rush on and attain, they give up in despair and enlist in the army of trade, is it the age that is to blame? Or is it the masters of the age, those men who think it nefarious that the young men and women of America should idle with art when trade is in danger, whose armies are calling for recruits, and who, using the machinery of education, see to it that their will is obeyed, that their fighting line is kept full? We ask again, is there some dark contract that is being fulfilled? Are the millions that are being poured into the coffers of our universities really not a charity but a price paid for service? One of the largest of these institutions has lately appointed a committee to ascertain, if possible, why it is that the scores who annually go from her supposedly equipped for the production of great books, are afterwards never heard of, or heard of only as space-writers for the daily press or as contributors to the magazines. Has this been done to allay the growing suspicions of the public and to stay its wrath? One of those investigations the purpose of which is to prevent investigation? Or is it really a sign of the dawn? Can it be that our universities are actually waking up? And they have begun to lose faith in their own creed that the cause is in the age!

We confess we should much prefer to see this investigation carried on by outside parties. This arrangement would be more satisfactory all round. The public would then have no cause to question the findings of the committee on

the ground of "undue influence," or to wink, as it sometimes does, when in municipal affairs a committee appointed to examine into the soundness of a work is composed of those who have done the work. And apart from this, we are not sure that the training of professors is such as to make it possible for them to find out what we want to know. What we want to know is what is the matter with our literature. If something were the matter with our finances we would call in not professors of finance but financiers. If something were wrong with our art we would consult not teachers of art but artists. Then if we suggest that in the present case the committee be composed not of professors of literature but of producers of literature we believe we are within the lines of common sense. And we would further suggest that the scope of the investigation be extended, that the committee be asked to inquire into and state, first, whether it find the method employed in teaching literature to be, as we claim, the anatomical method; second, whether it find the condition on which fellowships are awarded to be, as we claim, an aptitude for dissecting literature; and third, as to the cause of these stupendous follies. And finally, we would suggest that the report be made public. If the work is done as its importance demands that it should be done, the document should become historic.

EDWIN DAVIES SCHOONMAKER. Cincinnati, Ohio.

R

ECENT, as well as former, discussions of the immigration problem have yielded a prolific crop of endorsements of the "value" of good immigrants. Quite naturally, these gentlemen, whose horizon is bounded by the counting-house and the stock-market, dilate upon the "value" of immigrants, even comparing them with the salable price of negroes in ante-bellum days, in proof of their theory.

Of "value" to whom? it may be asked. As the immigrant usually brings little but strength, and habits of industry and thrift, whence comes this "value"? Of what does it consist?

Oh! we are told, he is valuable as a producer and consumer.

How clear! This is about as lucid as the average college professor's political

economy.

It is as wise as it would be to say, that loss and profit are equally valuable to the manufacturer or merchant.

Production is profit, but consumption is loss. No amount of fetich worship of the "favorable" balance-of-trade theory can make it anything else.

First, as to producers. How are producers benefitted by the addition to their number of another producer-an immigrant?

Is production made easier for them? If production of their products is increased is not the price of their product reduced? As to consumers. How are consumers benefited by an increase in the number of consumers?

If an increase of products lowers prices to consumers, does not an increase in consumption raise them to consumers?

But some say: "The immigrant's 'value' as a producer is balanced by his 'value' as a consumer"!

If so, his "value" is eliminated, just as

the merchant's gain is nil if his losses equal his profits.

If the immigrant's "value" as a consumer equaled his value as a producer there would be no immigration problem other than an embargo on criminals, the demented and the physically incapable. Then American workingmen would have no cause for opposing his entry, nor would the American manufacturer desire to import him. That the former opposes and the latter stimulates immigration proves that as a producer and consumer the immigrant is not in balance.

If he is not in balance in these two capacities, what is the cause?

Before seeking the answer, let us first inquire upon what the exponents of the "value" theory base their contention.

Do they mean that an increase in numbers increases efficiency in production, and, therefore, a greater production results?

