§ 194. A stream of water is a safe boundary of real estate; and when called for as a boundary in the description of a deed, will control courses, distances, the designated quantity,2 or the corners, monuments, and meander lines of

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a survey. A survey which is described as running on the bank of a navigable river, is to be so run that none of the lines shall cross the river, and courses and distances crossing the river will be disregarded so far as they are interfered with by the river.2 The side lines of land which is bounded by a river are to be continued to the stream in a straight line, if not otherwise defined in the deed, and the specified length of such lines is to be disregarded. When a deed, or survey and patent, shows a river to be one of the boundaries of the tract, it is a legal deduction that there is no vacant land left for appropriation between the river and the river boundary of such tract,5 and all the riparian rights incident to the ownership of the shore or bank pass to the grantee, unless clearly reserved. In case of ambiguity, parol evidence is admissible to determine the identical boundary referred to in a conveyance. If, for example, land upon a creek is conveyed and bounded "down the east bank of said creek to the ford below the mill," it would be for the jury to say, if there were two or more banks on the east side of the creek, which was intended as the boundary; but if the vendor has at the time, upon his other land opposite, a mill privilege which is not intended to be conveyed or relinquished, the

1 Shelton v. Maupin, 16 Mo. 124; Doe v. Hildreth, 2 Ind. 274, 284; Singleton v. Whiteside, 5 Yerger, 18; Meigs, 207; Overton v. Cannon, 2 Humph. 264; Simmons v. Baker, Cooke (Tenn.) 146; Verplank v. Hall, 27 Mich. 79; Galveston Co. v. Tankersley, 39 Texas, 651.

2 Phillips v. Ayres, 45 Texas, 601. 3 Howard v. Moale, 2 H. & Johns. 249; Buckley v. Gilmore, 12 Ohio, 63; Hastings v. Stevenson, 2 Ohio, 8; Patterson v. Trask, 30 Maine, 28; Klingensmith v. Ground, 5 Watts, 458; Swisher v. Grumbles, 18 Texas, 164.

4 Graves v. Fisher, 5 Maine, 69; Pollock v. Harris, 1 Hay. (N. C.) 252; Carraway v. Witherington, N. C. Term. Rep. 275. Where a grant called for a certain number of poles, "to a stake,

crossing the river," it was held that the line must cross, the river, though the distance terminated before reaching it. Whiteside . Singleton, Meigs (Tenn.) 207.

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County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 63; Churchill v. Grundy, 5 Dana, 100; Trustees v. Wagnon, 1 A. K. Marsh. 243; Bruce v. Taylor, 2 J. J. Marsh. 160; Reid v. Langford, 3 Id. 420; Walker v. Orr, Hughes (Ky.) 38; Smith v. Evans, Id. 169; Bradford v. McClelland, Id. 195; Cockrell v. McQuinn, 4 Mon. 62; Bruce v. Morgan, 1 B. Mon. 26; French v. Bankhead, 11 Gratt. 136, 157; Brown v. Huger, 21 How. 305; Posey v. James, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 98.

Ibid.; Richardson v. Prentiss, 48 Mich. 88.

court may decide, as matter of law, that the top of the bank above the ford, and not the low-water line, is the boundary, the intervening space being more appropriate for the use of the mill. A plan referred to in the conveyance becomes a part thereof, and has the same effect as if its details of courses, distances, and monuments were incorporated in the instrument.2 Where the shore and a plan referred to in a deed were incompatible, the plan was considered the more certain and controlled. But if a grant calls for a natural boundary, like a lake, which is not laid down upon a plat annexed thereto, the plat does not control the calls of the grant. A description which is so uncertain that it cannot be identified is void. If a boundary line is described in a deed as running from a creek which is several thousand feet in length, without other designation of the starting-point, and the description will be satisfied if the line starts from any point on the creek, the deed is indefinite and inoperative.5 When a tract of land extends along a river, the exterior lines are to be run so that every point in them shall be at the given distance from the nearest point on the stream, unless particular courses are given for the exterior lines.7 A con

