33. That the hauling of flat cars empty to the mills, or the practice of shippers to load cars below their capacity, are conditions which, to the extent they exist, are properly taken into account by carriers in fixing rates; and it must be assumed that they were considered by defendants in making and maintaining the rates so long in force prior to the advance herein charged. 34. That the rates on lumber, prior to the advance complained of, were reasonably high when compared with the rates on other commodities which are at all analogous to lumber in respect to value, volume, risk, cost of handling, and other circumstances and conditions affecting the transportation of the traffic. 35. That lumber rates should be relatively low in view of the limited life of the lumber business in Georgia, at the end of which large investments of manufacturers in plants, including buildings, machinery, and tramroads, will become practically valueless; the increase in the net revenue of the roads caused by the lumber traffic; the fact that lumber is inexpensive freight and few other commodities furnish greater tonnage; the constancy of the traffic throughout the year; the fact that no special equipment is required for its movement; that it is loaded by shippers and unloaded by consignees; that when flat or open cars are furnished the shipper is at considerable expense to equip them so as to protect the lumber and the train; that it is not a perishable freight and does not require rapidity of movement; that there is small risk and in case of accident the damage is insignificant; and that lumber is an article of general utility.

36. That the advance of 2 cents per 100 pounds in defendants' rates on lumber from Georgia shipping points to Ohio River points, which was made effective June 22, 1903, was not warranted by the facts, circumstances, and conditions disclosed in this case, and that the increased rates then put in force are unreasonable and unjust.

The Consolidated Forwarding Company v. The Southern Pacific Company; The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company; The Santa Fe Pacific Railway Company; and The Southern California Railway Company.

The Southern California Fruit Exchange v. The Southern Pacific Company; The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company; The Santa Fe Pacific Railway Company; and The Southern California Railway Company.

The Continental Fruit Express Company and Armour & Company, interveners. (10 I. C. C. Rep., 590.)

37. Defendants' minimum carload weight of 26,000 pounds for the carriage of citrus fruit in refrigerator or ventilator cars from southern California points to eastern destinations is not unreasonable with the 40-foot car in general use.

38. Whether or not the regulating statute applies to refrigeration charges in all cases, the defendants, by compelling shippers to pay icing charges on citrus fruits as established by the car lines or do without necessary refrigeration for the traffic, have made these charges part of the cost of transportation and subject to regulation under the law.

39. The refrigeration charges applying on shipments of citrus fruits from southern California points to eastern markets have been reduced during the pendency of this proceeding, and the present charges for refrigeration are not found, upon the record of this case, to be unreasonable.

40. Defendants are unlawfully engaged in pooling the traffic in citrus fruits originating in southern California and carried by them and their connections to eastern markets. Further action upon that branch of this proceeding is reserved by the Commission, in view of the pendency in the United States Supreme Court of an appeal from a like decision of the circuit court for the southern district of California, in a suit brought by this Commission to enforce its order herein prohibiting the defendants from continuing to apply and enforce a provision in their tariff reserving to themselves the routing of this traffic to eastern destinations, and depriving shippers of their right to determine which of various established routes shall be used for the transportation of their property.

41. Defendants' present rate of $1 per 100 pounds on lemons in carloads from southern California to points on and east of the Missouri River is apparently reasonable.

42. Defendants' rate of $1.25 per 100 pounds on oranges in carloads carried from southern California to points on and east of the Missouri River is unreasonable and unjust.

Richmond Elevator Company v. Pere Marquette Railroad Company. (10 I. C. C. Rep., 629.)

43. While the act to regulate commerce contains no provision which expressly or by proper implication gives this Commission jurisdiction in cases merely showing delay or negligence in the receipt, forwarding, or delivery of property offered for transportation, including the furnishing of cars, the regulating statute does prohibit any unjust discrimination or wrongful prejudice in the provision of cars or other transportation facilities, as well as in the fixing and application of transportation charges. 44. Every shipper is legally entitled to fair opportunity and treatment in the use of these public utilities, and any discrimination which in substantial degree deprives shippers of such use must be considered unjust, unless forced by justifying conditions. In such a case the burden of proof is upon the complainant to the extent of showing discrimination, and then upon the carrier to show that the discrimination was justified.

