on by the respondents in the present case, of the non-recognition of the widow's rights when the alienation was for family debts.

In Fakir Chand v. Mussammat Chironji (1), we find the same thing. The alienation was found to have been effected for purposes not binding on the family; and a similar finding in Jowahir Singh v. Mussammat Ram Devi (2), renders that ruling also useless to appellants. There the debt was an extravagant one for the purpose of the marriage of one of the two sons of the deceased husband of the lady claiming residence, and it was incurred by the two sons and not by the deceased.

In Venkatammal Andyappa Chetti (3), it was held that in the circumstances of that case the widow's right of residence must be recognised and that the house, about to be sold for a mortgage-debt, must be sold subject to that right. Here again we must take the dictum as applying to the facts of the case itself and to similar states of facts only. The debts were incurred by the lady's son after her husband's death in certain large transactions, not for the joint benefit of the son and the lady.

Turning to the cases quoted by Mr. Sawhney for respondent, I note that Civil Appeal No. 945 of 1900 (Anderson and Robertson, Judges), lays it down that a widow "should not "be turned out of the family house unless the debts on account of which alienation is being made have been "shewn to the satisfaction of the Court to be bond fide family “debts ; and on the facts the finding was that the consideration for the alienation was unjustifiable, if not immoral. With the dictum in this ruling I fully agree. It seems to me to provide a simple, intelligible and just rule; and it applies in the present case, for I have no doubt at all that the debt here was a family debt, incurred by Ghasita Mal himself in the ordinary way of such things, for no immoral purpose and with no similar design to injure the widow or the children. The Muhammadan wife or widow is a cred tor of her husband on account of her dower, which is a debt: and she is perhaps, as regards his estate, a creditor preferred to all other creditors. Bat a Hali wif, creditor on account of her maintenance or right of residence. If the estate has dwindled to nothing as a consequence of family expenditure and family debts incurred by her

(1) 84 P. R., 1883.
(7, L. R., VI MA

or wil w is no

(*) 112 P. R., 1888.
180.

APPELLATE SIDE.

husband in the ordinary way of business and living, I cannot sce that any thing remains for her any more than for her husband or her husband's heirs.

These being my views I need hardly discuss at length any more of Mr. Sawhney's precedents. I will, however merely state that in Jamna v. Machul Sahu ('), the husband had made a gift of his whole estate to his nephew, and of course the widow's rights were held not destroyed; that in Natchi ramal v. Gopala Krishna (2) a sale for a family debt was held sufficient to protect property sold in satisfaction of that debt from widow's claim to maintenance, that Raman dan v. Rangammal (*), distinguishing Venkatammal v. Andyappa (*), lays it down that where the debt was a just family debt, the widow's right of residence in the house sold for that debt is not recognised; that in Manilal v. Baitara (°), the test in such cases was stated to be whether the mortgage was for the benefit of the family or was in any way in fraud of the widow's rights; that in Mussummat Karam Kaur v. Mussammat Kishen Devi (), the debt was a just family debt and apparently another house was available for the widow, who therefore was hold not entitled to claim residence in the ancestral house even from a purchaser with notice of her claim. The other cases I need not mention at all.

My view, then is that this appeal must fail. I would dismiss it with costs.

No. 37.

Appeal dismissed.

{

Before Mr. Justice Robertson and

Mr. Justice Lal Chand.

DEVI DIAL AND OTHERS,-(PLAINTIFFS),-APPELLANTS,

Versus

UTAM DEVI AND ANOTHER,-(DEFENDANTS),

RESPONDENTS.

Civil Appeal No. 150 of 1905.

Res judicata-Alination by widow-Suit by reversioner to have such alienation declared null and void-Compromise of such suit between the widow in possession and the reversioner -Subsequen' sui' by the son of such reversioner-Estoppel.

Where a person entitled to object to an alienation made by a widow brought a suit to have such alienation declared null and void and ultimately

entered into a compromise in good faith with the widow, held that he
and his successors in title were bound by it and that a similar suit by the
son of such reversioner was barred by the rale of res judicata,

First appeal from the decree of Lala Kidar Nath, District
Judge, Jhang, dated 10th November 1904.

Sukh Dial, for appellants.

Ishwar Das, for respondents.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

ROBERTSON, J.-The facts of this case are as follows:- 7th Decr. 1906. The plaintiffs sue for a declaration that the transfer of certain lands, houses and date groves by Mussammat Uttam Devi, defendant No. 1, in favour of Bhoja Ram, defendant No 2, who is her and her husband's daughter's son shall not affect their reversionary rights after the death of Mussammat Uttam Devi.

