date the differential was removed by respondents and the rates on corn and corn meal made the same. Such action having obviated the complaints herein, no order is considered necessary.

The Rock Hill Buggy Company v. The Southern Railway Company and The Seaboard Air Line Railway. (11 Î. C. C. Rep., 229.)

94. Defendants' rate of $1.30 per 100 pounds on buggies in carloads from Rock Hill, S. C., to Tallahassee, Fla., is not shown to be unreasonable, and under the construction placed upon section 4, or the long and short haul clause of the statute, by the United States Supreme Court, competition by the A. C. L. R. Co. justifies defendants' lower rate of $1.10 for the longer distance to Quincy, Fla.

Bureau of Freight and Transportation of Charleston, S. C., v. The Norfolk and Western Railway Company, et al. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 235.)

95. This case, involving the reasonableness and justice of freight rates from Chicago, St. Louis, Louisville, and other Ohio River and Mississippi River points, is similar to, and was held to await the final disposition of, the case of Wilmington Tariff Asso. v. Cincinnati, P. & V. R. Co., et al., 9 I. C. C. Rep., 118, in which proceeding the Commission entered an order requiring correction of rates from the same points to Wilmington, N. C., but such order the United States circuit court declined to enforce. During the present year the rates from Chicago to Ohio River crossings have been materially reduced on shipments destined to southeastern points, resulting in reduction of through rates from Chicago to Charleston and Wilmington. Held: That in view of the decision of the circuit court in the Wilmington case, no enforceable order of relief can be predicated upon the facts shown in this case, and the complaint must be dismissed.

In the matter of class and commodity rates from St. Louis to Texas common points in force over the lines of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company; St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company; St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company; Missouri Pacific Railway Company; Texas and Pacific Railway Company; St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company; International and Great Northern Railroad Company; Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company; Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company; and Chicago, Rock Island and Texas Railway Company. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 238.)

96. Rates in force on freight articles from St. Louis, Mo., to Texas common points prior to March 15, 1903, afforded reasonable compensation to the carriers, and as they had been in effect for a long period, and the material advances of such rates on that date were made through concerted action of the carriers, justification for the advances should be clearly shown; but this is a general investigation, in which no complainant is demanding relief from some particular rate and no particular rates have been investigated, and it does appear, moreover, that the financial condition of the respondents, especially those operating in Texas, is not favorable. While impressed with the belief that these advances in rates are improper, the Commission does not feel warranted in making an order condemning such advances in this proceeding.

Cattle Raisers' Association of Texas, complainant, and The Chicago Live Stock Exchange, intervener, v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company; Chicago Great Western Railway Company; Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company; Chicago & Alton Railroad Company; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company; and Illinois Central Railroad Company. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 277.)

97. A railroad company may maintain its live-stock depot at a particular point, although it neither builds nor repairs nor insures the stock pens into which the stock is unloaded, and does not hire or control the men who do the unloading; and whether the Union Stock Yards at Chicago have been, in railroad phraseology or in legal definition the depot of defendants is immeterial, for they were, and still are, in fact the point to which the stock is transported and unloaded under the shipping contract of defendants. 98. Excluding the territory covered by the reduction of 1896, which is described in the findings, live-stock rates to Chicago participated in by defendants were on May 31, 1894, reasonable compensation for the service performed,