45. Merely putting in evidence defendant's rule of car apportionment is insufficient to show discrimination against the complainant; the actual effect of the rule, during the time covered by the complaint, is necessary to a determination of the question of unfairness in the distribution of cars. 46. It appears generally from the facts in this case that in furnishing cars defendant unjustly discriminated against the complainant, which desired to ship hay from various points in Michigan, but the proof fails to indicate with any degree of certainty the damage caused by the wrongful discrimination and the amount which the complainant is entitled to recover by way of reparation. Complainant granted leave to apply within a limited time for further hearing.

Charles A. Thompson v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company. (10 I. C. C. Rep., 640.)

47. The right of complainant to ship coal was not barred by the fact that he is a druggist by occupation, or that he loaded coal cars from wagons, for a large part of the commerce of the country is handled in that way; and when he tendered freight for transportation he was entitled to the same facilities furnished to other shippers under like conditions.

48. During the anthracite coal strike of 1902, which caused an extremely large demand for bituminous coal and great increase in the price of that coal, complainant arranged for the purchase and sale of the surplus product of certain bituminous mines, called surface or country mines, and for hauling the coal by wagon to stations or sidings and loading upon defendant's cars. Under normal conditions this could not be done at a profit. Complainant demanded and received several cars during the month of November, 1902. In that month defendant issued a rule limiting its coal cars to mines having track connection, with its road, and this rule was kept in force during the strike period. The demand for coal throughout the strike resulted in the greatest tax upon the railroad equipment and in the congestion of lines, yards, and terminals. The mines loading by tipple and by track connection received far less than their usual car supply. Under those and other attendant conditions, defendant's temporary rule, confining its comparatively few available cars to mines generally in operation, where quick loading could be accomplished, and declining to permit its sidings or switches to be further congested by loading coal from wagons, not only by complainant, but many others temporarily engaged in the same pursuit, was calculated to hasten rather than retard the movement of coal for public use, and was not unreasonable or unjust.

49. No opinion is expressed upon the point whether a railroad may, under ordinary conditions, discriminate in furnishing cars as between the methods of loading by tipple and wagon, or whether without a rule it may, even in great emergency, discriminate between the two classes of shipments, and the decision is confined to the particular situation disclosed by the record in this proceeding.

The Cannon Falls Farmers' Elevator Company v. The Chicago Great Western Railway Company and The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. (10 I. C. C. Rep., 650.)

50. A ruling that an antecedent haul to one locality and no previous transportation to a competing locality constitute justification for a lower charge from the

former to a common market, would be in effect to approve the equalization of natural advantages and disadvantages as between localities, and such equalization is not sanctioned by the act to regulate commerce. 51. With competition for the carriage of grain to and via Duluth and other northern lake ports, rates of 10 cents on wheat and 7 cents on other grain from Minneapolis to Chicago are as high as can be obtained by the all-rail lines between those points, and competition by lines other than the defendants from Minneapolis to East St. Louis has fixed the rate by all lines at 10 cents per 100 pounds, and this also controls the rate to Louisville. The rates from Cannon Falls, a point in Minnesota 48 miles from Minneapolis, to Chicago, East St. Louis, and Louisville are also competitive rates, and in its competition with Minneapolis Cannon Falls is entitled to as low rates to common points as the difference in conditions will permit. In view, however, of the desirability of keeping open the Minneapolis market to Cannon Falls grain, the short distance between those points, and the low rate from Minneapolis forced by competition, it is apparently not unjust that the grain rate from Cannon Falls should be as high as the local rate to Minneapolis plus a 7-cent rate therefrom to Chicago, provided the Cannon Falls dealer is not thereby subjected to disadvantage as compared with the Minneapolis grain dealer.

52. Under present rate conditions the Cannon Falls shipper is subjected to disadvantage as follows:

First. The combination of rates on rye and other coarse grain from Cannon Falls to Minneapolis and Minneapolis to Chicago is one-half cent less than the straight rate from Cannon Falls to Chicago, and this is without justification. Second. The favorable location of Cannon Falls with reference to Minneapolis and Duluth and the competitive advantage to which the Cannon Falls dealer is entitled by reason of the route via Duluth, are neutralized to an extent by manipulation of billing at Minneapolis whereby Cannon Falls grain sold in Minneapolis can be reconsigned to Duluth under a substituted billing and the balance of a through rate, resulting in a less total charge from Cannon Falls to Duluth than the charge on a through shipment from Cannon Falls to Duluth.

Third. The rate on rye, barley, and other coarse grain from Cannon Falls to Louisville or East St. Louis is wrongfully higher than the rate on wheat between the same points.

