The question depending when the bill was referred to a select committee, now recurred. It was on a motion of Mr. GASTON to strike out fifty millions (the proposed capital of the bank) and insert twenty This motion was immediately decided, without debate, by the following vote: For the motion, 54, 85. Mr. LOWNDES then moved to amend the bill by striking out fifty and inserting thirty millions, which question was decided without debate by the following vote: For the motion, 76, 67. So the House determined to reduce the capital of the bank to thirty millions. Mr. LOWNDES then suggested several amendments, to make other parts of the bill correspond with the amendment just made; which were agreed to. Mr. EASTON then moved an amendment to the bill, and spoke some time in support of it, the object of which was, to require the directors of the bank, at any time when 100,000 dollars should be subscribed and paid in, or held, by citizens of Missouri territory, and when the same shall be required by threefourths of such stockholders, to establish an office of discount and deposite at St. Louis, in the Missouri territory. This motion was supported, also, in a cogent manner, by Mr. M'KEE, of Kentucky. It was, however, negatived, twenty-seven only rising in favor of it. Mr. HANSON, of Maryland, then moved to strike out the first section of the bill; which he supported by a speech of considerable length. He was opposed to the bill as it now stood, as an inefficient and impracticable measure, not suited to the great exigency of the times. Mr. CALHOUN, of S. C. followed in reply to some points of Mr. HANSON'S speech, in defence of the bill. Mr. GROSVENOR, of New York, next took the floor, and made an animated speech against the bill as it now stood, and giving the preference to the bill originally reported by the Committee of Ways and Means. When Mr. GROSVENOR concluded Mr. JOHNSON, of Kentucky, assigning as a reason therefor his anxiety to expedite the public business, and proceed to the adoption of those measures which the times imperiously demand, required the previous question. The call was sanctioned by a vote of 73 to 71; but some misapprehension of the question having taken place, a second count took place, after some little confusion, and there appeared to be 62 for the previous question, and 70 against it. So the call was not duly sanctioned. After a few remarks from Mr. MACON and others, as to the effect of striking out the first section of the bill, which some appeared to think would have the effect to destroy the bill, Mr. HANSON, to save difficulty in that respect, withdrew his motion to strike out the first section of the bill. Mr. JOHNSON then renewed his demand of the previous question, (which precludes all further amendment as well as debate) which demand was seconded by a vote of 62 to 59. The previous question was then put in the following form, viz: "Shall the main question be now put?" And decided by yeas and nays as follows: For the previous question, 75, 67. The requisite number having required the main question to be put, it was put on the engrossing the bill for a third reading; and was decided as follows: So the House decided that the bill should not be read a third time-in other words, that it should be rejected. Mr. FORSYTH, of Geo. then rose, and said he had voted in the majority against the bill; and was, therefore, at liberty to move a reconsideration of the vote just taken. This motion he did make, with a view to retain the bill still in possession of the House, in order to recommit it; that the House might not be deprived of an opportunity of passing a bank bill during the present session. This motion gave rise to considerable sensation in the House, as, indeed, had all the proceedings of this day. The motion was opposed by Mr. MILLER, of N. Y. and Mr. FISK, of Vt. and advocated by Mr. Fisk, of N. Y. and Mr. FARROW, of S. C. &c. &c. At length, Mr. FORSYTH withdrew his motion for the present, intimating that he might renew it to-morrow. Mr. CALHOUN moved to print the Secretary of the Treasury's letter, read this morning; when the House adjourned. NOVEMBER 29, 1814. Ordered, That the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, laid before the House yesterday, by the chairman of the committee, to which was committed the bill to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, be referred to the Committee of Ways and Means. The letter of the Chairman, and the Secretary's reply, are here inserted. WASHINGTON, November 27, 1814. SIR: The committee of the House of Representatives, to which the bank bill was recommitted, on Friday last, have directed me to request you to communicate your opinion in relation to the effect which a considerable issue of treasury notes (to which should be attached the quality of being receivable in subscriptions to the bank) might have upon the credit of the Government, and particularly upon the prospects of a loan for 1815. As the bill, as it was referred to the committee, provides for the subscription of forty-four millions of treasury notes, to form, with six millions of specie, the capital of the bank, any information which you may think proper to give, either in relation to the practicability of getting them into circulation without depreciation, or in regard to their operation on any part of our fiscal system afterwards, will be very acceptable. