mileage-book and handed it to the man whom he had never before seen, telling him to send it back when he reached his destination. The remonstrances of his clerk-who was also his devoted friend and helper-he answered with a smile, turning to his desk in dismissal of the subject. Some time after, so long that there was a chance he had been deceived, the book came back, with the amount of fare enclosed in a poorly-written but most earnest letter of thanks. Anything like this naturally brought him in conflict with the railroads, but he would settle the difficulty by paying the difference in fare, remarking: "The very rich man can ride in a private car; the moderately wealthy may ride on a pass; and the wellto-do is able to buy a mileage-book at two cents a mile. It is only the poor man who is compelled to pay the full price.”

One cold winter morning three men came in and asked for money to get a Salvation-Army dinner, saying they were out of work. He drew out a five-dollar bill and gave them, telling them to bring back the change, as he had none. "You will never see that money again," remarked his clerk.

Late in the afternoon they returned, but Mr. Jones being out, they handed what was left to Mr. Voit.

"Is it all right?" asked the latter. They hesitated. "All but twenty cents," one said at last. "We took a drink out of what was left and thought we would run away with the rest, but we concluded we could n't treat a man like that in so mean a way."

Through all the years I knew him and when he was under the hottest fire of criticism, I never heard him speak unkindly of his enemies. And in his public life, through his political campaigns his condemnation was always of methods and measures, never of men.

Much of interest regarding the life of this man must necessarily be omitted from this article. I have said little of his political campaigns, carried on with no bribing of voters, no promises given

for influence and work, without appeal to partisan feeling, and with no catering to any class of society.

From the closing of his first term as Mayor, the magic of his name would call together crowds of eager listeners, the majority of whom were working-men and women, to whom he would talk simply and naturally of their duties to each other and to the community in which they lived. "The ideal government," he would say, "is one where the strongest will always help the weakest." Without cant, but with an intense earnestness that held the attention of the most careless, he presented the highest religious ideal as the practical one to live by.

The Golden Rule he declared to be an exact science. "It is really the physical law of action and reaction expressed in morals. It is the law of life, of relationand it works."

"I intend to be always in politics," he often declared, "working and voting for those candidates who seem to me to be looking most toward the light of liberty and equality."

Letters of commendation from thinkers and reformers came to him from all over the world. "It is a great joy to me," wrote Tolstoi, after the third election of Mr. Jones, "to know that such ideas as are expressed in your address are approved by a great majority of your people.'

"The work you are doing for human welfare," wrote Edwin Markham, "is far larger than the orbit in which you move; it is an object-lesson to the world."

In similar vein were letters from W. D. Howells, R. Heber Newton, Edward Everett Hale, Thomas Wentworth Higginson and almost countless others whose names are familiar household words.

Perhaps the letters which touched him most deeply, for which he cared most, were those from children telling him their troubles and asking him for all sorts of things, expressing their childish faith in his will to do what they desired. He loved children and they knew and loved him with fervor.

The life of Mr. Jones, both public and private, has the deepest moral significance from every point of view.

The man whose whole aim under every condition was to do every thing in his power to help unfortunate men and women to live better lives and do nothing to hinder them, finally won the love and trust of the great body of the people to a most unprecedented degree. And even though there were those who bitterly opposed him as dangerous; though the legislature repealed the law by which a mayor could take the place of the policejudge, because of the rulings which he made in that position with regard to criminals, few indeed were they who questioned the sincerity of his motives or doubted his integrity.

The outpouring of the people upon the day of his funeral was such as has been rarely witnessed in any city. Thousands stood for hours in the hot July sun upon

the lawn before the house and in the avenues leading thither, sorrowfully awaiting the moment when the body of their friend should be borne to its final resting-place. And all along the route to the cemetery groups of men and women stood with bared heads-many with tears streaming down their faces-while the procession slowly passed by. They loved him so these people.

Nor do they forget him, nor the things for which he worked. His name is one to conjure with to-day, and the lesson of brotherhood which he taught will remain a living influence even when the memory of the personal man has grown dim by the passing of the years. They will recall that by his life he exemplified this thought:

"Shun sorrow not; be brave to bear
The world's dark weight of sin and care;
Spend and be spent, yearn, suffer, give,
And in thy brethren learn to live."

THE

HE HEART of the railroad problem is the abolition of unjust discrimination between persons and places. President Roosevelt has recognized this fact, and in his messages to Congress has placed his chief emphasis upon the necessity of stopping rebates, midnight tariffs, private-car and terminal railroad abuses, elevator allowances and all other forms of favoritism.

"Above all else," he declares, "we must strive to keep the highways of commerce open to all on equal terms; and to do this it is necessary to put a complete stop to all rebates."