In The Matter of Divisions of Joint Rates and other Allowances to Terminal Railroads. (10 I. C. C. Rep., 661.)

53. Carriers operating lines to points west of the Mississippi River make rates to such points which are the same from East St. Louis, Ill., as from St. Louis, Mo. A large portion of the less than carload traffic is hauled by team from East St. Louis to the depots of the rail carriers in St. Louis, mostly by regularly organized transfer companies, but to some extent by teams owned by shippers. The rail carriers accept delivery at depots of the transfer companies at East St. Louis, pay the transfer companies 5 cents per 100 pounds for such transfer to St. Louis, and also pay a like sum to the Grant Chemical Company, a shipper, for a similar transfer of that company's shipments from East St. Louis, but refuse to make such payments to other shippers. The Eclipse Transfer Company was organized for the sole purpose of obtaining these payments; it uses teams owned by the Simmons Hardware Company, and uses the storehouse of the latter for a receiving depot. Under the circumstances, Held: That the payments to the Grant Chemical Company and the Eclipse Transfer Company are illegal. No opinion is expressed as to whether lines leading west from St. Louis may properly apply the St. Louis rate to the station of a bona fide transfer company in East St. Louis and absorb the cost of transfer to St. Louis; nor whether the rail carriers may, by proper schedules, allow all shippers from East St. Louis a fixed sum per 100 pounds for transporting their merchandise to the carriers' depots in St. Louis, those questions not being presented by the record in this proceeding.

54. The Granite City, Alton & Eastern Railroad Company was organized for the purpose of operating several thousand feet of railway used in the business of the St. Louis Sirup and Preserving Company and located on the latter's private grounds at Granite City, Ili. The Granite City Company has constructed a short track outside the limits of the grounds of the Preserving

Company and uses, jointly with other parties, another track about 3,000 feet in length. By means of these tracks the Granite City Company connects with other railroad companies and is paid by the latter certain divisions of transportation charges on traffic shipped by the Preserving Company and hauled to such connections by the Granite City Company. Assuming that the Granite City Company and the Preserving Company are identical in ownership, concerning which a definite finding is not made, Held: That the payments to the Granite City Company constitute rebates and are illegal. 55. The Illinois Terminal Railroad Company was organized in the interest of the Illinois Glass Company and uses tracks constructed by the latter on its private grounds at Alton, Ill., for the purpose of connecting its plant with different lines of railway. Facts relating to the construction and operation of the terminal road are stated. Held: That if the Glass Company owns and operates the Illinois Terminal Railroad, the case is in all respects identical with the facts developed at the Chicago hearing in this investigation (10 I. C. C. Rep., 385) and the conclusions there announced apply here, but if the holders of the capital stock of the Glass Company own the Railroad Company, a different question may by presented.

W. J. Koch and H. W. Koch v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company and The Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. (10 I. C. C. Rep., 675.) 56. Shippers are not entitled as a matter of right to mill grain in transit and forward the milled product under the through rate in force on the grain from the point of origin to the place of ultimate destination, but allowance of the privilege by a carrier to shippers in one section must be without wrongful prejudice to the rights of shippers in another section served by its line.

57. Considering the defendants as a single line, the granting of transit milling west of Pittsburg and denying it to millers at Harrisburg is not necessarily unlawful, because conditions on that line in Ohio and Indiana may be very different from conditions in eastern Pennsylvania, and it does not follow that the allowance of transit privileges in the former territory requires as a matter of law the like allowance in the latter territory; but such differences have not been shown, nor their bearing explained, by the testimony in this proceeding, and upon the meager and incomplete facts now appearing the Commission is not warranted in making a decision which in principle, if complainants' contention is well founded, would involve a general extension of transit privileges into a large territory where herotofore such privileges have not been allowed. Case continued for further hearing.

H. B. Pitts & Son v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company and Texas & Pacific Railway Company. (10 I. C. C. Rep., 684.) Complainants shipped two carloads of snapped corn over the railways of the St. Louis & San Francisco and Texas & Pacific companies from Grove, Indian Territory, to Marshall, Texas. On one carload defendants exacted a charge of 44 cents per 100 pounds and on the other 311⁄2 cents. The only published rates in effect and applicable to the shipments were an interstate rate of the former company of 21 cents per 100 pounds plus 25 per cent for the transportation to Paris, Texas, and a proportional rate of the latter for transportation from Paris to Marshall of 14 cents, except that the T. & P. Company's tariff provided that lower combinations by other roads would be protected. Upon one shipment the tariff purporting to name the rates was an association tariff consisting of 297 pages filled with notes, exceptions, and special references, indicated by a host of arbitrary signs, and was so involved that the freight officials of the carriers could not agree, and the auditor of the Commission found it difficult to determine the rate which did apply. Held:

58. That the rate of the St. L. & S. F. Company for the transportation to Paris was excessive and unreasonable to the extent that it exceeded 21 cents per 100 pounds.

