322

DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.

which he enjoys. If he gets tax immunity, it means that other citizens must pay his share.

The Court does not profess to go so far. It merely says that this case turns on changing military assignments and the burden placed on service men and women as a result of that feature of their work. But we also know that service men and women receive salaries much lower than those earned in civilian life. Can Congress remove those salaries from the reach of state taxing officials because they are burdensome to our military personnel? Certainly the burden, the harassment, the unpleasantness of those taxes would be as easy to establish as the burden of the present tax. And the relation of the burden to the federal service would be as close and intimate in one case as in the other.

The private affairs of our military personnel-the disposition of their salary, the furniture they purchase, the apartments they rent, the personal contracts that they make-by the very definition are not in the federal public domain. When Congress undertakes to protect them from state taxation or regulation, it is not acting to protect either a federal instrumentality or any function which a federal agency performs. Congress, therefore, acts without constitutional authority.

In sum, the power to tax is basic to the sovereignty of the states. The creation of islands of tax immunity should therefore be sparingly made. The tax immunity here recognized is not contained in the Constitution. It cannot be fairly implied because Denver's tax does not burden the performance of any federal function.

FORD MOTOR CO. v. HUFFMAN ET AL.

NO. 193. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

Argued December 18-19, 1952.-Decided April 6, 1953.

1. A collective-bargaining agreement whereby an employer, in determining relative seniority of employment among its employees, gives them credit for pre-employment military service, as well as the credit for post-employment military service required by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, is valid-although it works to the disadvantage of other employees, including those who were employed prior to their military service. Pp. 331-336. 2. By accepting such a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement, a union does not exceed its authority as a certified collectivebargaining representative under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Pp. 336–343.

195 F.2d 170, reversed.

The District Court dismissed a class suit for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief brought by an employee to invalidate a seniority clause in a collective-bargaining agreement between his union and his employer. The Court of Appeals reversed. 195 F. 2d 170. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 814. Reversed and remanded, p. 343.

William T. Gossett argued the cause for petitioner in No. 193. With him on the brief were L. Homer Surbeck and Richard W. Hogue, Jr.

Harold A. Cranefield argued the cause for petitioner in No. 194. With him on the brief were Lowell Goerlich and Sol Goodman.

*Together with No. 194, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, v. Huffman et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

330

Opinion of the Court.

Herbert H. Monsky argued the cause for respondents. With him on a brief was Samuel M. Rosenstein for Huffman, respondent.

Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Cummings, George J. Bott, David P. Findling and Mozart G. Ratner for the National Labor Relations Board; and by Nicholas Kelley, Francis S. Bensel and Hancock Griffin, Jr. for the Chrysler Corporation, in Nos. 193 and 194; and by Arthur J. Goldberg for the Congress of Industrial Organizations in No. 194.

MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In these cases we sustain the validity of collectivebargaining agreements whereby an employer, in determining relative seniority of employment among its employees, gives them credit for pre-employment military service as well as the credit required by statute for post-employment military service.1

These proceedings were begun in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky by respondent Huffman, acting individually and on behalf of a class of about 275 fellow employees of the Ford Motor Company, petitioner in Case No. 193 (here called Ford). His complaint is that his position, and that of each member of his class, has been lowered on the seniority roster at Ford's Louisville works, because of certain provisions in collective-bargaining agreements between Ford and the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, petitioner in Case No. 194 (here called International). He contends that those provisions have

1 Where the context permits, "military service" in this opinion includes service in the land or naval forces or Merchant Marine of the United States or its allies.

3

violated his rights, and those of each member of his class, under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended. He contends also that International's acceptance of those provisions exceeded its authority as a collective-bargaining representative under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. He asks, accordingly, that the provisions be declared invalid insofar as they prejudice the seniority rights of members of his class, and that appropriate injunctive relief be granted against Ford and International. After answer, both sides asked for summary judgment."

The District Court dismissed the action without opinion but said in its order that it was "of the opinion that the collective bargaining agreement expresses an honest desire for the protection of the interests of all members of the union and is not a device of hostility to veterans. The Court finds that said collective bargaining agreement

254 Stat. 890, 56 Stat. 724, 58 Stat. 798, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308.

349 Stat. 452, 61 Stat. 140, 65 Stat. 601, 2 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 157-159.

In No. 194, International also questions the jurisdiction of the District Court. International recognizes that one issue in the case is whether it engaged in an unfair labor practice when it agreed to the allowance of credit for pre-employment military service in computations of employment seniority. It then argues that the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 160 (a), vests the initial jurisdiction over such an issue exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board. This question was not argued in the Court of Appeals nor mentioned in its opinion and, in view of our position on the merits, it is not discussed here. Our decision interprets the statutory authority of a collectivebargaining representative to have such breadth that it removes all ground for a substantial charge that International, by exceeding its authority, committed an unfair labor practice. As to a somewhat comparable question considered in connection with the Railway Labor Act, see Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U. S. 210; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 204–207.

330

Opinion of the Court.

sets up a seniority system which the Court deems not to be arbitrary, discriminatory or in any respect unlawful." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, one judge dissenting. 195 F. 2d 170. Ford and International filed separate petitions for certiorari seeking to review the same decision of the Court of Appeals. We granted both because of the widespread use of contractual provisions comparable to those before us, and because of the general importance of the issue in relation to collective bargaining. 344 U. S. 814.

The pleadings state that Huffman entered the employ of Ford September 23, 1943, was inducted into military service November 18, 1944, was discharged July 1, 1946, and, within 30 days, was reemployed by Ford with seniority dating from September 23, 1943, as provided by statute. It does not appear whether the other members of his class are veterans but, like him, all have seniority computed from their respective dates of employment by Ford.

The pleadings allege further that Huffman and the members of his class all have been laid off or furloughed from their respective employments at times and for

5 "SEC. 8. . . .

"(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate [of satisfactory completion of his period of training and service], (2) is still qualified to perform the duties of such position, and (3) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after he is relieved from such training and service . . .

"(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such employer shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; ...." 54 Stat. 890, 58 Stat. 798, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308 (b) (B).