An objection of a very different nature has sometimes proceeded, unexpectedly, from a very different quarter-the friends of Revelation-who have been known, without due reflection, to contend that by the light of unassisted reason we can know absolutely nothing of God and a Future State. They appear to be alarmed lest the progress of Natural Religion should prove dangerous to the acceptance of Revealed; lest the former should, as it were, be taken as a substitute for the latter. They argue as if the two systems were rivals, and whatever credit the one gained, were so much lost to the other. They seem to think that if any discovery of a First Cause and another world were made by natural reason, it would no longer be true that "life and immortality were brought to light by the gospel." Although these reasoners are neither the most famous advocates of revelation, nor the most enlightened, we yet may do well to show the groundlessness of the alarms which they would excite.

possessed by another science, affords a perpetual | Deity, or who consider the reasons on both sides as source of new interest and fresh enjoyment. This so equally poised that they cannot decide either way. would be true if the science in question were one of an ordinary description. But when we consider what its nature is-how intimately connected with our highest concerns-how immediately and neces sarily leading to the religious adoration of the Supreme Being-can we doubt that the perpetually renewed proofs of his power, wisdom, and goodness tend to fix and to transport the mind, by the constant nourishment thus afforded to feelings of pure and rational devotion? It is, in truth, an exercise at once intellectual aud moral, in which the highest faculties of the understanding and the warmest feelings of the heart alike partake, and in which not only without ceasing to be a philosopher the student feels as a man, but in which the more warmly his human feelings are excited, the more philosophically he handles the subject. What delight can be more elevating, more truly worthy of a rational creature's enjoyment, than to feel wherever we tread the paths of scientific inquiry, new evidence springing up around our footsteps-new traces of divine intelligence and power meeting our eye! We are never alone; at least, like the old Roman, we are never less alone than in our solitude. We walk with the Deity; we commune with the great First Cause, who sustains at every instant what the word of his power made. The delight is renewed at each step of our progress, though as far as evidence is concerned we have long ago had proof enough. But that is no more a reason for ceasing to contemplate the subject in its perpetually renovated and varied forms, than it would be a reason for resting satisfied with once seeing a long lost friend that his existence had been sufficiently proved by one interview. Thus, instead of restricting ourselves to the proofs alone required to refute atheism or remove skepticism, we should covet the indefinite multiplication of evidences of design and skill in the universe, as subservient in a threefold way to purposes of use and of gratification: first, as strengthening the foundation whereupon the system reposes; secondly, as conducive to the ordinary purposes of scientific gratification, each instance being a fresh renewal of that kind of enjoyment; and thirdly, as giving additional ground for devout, pleasing and wholesome adoration of the Great First Cause, who made and who sustains all nature. It is, therefore, manifest that instead of resting satisfied with details and reasons barely sufficient to prove the existence of design in the universe, the gratification of a laudable scientific curiosity, and the proper indulgence of rational devotion, require that every occasion should be taken of exhibiting those evidences upon which the system of Natural Theology rests. The professed treatises upon that science do not suffice for this purpose, although they ought unquestionably to enter largely, and with very great variety of illustration, into the proofs; but each several branch of science natural and moral, should have a constant reference to this, and should never fail to apply its peculiar doctrines towards the proof and the illustration of the doctrines of Natural Theology.

1. In the first place, it is worthy of our consideration that the greatest advocates of Natural Theology have always been sincere and even zealous Christians. The names of Ray, Clarke. Derham, Keill, Paley, attest the truth of this assertion. None of these was likely to lend his support to any system the evidence of which put the outworks of Christianity in jeopardy. Some of them, as Clarke and Paley, have signalized themselves as strenuous and able defenders of the truth of Revelation. Derham actually delivered his celebrated work on the great truths of Natural Theology as a series of sermons preached in Bow Church, at a Lecture for the promotion of the Christian religion, founded by Mr. Boyle. At the same Lecture, in St. Paul's, was delivered Dr. Clarke's argument a priori, and indeed his whole "Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion," as well as his "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God;" and Dr. Bentley, the first preacher upon that foundation, delivered in like manner as sermons his argument in favor of Natural Religion from the structure of the human mind, the animal body, and the universe at large.