If so, there should be a corresponding reduction in price.

If, for instance, three persons produce, say, 8, while four would produce 12, then a reduction of price should result of from ths, to ths, or, for better comparison, from 4ths, toths.

If this had been general the most eager to welcome immigrants would be other workers.

It is admitted by all that increased numbers does result in a relatively greater production. Has there been a corresponding reduction in price to consumers? No one so contends. Why not? Why does not this natural law operate? Why is it that from the workers comes the opposition to immigration?

The reason is obvious. They find that an increase in available workers decreases the chances-and, therefore, the remuneration-for workers.

Evidently the balance is out of gear. Evidently their "value" as consumers does not equal their "value" as producers. And this in spite of the increased efficiency which their numbers give.

Why? Because there has been an interference with the natural law.

Why are employers so anxious for immigration?

If an increase in the number of producers resulted in an increase of pay corresponding to the increased efficiency in production, would employers be so anxious to facilitate immigration?

If such increased production resulted either in an increase of pay of, say, from 24ths to 24ths, or in a reduction of prices of from ths to 24ths, would employers encourage immigration?

If they did, we may be sure it would not be in their capacity of employers, but in some other capacity.

It must be remembered that workers seldom have any other relation to their employers than that of workers, while employers (merchants and manufacturers) are frequently also landowners entirely apart from their real estate used for manufacturing or merchandising.

In this is to be found a part of their desire to increase the available number of workers, as their land is made more valuable by the added population and the increased demand for its use. At the same time the increase in workers increases the competition for employment and so forces down the price to be paid to workers.

But test the "value" theory from another standpoint.

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So experienced an employer-and monopolist as Andrew Carnegie puts the value" at a thousand dollars a head. Accepting this as the correct measure of "value" let us see how it works.

Suppose a community of a thousand inhabitants, and that ten immigrants arrive. This $1,000 is based, I assume, upon an estimate of 25 years of efficient production, or an annual "value" of $40.

If the thousand-dollar theory is cor

rect, then the return to the one thousand inhabitants has been increased $40x10, or $400 equal to 40 cents a head. Although small it is nevertheless a gain, and the workers naturally say, if ten helps why not ten thousand? The following year, therefore, immigration having been induced to that extent, the original one thousand find their wages increased by 4c.x10,000, or $400 apiece, this, of course being an addition to their own wages. In other words, assuming that the one thousand original inhabitants constituted two hundred families, then each family would as a result of the settling in that place of the ten thousand immigrants, receive an increase of wages of $2,000.

But it will be said that these figures are fanciful, ridiculous, preposterous. Not at all. Not if the theory of "value" is sound, and if it applies, as it is insinuated it does, to the whole people, i. e., to everybody in the country. This hypothetical case is neither fanciful, ridiculous, nor than has its preposterous. It more counterpart in actual facts. Instead of these people profiting to the extent of $2,000 a family by the presence in their midst of ten thousand immigrants, their gain will be much greater if

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If what? If they have been "shrewd" enough, "sagacious" enough, "astute" enough, "far-seeing" enough, to get title to not only the comparatively limited area they originally occupied, but also that larger area around them which would be needed by the ten thousand when they arrived. Then the more sagacious among them would not merely have unearned incomes of $2,000 a year, but, as more immigrants came, either from abroad or by birth, they would find the reward of their "sagacity" in forestalling immigrants would run into hundreds of thousands and finally into millions of dollars a year. And that very thing has happened.

While there is no trustworthy data upon which to base an estimate of the annual value of the land of the United States, yet, the best obtainable information is that

the annual value of land in the city of New York is not less than $250,000,000, i. e., its rental value. This amount is now being paid by the immigrants (native as well as foreign) to the few thousand who got possession of the land and who have been "holding it" for them otherwise it would, of course, have run away.

