HIGH COURT.

who made the bets was the owner or occupier of the ground on which he stood, and so was liable under section 5 of the Act. Neither of the two last-mentioned cases have any application here: see Reg. v. Preedy, 17 Cox C. C. 433, where Hawkins, J., reviews the previous decisions.

Joseph Walton, Q.C. (Charles Mathews and Stutfield with him), for the respondent.-The object of the Betting Houses Act is to prevent the keeping of places for betting, not to make betting itself illegal : Reg. v. Cook, 32 W. R. 796, 13 Q. B. D. 377. The 'place" must be an ascertained area capable of being declared to be "a common gaming-house" (section 2), and of being entered and searched (section 11). The ratio decidendi in Doggett v. Catterns was that the ground under a tree in Hyde-park was not a "place" within the Act. Whitehurst v. Fincher, 17 Cox C. C. 70, is also in my favour.

Simey, in reply.-It is pointed out in Hornsby v. Raggett, 40 W. R. 111, [1892] 1 Q. B. 20, that in Whitehurst v. Fincher there was no evidence of anything more than casual betting, and the same remark applies to Snow v. Hill. In the present case there was systematic betting carried on day after day.

LINDLEY, L.J.-In this case I think that the offence described by the Act of Parliament has been committed, and that the magistrates ought to have convicted the respondent. [His lordship then referred to the facts as set out above, and continued:-] It seems to me obvious that the respondent was using one particular little bay between two of the stays of this hoarding for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto. It appears to me that that is an end of the case unless the word "place" is so defined that this bay cannot be considered to be place within the meaning of the Act. It is important to observe that the information in the present case was based on section 3 of the Act, which runs thus: " Any person who, being the owner or occupier of any house, office, room, or other place, or a person using the same, shall open, keep, or use the same for the purposes herein before mentioned or either of them" —that is, referring back to section 1, for the purpose of the owner, occupier, or person using the place, or any of the other persons mentioned in section 1, betting with persons resorting thereto, or receiving or paying money, &c., on any event or contingency relating to a horse-race. It is said that the decisions are in such a state that we cannot say that this is a place. If it were res nova I should have no shadow of a doubt, but it is necessary to consider what interpretation has been put on the word in previous cases.

There are only two cases as to which I feel any difficulty. The one is Doggett v. Catterns. That case turned on sections 4 and 5 of the Act, the question being whether the defendant was the occupier within section 4 of the ground under a certain tree in Hyde Park, so as to enable the plaintiff to recover from him under section 5 the money which he had deposited with him for the purposes of a bet. But section 3, under which the present proceedings were taken, applies not only to occupiers, but to any person" using the place. The decision, therefore, in Doggett ▾ Catterns, presents no real difficulty, although there are indications that the judges doubted whether the locality was a place at all within the meaning of the Act.

The other case to which I wish to refer is Whitehurst v. Fincher. There the alleged "place" was the bar of a public-house, and the judges came to the

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conclusion that it was not within the Act. That is a difficulty, but it is to a great extent removed by the remarks made by Mathew, J., in Hornsby v. Raggett, where he says that, in Whitehurst v. Fincher, "the facts only amounted to this: that the defendant was betting in the public-house on three occasions, and that, as betting in public-houses is not prohibited by the Act, we thought the defendant should not have been convicted. Here the magistrate finds that the house was habitually used for betting purposes."

This Act of Parliament is not directed against betting simply: it is directed against those who carry on the business of betting, and have a place where they carry on that business. In this case I think that the respondent was unquestionably using this place for the purposes of his business of betting. I think the place is sufficiently described in the information. It is more or less indefinite in boundary, but it is so described that it can be found by means of the description. I think, therefore, that the magistrates ought to have convicted, and the case must be remitted to them with that expression of our opinion.

KAY, L.J.-The facts proved or to be inferred are that the respondent was a bookmaker whose business it was to make bets, and that he resorted day after day for the purpose of carrying on that business to a spot (which is marked on the plan before us), close by one of the stays which support the hoarding, a place very much resembling the stall of a stable. In this locality, between two of the stays, this bookmaker, for three successive days, carried on his business of betting. Those are the material facts. Do they bring the case within the Act of Parliament ?