59. That the proportional rate of the T. & P. Company of 14 cents per 100 pounds is assumed to be reasonable.

60. That complainants are entitled to reparation to the extent that the charges exacted from them exceeded 35 cents per 100 pounds.

61. That it is the duty of railway companies, under the act to regulate commerce, to print, publish, and file tariffs showing rates which are so simplified that

persons of ordinary comprehension can understand them, and that a notation in the tariff of one carrier making reference to the tariff of some competing carrier does not meet the requirement of the law that the rate charged shall be published and filed.

H. B. Pitts & Son v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company; Texas & Pacific Railway Company; International & Great Northern Railroad Company; and Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company. (10 I. C. C. Rep., 691.) 62. Facts stated concerning shipments of hay by complainant over the railways of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe and Texas & Pacific Companies from Robinson and La Junta, Colo., and Dodge City, Kans., to Marshall, Jefferson, and Kildare, Tex. Held: That the proportional rates per 100 pounds charged by the former company were excessive and unreasonable to the extent that they exceeded 21 cents for the transportation to Fort Worth, Tex., and those of the latter company excessive and unreasonable to the extent that they exceeded 15 cents for the transportation from Fort Worth to the destinations named, and that complainant is entitled to reparation from the A., T. & S. F. R. Co. in the sum of $196.84, and from the T. & P. Co. in the sum of $51.95, with interest from August 1, 1903. 63. Neither the International & Great Northern Railroad Company nor the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company was a party to the transportation here in question, and as to those carriers the complaint is dismissed. Hope Cotton Oil Company v. Texas & Pacific Railway Company. (10 I. C. C. Rep., 696.) 64. Complainant desired to ship cotton seed in carloads from Louisiana stations on defendant's line to Hope, Ark., at the sum of local rates based upon Texarkana, Ark., which sum was less than the published through charge; but defendant refused to apply its local rate to Texarkana, which was 121 cents per 100 pounds, on such through shipments, and also refused to allow complainant to ship locally to Texarkana under the 12-cent rate in force to that point. Held: That while defendant was entitled to insist upon the application of the through rate to the through shipment to Hope, it could not lawfully refuse to receive and carry complainant's freight to Texarkana under its local rate to that point, and that complainant is entitled to reparation for damages resulting from its inability to ship 640 tons of cotton seed to Hope, which it had contracted for and desired to have transported over defendant's line.

Gallogly & Firestine v. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Railway Company. (11 I. C. Č. Rep., 1.)

65. A case before the Commission involving violation of the act to regulate commerce through alleged discrimination in furnishing cars, and for which reparation is demanded, is not barred under section 9 of the act by the previous institution in a State court of a suit for damages between the same parties, based upon such discrimination.

66. Defendant's refusal to furnish to complainants cars for interstate shipments of corn from Leipsic, Ohio, while it contemporaneously furnished to complainants' competitors cars for like shipments, was unlawful discrimination. 67. Evidence relating to damages found unsatisfactory and inconclusive, and complainants allowed until May 20, 1905, to apply for further hearing in respect thereto.

In the matter of differential freight rates to and from North Atlantic ports. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 13.)

68. Rates on freight articles from the West to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Boston are adjusted according to the following differentials below or above the rates to New York: Domestic traffic-3 cents less to Baltimore and 2 cents less to Philadelphia; 7 cents, first class, to 2 cents, sixth class, more to Boston. Export traffic-same as domestic traffic to Baltimore and Philadelphia, except on grain and iron and steel articles, which are 11⁄2 cents less to Baltimore and 1 cent less to Philadelphia; same rates to Boston as to New York on this traffic. On ex-lake grain received at Buffalo, Fairport, and Erie, there is, pending the disposition of this case, a differential in favor of Baltimore of four-tenths of a cent per bushel below the rate to New York, but no differential in favor of Philadelphia. It was contended by New York and Boston that the differentials favoring Baltimore and Philadelphia should be abolished. Upon voluntary submission of the controversy to the Commission by all parties, domestic traffic was excluded