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upon which our belief is challenged. The testimo- | cessary to add that no testimony of the witnesses ny of witnesses is adduced to prove a Miracle, or whom we are supposing to concur in their relation deviation from the ordinary laws of nature; but, contradicts any testimony of our own senses. If it says Mr. Hume, it is more likely that the witnesses did, the argument would resemble Archbishop Tilshould be deceived or should deceive, than that the lotson's upon the Real Presence, and our disbelief laws of nature should be broken; and at all events would be at once warranted.* we believe testimony only because it is a law of na- SecondlyThis leads us to the next objection to ture that men should tell the truth. This may very which Mr. Hume's argument is liable, and which possibly be true; doubtless it is, generally speaking, we have in part anticipated while illustrating the so likely to be true, that the belief of a miracle is, first. He requires us to withhold our belief in cirand ought to be, most difficult to bring about; but cumstances which would force every man of comat least, it is not like the belief in the Real Presence: mon understanding to lend his assent, and to act upit does not at one and the same time assume the ac- on the supposition of the story told being true. For curacy of the indications given by our senses, and suppose either such numbers of various witnesses as set that accuracy at nought;-it does not at once we have spoken of; or, what is perhaps stronger, desire us implicitly to trust, and entirely to disre- suppose a miracle reported to us, first by a number gard the evidence of testimony, as the doctrine of of relators, and then by three or four of the very Transubstantiation calls upon us at once to trust soundest judges and most incorruptibly honest men and disregard the evidence of our senses.

we know-men noted for their difficult belief of wonThere are two answers, however, to which the ders, and, above all, steady unbelievers in Miracles. doctrine proposed by Mr. Hume is exposed, and without any bias in favor of religion, but rather aceither appears sufficient to shake it,

customed to doubt, if not disbelieve-most people First-Our belief in the uniformity of the laws of would lend an easy belief to any Miracle thus vouchnature rests not altogether upon our own experience. ed. But let us add this circumstance, that a friend We believe no man ever was raised from the dead on his death-bed had been attended by us, and that —not merely because we ourselves never saw it, for we had told him a fact known only to ourselves indeed that would be a very limited ground of de- something that we had secretly done the very mo duction; and our belief was fixed on the subject ment before we told it to the dying man, and which long before we had any considerable experience to no other being we had ever revealed--and that fixed chiefly by authority—that is, by deference to the credible witnesses we are supposing inform us other men's experience. We found our confident that the deceased appeared to them, conversed with belief in this negative position partly, perhaps chiefly, them, remained with them a day or two, accompaupon the testimony of others; and at all events, our nying them, and to avouch the fact of his re-appearbelief that in times before our own the same posi- ance on this earth, communicated to them the secret ·tion held good, must of necessity be drawn from our of which we had made him the sole depository the trusting the relations of other men—that is, it de- moment before his death ;-according to Mr. Hume pends upon the evidence of testimony. If, then, the we are bound rather to believe, not only that those existence of the law of nature is proved, in great credible witnesses deceive us, or that ihose sound part at least, by such evidence, can we wholly re- and unprejudiced men were themselves deceived, ject the like evidence when it comes to prove an ex- and fancied things without real existence, but furception to the rule-a deviation from the law ?- ther, that they all hit by chance upon the discovery The more numerous are the cases of the law being of a real secret, known only to ourselves and the kept—the more rare those of its being broken-the dead man. Mr. Hume's argument requires us to more scrupulous certainly ought we to be in admit believe this as the lesser improbability of the twoting the proofs of the breach. But that testimony as less unlikely than the rising of one from the dead; is capable of making good the proof there seems no and yet every one must feel convinced, that were he doubt. In truth, the degree of excellence and of placed in the situation we have been figuring, he strength to which testimony may rise seems almost would not only lend his belief to the relation, but, if indefinite. There is hardly any cogency which it the relators accompanied it with a special warning is not capable by possible supposition of attaining. from the deceased person to avoid a certain contemThe endless multiplication of witnesses—the un- plated act, he would, acting upon the belief of their bounded variety of their habits of thinking, their story, take the warning, and avoid doing the forbidprejudices, their interests—afford the means of conceiving the force of their testimony augmented ad Prophecy is classed by Mr. Hume under the infinitum, because these circumstances afford the same head with Miracle-every prophecy being, he means of diminishing indefinitely the chances of says, a miracle. This is not, however, quite cortheir being all mistaken, all misled, or all combining rect. A prophecy-that is the happening of an to deceive us. Let any man try to calculate the event which was foretold-may be proved even by chances of a thousand persons who come from dif- the evidence of the senses of the whole world. Supferent quarters, and never saw each other before, pose it had one thousand years ago been foretold, and who all vary in their habits, stations, opinions, ihat, on a certain day this year, one person of every interests—being mistaken or combining to deceive family in the world should be seized with a particuus, when they give the same account of an event as lar distemper, it is evident that every family would having happened before their eyes—these chances be at once certain that the event had happened, and are many hundreds of thousands to one. And yet that it had been foretold. To future generations we can conceive them multiplied indefinitely; for the fulfilment would no doubt come within the deone hundred thousand such witnesses may all in scription of a miracle in all respects. The truth is, like manner bear the same testimony; and they that the event happening which was foretold may may all tell us their story within tweniy-four hours be compared to the miracle; and Mr. Hume's arafter the transaction, and in the next parish. And gument will then be, not that there is any thing miyet, according to Mr. Hume's argument, we are raculous in the event itself, but only in its happenbound to disbelieve them all, because they speak to ing after it had been foretold. Bishop Sherlock a thing contrary to our own experience, and to the wrote discourses on this subject, which Dr. Middleaccounts which other witnesses had formerly given ton answered: the former denying that prophecy us of the laws of nature, and which our forefathers was more exempt from the scope of the skeptical had handed down to us as derived from witnesses argument than miracles. On the whole, however, who lived in the old time before them. It is unne- l it does seem more exempt.