It is said that the preamble of the Act restricts the language used in section 3. It appears from the preamble that the mischief aimed at is "the opening of places called betting-houses or offices." But if this bookmaker resorted to this place for the purposes of his business, why is that not opening a place " for betting purposes? We must not give a narrow construction to the words of the preamble. I think the respondent was doing the very thing against which the Act is directed.

66

It is said that the place here is not sufficiently defined-that it must be circumscribed in some way; and it was argued that if a man said that he would be at the foot of a certain statue in Charing Cross for the purpose of betting, that would not be a place within section 3. I cannot see why it would not. It is not necessary that the place should be defined by metes and bounds, and I should have no doubt that the foot of a particular statue would be a sufficiently indicated place to come within the Act.

As to the cases which have been cited, the decision in Doggett v. Catterns was simply that sections 4 and 5 did not apply to the particular place in question, because section 5 refers back to section 4, which only deals with a person who is the " owner or occupier," and it could not be said that the man was the occupier of a piece of ground under a tree in Hyde Park. Section 3 is much wider, and covers a person who uses a place, although he is not the owner or occupier.

I think that Whitehurst v. Fincher comes nearer to this case than any other decision. There the person was seen on three days betting in the bar of a public-house; it not appear whether he was carrying on the business of a bookmaker, and I gather that the judges thought that he was merely betting there as any person might bet with another; and they held that he was not " using a place" for the purpose of betting. But here we have a professional bookmaker carrying on his business of betting in this spot, and I think that the facts bring the case within the Act of

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Parliament, and that the magistrates ought to have convicted.

Appeal allowed.

HIGH COURT.

It is also covered by article 3 of the Extradition Treaty with France.

Charles Mathews, in support of the rule nisi.

Criminal law-Extradition-Falsification of accountsWarrant of committal · Extradition Treaty with France, article 3, clauses 2, 18--French Code Pénal, art. 147-" Faux en écriture de commerce "-Larceny

Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), s. 83-Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 24), s. 1-Extradition Acts, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52) and 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 60).

Where in proceedings for the extradition of a foreign subject evidence sufficient to justify a committal is given of the commission by him of acts which constitute a crime, both according to English law and according to the law of the foreign State, and within the Extradition Treaty, extradition cannot be refused on the ground that the crime imputed falls under different headings cr classes of crime in the English and foreign systems of criminal law, or in the English and foreign versions of the Extradition Treaty.

The extradition was demanded of a French subject on a charge of "faux," the ordinary English equivalent of which is "forgery." He was committed by the magistrate upon evidence showing that he had committed acts constituting the offence of "faux en écriture de commerce "under article 147 of the Code Pénal, and cowered by head 2 (French version) of article 3 of the Extradition Treaty with France, and also constituting an offence (not amounting to forgery in English law) under section 83 of the Larceny Act, 1861, and section 1 of the Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875, and covered by head 18 (English version) of article 3 of the Extradition Treaty.

Held, that the committal order was rightly made. Argument of a rule nisi obtained on behalf of Emile Arton, a French subject, for a habeas corpus to bring up his body in order that he might be released.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment. Sir R. E. Webster, A.G., and Sir R. Finlay, S.G. (Henry Sutton with them), showed cause.-Extradition ought to be granted. The evidence shows that Arton has falsified the books of a public company, and that is "faux en écriture de commerce" within article 147 of the Code Pénal. It is also a crime according to English law: Larceny Act, 1861, s. 83; Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875, s. 1. It is also a crime within schedule 1 to the Extradition Act, 1870, which includes "fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee or director or member or officer of any company made criminal by any Act for the time being in force"; and within the schedule to the Extradition Act, 1873, which specifies "any indictable offence under the Larceny Act, 1861, or any Act amending the same,' ," and therefore includes an offence under the Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875.