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, To the Hon. the Secretary of the Treasury. WM. LOWNDES. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 27, 1814. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, requesting, for a committee of the House of Representatives, an opinion upon the following inquiries: 1. The effect which a considerable issue of treasury notes, with the quality of being receivable in subscriptions to a national bank, will have upon the credit of the Government; and particularly upon the prospects of a loan for 1815? 2. The practicability of getting forty-four millions of treasury notes (forming, with six millions of specie, the capital for a national bank) into circulation, without depreciation? The inquiries of the committee cannot be satisfactorily answered, in the abstract; but must be considered in connexion with the state of our finances and the state of the public credit. When I arrived at Washington, the treasury was suffering under every kind of embarrassment. The demands upon it were great in amount, while the means to satisfy them were comparatively small; precarious in the collection, and difficult in the application. The demands consisted of dividends upon old and new funded debt, of treasury notes, and of legislative appropriations for the army, the navy, and the current service; all urgent and impor tant. The means consisted, first, Of the the fragment of an authority to borrow money, when nobody was disposed to lend, and to issue treasury notes which none but necessitous creditors, or contractors in distress, or commissaries, quartermasters, and navy agents, acting, as it were, officially, seemed willing to accept. Second, Of the amount of bank credits scattered throughout the United States, and principally in the Southern and Western banks, which had been rendered in a great degree useless, by the stoppage of payments in specie, and the consequent impracticability of transferring the public funds from one place, to meet the public engagements in another place. And third, Of the current supply of money from the imposts, from internal duties, and from the sales of public land, which ceased to be a foundation of any rational estimate, or reserve, to provide even for the dividends on the funded debt, when it was found that the treasury notes (only requiring, indeed, a cash payment at the distance of a year) to whomsoever they were issued at the treasury, and almost as soon as they were issued, reached the hands of the collectors, in payments of debts, duties, and taxes; thus disappointing and defeating the only remaining expectation of productive revenue. Under these circumstances (which I had the honor to communicate to the Committee of Ways and Means) it became the duty of this department to endeavor to remove the immediate pressure from the treasury; to endeavor to restore the public credit; and to endeavor to provide for the expenses of the ensuing year. The only measures that occurred to my mind, for the accomplishment of such important objects, have been presented to the view of Congress. The act authorizing the receipt of treasury notes, in payment of subscriptions to a public loan, was passed, I fear, too late to answer the purpose for which it was designed. It promises, at this time, little relief, either as an instrument to raise money, or to absorb the claims for treasury notes, which are daily becoming due. From this cause, and from other obvious causes, the dividend on the funded debt has not been punctually paid; a large amount of treasury notes has already been dishonored; and the hope of preventing further injury and reproach, in transacting the business of the treasury, is too visionary to afford a moment's consolation. The actual condition of the treasury, thus described, will serve to indicate the state of the public credit. Public credit depends essentially upon public opinion. The usual test of public credit is, indeed, the value of the public debt. The faculty of borrowing money is not a test of public credit: for a faithless Government, like a desperate individual, has only to increase the premium, according to the exigency, in order to secure a loan. Thus public opinion, manifested in every form, and in every direction, hardly permits us, at the present juncture, to speak of the existence of public credit; and yet, it is not impossible that the Government, in the resources of its patronage and its pledges, might find the means of tempting the rich and the avaricious to supply its immediate wants. But, when the wants of to-day are supplied, what is the new expedient that shall supply the wants of to-morrow? If it is now a charter of incorporation, it may then be a grant of land; but, after all, the immeasurable tracts of the western wild would be exhausted in successive efforts to obtain pecuniary aids, and still leave the