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den deed. Mr. Hume's argument makes no excep | human body, of which the foot makes a part. Had tion. This is its scope; and whether he chooses to we never seen that body, or any other that walked push it thus far or no, all Miracles are of necessity on feet, the observation of the mark in the sand denied by it, without the least regard to the kind or could have led to no other conclusion than that the quantity of the proof on which they are rested; some body or thing had been there with a form like and the testimony which we have supposed, accom- the mark. So, when we are to reason from the panied by the test or check we have supposed, would works of nature to their cause, we are entitled to fall within the grasp of the argument just as much conclude that a being exists whose power and skill and as clearly as any other Miracle avouched by created them such as we behold them, and consemore ordinary combinations of evidence.

quently that this being is possessed of skill and powThe use of Mr. Hume's argument is this, and it ér sufficient to contrive and to execute those works is an important and a valuable one. It teaches us —that is, those precise works, and no more. We to sift closely and rigorously the evidence for mira- have no right to infer that this being has the skill culous events. It bids us remember that the proba- or the power to contrive and create one single blade bilities are always, and must always be, incompara- of grass or grain of sand beyond what we see. It bly greater against than for the truth of these rela- follows, then, that the argument a posteriori only tions, because it is always far more likely that the leads to the conclusion that a finite and not an in testimony should be mistaken or false, than that the nitely or an indefinitely wise and powerful Being general laws of nature should be suspended. Fur- exists; and it further follows that we are left with ther than this the doctrine cannot in soundness of out any evidence of his power (much less of his inreason be carried. It does not go the length of tention) to perpetuate our existence after death, as proving that those general laws cannot, by the well as without any proof of the capacity of the soul force of human testimony, be shown to have been, in to receive such a continuation of being after its sea particular instance, and with a particular purpose, paration from the body. This is the sum of the very suspended.