(4.) Reported by T. R. COLQUHOUN DILL, Esq., Law.

the different classes of "faux" mentioned in article 147 of the Code Pénal relate to the forgery of different documents. No such offence is disclosed by the evidence. Article 18 of the Extradition Treaty with France (made in 1878) does not cover offences under the Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875, and no committal can be made in respect of such offences. Arton has been committed in respect of an offence under section 83 of the Larceny Act, 1861 (to which article 18 of the treaty applies). This committal is not challenged; but the part of the committal order which is complained of adds a new offence to the treaty with France.

Sir R. Finlay, S.G., replied.

In re Windsor, 13 W. R. 655, 6 B. & S. 522; In Bellencontre, 39 W. R. 381, [1891] 2 Q. B. 122, were re Wilson, 26 W. R. 44, 3 Q. B. D. 42; and In re

cited.

Cur. adv. vult.

Feb. 8. The judgment of the Court (Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J., and WRIGHT and KENNEDY, JJ.) was delivered by

Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J.-In this case the French Government demanded the extradition of Arton under the treaty between the Queen and the The demand was based on the allegation that Arton French Republic, signed in 1876 and ratified in 1878. had committed a number of crimes against the law and in the territory of France, which are extradition 1895, after inquiry before him, the chief metropolitan crimes within the treaty. On the 6th of December, magistrate made a committal order to Holloway Prison, with a view to Arton's extradition in respect of the accusation against him of the commission of the crimes of "faux (falsification of accounts and using falsified accounts), fraud by an agent. fraud by company, obtaining money and goods by false a trustee, fraud by a director and public officer of a law, larceny. and embezzlement within the jurisdicpretences, crimes by a bankrupt against bankruptcy tion of the French Republic." It is in reference to the first of these charges only that any question arises.

Subsequently, on the 21st of December, 1895, this court, on the application of Arton's counsel, granted an order calling on the governor of Holloway Prison to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue. The application was in argument based on the allegation that the chief magistrate had come to the conclusion that no forgery, according to English law, had been committed in the falsification of accounts, and in the using of falsified accounts imputed, and it was therefore contended that he could not properly commit Arton for faux," the French equivalent or translation of "forgery," and, further, that he could not properly commit for such falsification on two grounds-(1) because the falsification was not in the order of committal described as committed by Arton as a director or member of a public company, or as clerk or servant, which would be necessary to constitute falsification a crime according to English law; and (2) that, even if the order of committal were amended in this respect, the magiscould not properly commit for falsification, on the ground that such falsification is not an extradition crime within the treaty."

Before proceeding to deal with these points, it will be well to make clear what we understand are the

admitted facts. It is true that the chief magistrate did in fact come to the conclusion that there was no evidence of forgery according to English law, but he also came to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence of the commission by Arton of the crime of fraudulent falsification of accounts in his character of member, director, or officer of a public company according to English law, and that such falsification of accounts constituted the crime of "faux" or "forgery" against the law of France within the meaning of the 147th article of the Code Pénal. The omission to state in the order of committal the character in which the falsification was committed is not a point of substance. I proceed, therefore, to consider the other alleged grounds.

The conditions of extradition, the fulfilment of which we have in this case to consider, are the following: (1) The imputed crime must be within the treaty; (2) it must be a crime against the law of the country demanding extradition; (3) it must be a crime within the English Extradition Acts, 1870 and 1873; and (4) there must be such evidence before the committing magistrate as would warrant him in sending the case for trial if it were an ordinary case in this country.

At

Is, then, the crime of such falsification a crime within the treaty? In my opinion it is. I take first the English version. The 18th head of article 3 of the treaty (English version) runs: "Fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee or director or member or public officer of any company, made criminal by any Act for the time being in force." the time the treaty was signed, and at the time it was ratified, the Larceny Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), was in force. By the 83rd section it is provided that Whosoever, being a director, manager, public officer, or member of any body corporate or public company shall, with intent to defraud, destroy, alter, mutilate, or falsify any book, paper, writing, or valuable security belonging to the body corporate or public company, or make or concur in the making of any false entry, or omit or concur in omitting any material particular in any book of account or other document, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour." That this was regarded by the Legislature as a serious crime is shown by the punishment which may follow on conviction for it—namely, penal servitude for any term not exceeding seven years and not less than three years, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement. Further, the Act passed in 1875 to amend the law with reference to the falsification of accounts was also in force. By the first section it is provided that if any clerk, &c., shall wilfully, and with intent to defraud, destroy, alter, mutilate, or falsify any book, paper, writing, or valuable security or account which belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, &c., or shall wilfully and with intent to defraud make or concur in making any false entry, &c., the person offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and be liable to be kept in penal servitude for a term not exceeding seven years, or to be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding two years.

