am going to speak of that very opposite character, the SCEPTICAL FREE-THINKER.

Dubious as he is (or as he endeavours to make himself) of every thing both prior and posterior to his own existence, he thinks it the wisest thing he can do, to bound all his views within the period of that existence :' and having examined into the visible face of Nature, though he cannot conclude himself placed in a system of complete felicity and perfection, yet, as the portion of good in it seems superior to the portion of evil, he concludes it to be the production, either of some fortunate concourse of atoms, or else of some benevolent being, who meant him to be as happy in it as the general system would allow; in consequence of this, his principal rule of conduct is to do whatever may promote his present happiness; and therefore he uses indiscriminately whatever object he can meet with, which his reason, but more frequently his passions, persuade him is conducive to that end. If he fortunately happens to have so much constitutional coolness, as not to hurry him into pleasures, which tend immediately to weaken his rational, or impair his sensitive faculties, his situation is for some time not unflattering:* yet Satiety too soon commences: Invention

* We have seen a recent instance of this in the life and character of the late Mr. David Hume, whose ruling passion, if we may trust his own Memoirs, seems to have been a love, I will not say of fame, but of literary celebrity; which appears to have been

is called in to remove it: but, as Invention cannot long supply new amusements without borrowing aid from Luxury, that aid is quickly demanded; and Luxury, having led her deluded follower through all the wilds of vanity and of folly, leaves him at length to himself, to drag out the remainder of a dissipated life, goaded by the stings of a guilty conscience, or at best burning with a fever of unsatisfied desires.

How different, how contradictory are these two characters ? The Bigot foolishly imagines that all the variety of beauties and blessings which God has scattered through the material universe, are so many snares which Satan makes use of to trepan his soul into the pit of destruction: the Inddel as foolishly persuades himself that these are the only blessings and beauties that he was formed capable of enjoying. One refuses to taste the wholesomest draught of pleasure, as if tinged with the deadliest poison; the other snatches her intoxicating cup, and dricks of it even to its foulest dregs. In a word, the former deems the world his prison; the latter, his Paradise.

There needs little stgument, 1 imagine, to convince us

se very strong in him, that de could even find gratification for his vanity, in the annhause which French women of quality gave te his molant veoa: talonk. This passieh,, probahịị, điề much tevazi prevening him from talling me say at the grosser

that the principles which lead to both these extremes in conduct, are fallacious. Let us see then if we cannot, by the assistance of the text, discover a rule that may lead us to the rational medium.

But here I am well aware that the context does not permit me to take the words in the light of an inspired precept; for they are delivered only in an answer to certain questions proposed to St. Paul by the Corinthians, which answer seems to refer, in the way of prophetical forecast, to the approaching persecution under Nero.* Yet, though delivered by St. Paul, in his own person, "and not by commandment of the Lord," we may certainly infer from them a permission to use the world, proIvided we observe the restriction of not abusing it; and this consistently with the whole tenor of Revelation, which, teaching us that we are placed in the world as in a state of probation, necessarily implies that we ought to use it, and take a regular trial in it; otherwise we do all in our power to prevent it from being such a state, (a consideration, which at once confutes all the doctrines of monastic seclusion). But we find that the Apostle cautions us to be very circumspect and prudent in the use of it, because human events are in such perpetual fluctuation; our stay here so very precarious; and our entrance upon another world so near and so certain.

* See Mr. Locke's Comment on the place.

All which, I suppose, St. Paul means when he urges the reason in these terms, "because the fashion of this world passeth away:" For if by this expression he only meant, that its final dissolution would speedily be accomplished, and left us to infer that all our powers of perception would be dissolved with it, it might seem of little consequence whether we abused the world or no. The generality of mankind would certainly range even to the utmost boundaries of sensuality, and think themselves justified by reason in so doing; "let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," would then be the fundamental rule in every rational system of ethics.

But as this sense of the words is repugnant to the express doctrines of Him, who brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel, we must conclude the Apostle's meaning to be, that the uncertainty of our duration here, and the assured belief of a future state of rewards and punishments hereafter, are the only reasons to induce us to keep a strict watch over ourselves in this important point; important indeed only as it refers to that future state, yet on that account surely of the last importance.

Let this consideration therefore prompt us to make such a liberal, many, and rational use of the world, that it may serve all the great and generous purposes (and many they are) to which virtue and religion can adapt

it: let us use it as persons who have a right and property in the good things which it contains: yet let us so use it as not to diminish the sum of happiness we find in it but by every social and charitable art endeavour to increase the proportion. Let us look upon it with a complacency and satisfaction similar to that of its high Creator when he formed it, and though, since that original formation, it may have lost much of its real perfection, yet we shall still see that it is good. Good for exercising our rational faculties, and for improving them; good for calling forth all the latent virtues in our bosoms, and for increasing them. Its past history will furnish us with numerous examples worthy our imitation: its present condition will afford us many occasions to exhibit those examples in our practice. The successes we may meet with in it, may give us ample scope for manifesting our gratitude to that God from whom they were derived. The calamities which may befall us, will give us room to exercise the no less meritorious talents of resignation and patience. Nay, the very vices and temptations with which it abounds may, in avoiding them, employ our prudence, and in opposing them, exercise our fortitude.

For purposes great and beneficial as these, may the rational Christian use the world; and to such purposes he who uses it may rest assured that when the fashion of this world passeth away, the fashion of another and a better shall commence, which shall not pass away;