One family-the Astors-are credited with the possession of $450,000,000 of New York city real estate. Undoubtedly from two-thirds to three-fourths of this is land value. Let us put it at two-thirds, $300,000,000, and the yield at five per cent. or $15,000,000 a year. The return to the two hundred families of my hypothetical community pales into insignificance when compared to the return the Astors get from immigration-domestic and foreign. They, at least, will not dispute the Carnegie theory that each immigrant has a value" of $1,000. Their only regret is that some of this value" slips past them as it goes to form the basis of other land fortunes in the West and South where some of the immigrants settle.

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The American workingman is correct in assuming that the immigrant intensifies competition, but the native-born child does this just as much as he who

comes from abroad. He is wrong, however, in assuming that his fight is with the employer as such. It is rather with the man whether employer or not-who monopolizes land, thereby forcing workers to compete with each other for its use, with the result that the monopolist draws to himself an ever increasing proportion of the yield of the activities of labor and capital.

Until the workers turn their attention to the dog-in-the-manger, who, doing nothing useful himself, yet because of his monopolization of natural opportunities, is able to demand the lion's share of all production, we may expect that he will continue to strike blindly at effects (immigration) instead of at causes (landmonopoly). And he is not to be seriously blamed if he does, as honest capital, i. e., non-monopolistic, is equally blind. It strikes at labor instead of at the common enemy, monopoly. The average capitalist, no more than the average workingman, understands that the value" of an immigrant inures to him who monopolizes the soil upon which and from which all, whether immigrant or native, must live, and from which all wealth must be produced.

Brooklyn, N. Y.

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ROBERT BAKER.

Q.

CHAPTER ONE.

The Referendum.

dum?

A. The Referendum means the referring of a law or ordinance or any specific question to the people for decision at the polls.

A vote on a law or ordinance may be taken, not for the purpose of decision, but merely to secure an accurate and definite expression of public opinion. This is a quasi-Referendum or publicopinion vote, such as is in use in Illinois; also in some cities, such as Chicago and Detroit.

The Referendum also means the right of the people to demand the submission of an enactment or measure to the voters for decision; and it is also used to designate a statute or constitutional amendment securing this right.

In Switzerland, during the greater portion of the last fifty years, the Referendum has been a part of the constitutional law of the republic. When a law is passed, if a certain per cent. of the

*The term Direct-Legislation is here employed in reference to the Initiative and Referendum, because it is the phrase most generally used in referring to these successful methods of maintaining democratic government which are employed in Switzerland and in this country also to a considerable extent. A more accurate descriptive term is guarded representative government. This is really the best name for the system as it exists in Switzerland and as it is proposed for general adoption here. It is the representative system guarded by the people's veto or Referendum and the people's right to propose a law, which is the Initiative. By such means, and only by such means can the people's sovereignty be assured and the representative system properly guarded. It is a thoroughly practical and simple method or provision for preventing popular government from becoming a possible

actment is held in abeyance until the electorate has voted on the question.

Q. Is the Referendum un-American? A. The Referendum is not un-American unless the principle of majority-rule or rule by the people is un-American. It is majority-rule that is important, and whatever means prove necessary to secure it must be adopted.

So far from being un-American, the Referendum is most emphatically American both in principle and practice. From the earliest days of our colonial government in New England the people not only voted directly on specific measures but practically all the laws were made by direct vote of the citizens. This practice has continued in unbroken succession so far as local or town government is concerned, but city and state government has lost its original character. As the growth of numbers made it necessary to rely more and more on representatives, the direct vote of the despotism under the form of a republic, wherein the public servants assume the rôle of rulers, as was the case in the Republic of Venice under the Council of Ten and later under the Three Inquisitors of State; or a despotism of wealth and privileged interests, as was the case in Florence under the di Medici, when that great family of bankers, to use the language of Professor Vallari of the Royal Institute of Florence, became the absolute rulers "of a republic that was keenly jealous of its liberties, without holding any fixed office, without suppressing any previous form of government." Guarded representative government is an evolution from the less perfect system and tends to an ideal civilization in which the people of great cities, states and nations become the sovereign power and act through representative government.