The law already requires that commoncarriers shall be impartial. And justice in this instance coincides with law. Outside of the Oil-Trust, Beef-Trust, one or

two professors in Rockefeller's Oil University, the people who infest the stockexchanges and other haunts of gamblers in railway stocks, and some other ethical slums in our big cities-the conscience of the civilized world is practically a unit on this point. Constitutional provisions and state and federal statutes have been enacted by the carload to enforce the rule. The railroads themselves declare that it is right. And yet in spite of the railway conscience and the common law, the universal sense of justice of mankind, and the whole legislative, executive and judicial power of the government, the rule is not obeyed. On the contrary, disre gard of it is chronic and contagious, and constitutes one of the leading characteristics of our railway system.

In order to understand this phenomenon and arrive at reasonable conclusions as to the means of abolishing the evils of unjust discrimination, we must study the causes, the purposes and the motives that lead railway traffic managers to make discriminating rates.

(1.) First the managers make special rates to keep business from going to competing lines. For example, as a railroad president said to me some months ago in illustrating this point:

"A representative of the Beef Combine asked the traffic-manager of a leading road for a reduction of two cents a hundred on the rate from Chicago to New York. The traffic-manager refused. Some weeks later it was noticed that this

road was no longer getting any of the Armour business. The manager sent for the agent of the packers and said: 'Why have you taken your business from our line?' "Well,' said the agent, I asked you for a two-cent reduction on the rate and you would not give it to me.' He did not say that the other roads were giving him cut rates, but that was the natural inference; and the effect was the same in

any case.

"The traffic-manager said: 'Well, what do you want us to do?'

"We want the two-cent reduction per hundred that we asked for some time ago.' "And if we give you that reduction will you return to our road a due proportion of your business, at least as much as we were getting six weeks ago?'

"Yes,' replied the agent. "Very well,' said the traffic-manager, 'you shall have the reduction."

(2.) A second cause for discrimination is the desire to get new business. Any additional traffic that will pay more than the cost of handling adds to the net income of the road. Jim Hill's cars come east from the Pacific loaded with lumber. There is not sufficient west-bound trade to fill those cars and many of them must go back empty unless by making low rates sufficient goods can be induced to

move to supply tonnage for the westbound trains. In such a case it will pay to make any rate above the additional cost due to the carriage of the goods in question in trains which must move anyway whether the cars are loaded or not.

Even where there is no question of empty cars very low rates may be made to develop new business, which either would not move at all at ordinary rates, or would not move by railway transportation. A Southern manufacturer de

sired to build a chimney of Jersey bricks, but the freight-rates made the cost too high. In order that the Jersey brick might compete with Southern brick and the railways get the tonnage they made a very low special rate on this shipment from New Jersey. On the same principle goods have been carried all the way from Hamburg to Denver more cheaply than the same goods could be transported from Chicago to Denver. And the railways have made arrangements so that hats, caps, shoes, blankets, and many other sorts of freight could go from Liverpool to San Francisco for $1.07 per hundred, while the same sort of goods of domestic manufacture have had to pay $2.88 and even $3.70 per hundred from New Orleans to San Francisco; the railone-sixth as much for the carriage of imways receiving in many cases less than ported goods as for the carriage of domestic goods of the same kind in the same trains.

(3.) Another purpose of discrimination is to simplify and solidify traffic. Many a railroad man in the West has assured me that it is much easier to give one good, sharp, hustling man a cut-rate on grain and let him scoop the market than to try to deal with a large number of shippers all anxious to get the best possible rates, and multitudinous in their shipments, their importunities and their complaints. If they give concessions to a large number of grain-shippers the facts are almost sure to leak and other roads will cut below the line and take the traffic. But if one man only has the cut-rate or rebate he will

keep it to himself and capture the market and the road will get the tonnage with the least possible expenditure of time and energy and the greatest economy in the massing of shipments and condensation of billing and collection, etc.

(4.) The fourth and most prolific cause of unjust discrimination is the desire to favor persons who through political influence or other power may aid or injure the road. For this reason passes are given to legislators, congressmen, judges, sheriffs, auditors and others who are in a position to help or hurt the railroad interests. I have in my possession several photographs of passes given by the Pennsylvania Railroad to members of the legislature. Some of these passes are dated 1904 and some are dated 1905.

The Constitution of Pennsylvania, section 8 of article 8, says: "No railroad, railway or other transportation company shall grant free passes or passes at a discount to any persons except officers or employés of the company." The question is whether the members of the Pennsylvania legislature are employés of the Pennsylvania Railroad. A good many people think they are.

This motive of favoring influential persons applies to the making of freightrates as well as to the management of the passenger service. In the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company case, for instance, a company which is controlled by Standard Oil interests was given a rebate on shipments of coal over the Santa Fé lines from Trinidad, Colorado, to Deming, New Mexico, and other points. There was no competing railway in this case nor any question of new business or simplification. The Santa Fé transported the Fuel Company's coal at $2.90 a ton against the published tariff of $4.05 which other shippers had to pay, and the real reason for the discrimination was simply that the persons interested in the Colorado Fuel Company had great influence in the railway councils and were powerful enough to injure the railroad if their demands for favors were not granted.

