"followed by a long course of decisions, the greater part of "which will be found noticed in the very able notes of Mr. Smith "to the case of the Duchess of Kingston." Gobind Chunder Koondoo v. Taruck Chander Bose (1), in which it was said, "We have therefore to see whether the right "and title which is the subject of claim in this suit was not "the very same right and title which was in issue between the same parties, and determined in the former suit. When once "it is made clear that the self-same right and title was substantially in issue in both suits, the precise form in which the "suit was brought, or the fact that the plaintiff in the one case 66 was the defendant in the other, becomes immaterial." Lachman Singh v. Mohan (2), in which a majority of a Full Bench held that certain defendants could appeal from a decree which merely dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for possession as it at present stands," an issue as to the defendants' title having been decided against them in the body of the judgment, in which it was held that they were entitled to possession as tenants under an unexpired lease. Dwarka Das v. Kameshar Prasad (3), in which it was held that, where a claimant-objector makes the judgment-debtor a defendant to his suit under Section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and does not limit his claim, he claims both in form and substance against the judgmentdebtor a declaration of his title to the whole of the property, the title to which is in issue in the suit: that a decree in such suit, declaring the liability or non-liability of the property to attachinent and sale in execution of the creditor's decree, must necessarily, unless the suit be decided on a ground not involving the question of title, decide and determine all questions of title on which the parties to the suit could rely, and that such decision would operate in any future suit between the parties as res judicata on those questions of title, though such subsequent suit might relate to property not in question in the suit under Section 283, provided the second suit is within the jurisdiction of the Court which decided the first suit. Jamna Das v. Udey Ram (*), in which it was held that, where plaintiffs as second assignees of a debt, sued for recovery of the debt and impleaded their assignors, the original debtors and certain persons whom they alleged to have been prior assignees of the debt, but to have lost the benefit of their assignment through non-fulfilment of the conditions on which it was made, and the Court gave the plaintiffs a decree against the original debtors, the first assignees could appeal, inasmuch as the decree, though not against them by name, necessarily implied a finding that the assignment to them, upon the basis of which they resisted the plaintiffs' claim, had became void. Rai Charan Ghose v. Kumud Mohun Dutt Chowdhry (1), in which it was held that an appellate judgment in a suit operated as res-judicata, although no second appeal to the High Court lay in that suit and a second appeal would have lain in the second suit, Section 13 of the Code, containing nothing to indicate that the judgments in the two suits must be open to appeal in the same way, in order that the decision on any issue in the earlier, can bar the trial of the same issue in the later suit. Phugwanbutti Chaudhrani v. Forbes (*), in which it was held that the course of appeal does not affect the question of res-judicata. Ananta Balacharya v. Damodhar Makund (8), in which it was held that, where the decree depends on an issue, the finding on that issue effects res-judicata, although the finding does not appear upou the face of the decree. Wasdeo v. Rup Chand (*) in which it was held that, inasmuch as a decree for partition is a joint declaration of the rights of all the co-sharers interested in the property of which partition is sought, each co-sharer is entitled to obtain possession of the sl are allotted to him under the decree, whether he be plaintiff or defendant. Ghesa v. Ranjit (*), in which it was held, by a Full Bench, that, when a common question, such as the tenure of a village Community arises between the members of a community and one of such members sues the rest, the determination of such common question will not bind the whole of the defendants as res-judicata, so as to bar the question being raised among themselves in a subsequent suit, unless they have been distinctly at issue on the point in the suit, and acting as opposite parties and the order made is ne affecting the rights of the defendants among themselves. Nihal Singh v. Chanda Singh ("), in which it was held that, where there is a conflict of interest between defendants inter se, an adjudication of rights may be res-Judicata between them as well as between the plaintiff and the defendants. 66 V. Was deo v. Rup Chand (1), in which it was held that, as a decree for partition is a joint declaration of the rights of all the co-sharers interested in the property of which partition is sought each co-sharer is entitled to obtain possession of the share alloted to him under the decree, whether he may be a plaintiff or Nabbee defendant. Sheikh Khoor shed Hossein a Fatima (2), in which it was said "we are of opinion that 8 decree for partition is not like a decree for money or for "the delivery of specific property, which is only in favour "of the plaintiff in the suit. It is a joint declaration of the rights of persons interested in the property of which parti"tion is sought, and, having been so made it is unnecessary "for these persons who are defendants in the suit to come "forward and institute a new suit to have the same rights "declared under a second order made. It must be taken "that a decree in such suits is a decree, when properly drawn "up, in favour of each share-holder, or set of share-holders, 'having a distinct share." 