1 Jenkins v. Cooper, 50 Alą. 419. 601; Fuller v. Williams, Busb. Eq. 2 Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Maine, 169; 162; Horton v. Cook, 1 Jones Eq. Erskine v. Moulton, 66 Maine, 276; 270; McDiarmid v. McMillan, 5 Jones Wellington v. Murdock, 41 Maine, Eq. 29; Hinchey v. Nichols, 72 N. C. 281; Whitman v. Boston & Maine 66; Speed v. Wilson, Sneed (Ky.) Railroad, 3 Allen, 133; McIver v. 78; Donnebaum v. Tinsley, 54 Texas, Walker, 4 Wheat. 444; 9 Cranch, 362; Shipp v. Miller, 2 Wheat. 316; 173; Blaney v. Rice, 20 Pick. 62; Swanton v. Crooker, 52 Maine, 415; Magoun v. Lapham, 21 Pick. 135; Martin v. Boon, 2 Ohio, 238; Miles v. Shufeldt v. Spaulding, 37 Wis. 662; Knott, 12 Gill & J. 442. Greater cerLoring v. Norton, 8 Maine, 61; Pro- tainty in describing the land is reprietors v. Tiffany, 1 Maine, 210; quired in a legal process, like a petiEaton v. Knapp, 29 Maine, 20; tion for partition, than would suffice Walker v. Boynton, 120 Maine, 349; in a conveyance. Miller v. Miller, 16 Lunt v. Holland, 14 Mass. 149; Davis Pick. 215. r. Rainsford, 17 Mass. 207; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston, 127 Mass. 376.

3 Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Maine, 169. 4 President v. Clark, 9 Ired. 58; Jamison v. Cornell, 3 Hun, 557; 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 628.

6 Winthrop v. Curtis, 3 Maine, 110; Dunn v. Hayes, 21 Maine, 76; Jackson v. Lunt, 2 Caines, 363; Van Gordon r. Jackson, 5 Johns. 440; Williams v. Jackson, Id. 489; Jackson v. Joy, 9 Johns. 192.

7 Keith v. Reynolds, 3 Maine, 393;

5 Le Frane v. Richmond, 5 Sawyer, Donaldson r. Lucett, 2 Caines, 363;

tract for land lying on both sides of Cold River," to be paid for at the rate of one hundred dollars per acre, does not bind the purchaser to pay for the river bed, although that passes by the deed.1 In Holbert v. Edens,2 in Tennessee, it was held that the purchaser, at a stipulated price per acre, of land which is bounded by the meanders of a river is only required to pay for the land bounded by a line running with the ordinary low-water mark, and any islands which may be between that line and the thread of the stream, and not for the river bed. Where land, described as grass land bounded by a drain, and containing about twenty-three acres, "but to be surveyed," was purchased at a specified price per acre, and measured about twenty-one acres to the edge of the drain, and about twenty-three acres to its centre, the purchaser was required to pay the stipulated price for the land to the middle of the stream.3

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§ 195. When riparian estates are conveyed, the owner may reserve the land under water, but the general presumption, in all cases, is that the purchaser's title extends as far as the grantor owns. The legal effect of the conveyance is determined by the terms employed, and cannot be controlled by parol testimony,5 unless there is a latent ambiguity, or the description itself is rejected as false, or the identical boundary referred to in the conveyance is in dispute. If land is bounded by Broad River, it may be

Nicholl v. Huntington, 1 Johns. Ch. Corliss, 63 Maine, 287; Nickerson v. 166. Crawford, 16 Maine, 247.

1 Daniels v. Cheshire Railroad Co., 20 N. H. 85.

2 5 Lea, 204.

8 Re Popple, 25 W. R. 248. See Higginbotham v. Stoddard, 72 N. Y. 94; Ardery v. Rowles, 71 Penn. St. 369; Shand v. Triplett, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 76.

