 1. But clause (a) merely speaks of a decree affirming the decree

sought to be enforced, and the decree of Colonel Wood in 1889 maintained by Mr. Kensington in March 1901 comes within the category.

A similar question arises under clause (2) of Article 179 which runs thus " (where there has been an appeal) the date "of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court". Appellant contends that the appeal to the Divisional Court related to house No. 1 which did not concern him and not to house No. 2 to which the present application for execution relates. The argument under Section 230, Civil Procedure Code, and Article 179 (2) of the Limitation Act is thus practically identical.

Now there was but a single decree passed by the District Judge and not two, though all the defendants were not interested in both the properties in respect of which the decree was passed. The suit was filed on the allegation that both properties were joint and ancestral of the parties, but the decree made a distinction among the defendants and granted relief to plaintiffs in respect of the two hoases specifying the defendants from whom plaintiffs were to get their share of each house. Defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were made jointly liable with defendant No. 7 with respect to one house and with defendant No. 4 (present appellant) and defendant 5 with respect to the other.

Reading the language of the two enactments in their plain grammatical sense which is imperative on me in construing all statute law in general and limitation law in particular, I am unable to introduce any addition in the section and article by which I can split the decree into two portions and differentiate the limitation applicable to each portion with reference to the decree in appeal. In my opinion we have no right to introduce any refinements in the plain language of the Legislatare which have the effect of varying its meaning. This view was taken in respect of clause 2 of Article 179 by the Bombay High Court in Abdul Rahiman, etc., v. Mai Din Saiba, etc. (1), and I entirely agree with the reasoning adopted by the Court.

The second clause of explanation 1 to Article 179 has no bearing in appellants' favour. There were two properties no doubt included in the decree and the liabilities of the various defendants distributed in two groups were somewhat different, but the decree was nevertheless joint against defendants 1, 2 and 8 in respect of both houses and No. 4 was joined with them (1) I, L, R., XXII Bom., 500,

as regards house No. 2. This clause

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relates to the effect of applications for execution and not to the effect of appeal. There is a vast distinction to use the language of Mahmud, "J., in Mashiat-un-Nissa v. Rani (1), vide 7 between cases in which an application for execution is made, there having been no appeal from the decree and cases in which there has been an appeal as contemplated by clause (2), Article 179. I am of opinion, therefore, that it is useless to employ the analogy of applications for execution in decrees mentioned in the 2nd clause of the explanation in interpreting clause 2 of the article. They have no connection with each other and apart from the fact that the language of clause 2, which is plain, makes no distinction between joint decrees and several decrees against separate judgment-debtors included in single decrees, it is difficult to ignore the inference deducible from the fact that whereas the explanation has been inserted to make the dis. tinction in respect of applications for execution mentioned in clause 4, no corresponding explanation or reservation is introduced in respect of clause 2. The Allahabad case is cited as an authority in favour of the appellant, but its facts are not exactly similar, the decree having been not joint but several against the defendants individually and the ruling of the majority of the Judges was differed from in a recent Calcutta Full Bench judgment, Gopal Chunder Manna v. Gosain Das Kelay (*) in which a similar interpretation to that I am disposed to put on clause 2 of Article 179 was approved and laid down. I agree with the learned Chief Justice in the last mentioned case in preferring the reasoning and the conclusion of the two dissenting Judges in the Allahabad case to the view of the majority.

There are many authorities bearing more or less on the point before me, but I deem it useless to swell the bulk of this judgment by discussing them in detail as I have mentioned the most recent and authoritative. There is no ruling of this Court exactly in point, Ralla Mal v. Mussammat Malan (8) cited by the respondent, having no direct bearing on the present discussion, and I am glad that I am comparatively less fettered in the free exercise of my own judgment in construing the clause. I accordingly hold that limitation runs both under clause (a) of Section 230, Civil Procedure Code, and clause 2 of Article.

(1) 1, L. R., XIII AN., 1 F. B.
(") I. L. R., XXV Calc., 594.
(*) 8 P. R., 1905,

179 of the Limitation Act, 1877, from the last order in appeal, viz., that of Mr. Kensington on 31st March 1901, and that the respondent's application is within time.