(5.) Another motive for discrimination is the wish to advance the interest or enhance the value of a business, property or place in which the railway or its offlcers are interested, or to favor persons who through friendship, marriage, business or civic connection or other relationship have a "pull" with the management. Take for example the Hutchinson Salt case (1903-04). There are sixteen saltmills in Hutchinson, Kansas, nine of which are combined in what is known as the Salt-Trust, the rest being independent. The president of the Salt-Trust was Joy Morton, brother of Paul Morton who was head of the traffic department of the Santa Fé railroad. The Salt-Trust owns some switch-tracks around the mills amounting in all to less than a mile of track. They incorporated this as a railroad company and asked for a division of rates. The Santa Fé gave the trustrailroad 25 per cent. of the through rates, equivalent to a rebate of 50 cents a ton on shipments to Missouri river points, so that the Trust was enabled to drive the independents out of those markets and take their packing-house contracts away from them.

Another illustration of this principle is the tendency of railway managers, especially on western lines, to favor towns and cities in the development of which they or their friends or business associates have personal interests. Railroad directors frequently invest in town lots or other property at special points on their roads and then manage the road in such a way as to draw traffic to those points and rapidly increase the value of their property.

(6.) Sometimes the railway management will discriminate in order to kill or injure a person or place that has incurred the enmity of the road or its officials. It is said that a town in Montana, which had displeased the Northern Pacific, was punished by entire deprivation of all railroad facilities. The management refused to stop their trains within the limits of the town; built a station two miles

beyond in the open prairie and ran their trains right through the old town, built up another settlement around the new station and practically ruined the offending town. Even President James J. Hill is accused of inflicting a similar punishment on a Minnesota town that incurred his displeasure. He moved the station half a mile out of town into the middle of swamps, and made the people walk out to the new station.*

The remedies proposed by President Roosevelt and others for the prevention of discrimination are the fixing of maximum rates, the lowering of the open rate to all shippers to the level of any rebate or concession given to favorite shippers, the recovery of double the value of rebates or concessions from the beneficiaries thereof, pooling and publicity.

It is clear that the fixing of maximum rates could not prevent discrimination. The railroads disregard the rates fixed by themselves and protected by law by publication under the Interstate Commerce Act, and there is no reason to suppose that they would refrain from cutting rates fixed by any other authority.

The fixing of the open rate at the level of the cut-rate or concession given to favored shippers would seriously disturb the business of transportation and would punish innocent railways more severely than the guilty ones. Suppose the Santa Fé were found to be giving a 50 per cent. concession to certain shippers of fruit from California to Chicago and Eastern points; if the open rate were cut to the rebate level the Santa Fé would get all the fruit business from California unless competing roads cut their rates in a corresponding ratio, which might mean serious loss to revenue and a practical war of rates brought on by intervention of law. It would seem that some method should be used that would punish the

*The illustrations given in the text afford but a few glimpses of the various forms in which discrimination makes its appearance. In my Railways, Trusts and the People I have enumerated over sixty methods of unjust discrimination now in use on our railways.

road in fault rather than those who are innocent in respect to the matter in hand. Another trouble with this plan and with the publicity plan and the collection of double damages from rebate beneficiaries, etc., is the fact that rebates and other forms of favoritism are resorted to in secrecy. In many cases no records are kept, or if kept they are destroyed upon the slightest hint that they may be desired in evidence, and as the Interstate Commerce Commission has abundantly shown, railway managers, as a rule, absolutely refuse to tell the truth about discrimination.

Discussing the continuance of the demand for rebates in the spring of 1905 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Commissioner Prouty said:†

"When I first came into the Interstate Commerce Commission (1897), I used to see continually in the newspapers statements like these: 'Rates sadly demoralized,' 'Agreement between railroad officers to restore rates,' and everything of that sort. I said to my associates: 'Gentlemen, this thing will not do; we must stop the payment of rebates.' They said: 'How are you going to stop the payment of rebates?' I said: 'We are going to call these gentlemen before us; we are going to put them under oath, and we are going to make them admit they paid these rebates, and we are going to use the evidence which we obtain to convict them.' We employed Mr. Day, who is now with the Department of Justice. The rates which have been almost uniformly demoralized have been the grain rates from Chicago to the Atlantic seaboard. We called in the chief traffic officials of all these lines and we put them under oath. Now, I would ask these gentlemen, 'Are you the chief traffic official of this road?' 'I am.' 'Would you know it if a rebate was paid?' 'I would.' 'Are any rebates paid on your road?' 'There are none.' 'The rates are absolutely maintained 2'They are.' + Sen. Com., 1905, pp. 2,899, 2,901, 2,911.