4 Boston v. Richardson, 13 Allen, 155; Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 4 Pick. 268; Pratt v. Lamson, 2 Allen, 275, 284.

5 Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vt. 262; Platt v. Jones, 43 Cal. 219; Bartlett v.

6 White v. Luning, 93 U. S. 515; Pride v. Lunt, 19 Maine, 115; Hurley v. Morgan, 1 Dev. & Bat. 425; Becton v. Chestnut, 4 Dev. & Bat. 335; Hill v. Mason, 7 Jones, 551; Slade v. Green, 2 Hawks, 218; Lynch v. Allen, 4 Dev. & Bat. 62.

7 Ibid.; Emery v. Webster, 42 Maine, 204; Gerrish v. Towne, 3 Gray, 82; McCuthen ». McCuthen, 9 Porter, 650; Jenkins v. Cooper, 50 Ala. 419; Williams v. Kivett, 82 N. C. 110; Nourse v. Lloyd, 1 Penn. St. 220; Couchman v. Thomas, Hardin (Ky.)

shown that Catawba River was intended; and where land was bounded in a deed "by the side of the mill-pond,” parol evidence was admitted of an intent to limit the grant to the margin of the water, as it overflowed in the spring.2 In the case of tide waters, the ordinary high-water mark is the boundary of the adjoining lands at common law; but in those States in which the title of the owner of the upland extends to lowwater mark, the flats pass as appurtenant to, or parcel of, the upland, when that is conveyed, unless a different intention is manifested by the deed. In Massachusetts and Maine, a grant of the upland, made since the ordinance of 1647, passes the adjoining shore to the extent of the grantor's title, if not restricted by specific description, but bounded generally by the water: as "by the sea," "tide water," or "salt water,"6 "by the harbor," "bay,"8 "cove," "creek," 10 "river," or "the stream" of a tidal river.12 So, under this ordinance, a boundary by a tidal creek, the bed of which is bare at low

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277; Jones v. Burgett, 46 Texas, Worcester Railroad Co., 1 Cush. 575, 285.

1 Middleton v. Perry, 2 Bay, 539. 2 Lowell v. Robinson, 16 Maine, 357.

Ante, § 27; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 237; Canal Commissioners v. People, 5 Wend. 423, 446; Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N. Y. 377, 385; State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 525; East Haven v. Hemingway, 7 Conn. 186; More v. Massini, 37 Cal. 432; Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. Ann. 324. See Mayor v. Hart, 16 Hun, 380.

4 Ante, § 169.

5 Ante, § 169. A conveyance of "one-half of the land and flats below the house in quantity and quality," creates an estate in common between the parties. Adams v. Frothingham, 3 Mass. 352.

6 Boston v. Richardson, 105 Mass. 351, 355; 13 Allen, 155; Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 439; Mayhew v. Norton, 17 Pick. 357; Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick. 85; Green v. Chelsea, 24 Pick. 71; Jackson v. Boston &

578; Saltonstall v. Long Wharf, 7 Cush. 195, 200; Doane v. Willcutt, 5 Gray, 328, 335, 336. In New York v. Hart, 16 Hun, 380, it was held that a grant to a town, for the benefit of the public, and bounded by a navigable river, extends to low-water mark.

7 Boston v. Richardson, 105 Mass. 355; Mayhew v. Norton, 17 Pick. 357. 8 Ibid.; Partridge v. Luce, 36 Maine, 16.

9 Hathaway v. Wilson, 123 Mass. 359.

10 Ibid.; Harlow v. Fisk, 12 Cush. 302.

11 Ibid.; Trull v. Wheeler, 19 Pick. 240; Moore v. Griffin, 22 Maine, 350; Pike v. Monroe, 36 Maine, 309; Brackett v. Persons Unknown, 53 Maine, 238. See Mobile v. Emanuel, 1 How. 95; 17 Peters, 155.

12 Ibid.; Boston v. Richardson, 13 Allen, 155; Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Maine, 85, 92; Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumner, 170; Dunlap v. Stetson, 4 Mason, 366.