certain powers of jurisdiction and control conferred upon Congress by the Federal Constitution, but the property itself was not granted to the general government. The powers thus ceded to the United States include: First, The right of jurisdiction by its courts, as defined and regulated by Congress, in admiralty and maritime causes arising upon the high seas or upon navigable waters within the limits of a State, and accessible to vessels from other States; Second, The power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.2 The powers thus conferred upon Congress are distinct, having no necessary connection with each other, and being conferred in the constitution by separate grants.3 Neither of them is absolutely exclusive of State authority. In causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the right of a common-law remedy is expressly saved to suitors where the common law is competent to give it ; and, if Congress has not excluded State legislation, the State courts retain concurrent jurisdiction in maritime cases, where, previous to the constitution, they had jurisdiction of the subject-matter.5 So the commerce clause of the constitution does not make nugatory legislation by a State which affects commerce and does not interfere with the existing regulations of Congress upon the same subject. The admiralty jurisdiction does not

U. S. Const. art. 3, § 2; U. S. Rev. Stats. § 563. The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443; Fretz v. Bull, 12 How. 466; United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; Allen v. Newberry, 21 How. 244; Maguire v. Card, Id. 248; Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How. 296; Waring v. Clark, 5 How. 441; New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Eagle, 8 Wall. 15; Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; The Commerce, 1 Black, 574. Artificial canals, when channels of international commerce, are within the jurisdiction of the admiralty. Scott v. The Young America, 1 Newb. Adm. 101, 106; The

Oler, 2 Hughes, 12; The Avon, 1
Brown Adm. 170.

2 U. S. Const. art. 1, § 8; Hallet v. Novion, 14 Johns. 273; Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns. 257.

The Commerce, 1 Black, 574, 579; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.

4 U. S. Rev. Stats. § 563; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336.

5 Reynolds v. The Favorite, 10 Minn. 242; Morin v. The F. Sigel, Id. 250; Bohannan v. Hammond, 42 Cal. 227.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 463; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 371, 378; Wilson r. Blackbird Creek Co., 2 Peters, 245; Crandall r. Nevada, 6

extend to injuries sustained on land, as where a wharf or elevator is injured by a collision with, or a fire originating upon, a vessel, although it includes injuries to vessels caused by illegal obstructions in navigable waters; 2 and claims for wharfage. But the power to regulate commerce extends to acts done on land which interfere with commerce or navigation.1

§ 34. The right of Congress to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate navigation upon the navigable waters of the United States, and to keep such waters open and free for the purposes of intercourse with foreign nations and between different States.5 The navigable waters of the United States are those which, whether fresh or salt, form, in their ordinary condition, by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is, or may be, carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water. The power of Congress upon this subject does

Wall. 35; Cox v. State, 3 Blackf. 197;
People v. St. Louis, 10 Ill. 350; In-
graham v. Chicago Railroad Co., 34
Iowa, 249; 1 Kent Com. 439.

'The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213; United States v. Winchester, 99 U. S. 372; The Maud Webster, 8 Ben. 547; The Ottawa, 5 Am. L. T. Rep. 147; The Mary Stewart, 8 So. L. Rev. 2.

"Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. Atlee, 2 Dillon, 479; 21 Wall. 389; The Mohler, 21 Wall. 230; The Lady Pike, 21 Wall. 1; King v. American Transportation Co., 1 Flippin, 1.

Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68; The Kate Tremaine, 5 Ben. 60; Union Wharf Co. v. Steamer Starin, 45 Conn. 585.

v. Buckley, 20 How. 84; The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; The Passaic Bridges, 3 Wall. 782; County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 724; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564; 1 Kent Com. 439; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 229; The Bright Star, 1 Woolw. 266; Rogers v. Cincinnati, 5 McLean, 337; The Brig Wilson, 1 Brock. 423; The Chusan, 2 Story, 456; Navigation Co. v. Dwyer, 29 Texas, 376. The power given to Congress to regulate commerce does not, it seems, include the regulation of navigation with the Indians. Moor v.

