right to exclude aliens, either absolutely or upon conditions, in war or in peace, was an inherent right of every sovereign nation.5 Admitting that it was competent for Congress to prevent aliens from coming to the United States and to provide for the deportation of those who were unlawfully within its territory, and to submit the enforcement of the laws enacted for that purpose to executive officers, a question arose as to the constitutionality of a section of a subsequent act declaring that "any such Chinese person or person of Chinese descent convicted and adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a period not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from the United States." The contention was made that this section authorized the infliction of an infamous punishment, and, therefore, was in conflict with the fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution declaring that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district in which the crime shall have been committed. The court said that it thought it clear "that detention or temporary confinement as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character and while arrangements were being made for their deportation. Detention is a usual feature of every case of arrest in a criminal charge, even when an innocent person is wrongfully accused; but it is not imprisonment in a legal sense. So, too, we think it would be plainly competent for Congress to declare the act of an alien in remaining unlawfully within the United States to be an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment, if such offense were to be established by a judicial trial." The court said, however, that the evident intention of the section was that the detention provided for was imprisonment at hard labor to be suffered before the sentence of deportation should be effectuated, and that such imprisonment was to be adjudged upon a summary hearing. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016, 37 L. ed. 905. 6 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 977, 41 L. ed. 140. § 197. Judicial trial necessary. The court adverted to its previous decisions to the effect that the United States, as a matter of public policy, might forbid the coming of aliens or expel those within its territory, and might devolve the power and duty of identifying and arresting such persons and procuring their deportation upon subordinate officials. "But," said Mr. Justice Shiras, delivering the opinion of the court, "when Congress sees fit to further promote such a poliey by subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, we think such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused. No limits can be put by the courts upon the power of Congress to protect, by summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel such if they have already found their way into our land and unlawfully remain therein. But to declare unlawful residence within the country to be an infamous crime, punishable by deprivation of liberty and property, would be to pass out of the sphere of constitutional legislation, unless provision were made that the fact of guilt should first be established by a judicial trial. It is not consistent with the theory of our government that the legislature should, after having defined an offense as an infamous crime, find the fact of guilt and adjudge the punishment by one of its own agents. 997 § 198. Employment of Chinese by corporation.-The Constitution of California adopted in 1879 contains the following clause: "No corporation now existing, or hereafter formed under the laws of this State, shall, after the adoption of this Constitution, employ, directly or indirectly, in any capacity, any Chinese or Mongolian. The legislature shall pass such laws as may be necessary to enforce this provision."'8 In pursuance of this constitutional provision an act was passed by the legislature of California declaring that any officer of a corporation who should employ "in any manner, or capacity, upon any work or business of such corporation, any Chinese or Mongolian is guilty Wong Wo v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 977, 41 L. ed. 140. That an order of deportation may be made without a jury trial, see In re Tsu Tse Mee, 81 Fed. 565. Cal. Const. 1879, art. XIX, sec. 2. of a misdemeanor," punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. An officer of a corporation convicted and imprisoned for a violation of this act obtained a writ of habeas corpus from the United States circuit court, alleging that this provision of the Constitution and law passed in pursuance of it were void, because they were in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the civil rights law, and also of the treaty between the United States and China. Upon the latter point the court held that the treaty-making power had been surrendered by the states to the national government, and that the provisions of the treaty made with China in 1868, recognizing the right of the citizens of China to emigrate to the United States for purposes of curiosity, trade and permanent residence, and providing that Chinese subjects residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect to residence and travel as may be enjoyed by the citi zens or subjects of the most favored nations, were within the treaty-making power. It was contended that even if the treaty in terms should apply, the provision was not within the treatymaking power, but Judge Sawyer said that he had no doubt that the provision was within this power, and continued: "As to the point whether the provision in question is within the treatymaking powers, I have as little doubt as upon the point already discussed.10 Among all civilized nations, in modern times at least, the treaty-making power has been accustomed to determine the terms and conditions upon which the subjects of the parties to the treaty shall reside in the respective countries, and the treatymaking power is conferred by the Constitution in unlimited Cal. Pen. Code, secs. 178, 179. 