ingenious, subtle, and original argument of Mr. It is unnecessary to add, that the argument here Hume, affording a mighty contrast to the flimsy has only been conducted to one point, and upon one sophisms, the declamatory assertions, of the French ground-namely, to refute the doctrine that a mira- writers, and giving the Natural Theologian, it cle cannot be proved by any evidence of testimony. must be allowed, a good deal to answer. We have It is for those who maištain the truth of any revela- stated it as strongly as we could, in order to meet tion to show in what manner the evidence suffices it fully; and it appears capable of a satisfactory to prove the Miracles on which that revelation rests. answer. This treatise is not directed to that object; but in The whole argument a posteriori rests upon the commenting upon Mr. Hume's celebrated argu- assumption, that if we perceive arrangements made, ment, we have dealt with a fundamental objection by means of which certain effects are produced, and to all Revelation, and one which, until removed, if seeing such arrangements among the works of precludes the possibility of any such system being men, we should at once conclude that they were deestablished.

signed to produce those effects, we are entitled to II. The Essay upon Miracles being supposed by say that the arrangements which we see and which its author sufficient to dispose of Revelation, the Es we know not to be the work of man, are the work say on Providence and a Future State appears to of an intelligent cause, contriving them for the purhave been aimed as a blow equally fatal to Natural pose of producing the effects observed. In truth, Religion. Its merits are, however, of a very supe- such must needs be the assumption on which the arrior order. There is nothing of the sarcasm so un- gument rests, because we have no other knowledge becoming on subjects of this most serious kind, of what design and contrivance are. They ne which disfigures the concluding portion of the for- cessarily bear reference to our own nature and mer treatise. The tone is more philosophic, and the the knowledge we have of our own minds, derived skeptical character is better sustained. There can- from our own consciousness and experience; and not, indeed, be said to prevail through it any thing of this we have treated in the text, Sect. III. and of a dogmatical spirit, and certainly we here meet IV. of Part I. 'with none of thai propensity to assume the thing in If we found anywhere a mechanism of any kind, question, to insist upon propositions as proved which a watch for instance, as Paley puts the case, we have only been annunciated, to supply by sounds the should at once conclude that some skilful and intelplace of ideas, which we remark in the " Systeme ligent being had been there, and had left his works de la Nature.” On the contrary, ihe argument, whe- on the spot. We should conclude (indeed this is sher sound or not, of a substantial nature; it is involved in the former inference) that he was caparested on very plausible grounds; and we may the ra- ble of doing what we saw he had done, and that he her conclude that it is not very easily answered, had intended to produce a particular effect by the vecause, in fact, it has rarely, if ever, been encoun- exercise of his skill; but we should also conclude ered by writers on theological subjects. Neverthe-that he who could do this could repeat the operation if ess, it'strikes at the root of all Natural Religion, he chose, and the probability would be that his skill and requires a careful consideration.