4 United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. Veazie, 32 Maine, 343. 72.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 193; United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72; Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 392, 401; Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568; Withers

6 The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430; Gilv. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 724; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; Mobile Co. v. Kimball,

man

not stop at the boundaries of the States, and, when exercised, is exclusive of State authority. If it authorizes the obstruction of public navigable waters, its action is conclusive as to the extent to which the public interests will be promoted by the interference with, or termination of, the navigation.2 It possesses all powers necessary to the protection and improve-. ment of the channels of intercourse; the right to declare what shall or shall not be deemed an illegal obstruction of navigation, either before or after its erection or condemnation as a nuisance, and the power to close one of several channels in a navigable river, in order to make the others more useful for navigation. The methods approved by Congress for the improvement of a harbor prevail, in case of conflict with State legislation upon the same subject. The commercial power of Congress over the Savannah River is not restricted by the compact between the States of South Carolina and Georgia prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, which provided that the northern branch of the river should

102 U. S. 691; Lord v. Steamship Co., Id. 541; Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Peters, 245; New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 102, 149; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 518; 18 Id. 421; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Silliman v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 2 Wall. 403;1 Black, 582; 4 Blatch. 74, 395; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148; United States v. Duluth, 1 Dillon, 469; United States v. Coombs, 12 Peters, 72; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 258; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 417; Morse v. Home Ins. Co., 30 Wis. 496.

1 Sinnott v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Halderman v. Beckwith, 4 McLean, 286.

2 Miller v. Mayor, 13 Blatch. 469; People v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475.

3 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96

U. S. 1; Works v. Junction Railroad
Co., 5 McLean, 425; United States v.
Railroad Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 517.

4 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 518; 18 How. 421; The Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall. 454; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 196; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 394; People v. Brooks, 4 Denio, 469. When Congress legislates, it suspends, but does not necessarily repeal, the State law. Sturgis v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 446; 52 Barb. 436; Henderson v. Spofford, 59 N. Y. 131; Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236; Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238, 244; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99.

5 Ibid.; South Carolina v. Georgia, 94 U. S. 4.

6 Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 379; 2 Dillon, 406; United States v. Duluth, 1 Dillon, 469; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; post, c. 4.

be the boundary between them, and that the navigation along a specified channel of the river should be forever free to the citizens of both States, and exempt from interruption by either State.1

§ 35. Under the Constitution of the United States, a State has the right, if its legislation does not conflict with the action of Congress upon the same subject, to authorize bridges and dams across the navigable waters within its limits; to license wharves, piers, and docks intruding upon such waters; 3 to establish harbor lines to which wharves may be extended; 4 to prescribe the places and manner in which vessels may lie in a harbor, and what lights they are to carry at night;5 to

pass reasonable quarantine and inspection laws, and pilotage, or port regulations; to improve the navigability of its waters, and to authorize the collection of tolls in consideration of such improvements.2 Either of two States, bordering upon navigable waters leading to the sea, may license pilots, and enact pilotage regulations, but cannot exclude pilots licensed by the other State, even from those parts of such waters and those ports which are within its own territorial limits. The improvement, by the States, of the navigable waters within their respective limits, will not be permitted to impair their free navigation under the laws of Congress; but the inaction of Congress in such matters. amounts to an assent to the exercise of State authority so long as such inaction continues. 4 The State, or those acting under its authority, cannot lay tonnage duties, or

and station vessels, and imposing a penalty for violation of their orders, is a valid police regulation. Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cowen, 349; Commissioners v. Clark, 33 N. Y. 251; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; Simpson's Appeal, 77 Penn. St. 270. So is an act of the State legislature regulating the speed of steamboats while passing the wharves of a city. People v. Jenkins, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 469. And a state statute defining what lights shall be carried on its internal waters, may continue in force, notwithstanding subsequent legislation by Congress on the same subject. Fitch v. Livingston, 4 Sand. (N. Y.) 492. The pilot laws of a State may fix the compensation of pilots beyond the State boundaries. The Nevada, 7 Ben. 386; Horton v. Smith, 6 Ben. 264; The Traveller, Id. 280; Wilson v. Mills, 10 Abb. Pr. N. s. 143; 4 Daly, 549. The exercise by the States of the power to regulate pilotage does not withdraw it from the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 581.

The James Gray v. The John Frazier, 21 How. 184.

2 Wisconsin River Improvement Co. v. Manson, 43 Wis. 255; Chicago v. McGinn, 51 Ill. 266, 273; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 3 McLean, 226; Carondelet Canal Co. v. Parker, 29 La. Ann. 430; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Kirk, 46 Penn. St. 112; McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush, 447; Kellogg v. Union Co., 12 Conn. 7; Benjamin v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 42 Mich. 628; Nelson v. Cheboygan Slack-water Navigation Co., 44 Mich. 7. 3 The Clymene, 24 Alb. L. Journ.

491.

4 Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691.

5 Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273; Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; Hackley v. Geraghty, 34 N. J. L. 332; John Kyle Steamboat Co. v. New Orleans, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 19.