The defendants pleas are that on 7th June 1873 the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title brought a suit for a declaration of a similar nature, that this suit was settled by a compromise under which the then plaintiffs got immediate possession of certain property which they have enjoyed for more than thirty years and to which otherwise they would have had no claim until the death of Mussammat Uttam Devi, and gave up all claim in present or in fature as regards the balance of the property. The defendants plead in virtue of these facts that the plaintiff's suit is barred as res judicata.

The parties who brought the suit in 1873 were in fact Ram Jas, father of plaintiffs Nos. 1, 2, 3, and the plaintiffs Nos. 4 and 5 themselves, by Ram Jas, their next friend, Ram Jas being their full uncle.

When plaintiffs Nos. 4 and 5 came of age they never attempted to repudiate the compromise or to restore to the status quo ante, on the contrary they proceeded to deal with the property acquired in virtue of the compromise only as their own and to alienate it, and they are, it is urged, clearly estopped from trying to set the compromise aside now.

The plaint of the 1873 case has been destroyed, but it is clear that, the parties being Brahmans, there was a conflict of interest between the plaintiffs and Bhoja Ram, the daughter's son of the deceased Ram Narain whose property was in dispute, and of Uttam Devi, his widow. The plaintiffs brought amit, they and the widow at that time represented the

whole estate, and they in good faith entered into a compromise which may have been exceedingly beneficial to them. Upon no principle of equity could they he allowed to back out of it without disgorging the proceeds of the property which they have enjoyed for over thirty years. If they seek justice they must do it, and first make restitution, which they do not in any way propose to do.

The learned pleader for the appellants addressed us at very great length, but his two principal arguments appeared to be, first that all the recorded decisions which are dead against the highly inequitable doctrine set forward, deal with compromises, regarding specific acts of alienation, and secondly, that the reversioners in 1873 were not competent to "improve" the widow's estate, and to make it, as regards some part of the estate into an absolute one instead of the ordinary widow's estate for life. Neither of these propositions appears to us to carry any weight. The same principles apply whether the alienation is one of a part or of the whole estate, and here it is clear that in 1873 the whole estate was concerned and that some cause of action had actually arisen. The plaintiffs themselves insisted that the order of the court should be under Section 98 of the Act then in force, Act VIII of 1859, and the judgment recites the terms of the settlement. It is clear, therefore, that the decision is evidence of the compromise and did not require registration. The point that the document required registration indeed was not strongly pressed in the appeal.

In 1873 the whole of the reversioners then having any apparent rights sued and entered into a compromise in bonâ files. They and their successors in title are clearly bound by their action; such action can only be attacked by a more remote or subsequent reversioner on the ground of mala fides. The principle that in respect of ancestral land, successio n is a right derived from the common ancestor who first acquired the land, is not one which interferes with the ordinary application of the principles of res judicata, limitation and the like. If it were so held the result would be monstrously inequitable, and there would never be any finality in regard to such cases as that now before us.

In Labh Singh v. Gopi and others (1), the learned Judges say: "The person in enjoyment of property, or entitled to

(115 P. R., 1903,

46

"the right to object to the alienation, must be allowed a certain latitude of judgment as to the mode in which the "property or the right should be protected when invaded or put "iu jeopardy by others, and in our opinion his successors and "descendants must be held to be bound by the action so taken "by him." It would be intolerable and would put an end to all "finality in proceedings in a court of justice if it were otherwise. In Buta v. Khuda Bakhsh and others (1), the learned Judges say:

"It appears to us that the right of the present plaintiff "to sue depends entirely upon the question whether his father's "action was taken bond fide for the protection of the estate......" and finding that the father's action had been bond fides they held the son to be bound by a compromise which his father had entered into.

With these views we entirely concur, holding them to be the only possible principles upon which justice can be administered in fairness and equity. As regards the second point we may simply add that it is quite immaterial whether the compromise did or did not have the effect of improving the widow's estate as regards the property left to her. The plaintiffs are bound by the compromise whatever its effect in that respect. The compromise is a complete answer to

the claim.

The present claim appears to us to be particularly inequit able, not to say impudent. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Suit by a reversioner for possession of immovable property-Defendant in possession under an alleged adoption-Limitation Act, 1877, Article 118Starting point of limitation.

Held, that Article 118 applies to every suit filed for whatever purpose where the validity or invalidity of an adoption comes into question, aud

(1) 97 P. R., 1906.

APPELLATE SIDE.