that the words "United Kingdom," as employed in a statute with reference to salvage, included both the land of the kingdom and three miles from the shore. In Church v. Hubbard,1 in the Supreme Court of the United States, the question was whether an insurance company was liable for a vessel named the Aurora, which was seized and condemned some four or five leagues from the coast of Brazil for attempting to trade illicitly. Marshall, C. J., said: "That the law of nations prohibits the exercise of any act of authority over a vessel in the situation of the Aurora, and that this seisure is, on that account, a mere marine trespass, not within the exception, cannot be admitted. To reason from the extent of protection a nation will afford to foreigners to the extent of the means it may use for its own security does not seem to be perfectly correct. It is opposed by principles which are universally acknowledged. The authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act, which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory." In United States v. Smiley,2 the defendant was indicted for the larceny of treasure lost from a wreck and buried in the sea sand within one hundred and fifty feet from the shore of Mexico. Field, J., held that the jurisdiction of that country over all offences committed within a marine league from its shores, not on a vessel of another nation, was complete and exclusive, and that the United States had no jurisdiction over the place or the property. § 10. In the present century the question arose in England as to the rights of the Queen and the Prince of Wales, as Duke of Cornwall, to the mines and minerals under the sea adjoining the coasts of Cornwall. This involved the right of 12 Cranch, 187, 234; Hudson v. Gustier, 4 Cranch, 293; The Brig Ann, 1 Gall. 62; United States v. Kessler, Bald. C. C. 15; United States v. Da vis, 2 Sumner, 482; Montgomery v. property in minerals between high and low-water mark around the coasts of that county, and also the right of property in minerals beyond low-water mark, won by an extension of workings begun above low-water mark, and was determined by arbitration. It appeared that the Prince was in possession, and had worked the mines from land which was his own. With respect to the title beyond low-water mark, it was contended, on behalf of the Crown, that the bed of the sea was its property; and on behalf of the Prince it was insisted, first, that under the terms of the original grant from the Crown, the Duke of Cornwall acquired everything adjoining and connected with the county, and that, even if the bed of the sea elsewhere belonged to the Crown, it had passed to the Duke in the seas adjoining Cornwall; 2 second, that the bed of the sea did not belong to the Crown by the common law, but that the Prince was entitled to the mines as first occupant. The decision of the arbitrator was that all the mines and minerals lying under the seashore between high and low-water marks, and under the estuaries, tidal rivers and other places beyond low-water mark, which were within the county, belonged to the Prince as part of the soil and territorial possessions of the Duchy of Cornwall; but that the right to all mines and minerals beyond low-water mark, under the tide waters adjacent to, but not part of, the county, was vested in the Queen in right of her Crown, although won by workings commenced above low-water mark and extended below it.3 An act of Parliament was passed to give effect to this decis 1 This arbitration is reviewed in Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, at pages 121, 155-158, 199-202. See, also, 6 Law Mag. & Rev. 113. The reference was made by Lord Chancellor Cranworth on the part of the Queen, and by Lord Kingsdown, then Chancellor of the Duchy of Cornwall, on the part of the Prince of Wales, to the arbitration of Sir John Patteson. A further question, involving the construction of the Act of Parliament referred to in the text, was afterwards referred to the arbitration of Sir John Coleridge. See opinion of Coleridge, C. J., in Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, 155-157. Lord Coleridge here says that all the proceedings in both references were in writing, that he was furnished with copies of the whole of them, and that most of the authorities cited in the case then before the court were cited there, as well as some others of considerable importance. 2 See Trematon Case, Wightwick, 167; Attorney General v. St. Aubyn, Id. 270; Penryhn v. Holm, 2 Ex. D.. 328; Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63. 3 21 & 22 Vict. c. 109. ion in favor of the Crown, by which it was declared and enacted that all mines and minerals lying below low-water mark under the open sea adjacent to but not being part of the county of Cornwall were, as between the Queen, in right of her Crown, and the Prince, in right of his Duchy of Cornwall, vested in the Queen "in right of her Crown as part of the soil and territorial possessions of the Crown." It would seem that the Prince, being owner of the shore between high and low-water marks around the county, would control the access from the land to the bed of the sea; and that, as he was the first occupant of the mines, the Crown could be held to be the owner of the fundus maris beyond the limits of the county, independently of a title to the shore, only under the supposed rule of the common law, while the Crown's rights in the sea-bottom adjacent to but beyond the limits of Cornwall would, according to this arbitration and statute, be similar to those which it had been thought to possess around all the coasts of the kingdom.1 §11. In Regina v. Keyn,2 it appeared that the Franconia, a German vessel, while proceeding from one foreign port to another, negligently came in collision with an English vessel off Dover, and at a point less than three miles distant from the coast of England. It was held that the defendant, who was in command of the Franconia, and was charged with manslaughter for causing the death of a passenger upon the English vessel, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the English admiralty. The six judges who dissented from this conclusion were of the opinion that the territory of England and the jurisdiction of the Crown, and the Admiral, included the See the judgment of Amplett, J. A., and Lord Coleridge, C. J., in Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, 121, 155-158, and the criticism upon this arbitration by Cockburn, C. J., in the same case, 2 Ex. D. 199-202. See post, § 12. 22 Ex. D. 63. 