It seems clear, therefore, that the falsification charged, if committed by a member, officer, or director of a public company (which Arton in fact was), or by a clerk or servant, is within the English version of the Treaty. In other words, such a falsification is a crime against English law in respect of which the French Government has engaged (other conditions being fulfilled) to grant extradition.

I now turn to the French version of the treaty. The French version of the 18th head of article 3 of the

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treaty is certainly not a translation of the English version, nor does it in substance cover the same ground. It deals with the fraudulent misappropriation by officers and members of a company of the funds of a company. It has no reference to falsification of accounts pure and simple by such officers and members. The English version, on the other hand, is, as we have seen, much wider, and by its incorporation of the Acts of 1861 and 1875 includes falsification of accounts in the manner charged against Arton. We must therefore look to see whether such falsification of accounts constitutes a crime under any other head of the treaty according to the French version.

I turn to head 2 of article 3 (French version). That article, both in the English and French version, deals with forgery. As to the English version, it is clear that all falsifications of accounts do not constitute forgery, while it is equally clear that the falsification of accounts may take such a form as to amount to forgery at common law or under the Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 98) to consolidate and amend the statute law relating to forgery. But in the present case we must assume, as I have said, that the chief magistrate has come to the conclusion that there was no evidence before him in this case which warranted him in committing Arton for any such falsification of accounts as, according to English law, amounted to forgery, but that there was evidence before him of such a falsification of accounts as amounted to forgery according to French law and within the treaty. Was he warranted in that conclusion? I think he was. The French version of the second head of article 3 runs as follows:-"Faux ou usage de pièces fausses; contrefaçon des sceaux de l'État, poinçons, timbres, et marques, publics ou usage des dits sceaux, poinçons, timbres, et marques publics, contrefaits." There is no doubt, in my judgment, that the opening words mean forgery of or using false documents. Turning to the Code Pénal we find a number of articles dealing with various kinds of forgeries, as of money, of public seals, bank notes, &c., and then a group of articles relating to forgery of public and authentic writings and of writings of commerce or banking. Of this group article 147 is one. It runs as follows:-"Seront punies des travaux forcés à temps, toutes autres personnes qui auront commis un faux en écriture authentique et publique ou en écriture de commerce ou de banque; soit par contrefaçon ou altération d'écritures ou de signatures; soit par fabrication de conventions, dispositions, obligations, ou décharges, ou par leur insertion après coup dans ces actes; soit par addition ou altération de clauses, de declarations, ou de faits que ces actes avaient pour objet de recevoir et de constater." Does that article cover and include the crime of falsification of accounts according to English law? I think it clearly does. If so, it is an extradition crime according to and within both versions of the treaty. In the English version it comes under the 18th head of article 3; in the French version it comes under the second head of the same article. It is to be noted that in the "Extrait des Procédures Déposées au Greffe de la Cour d'Appel de Paris" amongst the crimes imputed to Arton is (following the words of article 147 of the Code Pénal) "le crime de faux en écritures de commerce." Further (French law being a question of fact to be determined as such in our courts), we are furnished with an affidavit from an expert in French law-M. Gabriel Astoul, a French advocate--which, after setting forth a translation of article 147, proceeds as follows:-"I am most clearly of opinion that falsification of accounts under the circumstances referred to in the depositions used at Bow-street police-court on the application for the surrender of Emile Arton constitutes the

offence of faux' mentioned in the treaty between Great Britain and France and set out in article 147 of the French penal code." The affidavit further explains the the word 'other' in the said article means 'persons other than those referred to in article 146-viz., public functionaries or public officers."" It seems therefore clear that the falsification of accounts, of which the chief magistrate has decided there was sufficient evidence, is a crime against the law of France and within the French version of the treaty; in other words, that such falsification of accounts is a crime in respect of which the Government of this country has solemnly engaged (other conditions being fulfilled) to grant extradition.