had not been confined to the single exertion of it Mr. Hume does not deny that the reasoning from which we had observed. There is nothing peculiar the appearances and operations of nature to the ex- in the nature of human workmanship or of the huistence of an intelligent cause is logical and sound; man character to make us draw this least he admits this for argument's sake. But he We arrive at it just as we arrive at the inference of takes this nice and subtle distinction. We are here, design and contrivance; we believe in them behe observes, dealing with an agent, an intelli- cause we are wholly unable to conceive such an gence, a being, wholly unlike all we elsewhere see adaptation without such an intention; and we are or hitherto have known; our inferences, therefore, equally unable to conceive that any, being, or any must be confined strictly to the facts from whence intelligence, or any power, which had sufficed to they are drawn. When we see a foot-mark imprint- perform the operation we see, should be confined to ed on the sand, we conclude that a man has walkedihat single exertion. We can conceive no reason there, and that his other foot had likewise left its whatever why the same power should not be capaprint, which the waves have effaced. But this in- ble of repeating the operation. There is nothing ference is not drawn from the inspection of the foot peculiar-no limil-no sufficient reason, of an er: alone; it comes from a previous knowledge of the Iclusive nature, why the same power should not be again exercised and with the same result. All in- | as soon believe in the sun not rising to-morrow, or duction proceeds upon similar grounds. It is the in his light ceasing to be differently refrangible. generalization of particulars; it is the concluding Much is said in the course of arguments like the from a certain limited number of instances to an in- present of the word "infinite." Whether or not definite number — to any number unless circum- we are able to form any precise idea of that which stances arise to restrict the generality-to any num- has no bounds in power or in duration may be anber, where nothing arises to vary or limit the con other question. But when we see such stupendous clusion. We mix an acid and alkali, and form exertions of power, upon a scale so vast as far to a neutral salt having peculiar properties. We pass pass all our faculties of comprei ension, and with a sunbeam or the light of a candle through a prism, a minuteness at the same time so absolute, that as and observe the rays separated into lights making we can on the one hand perceive nothing beyond certain colors, Why do we conclude from hence its grasp, so we are on the other hand unable to find that all the acid made by burning sulphur, in what any thing too minute to escape its noi ce, we are way soever the sulphur was produced or the com- irresistibly led to conclude that there is nothing bustion effected, will be neutralized by soda where- above or below such an agent, and that nothing soever produced and howsoever obtained, and that which we can conceive is impossible for such an their union will always make Glauber's salts ? Or, intelligence. The argument of Mr. Hume supposes that all light, of all kinds, even that obtained by or admits that the whole universe is its work, and burning newly-discovered bodies, as the metal of that animal life is its creation. We can no more potassium, unseen, unknown before the year 1807, avoid believing that the same power which created will be found resolvable into the seven primary co- the universe can sustain it-that the same power lors ? According to Mr. Hume's argument, we have which created our souls can prolong their existence no right to infer that any one portion of acid or al- after death-than we can avoid believing that the kali, save the one we have subjected to our experi- power which sustained the universe up to the inments, or any light save that of the formerly-known stant we are speaking, is able to continue it in being combustible bodies, or rather of those classes of for a thousand years to come. But indeed Mr. them on which we had experimented—nay of the Hume's argument would go the length of making individuals of those classes which we have burnt-us disbelieve that the Deity has the power of conwill produce the effects we have experienced in our tinuing the existence of the creation for a day. laboratory, or in our darkened chamber. In other We are only entitled, according to this argument, words, according to this argument, all experimental to conclude that the Deity had the power of workknowledge must stand stisi, generalizing be at an ing the works we have seen and no more. Last end, and philosophers be content never to make a spring and autumn we observed the powers of nasingle step, or draw one conclusion beyond the ture in vegetation, that is, we noted the operations mere facts observed by them; in a word, Inductive of the Deity in that portion of his works, and were

2 Science must be turned from a process of general entitled, Mr. Hume admits, to infer that he had the reasoning upon particular facts, into a bare dry re- skill and the power to produce that harvest from cord of those particular facts themselves.

that seed time, but no more. We had, says the arIf, indeed, it be said that we never can be so cer- gument, no right whatever to infer that the Deity's tain of the things we infer as we are of those we power extended to another revolution of the sea. have observed, and on which our inference is sons. The argument is this, or it is nothing. Congrounded, we may admit this to be true. But no fining its scope, as Mr. Hume would confine it, to one therefore denies the value of the science which the universe as a whole, and excluding all inferis composed of the inferences. So we cannot be so ences as to a future state or other worlds, is wholly well assured of the Deity's power to repeat and to gratuitous. The argument applies to all that we vary and to extend his operations, as we are of his have seen of the already past and the actually exhaving created what we actually observe; and yet ecuted in this universe, and excludes all respecting our assurance may be quite sufficient to merit entire this same universe which is yet to come; conseconfidence. Nor will any student of Natural The- quently if it be good for any thing, it is sufficient ology complain if the only result of the argument to prove that, although our experience may authowe are combating be to place the higher truths of rize us to conclude that the Deity has skill and the science but a very little lower in point of proof power sufficient to maintain the world in is present than the inferences of design in the works actually state up to this hour, yet that experience is wholly examined. The self-same difference is to be found insufficient to prove that he has either skill or in the inferences composing the other branches of power to continue its existence a moment longer. inductive science, and it in no perceptible degree Every one of the topics applied by him to a Future lessens our confidence in the inductive method. State applies to this. If we have no right to believe