including delivery at the Union Stock Yards in Chicago. At all times since that date such rates have been, and now are, sufficiently high to include a delivery at the stock yards as such delivery was made prior to June 1, 1894. While since that time there have been advances and reductions from some points, they have been about equal, averaging probably less than 1 cent per 100 pounds, and the great majority of rates remain the same as they were on May 31, 1894. These scattered reductions, as well as the advances, applied variously, some on cattle, some on sheep, and others on hogs. No change in the rate has been made to offset the addition of the terminal charge in Chicago of $2 per car, or with any reference to such charge. The imposition of any such terminal charge, except in so far as the cost of delivery in Chicago has been increased by the trackage charge paid by defendants to the Stock Yards Company, since June 1, 1894, is unreasonable. Such increased cost of delivery-that is to say, such trackage charge-is fairly estimated for all of the defendants at $1 per car. Citing and applying Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 186 U. S., 320, 46 L. ed. 1182, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 824; Held: First. That delivery to the Union Stock Yards prior to June 1, 1894, was included in the rate and was in no sense a gratuity. Second. That outside of the excluded territory, a terminal charge for delivery to the Union Stock Yards in Chicago of $1 per car is reasonable, and defendant's terminal charge of $2 per car, exacted since June 1, 1894, is unreasonable. Third. That the case be retained for further proceedings in the matter of reparation. The Cattle Raisers' Association of Texas v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company; Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Railroad Company; Houston & Shrevesport Railroad Company; Kansas City Southern Railway Company; Missouri Pacific Railway Company; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company; St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company; St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company; Union Pacific Railroad Company; Cane Belt Railroad Company; Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf Railway Company; Chicago, Rock_Island & Mexico Railway Company; Chicago, Rock Island & Texas Railway Company; Choctaw, Oklahoma & Texas Railroad Company; Eastern Texas Railroad Company; El Paso & Northeastern Railway Company; Fort Worth & Denver City Railway Company; Fort Worth & Rio Grande Railway Company; Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company; Galveston, Houston & Henderson Railroad Company; Galveston, Houston & Northern Railway Company; Gulf, Beaumont & Great Northern Railway Company; Gulf, Beaumont & Kansas City Railway Company; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company; Gulf & Interstate Railway of Texas; Gulf, Western Texas & Pacific Railway Company; Houston, East & West Texas Railway Company; Houston and Texas Central Railroad Company; International & Great Northern Railroad Company; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas; New York, Texas & Mexican Railway Company; Paris & Great Northern Railroad Company; Pecos Valley, & Northeastern Railway Company; Pecos & Northern Texas Railway Company; Pecos River Railroad Company; Red River, Texas & Southern Railway Company; San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railway Company; San Antonio & Gulf Railroad Company; St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas Railway Company; St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas; Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company; Texas & Pacific Railway Company; Texas Central Railroad Company; Texas Mexican Railway Company; Texas Midland Railroad Company; Colorado & Southern Railway Company; Southern Kansas Railway of Texas; Weatherford, Mineral Wells & Northwestern Railway Company; Wichita Valley Railway Company; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company; Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company; Chicago & Alton Railway Company; Chicago Great Western Railway Company; Chicago & Eastern Ilinois Railroad Company; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company; inois Central Railroad Company; Wabash Railroad Company. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 296.) This case relates to advances in rates on cattle from points north of the Texas quarantine line to northern ranges in Colorado, Western Nebraska, Wy yoming, Montana, and North and South Dakota, and to advances in rates from points in Texas, Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska, Kansas, Indian Territory, and New Mexico to Chicago, St. Louis, and Kansas City. An appendix to the decision shows the advances in detail. After considering cost to the carriers at originating and delivering points, cost and maintenance of equipment, expense of unloading and reloading in transit incident to feed

ing, watering, and resting the stock, character of the movement, number of cars in trains, average loading, volume, and desirability of the traffic, return of empty cars, liability to damage, cost of carriage, increased cost of producing live stock, decreased selling price, method of making the advanced rates, disappearance of competition, cost of railroad labor and supplies, improved methods of operation and increased general traffic, mileage revenue per ton per car and per train, and other pertinent circumstances and conditions, Held:

99. That defendants' advances in live stock rates during 1903, as shown in the appendix, were unjust and unreasonable, and that the present rates are unjust and unreasonable to the extent of such advances.

100. That the present terminal charge for delivery of live stock at the Union Stock Yards in Chicago, amounting to about $2.00 per car, is unjust and unreasonable, and that a reasonable charge would be $1.00 per car for such terminal services.

George M. Spiegle & Company v. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company and The Pennsylvania Railroad Company. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 367.)

101. On complaint that defendants' rates on oak lumber in carloads to Philadelphia are unlawfully higher from Afton, Va., and points east thereof, to and including Gordonsville, Va., than those for the longer distances over the same line from Staunton and Basic City, Va., it appeared that a rate of 14 cents per 100 pounds applied over the whole territory for a period of about nine years between November 1, 1892, and August 1, 1901. Effective competition was shown by defendants' witnesses at Basic City and Staunton, and complainants failed to offer any testimony. Upon the record as made in this case, Held, That the higher rate from the AftonGordonsville group does not constitute unlawful discrimination. 102. Complainants allowed reparation for conceded erroneous charges on two carloads of oak lumber.