Government necessitous, unless the foundations of public credit were re-established and maintained. In the measures, therefore, which it has been my duty to suggest, I have endeavored to introduce a permanent plan for reviving the public credit; of which the facility of borrowing money in anticipation of settled and productive revenues, is only an incident, although it is an incident as durable as the plan itself. The outline seemed to embrace whatever was requisite; to leave no doubt upon the power and the disposition of the Government, in relation to its pecuniary engagements; to diminish, and not to augment, the amount of the public debt in the hands of individuals; and to create general confidence, rather by the manner of treating the claims of the present class of creditors, than by the manner of conciliating the favor of a new class. With these explanatory remarks, sir, I proceed to answer, specifically, the questions which you have proposed. 1. I am of opinion that a considerable issue of treasury notes, with the quality of being receivable in subscriptions to a national bank, will have an injurious effect upon the credit of the Government, and also upon the prospects of a loan for 1815. Because it will confer, gratuitously, an advantage upon a class of new creditors, over the present creditors of the Government, standing on a footing of at least equal merit. Because it will excite general dissatisfaction among the present holders of the public debt; and general distrust among the capitalists, who are accustomed to advance their money to the Government. Because a quality of subscribing to the national bank, attached to treasury notes exclusively, will tend to depreciate the value of all public debt, not possessing that quality; and whatever depreciates the value of the public debt in this way, must necessarily impair the public credit. Because the specie capital of the citizens of the United States, so far as it may be deemed applicable to investments in the public stocks, has already, in a great measure, been so vested; the holders of the present debt will be unable to become subscribers to the bank (if that object should, eventually,prove desirable) without selling their stock at a depreciated rate, in order to procure the whole amount of their subscriptions in treasury notes; and a general depression in the value of the public debt will inevitably ensue. Because the very proposition of making a considerable issue of treasury notes, even with the quality of being subscribed to a national bank, can only be regarded as an experiment, on which it seems dangerous to rely. The treasury notes must be purchased, at par, with money; a new set of creditors are to be created; it may, or it may not, be deemed an object of speculation by the money holders to subscribe to the bank; the result of the experiment cannot be ascertained, until it will be too late to provide a remedy in the case of failure; while the credit of the Government will be affected by every circumstance which keeps the efficacy of its fiscal operations in suspense or doubt. Because the prospect of a loan for the year 1815, without the aid of a bank, is faint and unpromising; except, perhaps, so far as the pledge of a specific tax may succeed; and then, it must be recollected that a considerable supply of money will be required for the prosecution of the war, beyond the whole amount of the taxes to be levied. Because, if the loan for the year 1815 be made to depend upon the issue of treasury notes, subscribable to the national bank, it will probably fail, for the reasons which have already been suggested; and, if the loan be independent of that operation, a considerable issue of treasury notes, for the purpose of creating a bank capital, must, it is believed, deprive the Government of every chance of raising money in any other manner. 2. I am of opinion that it will be extremely difficult, if not impracticable, to get forty-four millions of treasury notes. (forming, with six millions of specie, the capital of a national bank) into circulation, with or without depreciation. Because, if the subscription to the bank becomes an object of speculation, the treasury notes will probably be purchased at the treasury and at the loan offices, and never pass into circulation at all. Because, whatever portion of the treasury notes might pass into circulation, would be speedily withdrawn, by the speculators, in the subscription to the bank, after arts had been employed to depreciate their value. Because it is not believed that, in the present state of the public credit, forty-four millions of treasury notes can be sent into circulation. The only difference between the treasury notes now issued and dishonored and those proposed to be issued, consists in the subscribable quality; but reasons have been already assigned for an opinion, that this difference does not afford such confidence in the experiment, as seems requisite to justify a reliance upon it, for accomplishing some of the most interesting objects of the Government. I must beg you, sir, to pardon the haste with which I have written these |