It has oftentimes been asked, why we believe that that one exertion of skill proves the author of nathe same result will happen from the same cause ture adequate to another exertion of a kind no more acting in the like circumstances-the foundation of difficult and only a little varied, we can have no all induction; and no answer has ever been given right to believe that one exertion of skill proves except that we cannot help so believing--that the him adequate to a repetition of the same identical condition of our being—the nature of our minds, operation. Now no man living carries or can carry compels us so to believe; and we take this as an ul- his disbelief so far as this. Indeed such doubts timate fact incapable of being resolved into any fact would not only shake all inductive science to more general. Can we help believing that a being pieces, but would put a stop to the whole business capable of creating what we see and examine, is of life. And assuredly we may be well contented also capable of exercising other acts of skill and to rest the truths of Natural Theology on the same power? Can we avoid believing that the same foundation upon which those of all the other power which made all the animals and vegetables sciences, as well as the practical conduct of all on our globe suffices to people and provide other human affairs, must for ever repose. worlds in like manner? Again, can we by any effort bring our minds to suppose that this being's

NOTE VI. whole skill and power were exhausted by one effort, and that having sufficed to create the universe, of the ancient Doctrines respecting Mind. it ceases to be effective for any other purpose what- The opinions of the ancient philosophers upon ever? The answer is, that we cannot- that we can the nature of the Soul were not very consistent



with themselves; and in some respects were diffi- | ψυχη ουκ εργον εστι μονον αλλα και μερος ουδ' υπ αυτου αλλ cult to reconcile with the doctrine of its immateri- ér" avrov, kat es avrov yeyovev_" The soul is not only ality which most of them maintained. It may suf- his work, but a part of himself ; it was not created by fice to mention a few of those theories.

him, but from him and out of him." Plato and his pupil Aristotle may certainly be said to have held the Soul's immateriality; at least, they maintained that it was of a nature wholly dif

NOTE VII. ferent from the body; and they appear often to hold of the ancient Doctrines respecting the Deity and that it was unlike all matter whatever, and a sub

Matter. stance or existence of a nature quite peculiar to it- The notions of the Supreme Being entertained by self. Their language is nearly the same upon this the ancient philosophers were more simple and consubject. Plato speaks of the ovora aowwatos kat vorens sistent than their iheory of the soul; and but for -a bodiless or incorporeal and intelligent being; and the belief, which they never shook off, in the eterof such existences he says, in one place, Ta aowata nity of matter, would very nearly have coincided καλλιστα οντα και μεγιστα λογω μονον, αλλω δε ουδενι | with our own. They give him the very same names, σαφως δεικνυται, Things incorporeal being the most and clothe him apparently in the like attributes. He excellent and the greatest of allare made manifest by is not only abavatos, aplaptos, arw.c@pos-immortal, in. reason alone, and no otherwise." (Politicus.) So corruptible, indestructible--but ayuntos, avroyomas, again in the Cratylus, he derives owna from owscobar, avtopuns, avou rooTatos—uncreated, self-made, self-oriand represents the body as a prison of the soul, ginating, self-existing: Zwov Tasav exou paraprotuta εικονα δεσμοτηριου ειναι συν της ψυχης αυτο εως ην τα οφει- μετ' αφθαρσιας, says Epicurus-“A Being haring all doveva to owua, following herein the doctrine said to happiness, with an incorruptible nature.' Again, be have been delivered by Orpheus. Aristotle, too, is #avropatwp, tayapatns-omnipotent, all-powerful; speaks of a being separable and separated from dvvaraı yap atavra, says Homer (Odyss. 5}"He has things perceivable by the senses-ovora xwpcorn kal power over all things." The creative power is also KEXwCiguen twv aloontwr. Nevertheless, these philo in words at least ascribed to him-KOPOTOLITAS, Onuto sophers frequently speak of the soul as being al- voyos--the maker of the world, the great artificer. ways, and as it were necessarily, connected with Aristotle, too, in a very remarkable passage of the matter of some kind or other-aci tuxn emitetayuevn Metaphysics, says that God seems to be the cause owparı, tore per allw, tot edc aliw. The soul is always of all things, and, as it were, a beginning, or prinannered to a body, sometimes to one and sometimes to ciple-OcOS DOREL TO OUTLOV TROUV Elvat xal apxn res: and, another. - De Legg. x. Thus Aristotle, (De Gen. indeed, by implication, this is ascribed in the terms Anim. ii. 4.), yap tuxn ovora owparos Tivos corethe uncreated, self-created, and self-existing ; for in soul is the substance of some kind of body. And in soundness of reason the being who had no creator, the Treatise De Anima, ii. 2, he says—kal dra torto and much more the being who created himself (if καλως υπολαμβανουσιν οίς δοκει μητε ανευ σωματος ειναι μητε | we can conceive such an idea,) must have created σωμα τε ψυχη, σωμα μεν γαρ ουκ εστι, σωματος δε τι- all things else. Nevertheless, such was certainly “Those therefore rightly hold who think that the soul not so plain an inference of reasoning with the ancannot exist without the body, and yet that it is not cients; for whether it be that by avropons and atta body; it is not the body, but somewhat of the body.". γενης, they only meant to convey the idea of αγινητος