3 The trial was in the Central Criminal Court, to which the jurisdiction of the admiral over crimes was trans ferred by Stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36; Stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 2. The judge who presided at the trial reserved the question of jurisdiction for the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. The case was argued a second time in this court before fourteen judges. Archibald, J., one of this number, died before judgment, but agreed with the majority. waters within the three-mile. belt, and the fact that the passenger's death occurred upon an English vessel was regarded by Lord Coleridge, C. J., and Denman, J., as sustaining the jurisdiction. It was also held that express legislation is necessary to confer upon the courts jurisdiction over foreign vessels passing near the coast; that the Admiralty had not such jurisdiction in the particular case under the statutes then in force; that, with respect to both property and jurisdiction, the territorial seas and the ocean beyond are alike high seas, open to the peaceful navigation of all nations,2 and that the territory of England extends only to low-water mark on the external coast.3 §12. Of the opinions delivered in Regina v. Keyn, that of Cockburn, C. J.,4 contains the fullest discussion of the ques See Reg. v. Coombes, 1 Leach, C. C. 388; Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1. The admiralty has no jurisdiction of an offence committed by a foreigner upon a foreign vessel upon the high seas beyond the threemile belt, even when the offence is committed against English subjects. Reg. v. Serva, 1 Den. C. C. 104; Reg. v. Lewis, 1 Dearsley & Bell, C. C. 182; Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63. 2 Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, 70, 77, 82, 91, 119, 206, 217; The Saxonia, 1 Lush. 410; 11 H. L. Cas. 192; L. R. 4 H. L. 266; The Twee Gebroeders, 3 C. Rob. 336, 352; The Vigilantia, 1 C. Rob. 1; The Catharina, 5 C. Rob. 161; The Success, 1 Dodd's Adm. 131; United States v. Kessler, 1 Bald. C. C. 15, 17. 3 In Manning's Law of Nations (Amos's ed.), 119, the purposes for which jurisdiction over the sea may be exercised under the law of nations are said to be: (1) the regulation of fisheries; (2) the prevention of frauds on custom laws; (3) the exaction of harbor and lighthouse dues; and (4) the protection of the territory from violation in time of war between other states. This passage was noticed and apparently approved in Regina v. 4 The learned judge (2 Ex. D. 177,178) regards Bynkershoek, whose treatise De Dominio Maris was published in 1702, as the first to limit the territorial jurisdiction over the sea to the range of cannon. After reviewing the diverse opinions expressed by various writers with reference to the character and extent of this jurisdiction, the opinion proceeds: “But it is said that, although the writers on international law are disagreed on so many essential points, they are all agreed as to the power of a littoral state to deal with the three-mile zone as subject to its dominion, and that consequently we may treat it as sub tions considered and of the Crown's property in the sea. The learned judge, adverting to the fact that Selden, Hale, ject to our law. But this reasoning strikes me as unsatisfactory, for what does this unanimity in the general avail us when we come to the practical application of the law in the particular instance, if we are left wholly in the dark as to the degree to which the law can be legitimately enforced? This unanimity of opinion that the littoral sea is, at all events for some purposes, subject to the dominion of the local state, may go far to show that, by the concurrence of other nations, such a state may deal with these waters as subject to its legislation. But it wholly fails to show that, in the absence of such legislation, the ordinary law of the local state will extend over the waters in question which is the point which we have to determine. Not altogether uninfluenced, perhaps, by the diversity of opinion to which I have called attention, the argument in support of the prosecution presents itself-not without some sacrifice of consistency-in more than one shape. At one time it is asserted that, for the space of three miles, not only the sea itself, but the bed on which it rests, forms part of the territory or realm of the country owning the coast, as though it were so much land; so that the right of passage and anchorage might be of right denied to the ships of other nations. At another time it is said that, while the right is of a territorial character, it is subject to a right of passage by the ships of other nations. Sometimes the sovereignty is asserted, not as based on territorial right, but simply as attaching to the sea, over which it is contended that the nation owning the coast may extend its law to the foreigner navigating within it. To those who assert that to the extent of three miles from the coast, the sea forms part of the realm of England, the question may well be put, When did it become so? Was it so from the beginning? It certainly was not deemed to be so as to the three-mile zone, any more than as to the rest of the high seas, at the time the statutes of Richard II. were passed. For in those statutes a clear distinction is made between the realm and the sea; the jurisdiction of the admiral being (subject to the exception already stated as to murder and mayhem) confined strictly to the latter, and its exercise "within the realm" prohibited in terms. . . . In these statutes the jurisdiction of the admiral is restricted to the high seas, and in respect of murder and mayhem, to the great rivers below the bridges, while whatever is within the realm, in other words within the body of a county, is left within the domain of the common law. There is no distinction taken between one part of the high sea and another. The three-mile zone is no more dealt with as within the realm than the seas at large. The notion of a three-mile zone was in those days in the womb of time. When its origin is traced, it is found to be of comparatively modern growth. The first mention of it by any writer, or in any court of this country, so far as I am aware, was made by Lord Stowell, with reference to a question of neutral rights, in the first year of the present century, in the case of The Twee Gebroeders (3 C. Rob. 162). To this hour it has not, even in theory, yet settled into certainty. For centuries before it was thought of, the great landmarks of our judicial system had been set fast the jurisdiction of the common law over the land and the inland waters contained within it, forming together the realm of England, that of the atural over |