66 66 Busoun Lal Shookul versus Chundee Dass (3), in which it was held that, where A had brought a fait against B for arears of rent and B admitted the sum claimed, but contended that the rent was due for a larger area of land than that specified in the plaint, and an issue was framed on such contention and decided against. B, a subsequent sait by B to have it declared that a sum of money equal in amount to the sum paid on admission in the former suit, comprised the rent due on all the lands held by him under A, was barred, being res-judicata. Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secretary of State for Indiu in Council (*), in which it was held that, to apply the law of estoppel by judgment under Section 13, Act XIV of 1882, it must be seen what has been directly and substantially in issue in the suit, and whether that has been heard and finally decided, and that, for this purpose, the judgment must be looked at, the decree being usually insufficient for the purpose inasmuch as, according to the Code, it only states the relief granted if any, or other disposal of the suit, without the ground of decision and without affording information as to what may have been in issue and decided. Phundo v. Jangi Nath (1), and other authorities for the established rule that where a Judicial decision, pleaded as constituting res-judicata in all respects fulfils the requirements of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it has become final, it is immaterial whether it is or is not sound law. In my view of the law and the facts it is unnecessary to consider the authorities above cited on the question whether the right of appeal or the course of appeal affects the question of res-judicata. The case for the plaintiff in the previous suit was that the award bound all or some of the defendants. The property in suit was in possession of the male defendants. The female defendants were impleaded because they were alleged to be bound by the award, and because they would be necessary parties on the issues which would arise in the event of the award not binding the male defendants. If the award bound the latter the issue as to custom or Muhan na. dan law did not arise; inasmuch as the male parties to the suit could not re-open issues which had been concluded by the award, and the award bad adjudicated on their respective rights in the estate. All that the Court below had therefore to do in the previous suit was to pass a decrce against the male defendants in the terms of the award, on the finding that it bound them, and the decision on the question of status with reference to Muhammadan law or custom was ultra vires, inasmuch as that issue did not arise: Mussammat Indra Bai v. Gadu Dhar (2), and Mula v. Gandu (3). Of the authorities cited above for the defendant-respondents, the case of Krishna Roy v. Bunuari Lall Roy (4) does not help them, inasmuch as the rule laid down therein applics only to cases in which the issue tried was material and arose on the pleadings. The substance of the suit was to establish the award and obtain a decree in the terms thereof against those bound ly it, and the other issues would arise only on a finding that the award did not bind the defendants in possession of the property. Gobind Chunder Koondco v. Tarvck Chunder Bose (5), is inapplicable because the question substantially in issue previously was whether the males in possession were bound by the award. (3) 92 P. R., 1962, F. B. (') 1. L. R., 15 All., 327. REVISION SIDE. Shib Charan Lal v. Ragu Nath (1), is inapplicable because the parties to the award could not go behind its terms, if binding on them. Wasdeo v. Rup Chand (2), is inapplicable because the question of the rights of the females did not arise on the finding that the award bound the males, and the same may be said of Ghisa v. Ranjit (3), Nihal Singh v. Chanda Singh (*), Sheikh Khoorshed Hossein v. Nabbee Fatima (5), and Kali Krishna Tajone v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (®). For these reasons I concur with my brother Chatterji in holding that the subsequent suits were not barred by Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in decreeing the appeals and setting aside the decrees below, and in remanding the suits under Section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure for decision in accordance with law. Court fees on the memoranda of appeal will be refunded and costs will be costs in the cause. No question as to property not dealt with by the award was argued before me. No. 58. Appeal allowed. Before Mr. Justice Rattigan. GHULAM MUHAMMAD,-(PLAINTIFF),-PETITIONER, Versus JANGBAZ AND THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OF Municipal Committee-Discretion of, to take action under Section 120 ESuit by person aggrieved for injunction-Jurisdiction of Civil Court to restrain action of Municipality- Punjab Municipal Act, 1891, Section 120 E. Although under the powers given by the Legislature a local body may act perfectly bond fide and intru vires in issuing a certain order, still if that order injuriously affects the rights of any person the latter can undoubtedly appeal to the Civil Courts for protection and to that protection he will be entitled if he can prove that the order in question was made wantonly or without any reasonable justification. Therefore, where a Municipal Committee, at the instance of a discontented neighbour, issued a notice under Section 120 E of Act XX of [1891, directing the plaintiff to close his old drain and to make a new one |