This corporeal connection is slated by Plutarch, 1--of a being uncreated and existing from all eterin the Quæst. Platon., still more plainly to have nity-or that they took some nice distinction, to us been the Platonic doctrine-fuxnv #pcosurepay tou incomprehensible, between self-creation and the σώματος, αιτιαν τε της εκεινου γενέσεως και αρχην ουκ α creation of other beings or things-certain it is, that γενεσθαι ψυχην ανευ σωματος ουδε νουν ανευ ψυχης αλλα | the same philosophers who so described the Deity ψυχην μεν εν σωματι, νουν δε εν τη ψυχη. The soul is clung to the notion of matter being also eternal, and older than the body, and the cause and origin of its co-existent with the supreme power, and that by cxistence : not that the soul exists without the body, or creator and artificer they rather seem to have meant the understanding without the soul ; but that the soul the arranger of atoms--the power giving form to is in the body, and the understanding in the soul." chaotic matter, than the power calling things into

According to these representations and quotations existence. They appear to have been all pressed taken together, Plato held the soul to be an imma- by the difficulty (and who shall deny it?) of conterial substance, separable from any given body, but ceiving the act of creation—the act of calling'erincapable of existing without somebody or other, istences out of nothing. Accordingly, the maxim and the mind or understanding to be a part of the which generally prevailed among most of the Greek son). The residue of the soul was, as we shall af- sects, and which led to very serious and even practerwards see, its sensitive or mortal portion. tical consequences in their systems, was ovdsy is tot

The idea of motion seems to have been intimate- μη οντος (or εκ ουδενος) γινεσθαι--that nothing is made ly connected in their views with mind or spirit, and of what has no existence, or of nothing. Aristotle in so far their doctrines approach those, if we can represents this as the common opinion of all natural call them doctrines, of the modern aiheists (See philosophers before him—kovny dotny twv Qvoltur, Note IV.)-50 {auto KiveLV (says Plato,) øns Noyov exeiv He says, in another passage (De Cælo. iii. 1.)την αυτην ουσιαν ηνπερ τουνομα και δε παντες ψυχην προσαγο- μεν αυτων (προτερον φιλοσοφησαντες) ανειλον όλως γενεσιν ρευμεν; φημιγε- You say that the substance (or δεing) και φθεραν ουδεν γαρ ουτε γιγνεσθαι φασιν ουτε φθειρεσθαι to which we all give the name of soul, has for its de- twv ovrwv- " Some of those (older philosophers) took finition that which mores itself ?" ' I certainly do away (or abolished) all generation ond destruction, say so.De Legg. x.