City Gas Company of Norfolk v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 371.)

103. A difference in charge by defendant on coal carried from Pennsylvania mines to Baltimore for local consumption and on coal carried to its Curtis Bay or Locust Point docks in Baltimore, is based upon dissimilar circumstances and conditions, and is not unlawful. 104. Defendant carries coal to Baltimore destined finally to "points outside the Capes" (largely to New England seaboard points) and shipments of the same coal may also be made to Norfolk, an Atlantic seaport. The rate to Baltimore on coal reshipped to "outside the Capes" points is forced by the competition of lines from other mines, and under such rate defendant secures a large annual tonnage via its line to the port of Baltimore. The rate to Baltimore on coal for Norfolk is the local rate to Baltimore. If the shipments to Norfolk and points outside the Capes be regarded as through shipments, on what are in essence through rates, the competition stated might justify a higher rate to Baltimore when the final destination is Norfolk than when it is a point outside the Capes; but if this coal is all purely local to Baltimore, there is much doubt whether, as a matter of law, defendant can charge for the haul to Baltimore more in one case than in the other. Similar question involved in another pending proceeding and decision reserved upon that branch of this case.

105. Defendant also transports coal from Pennsylvania mines to Baltimore which may be carried from Baltimore by water to Norfolk and to various other points on Chesapeake Bay termed in its tariffs as "points inside the Capes.' The rate to Baltimore on coal reshipped by water to "inside the Capes points" is materially less than its rate to Baltimore on coal reshipped by water to Norfolk. Defendant's service and expense to Baltimore is the same whether the coal finally goes to Norfolk or to other points on Chesapeake Bay. By agreement between the carriers of coal from the various mines to Norfolk, Newport News, and other Chesapeake Bay points, competition has been suppressed, and while defendant does want to carry traffic to designated "inside the Capes points," it does not desire to participate in the coal traffic to Norfolk. Held: That this constitutes wrongful prejudice and unjust discrimination, and that while defendant continues to give a rate less than its local to Baltimore on coal destined to "inside the Capes points," it can not lawfully deny the same rate on coal forwarded by water from Baltimore to Norfolk. Complainant granted reparation.

and com

Planters' Compress Company v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company; Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company; New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company; Erie Railroad Company; Boston & Maine Railroad; New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company; Wabash Railroad Company; Pennsylvania Railroad Company; Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Company, and V. T. Malott, receiver thereof; Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company; Southern Railway Company, and Illinois Central Railroad Company. (11 I. C. C., Rep., 382.) Cotton is transported by defendants and carriers generally at the same rate per hundred pounds, whether shipments are made by the carload or in less quantities. The usual shipment weighs about 25,000 pounds, when the common method of square-bale compression is used, though considerably greater weight may be loaded in the ordinary car. The round-bale process permits the shipment of 45,000 pounds or more per car, plainant seeks a ruling which would in effect require one rate on cotton as ordinarily loaded and a lower rate based upon a carload minimum of 45,000 pounds or more. The reasonableness of the defendants' rates as applied to all cotton is not questioned, and the sole object of this proceeding is a carload differential based upon a high carload minimum, which could not be complied with by shippers using the square-bale process without considerable difficulty and greater expense. The cotton grower would benefit by a general reduction of cotton rates, but no advantage would result to either the cotton grower or the middleman from such a differential, and complainant's proposal would not advance the interests of the public. After considering all the conditions and circumstances, including the effect of the proposed differential upon carriers from producing territory as well as the defendants, Held: 106. No classification can be so minute as to conform to the differing varieties and conditions of traffic, and to separate different grades or densities of the same article into different classes with varying rates, even if it could be accomplished, would go far to defeat the real purpose of classification. 107. If the rate on an article is reasonable to those who ship the great bulk of that article in the form in which it is commonly prepared for transportation, that rate does not become unreasonable to the shipper of a small quantity of the same article merely because he chooses to prepare his shipments in a form which affords the carrier a greater profit per hundred pounds, particularly when the preparation of that article in the more profitable form would impose some degree of hardship upon a large majority of shippers because of its greater expense or for other reasons. 108. While carriers may lawfully establish carload and less than carload rates on cotton, with a reasonable difference between the two rates and a reasonable carload minimum securing to shippers generally the lower carload rates, it does not follow that they are bound to do so, much less that they can be required to establish a differential based upon an unusual carload minimum.