This Lecture was expressly founded by Mr. Boyle in support of the Christian religion; and no reference to Natural Theology, apart from its uses in supporting Revelation, is to be found in the terms of the gift. The subject of the eight sermons is to be, in the words of the will, "The proof of the Christian religion against notorious infidels, viz. atheists, theists, Pagans, Jews, and Mahometans, not descending lower to any controversies that are among Christians themselves." Yet the great Christian divines whom we have named so construed these words as to include a proof of Natural Religion among the most essential arguments for Christianity; and almost as many of the sermons preached at the Boyle Lecture, during the first forty years after its foundation, relate to the doctrines of Natural Theology as to those of Revelation. So far were the divines of that day from holding the two subjects as hostile to each other.*

2. But, secondly, Natural Theology is most ser. viceable to the support of Revelation. All the soundest arguments in behalf of the latter pre-suppose the former to be admitted. Witness the profound work of Butler, his " Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion to the Order of Nature," the most argumentative and philosophical defence of Chris

If any one will read the vituperation rather than sermon against infidels with which Dr. Bentley commences his discourses upon Natural Reli gion, he will see no reason to doubt the zeal for [Christianity of that most learned preacher.

tianity ever submitted to the world. But Lardner | the weight or the fallibility of testimony; it assumes

of the being that sent him, as those miracles only | prove power, he might be sent to deceive us; and thus the hopes held out by him might be delusions. The doctrines of Natural Religion here come to our aid, and secure our belief to the messenger of one Being, whose goodness they have taught us to trust.

value, and only estimate them aright when we lose them, or fancy them lost. Accustomed to handle the truths of Revelation in connection with, and in addition to, those of Natural Theology, and never having experienced any state of mind in which we were without the latter, we forget how essential they are to the former. As we are wont to forget the existence of the air we constantly breathe until put in mind of it by some violent change threatening suffocation, so it requires a violent fit of abstraction to figure to ourselves the state of our belief in Revelation were the lights of natural religion withdrawn. The existence and attributes of a God are so familiarly proved by every thing around us, that we can hardly picture to ourselves the state of our belief in this great truth, if we only knew it by the testimony borne to miracles, which, however, authentic, were yet wrought in a remote age and distant region.*

4. In other respects, the services of Natural Religion are far from inconsiderable, as subsidiary to, and co-operative with, the great help of Revelation. Thus, were our whole knowledge of the Deity drawn from Revelation, its foundation must become weaker and weaker as the distance in point of time increases from the actual interposition. Tradition, or the evidence of testimony, must of necessity be its only proof; for perpetual miracles must be wrought to give us evidence by our own senses. Now, a perpetual miracle is a contradiction in terms; for the exception to, or suspension of, the laws of nature so often repeated would destroy the laws themselves, 5. The use of Natural Theology to the believer in and with the laws the force of the exception or sus- Revelation is equally remarkable in keeping alive pension. Upon testimony, then, all Revelation must the feelings of piety and devotion. As this topic has rest. Every age but the one in which the miracles occurred under a former head, it is only to be prewere wrought, and every country but the one that sented here in close connection with Revealed Reliwitnessed them-indeed, all the people of that coun- gion. It may be observed, then, that even the intry itself save those actually present-must receive spired penmen have constant recourse to the views the proofs which they afford of Divine interposition which are derived from the contemplation of nature upon the testimony of eye-witnesses, and of those when they would exalt the Deity by a description to whom eye-witnesses told it. Even if the mira- of his attributes, or inculcate sentiments of devotion cles were exhibited before all the nations of one age, tawards him. "How excellent," says the Psalmist, the next must believe upon the authority of tradi-"is thy name in all the earth; thou hast set thy glotion; and if we suppose the interposition to be re-ry above the heavens. I will consider the heavens, peated from time to time, each repitition would in- even the work of thy fingers; the moon and the calculably weaken its force, because the laws of na- stars which thou hast ordained." See also that sinture, though not wholly destroyed, as they must be gularly beautiful poem the 139th Psalm; and the by a constant violation, would yet lose their pre- Book of Job, from the 38th to the 41st chapter. vailing force, and each exception would become a slighter proof of supernatural agency. It is far otherwise with the proofs of Natural Religion; repetition only strengthens and extends them. We are by no means affirming that Revelation would lose its sanction by lapse of time, as long as it had the perpetually new and living evidence of Natural Religion to support it. We are only showing the use of that evidence to Revelation, by examining the inevitable consequences of its entire removal, and seeing how ill supported the truths of Revelation would be, if the prop were withdrawn which they borrow from Natural Theology; for then they would rest upon tradition alone.*

In truth, it is with Natural Religion as with many of the greatest blessings of our sublunary lot; they are so common, so habitually present to and enjoyed by us, that we become insensible of their * Note V.