for they hold that none of the things which exist are But the same philosophers also held the soul to either created or destroyed.” Nevertheless, it cannot be an emanation from the Deity, and that each in- be doubted that the Platonic doctrine was of the dividual soul was a portion of the Divine Essence, same kind, and that Aristotle, in truth, ascribed or Spirit: consequently, they could not mean to as-only a qualified creative power to the Deity. Plusert that the divine essence was inseparable from tarch's statement of the Platonic doctrine is precise matter of some kind, but only those portions of that to this point-Berlov ovn II detwi asilousvows tov HEV Kos essence which they represented to be severed, and μον υπο θεου γεγονεναι λεγειν και αδειν' ο μεν γαρ καλλιστος as it were torn off from the divine mind-συναφεις των γεγονότων, δδε αριστος των αιτιων" την δε ουσιαν και υλην τω θεω, ατε αυτου μορια ουσια και αποσπασματα.--(Epid.) εξ ης γεγονεν, ου γενομενην, αλλα υποκει μεσης αει των δημιουρ

Plutarch, in the work already cited, says-ή δε γω, εις διαθεσιν και ταξιν αυτης και προς αυτον εξομοιωση

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ως δυνατον ην παρασχειν' ου γαρ εκ του μη οντος γενεσις, αλλ' | far as the metaphysical and more subtle arguments

Kahws, and leavws EXOVTOS, WS olkias, kai variou, for their belief go; and accordingly its pre-existence kau avšplavras-Better then be convinced by Plato, is a part of their faith as much as its future life, the and say and sing that the world was made by God; eternity ab ante being as much considered as the eterfor the world is the most excellent of all created things, nity post. Thus Plato says that“our soul was someand he the best of all causes. But the substance or where before it existed in the human form, as also it matter (literally timber) of which he made it was not seems to be immortal afterwards”-nö quv nuwe na yruan created, but always lay ready for the artificer, to be APIV Ev Twde Tw avôow TIVW ELdce yavcobal, wote kal ravin alaarranged and ordered by him ; for the creation was νατον τι εoικεν η ψυχη ειναι.

::--Phad.) Nevertheless, it not out of nothing, but out of what had been without must be admitted that their doctrine of future existform and unfit, as a house, or a garment, or a statue ence is most unsatisfactory as far as it is thus deare made.And thus it seems that when Maker or rived, that is, their psychological argument: and for Creator is used by the Academics, we are rather to two reasons-first, because it is coupled with the lenet regard them as meaning Maker in the sense in of pre-existence, and having no kind of evidence of which an artificer is said to make or fabricate the that from reasoning, we not only are prone to reject object of his art. EROLNtev (says Aristotle) wv tovde it, but are driven to suppose that our future exista TWV koopov i åtagas ons idas-He made the world of all ence will in like manner be severed by want of rekinds of matter.De An. Mund. Indeed I can in collection from all consideration of personal idenno other way understand that very obscure, and buttity; secondly, because, according to the doctrine of for some such gloss, contradictory passage of Aris- the soul being an emanation from the Deity, its futotle, in the first book of the Physics, where he is ture state implies a return to the divine essence, and giving his own doctrine in opposition to the tenets a confusion with or absorption in that supreme inof the elder philosophers on this point-Huets de kal telligence, and consequently an extinction of inαυτοι φα μεν γιγεσθαι μεν ουδεν απλως εκ του μη οντος, ωμως | dividual existence: a doctrine which was accordμεντοι γιγνεσθαι εκ μη οντος ούτε κατα συμβεβηκος εκ γαρ της | ingly held by some of the metaphysical philosophers στερησεως και εστι καθ' αυτο μη ον, ουκ ενυπαρχοντος γιγνεται τι. | who maintained a Future State. θαυμαζεται δε τουτο και αδυνατον ούτω δοκει γιγνεσθαι τι εκ In one important particular there was an entire row pen OvTos—“We ourselves however say that nothing difference of opinion among the ancient philosois absolutely (or merely) produced from what has no phers; in truth, so important a difference, that existence, yet that something is produced from that ihose were held not to be theists, but atheists, who which has no existence as far as regards accidents maintained one side of the argument-I mean as to (or accessory, qualities ;) for something is produced Providence. The Atomists and Epicureans held from privation, which has no existence in itself, and that there were Gods, and upon the subject of creanot from any thing inherent. But this is wonderful, tive power they did not materially differ from those and seems impossible, that something should be pro- generally called theists; but they denied that these duced out of that which has no existence."-(Phys. Gods ever interfered in the affairs of the universe. i. 8.) Indeed he had said in the same treatise, júst The language of Plato and the other theists upon before, that all confessed it impossible and incon- this subject is very strong. They regard such a ceivable that any being could either be created out of doctrine as one of the three kinds of blasphemy or nothing, or be uiterly destroyed-ex tou un outos y ve- sacrilege; and in the Republic of that philosopher, θαι τοτε ου εξολλυσθαι ανηνυστος και αρρηκτον. (Ιb. 1. 5.) all the three crimes are made equally punishable