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

No. 33.

Before Mr. Justice Johnstone and Mr. Justice Rattigan.
NIHAL CHAND,-(PLAINTIFF),--APPELLANT,

Versus

BHAGWAN SINGH AND OTHERS,-(DEFENDANTS),-
RESPONDENTS.

Civil Appeal No. 777 of 1906.

Custom-Alienation – Alienation by sonless proprietor-Locus standi of eversioner-Bedi Khatris of Kalewal, tahsil Dasuha, Hoshiarpur District — Hindu Law--Burden of proof.

Held, that the plaintiff upon whom the onus lay had failed to establish that in matters of alienation a sonless Bedi Khatri of Kalewal, tahsil Dasuha, in the Hoshiarpur District, was governed by custom and not by Hinda Law.

Further appeal from the decree of Major G. O. Beadon, Divisional
Judge, Hoshiarpur Division, dated 25th May 1906.

Golak Nath, for appellant.

Sohan Lal, for respondents.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

APPELLATE SIDE.

JOHNSTON, J.-Defendant 2 sold the land in suit on 26th 12th Jany. 1907. May 1898 by registered deed for Rs. 500, the vendor being a Bedi Khatri of Kalewal, tahsil Dasuha, district Hoshiarpur. Plaintiff, who is admittedly a reversioner, has sued for the usual declaration. Defendant vendee pleaded time-bar, and also con. tended that the Bedis are not bound by agricultural custom and so plaintiff has no right to sue. He also lastly urged that the sale was for consideration and "necessity." The first Court found the suit within time, held, on the strength of Uttam Singh and others v. Jhanda Singh and others (1), that these Bedis do follow agricultural custom; and that of the consideration money only Rs. 65 is proved to have passed. Plaintiff got his declaration accordingly, and the vendee appealed to the Divisional Judge.

(4) 21 P. R., 1896.

That officer held the suit within time, but went on to find that these Bedis do not follow agricultural custom restricting a male owner's power of alienation. The suit having been dismissed in accordance with this finding, plaintiff appeals farther to this Court, attacking only the actual finding of the lower Appellate Court regarding the non-applicability of agricultural custom to the case. There are not many published rulings relating to Bedis and their customs, and it seems to me impossible to lay it down that any general rule applies to them all. They are to be found in many districts in different parts of the Province. In Khazan Singh v. Maddi (1) Bedis of Mobla Wahidpur, tahsil Garhshankar, district Hoshiarpur, are spoken of as a nonagricultural class, though in that case holding land as malikan kabizan; and it was held that the burden of proving a custom whereby alienations by a deceased collateral male proprietor were liable to be contested by reversioners had not been discharged. It was said that Bedis are more on a level with Sayads, Brahmins and Khatris than with ordinary agriculturists.

In Surup Singh v. Mussammat Jassi (2) the Bedis of Gurdaspur were treated as a sub-division of the Khatris. After a special further enquiry it was held that these Bedis could adopt a wife's brother, an act that would be valid under Hindu Law, but not under Jat custom. The Hindu Law was not specifically followed; but this was the result. In Uttam Singh v. Jhanda Singh (3) we have a Case of Bedis of Pindori Bawa Das in the Hoshiarpur District. The case was one of gift by a sonless proprietor, and the gift was held invalid. The case of Khazan Singh quoted above was distinguished on the score of the different circumstances of the Bedis concerned in it. In Khazan Singh's case the Bedis were a small group of malikan kabra, and it was not proved that they followed agricultural custom. In the case of 1896 the whole village belonged to Bedis whose ancestors founded it some generations back. They form a compact body, the judgment says, "and whatever the pursuits of their ancestors may have been they are certainly now agriculturists."

In Civil Appeal 480 of 1903, decided by a Division Bench of this Court, it was held that certain Bedis who came and settled in Una and followed pursuits other than agriculture, did not follow general Punjab custom. The test, then, as regards presumption appears to be whether a body of Bedis have adopted

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