10 In re Tiburcio Parrott, 6 Saw. 349, 1 Fed. 481. Speaking of the right of the Chinese to the equal protection of the laws, Judge Sawyer said: "It would seem that no argument should be required to show that the Chinese do not enjoy the equal benefit of the laws with citizens, or 'the equal protection of the laws,' where the law forbids their laboring, or making and enforcing contracts to labor, in a very large field of labor which is open, without limit, let or hindrance, to all citizens, and all other foreigners, without regard to nation, race or color. Yet in the face of these plain provisions of the national constitution and statutes, we find, both in the constitution and laws of a great state and member of this Union, just such prohibitory provisions and enactments discriminating against the Chinese. Argument and authority, therefore, seem still to be necessary, and fortunately we are terms. Besides, the authorities cited on the first point fully cover and determine this question. If the treaty-making power is authorized to determine what foreigners shall be permitted to come. into and reside within the country, and who shall be excluded, it must have the power generally to determine and prescribe upon what terms and conditions such as are admitted shall be permitted to remain. If it has authority to stipulate that aliens residing in a state may acquire and hold property, and on their death transmit it to alien heirs who do not reside in the state, against the provisions of the laws of the state, otherwise validand so the authorities already cited hold-then it certainly must be competent for the treaty-making power to stipulate that aliens residing in a state in pursuance of the treaty may labor in order that they may live and acquire property that may be so held, enjoyed, and thus transmitted to alien heirs. The former must include the latter-the principal, the incidental power." It was accordingly held that these provisions of the Constitution of California and the statute providing a penalty for their violation were void, because they were in conflict with the treaty.11 not without either. From the citations already made, and from many more that might be made from Justices Field, Bradley, Swayne and other judges, it appears that to deprive a man of the right to select and follow any lawful occupation— that is, to labor or contract to labor, if he so desires and can find employment is to deprive him of both liberty and property, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and the act of Congress. In re Tibureio Parrott, 1 Fed. 481, 6 Saw. 349. "In re Tiburcio Parrott, 6 Saw. 349, 1 Fed. 48. In that case Judge Hoffman, United States District Judge, said: "The end proposed to be attained by this extraordinary article is clearly and even ostentatiously avowed. Its title proclaims that it is directed against the Chinese. It forbids their employment by any but private individuals, and when through the operation of the laws they shall have become, or be liable to become, vagrants, paupers, mendicants, or criminals, the legislature is directed to provide for their removal from the state if they fail to comply with such conditions as it may prescribe for their continued residence. 66 The framers of the article do not seem to have relied upon the efficacy of the provisions imposing such extensive restrictions upon the rights of the prescribed race to labor for their living, to reduce them to the condition of vagrants, paupers, mendicants, or criminals, or persons who 'may become' such. The legislature is directed to impose conditions of residence, and provide for the removal of aliens otherwise dangerous or detrimental to the well-being or peace of the State,' and lest any doubt or hesitation should be felt as § 199. Comments.-While, confessedly, the police power of a state is very broad, and it is impossible to define it, so as to describe and fix its exact limits, yet it is beyond all doubt that an unconstitutional object cannot be accomplished because it is pretended that the statute, seeking to secure this end, was passed in the legitimate exercise of the police power. It is always com to the propriety of including wealthy and respectable Chinese in this class, the fourth section declares 'the presence of foreigners ineligible to become citizens of the United States' (i. e., the Chinese) to be 'dangerous to the well-being of the state.' And the legislature is directed to 'discourage their immigration by all the means within its power.' "Would it be believed possible, if the fact did not sternly confront us, that such legislation as this could be directed against a race whose right freely to emigrate to this country, and reside here with all the privileges, immunities, and exemptions of the most favored nation,' has been recognized and guaranteed by a solemn treaty of the United States, which not only engages the honor of the national government, but is by the very terms of the constitution the supreme law of the land? "The legislature has not yet attempted to carry into effect the mandate of the first section by imposing conditions upon which aliens who are or may become vagrants, paupers, mendicants, or criminals, may reside in the state, or by providing for their removal. Its action thus får had been limited to forbidding the employment of Chinese, directly or indirectly, by any corporation formed under the laws of this state. The validity of this law is the only question presented for determination in the present case. In considering this question we are at liberty to look not merely to the language of the law, but to its effect and purpose. "In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose may be determined by its natural and reasonable effect; and if it is apparent that the object of this statute, as judged by that criterion, is to compel the owners of vessels to pay a sum of money for every passenger brought by them from a foreign shore and landed at the port of New York, it is as much a tax on passengers if collected from them, or a tax on the vessel or owners for the exercise of the right of landing their passengers in that city, as was the statute held void in the passenger cases.' Henderson v. Mayor etc., 92 U. S. 268, 23 L. ed. 543. "If, as we have endeavored to show, in the opinion in the preceding cases, we are at liberty to look to the effect of a statute for the test of its constitutionality, the argument need go no further.' Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 279, 23 L. ed. 550. "If the effect and purpose of the law be to accomplish an unconstitu tional object, the fact that it is passed in the pretended exercise of the police power, or a power to regu late corporations, will not save it. If a law of the state forbidding the Chinese to labor for a living, or requiring them to obtain a license for doing so, would have been plainly in violation of the constitution and treaty, the state cannot attain the |