Upon the uncreated nature of things for the with death. The first species is denying the existdoctrine extended to mind as well as to matter—the ence of a Deity, or of Gods: To de devrspov, ovras (Ocous) ancient philosophers founded another tenet of great ov φροντιζειν ανθρωπον. The second, admitting their importance. Matter and soul were reckoned not existence, but denying that they care for man. The only uncreated, but indestructible; their existence third kind of blasphemy was that of men attempting was eternal in every sense of the word, without end to propitiate the Gods towards criminal conduct, as as without beginning: μηδεν εκ του μη οντος γινεσθαι, φθονοι and αδικηματα, slaughters and outrages upon unds as to un ov pocipcobai—"Nothing can be produced justice,by prayers, thanksgivings, and sacrifices; out of that which has no existence, nor can any thing thus making those pure beings the accomplices of their be reduced to nonentity.” Such is Diogenes Laer- crimes, by sharing with them a small portion of the tius's account of Democritus's doctrine, or the Ato- spoil, as the wolves do with the dogs.De Legg. x.* mic principle, “Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet,

NOTE VIII. Nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam”. “Huc accedit uti quidque in sua corpora rursum

of the ancient Doctrine of the Immortality of the

Soul. Dissolvat natura, neque ad nihilum intereunt res" “Haud igitur redit ad nihilum res ulla, sed omnes

That the ancient philosophers for the most part Discidio redeunt in corpora materiai"

believed in the Future Existence of the Soul a. ter are the expressions of Lucretius, in giving an ac

* Who can read these, and such passages as these, count of the Epicurean Philosophy (i. 151, 217, without wishing that some who call themselves 249,) or, as Persius more shortly expresses it,

Christians, some Christian principalities and pow. “De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.” ers, had taken a lesson from the heathen sage, and

Sat. 111. 84. (if their nature forbade them to abstain from masAnd it must be admitted that they reasoned with sacres and injustice) at least had not committed the great consistency in this respect: for if the difficulty scandalous impiety, as he calls it, of singing in of comprehending the act of creation out of nothing places of Christian worship, and for the accomwas a sufficient ground for holding all things to be plishment of their enormous crimes, Te Deums, eternal a parte ante—the equal difficulty of compre- which in Plato's Republic would have been punishhending the act of annihilation was as good a ground ed as blasphemy? Who, indeed, can refrain from for believing in their eternity a parte post—there be- lamenting another pernicious kind of sacrilege (an ing manifestly just as much difficuliy, and of the anthropomorphism) yet more frequent: that of mak. same kind, in comprehending how a being can ing Christian temples resound with prayers for viccease to exist, as how it can come into existence. tory over our enemies, and thanksgiving for their

From this doctrine mainly it is that the Greek defeat? Assuredly such a ritual as this is not taken philosophers derive the immortality of the soul, as from the New Testament,


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