It is remarkable how little is to be found of partícularity and precision in any thing that has been revealed to us respecting the nature of the Godhead. For the wisest purposes it has pleased Providence to veil in awful mystery almost all the attributes of the Ancient of Days beyond what natural reason teaches. By direct interposition, through miraculous agency, we become acquainted with his will, and are made more certain of his existence; but his peculiar attributes are nearly the same in the volume of nature and in that of his revealed word.

* Mr. Locke has said, upon a similar question, "He that takes away Reason to make way for Revelation puts out the light of both; and does much about the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.”—(Human Understanding, iv. 19, 4.)

NOTE I.

Of the Classification of the Sciences.

NOTES.

of ontology-that is, of existences, natural and mental; and yet it bears a more close relation to the third, or logical division. It certainly appears someI AM abundantly sensible, not only, as is stated what violent to class fluxions with anatomy, metalin the text, how imperfect all such classifications lurgy with psychology, and entomology with theomust be, but that grave objections may be urged logy; while we make separate heads of ethics and against the one I have adopted, and particularly logic. But yet more violent is M. Turgot's classiagainst the threefold division of physical, psycholo-fication, by which he ranges, under the head of gical, and ethical or moral. It may be said that one physical sciences, not only natural philosophy and part of the moral branch of Natural Theology be- metaphysics by name, but also logic and history. longs to psychology-namely, the arguments drawn To thus classing history there is, indeed, a double from the nature of the mind in favor of a future objection. Not only is it doing unnecessary viostate; and that this part ought therefore to have lence to common language, to make that which been classed with the second division of the ontolo- bears no exclusive relation to natural objects a part gical branch-namely, the psychological. But it of physics, but to make history a science at all is must be borne in mind that the two first divisions, perhaps yet more objectionable, unless in the sense comprising the ontological branch, are confined to in which inductive science is deemed historical by the doctrine of existences--the investigation of the Lord Bacon-being considered by him as the hisDeity's existence and attributes; while the whole tory of facts. But this, too, is incorrect; for the of the third division, or second branch, relates to history or record of facts is only the foundation of the prospects of man with respect to his soul; and inductive science, which consists in the comparison, consequently, although the arguments respecting or reasoning from the comparison, of these facts, these prospects are partly of a psychological nature, and marking their differences and resemblances; yet they relate to the future, and not at all to the whereas history is applicable to all events and all past or present-not at all to the doctrine of exist- sciences, being merely the record of things that ence or attributes. This is therefore a sufficiently have happened, of whatever kind, and implies no distinct ground for the separation. In all such clas- reasoning or comparing at all. Why is poetry, sifications we should be guided by views of conve- music, painting, omitted in such arrangement as nience, rather than by any desire to attain perfect that of Turgot? They are as much sciences as symmetry; and that arrangement may be best suit- history. ed to a particular purpose which plants the same things in one order, and separates them and unites them in one way, when an arrangement which should dispose those things differently might be preferable, if we had another purpose to serve. Thus the three divisions of physics, psychology, and morals may be convenient for the purposes of Natural Theology, and yet it may not so well suit the purposes of general science; although I own my opinion to be in favor of that classification for such general purposes also, keeping always in mind that whatever portion of moral science (using the term in its more ordinary sense) belongs to ontology comes within the second, and not the third, subdivision, and that the third deals with deontology

alone.

