It has been decided in Grey v. Diwan Lachman Das (1), that an advocate cannot sue for his fee and in Thakar Das v. Beechey, it has been laid down that a "back fee" is part and parcel of the ordinary fee, and that a client cannot sue to recover a back fee" from an advocate with whom he has deposited it. It therefore appears that as regards barristers-at-law, the position is the same as in England, vide Ross Alston v. Pitambar Das (2), and the principles laid down in Morris v. Hunt (3) make it perfectly clear that in their case it is certainly not permissible to stipulate beforehand for a fee which is in any way dependent on the results of the litigation. As Mr. Grey, the President of the Bar Association, who was kind enough to assist the Bench by arguing the question pointed out as regards barristers there can be no question at all that the practice must be entirely condemned. This view is also supported by ample authority. As regarda pleaders the case is possibly somewhat different, and it becomes necessary before considering the question in reference to the authorities as they stand at the present day to examine the decision passed in Beechey v. Faiz Muhammad (*) and to consider the correctness or otherwise of its reasoning. In that case one Beechey, a pleader, had made an agreement with a client under which he was to receive Rs. 150 down, and Rs. 200 in case of the recovery of certain stolen property which was the subject of litigation. It was laid down in that ruling that the office of pleader was one created by the legislature and that his rights and duties are to be regulated by the enactment governing pleaders. It was then pointed out that a pleader had full freedom of contract in regard to his agreements with his clients subject only to the provisions of the general law, and that such an agree ment could only be held to be void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, if the consideration or object was one of those declared in that section not to be lawful. The question is thus stated on page 42. "Thas the question is reduced to whether "such an agreement is void because its consideration "object ought in the Court's opinion to be regarded "opposed to public policy. In other words it is opposed to "public policy that a client should agree with his pleader that "the former shall pay to the latter an additional fee in the or as "event of the pleader conducting the client's case by lawful 66 means to a successful issue lawful in itself. "If this is opposed to public policy it must be for reasons "connected either with the time for payment, or the fact of 66 success or the character of the event which is deemed to con"stitute success." Now everything which has been written by so learned a Judge as Sir Meredyth Plowden must command our respect, but I find it necessary to point out that in my humble judg ment the reason why we must hold that such a contract as that under discussion is illegal and void as contrary to public policy lies a little deeper. To this I will return presently: The judgment there goes on to say that as regards the client the practice can only produce good effects and the origin of the custom is said to have been the distrust of the Punjab litigants of the legal practitioners. Are we to hold that the legal profession have done nothing in the 28 years since 1878 to mitigate this distrust? But there can be no doubt that if this was one reason another was that it made it possible for counsel to get higher fees. A money-lender is always chary of lending money to a person about to litigate without good security, but he is always prepared to deposit a much larger sum than he would otherwise lend with the legal practitioner upon his assurance that it will be returned if the litigation is not brought to a successful issue. After admitting that the question was one in regard to which there was much doubt the conclusion finally come to was "the rule then that I am prepared to "assent to is merely a negative rule, namely that an agreement "between pleader and client regarding the remuneration of the "former for his professional services is not void as opposed "to public policy, merely because it contains a stipulation that "the pleader is to be paid an additional sum by the client on condition of his conducting the case to a successful issue. "Such an agreement I would hold to be prima facie "lawful, subject to the qualification that the bargain is a "fair one, and not such as it would be inequitable to enforce, "that is (to borrow the words of the Privy Council) not, "extortionate and unconscionable "; that it is not of a "gambling "or speculative character; that it is not open to any such objection as would invalidate the agreement if made by a private person supplying funds to maintain the litigation, "that is tending to promote unrighteous litigation; and, lastly, "that the particular issue or event on which the right to the "future payment is contingent, is not of such a nature that it 66 "would be improper to permit the pleader to have a pecuniary "interest in bringing that event about. "I think it would be found after experience of the general "rule, subject to these qualifications, that they are sufficient to "guard against the abuse of a practice which it seems to me "inexpedient to attempt to wholly suppress. If experience "shows they are not, further qualifications can be added such as occasion may demand." In the first place it would appear impossible to say that such contracts are not of "a gambling and speculative nature." Surely a contract to receive one-sixth down and five-sixths only on success is a contract of a gambling and speculative nature, and all such contracts are of their very nature "speculative," and would appear to come within the purview of Section 30 of the Contract Act. It appears to me that a good deal of the reasoning of this judgment is fallacious and unsound, and that the conclusions have not been borne out by subsequent experi ence. The main reason why in my judgment a contract between a client and a pleader under which the latter's remuneration is made