109. Defendants' refusal to grant lower rates on cotton in carloads of 45,000 pounds or more is not a violation of the regulating statute.

D. W. Miner v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 422.) Defendant's tracks in Providence, R. I., are so located that competitors of complainant occupying places of business abutting on its Canal street yard are able to unload carloads of fresh meat directly into their warehouses, and the privilege of unloading meat in that yard was formerly accorded to complainant, whose storehouse is across the canal and about 300 feet from the railroad yard, but such privilege to complainant was recently withdrawn. Denial of such privilege entails the hauling of complainant's meat from another yard about one-half mile distant and damages his business from $20 to $100 per car. The capacity in and about the Canal street yard of the track which may be used for unloading meat is limited, and defendant's refusal to continue the privilege is apparently upon the assumption that its allowance would involve extension of the privilege to the unloading of all perishable commodities at that point.

110. Held: That there is no such competitive relation between fresh meat and, for example, fresh fruit that it is of necessity undue discrimination to accord a privilege to the one commodity which is refused to the other.

111. That complainant is subjected to undue prejudice under the circumstances of this case.

In the Matter of Proposed Increase in the Minimum Percentage of Cars in Trains Required to be Operated with Power or Train Brakes. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 429.) 112. The manifest purpose of the amended safety appliance law is that all freight cars shall be equipped with air-brakes, and that all brakes shall be used and operated, and such condition is necessary to the safety of both railway employees and the traveling public, besides facilitating traffic movement and resulting in the handling of traffic with greater economy. Increasing the minimum percentage of air-braked cars in trains from 50 to 75 per cent would result in the earlier operation of trains fully equipped with air brakes and accelerate the removal from service of old and comparatively unsafe cars now unequipped with that appliance; but under the present public demand the use of every available car is required to move the unusual volume of traffic now offered, and ordering such increased percentage into immediate effect would hamper railway operations and impose severe hardship upon shippers and the general public. After due notice and full hearing, Held: That the minimum percentage of air-braked freight cars in trains on railroads used in interstate commerce shall stand increased to 75 per cent on and after August 1, 1906.

Red Rock Fuel Company v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. (11 I. C. C. Rep., 438.)

113. A State has jurisdiction to enact that carriers of coal therein shall provide

track connections with all mines within its borders, but the power of the State in that respect arises from its authority over State commerce and does not constitute any limitation upon the exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

114. The enactment by Congress in section 3 of the act to regulate commerce that the carriers affected thereby shall not subject persons, localities, or descriptions of traffic to undue prejudice or unreasonable disadvantage, or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to persons, localities, or kinds of traffic in any respect whatsoever applies to discrimination in facilities or instrumentalities of shipment or carriage, and while the Commission has no authority to order a carrier to put in sidetrack connections, or to prescribe the terms or conditions relating to the construction of such connection, its jurisdiction does extend to any case of wrongful prejudice resulting from discrimination in the provision of such facilities or instrumentalities of shipment or carriage, including sidetrack connections. 115. Carriers must conduct and manage their business under the requirements and prohibitions of the regulating statute, and undue discriminations can not be justified by the fact of long-standing agreements with favored mine operators and other shippers, nor is it a defense to the charge of discrimination that the facilities provided the favored persons may be withdrawn at the will of the one who grants them.

116. Defendant declines to permit a sidetrack connection between its line and a switch or sidetrack to complainant's coal mine in the Fairmont district of West Virginia for the purpose of receiving interstate shipments of coal from its mine, although it has provided and maintains sidetrack connections for other mines in that district from which large quantities of coal are shipped to interstate destinations. Defendant controls, through ownership of capital stock, large coal-mining enterprises in the Fairmont district, which, during the year 1904, shipped more than one-half the tonnage from that district. Complainant has purchased the right of way for the sidetrack and the physical conditions pertaining to the proposed connection are at least as favorable as those pertaining to connections already made for other mines in that coal field. It is found generally that as between complainant's and the favored mines similarity of situation exists in essential respects. Under such discrimination complainant is unable to make interstate shipments of coal from its mine, and the defendant, by continuing its policy of denying these facilities to applying owners of coal lands, may practically control in its own interest all the undeveloped coal in this field, as well as derive greater profits from its large holdings in mines already developed in that section. Held: That the discrimination is