The various classifications which, in ancient as well as modern times, have been made of the sciences, are well calculated to illustrate the difficulty of a perfect arrangement. The Greek philosophers distinguished them into physics, ethics, and logic. Under the first head was comprehended both the nature of mind and of the Deity; consequently, under physics were classed what we now term psychology and theology, as well as natural philosophy. Mr. Locke mainly adopted the same order when he ranged the objects of science into physical, practical, and logical (pvoin, xpaktin, onμelwin, or Aoyian; or, 1. Things in themselves knowable, whether God himself, angels, spirits, bodies; or their affections, as number, figure, &c. 2. Actions, as they depend upon us in order to happiness; and 3. The use of signs, in order to knowledge. Thus, like the Greek philosophers, he classed natural philosophy, psychology, and theology under one head; but as he only stated ethics to be "the most considerable of the second head," it may be doubtful whether or not he included under it any practical application of the natural branches of the first head. One thing, too, is quite clear in this arrangementthat pure mathematics becomes part of the science 818

Lord Bacon's own scientific classification is certainly not distinguished by peculiar felicity. He divides science into three parts, according as its object is the Deity, Man, or External Nature, naming these branches Natural Theology, Human Philosophy, and Natural Philosophy. Hence, while intellectual and moral philosophy are separated from theology, they are both classed with anatomy and medicine; while optics and acoustics, merely from their relation to the human eye and the human ear, are ranged under the same head with ethics, and separated from natural philosophy. Hence, too, the chemical nature of the blood and bones of man is made one part of one division-Human Philosophy; while the chemical nature of the blood and bones of all other animals is ranged under another head-Natural Philosophy. As for logic and the mathematics, they are treated as a kind of appendix to physics, rather than as deserving the name of sciences.

NOTE II.

Of the Psychological Argument from Final Causes. DR. CLARKE maintains that the evidences of design are much more to be traced in the natural than in the moral world; but he plainly means by this proposition, not so much to compare the proofs of Divine wisdom exhibited in the phenomena of the material with those exhibited in the phenomena of the intellectual world, as to show that the designs or intentions of the Deity are more easily perceived in the arrangements of the world with which we are most conversant, than his plans for our happiness, and his general intentions respecting our fate, are to be inferred from moral considerations. It is, however, to be remarked that, like all other reasoners upon Natural Theology, Dr. Clarke confines his attention entirely to physical, and never adverts to psychological proofs.

Mr. Stewart, who refers to this passage, has adopted the paraphrastic translation by Mrs. Fielding, and it is extremely unlike the original. Mr. Stewart justly praises the “almost divine simplicity" of the whole conversation, which is a just eulogy; but the translation, although well written, little resembles the Greek in that particular. The one I have here given is at least faithful.

Mr. Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, has interspersed with his reasonings upon the constitution of the affections and feelings, reflections upon the purposes to which they are subservient; and Mr. Stewart's writings afford frequent instances of his attention having been alive to the soundness of the same speculation. Indeed, no one who had the accurate and just views of the nature of the sentient principle, and the steady conviction of its In like manner, the discussion with Euthydemus, separate and immaterial nature, which prevail after showing the goodness of the Gods in adapting through all his writings, could fail to perceive the all things to man's use, closes with mentioning the application of the argument a posteriori to our men- senses given us to enjoy those gifts of external natal constitution. But these indications of this ad-ture, and, lastly, the use of reason. Το δε και λογισμον mirable writer's attention to the subject are acci-hiv epovoaι, &c. &c.—"They have implanted reason dental, and scattered through his works; and it is in our nature, whereby we inquire touching external exceedingly to be regretted, nor, indeed, very easily things; and, arguing and remembering, we learn the to be explained, that he should have entirely omit- uses of each, and hit upon many contrivances for atted all reference to the constitution of our mental taining good and avoiding evil. Have they not also faculties in the otherwise full and able treatise upon given us the gift of speech, by which we can communiNatural Religion which forms so large a part-cate mutually all we have learnt, and thus instruct above one third-of his "Philosophy of the Active each other, and make laws, and regulate civil polity?”* Powers." With the exception of a single remark Plato pursues the same course of reasoning. We (vol. ii. p. 48,) and that only upon the adaptation of may refer particularly to the tenth and twelfth books our faculties to our external circumstances, and a of the treatise De Legg. Thus, towards the end of quotation from Locke, which relates more to the the latter book, he states the argument for the Deity's bodily than to the mental powers, there occurs no- existence as twofold-the nature of the mind, and thing whatever upon this important part of the sub-the order of the worldly system. The first of his ject in that excellent work, where it would have reasons is drawn from considering the qualities of been so peculiarly appropriate. the mind; its greater antiquity than that of the This silence of modern writers upon Natural body and its immortality; for the Platonists eerTheology is easily accounted for by the same consi- tainly considered immortality to be so much of the deration to which Dr. Reid has referred in explain-essence of mind as to deduce from thence, as the ing how the modern skeptics have admitted the ex-less clear proposition, the existence of a Deity. istence of appearances of design in the universe, The Stoics reasoned in like manner, with an and denied what he terms the major proposition-equal regard to mental and to natural phenomena. that design may be traced by its effects; while the Epictetus, after deducing the inference of design ancient skeptics, admitting the latter proposition, from the adaptations of sensible objects, as of the denied the former. He considers this as owing to eye to light, adds, correctly and philosophically, the great discoveries in physics made in modern that "the constitution of the understanding, wheretimes; and to the same cause may be ascribed the by it not only receives impressions through the disposition of Natural Theologians to confine their senses, but also deals with the ideas thus received, attention to the evidences afforded by the material and combines or composes something out of them, world. The ancients, on the other hand, whose proceeding from things that are near to things quite progress in Natural Philosophy was extremely li-remote, proves the existence of an Artificer; since mited, bestow more attention, and with consider- things carrying such marks of contrivance could ably greater success, upon Intellectual Philosophy; not," he contends, "exist spontaneously, and withand accordingly we find that they drew their argu-out design."+