in any way dependent on success must be held to be contrary to public policy, is that, such a contract places a direct temptation before and an incentive to the pleader to act improperly in the conduct of the case. It is notorious that the morality of many suitors in this Province at least permits them to bolster up a true claim with false evidence. Are we to suppose that such clients are usually particularly anxious that the pleader shall bring his case "by lawful means to a successful issue lawful in itself." Surely it is quite obvious that the prospects of securing a remuneration far in excess as the "back fee" often is of the ordinary fee must be a temptation to all legal practitioners, and it is a temptation to which they ought not to be subject. There may be few of whom it can be directly predicated that they will knowingly resort to fraudulent practices to secure the "back fee," but there are many upon whom it must have a subtle influence in the direction of disingenuousness, the suggestio falsi and the suppressio veri, and there are few upon whom the temptation will not be a burden though many may be able to resist it. For it must be remembered that the "back fee " is a gamble upon the result pure and simple. Under such a contract the exertions of the counsel count for nothing. He may make most strenuous and able efforts for a successful issue, but all this will avail him nothing to increase his ordinary fee unless his efforts are crowned with success, and there are many cases in which a pleader entering into such a contract must be perfectly aware that he has no right to success. It is not necessary in order to declare a class of contracts contrary to public policy to be able to aver that in all cases such contracts must have mischievous results, it is quite sufficient to be obliged to conclude that the contract in question is one which is to all ordinary human beings a direct temptation and incentive to practices which are clearly injurious to the public and detrimental to the administration of justice. And it must never be lost sight of that this is not a question concerning only a small and peculiar class, for it is stated that one in every 30 of the inhabitants of the Punjab is annually affected by litigation. It is clearly, therefore, a matter of pressing public interest to the whole Province. And I would remark that it appears to me that there is no analogy between the case decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council in regard to champerty and maintenance on which stress is laid in Beechey v. Faiz Muhammad (1) and the matter now before us. I will now proceed to consider the authorities on the question particularly those of date subsequent to 1878. Beechey v. Fais Muhammad (') itself over-ruled a judgment of this Court in Beechey v. Gholam Ghous (*), in which the view had been taken that such contracts were contrary to public policy. In the case quoted in Beechey v. Faiz Muhammad (1), Ranee Usmut Koowar v. Mr. W. Tayler (3), the defence was never set up that the contract in question was contrary to public policy and the matter was never discussed. It is difficult to see how that case can have any bearing on the matter. The same appears to be the case in regard to the judgment in the case of Shiv Ram Hari v. Arjun and others (4), and in the case of Parshram Vaman v. Hiraman Fatu and others (3), a different point only was decided, a remand made and all other points, including presumably the legality of the contract, were referred back to a lower Court. These appear to be the only cases in which any mention occurs of such a contract without strong condemnation of it. As regards the English rule for barristers it is clearly laid down in Morris v. Hunt (1), noticed above, and as regards solicitors in regard to contentions business an agreement to remunerate a solicitor by a share of or commission in or a sum proportioned to the amount of the property is bad. See Cordery's "Law of Solicitio rs," p. 273, 3rd edition. These rules are embodied in Section 11 of the Solicitors' Remuneration Act of 1870. In Achamparambath Cheria Kunhammu v. William Sydenham Gantz (*), it was laid down by the Madras High Court that even as regards pleader's contracts for professional remuneration contingent as to the amount on the success or otherwise of the suit could not be enforced, under the circular orders of the Sadar Adalat. In the case of In the matter of an advocate of the Calcutta High Court (8), it was laid down by a Full Bench of five Judges that it was "improper for an advocate or pleader to stipulate "with his client to share in the result of a litigation, and that "in this case a warning and censure would be sufficient, but "it should be distinctly understood that should a case of a "similar nature be brought to the attention of the Court in "future it will be most severely dealt with. It is hardly necessary to point out that any pleader who takes an additional sum after bringing litigation to a successful issue clearly shares in the result of such litigation where the claim is one to realizable property, and that precisely the same principles apply where the object aimed at is something different. A Bench of two Judges of the High Court of Calcutta " In the matter of Moung Htoon Oung (4), an advocate of the Recorders Court at Rangoon "expressed similar views. In that case decided in 1883 or 1884 it appears that the advocate had contracted with his client to share in the money recovered by litigation, and the Judges remark, inter alia, "of the "impropriety of such a practice there can be no doubt. If "allowed it may produce various mischiefs and though there "may possibly be cases. in which an advocate from the "circumstances of the plaintiffs might be allowed to make some arrangement of that kind, they are so few and so easily "confounded with cases in which he ought not to do any thing of "the kind, that it is not fit or proper for the Courts to allow a "transaction of such a nature to be entered into by advocates (1) 1 Chit. 544. (3) I. L. R., III Mad., 138, F. B. (*) 4 Calc. W. N., Civ., F. B, |