ments a posteriori for the existence of design in the The same train of reasoning is followed by Cicero universe as much from moral as from physical con- in all those parts of his writings in which he treats siderations. of the existence of a Deity. Thus the famous pasThe discussion held by Socrates with Aristode- sage so often quoted from the treatise De Natura mus, as recorded by Xenophon, is well known. Af- Deorum, ends with a reference to our mental conter enumerating the various convenient arrange-stitution, although this part of it is not so frements of the bodily organs, he adds-Ov TOLVUV povov ήρκεσε τω θεω του σώματος επιμεληθηναι· αλλ' (όπερ μεγιστον εστι) και την ψυχην κρατίστην τω ανθρώπω ενεφυσε τινος | γαρ άλλου ζώου ψυχη πρώτα μεν θεων, των τα μέγιστα και καλλιστα συνταξαντων, ήσθηται ότι εισι ; τι δε φύλον αλλο η ανθρωποι, θεους θεραπεύουσι; ποια δε ψυχη της ανθρωπινης | Σκανώτερα προφυλλάττεσθαι, η λιμον, η διψος, η ψυχή, η θαλπη, η νόσοις επικουρήσαι, η ρώμην ασκησαι, η προς μαθησιν εκπονήσαι, η όσα αν ακουση, η ίδη, η μαθη, ικανώτερα εστι dia peprnodai;—" Nor has the Deity been satisfied with taking care of the body alone; he has implanted in man what is a far greater work to have made-a most excellent soul; for what other animal possesses a mind that can perceive the existence of the Gods by whom all these vast and fair works have been form

ed?

What other creature than man worships those Gods? What other intelligence is superior to man's in providing against hunger, and thirst, and cold, and heat? or in curing diseases, or in exercising strength, or in cultivating learning, or in storing up the recollection of things heard, and seen, and learnt?"-It may be observed here, in passing, that

Xen. Memor. I. iv. 13.

quently attended to. "An vero si domum magnam, pulchramque videris, non possis adduci ut etiam si dominum non videas muribus illam et mustelis ædificatam putes; tantum vero ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum celestium, tantam vim et magnitudinum maris atque terrarum si tuum ac non deorum immortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere videare ? Thus far as to sensible objects. But he proceeds, "Aliud a terra sumsimus, aliud ab humore, aliud ab igne, aliud ab aere eo quem spiritu ducimus: illud autem quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem dico et si placet, pluribus verbis, mentem, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus ?"

And again, in the same book, after speaking at large of the structure of the body, and the uses to which its various parts are adapted, he adds, “Jam vero animum ipsum, memtemque hominis, rationem, consilium, prudentiam, qui non divina cura perfecta

* Xen. Memor. IV. iii. 11.
+ Epict. Enchir. i. 6.
De Nat Deor. ii. 6.