Further, it is clear that the crime in question, whether regarded as forgery or falsification of accounts, is an extradition crime within the meaning of the Extradition Acts, 1870 and 1873. The learned law officers of the Crown, for some reason which I failed to appreciate, seemed unwilling to admit that "faux" in article 147 means forgery. For my part it seems to me to be clear that it means that and nothing else, and it is to be observed that M. Gabriel Astoul does not suggest in his affidavit that it has any other meaning.

The matter then stands thus:-Evidence of the crime of falsification of accounts according to English law not amounting to forgery according to that law, and within the 18th head of article 3 of the treaty (English version); evidence also that that crime of falsification is a crime according to French law ranging itself according to that law under the head of forgery and within head 2 of article 3 of the treaty (French version). Why, then, is it not to be regarded as an extradition crime? I see no valid reason. English law, as I have said, treats some acts of falsification of accounts as forgery, but does not treat all of them as such. The French law, on the other hand (as we must conclude on the evidence of fact before us), treats such falsification of accounts as alleged in this case as forgery within article 147 of the Code Pénal. Is extradition to be refused in respect of acts covered by the treaty and gravely criminal according to the law of both countries because in the particular case the falsification of accounts is not forgery according to English law, but falls under that head according to French law? I think not. To decide so would be to hinder the working and narrow the operation of most salutary international arrangements.

It seems to me, therefore, that all the conditions which I have mentioned have in this case been fulfilled. In my judgment those treaties ought to receive a liberal interpretation, which means no more than that they should receive their true construction according to their language, object, and intent. I know no head of the French law for which an exact equivalent is to be found in the law of England. The British and French texts of the treaty are not translations of one another. They are different versions, but versions which, on the whole, are in substantial agreement. We are here dealing with a crime alleged to have been committed against the law of France, and if we find, as I hold that we do, that such a crime is a crime against the law of both countries, and is, in substance, to be found in each version of the treaty, although under different heads, we are bound to give effect to the claim for extradition.

I think I have correctly stated the view of the facts taken by the learned chief magistrate. We are not a court of appeal on questions of fact from him. We have only to see that he had such evidence before him as gave him authority and jurisdiction to commit. But, lest there should be any misapprehension, I think it well that the view of the court should be presented

LUNACY.

to him, and that the order of committal should be remitted to him, in order that it may be made clear in respect of what crime of "faux" Arton is committed. The first offence should, I think, be described as "the crime of fraudulent falsification of accounts as a director, officer, or member of a public company according to the law of England, and constituting the

crime of faux en écritures de commerce' within article 147 of the French Code Pénal." The rule will therefore be discharged.

Rule discharged.

Solicitor for the prosecution, The Solicitor to the Treasury.

Solicitor for the prisoner, Arthur Newton.

(Lindley, Kay, and A. L. Smith, L.JJ.) Ĵ

Lunacy.

In re RAY. (a.)

Feb. 3.

Lunacy Lunatic tenant for life - Conveyance by committee under Settled Land Acts-Covenants for title-Lunacy Act, 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5), 8. 124— Settled Land Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38), s. 62. life selling under the powers of the Settled Land Act, Upon a sale by the committee of a lunatic tenant for 1882, the court has power, under section 124 of the covenants for title as are usual and proper in a conveyLunacy Act, 1890, to authorize the insertion of such ance upon a sale.

In re Fox, 35 W. R. 81, 33 Ch. D. 37, explained.

This case raised the question whether, upon a sale of property under the Settled Land Act, 1882, the tenant for life being a lunatic, his committee had power to bind his estate by conveying on his behalf as beneficial owner.

The facts of the case sufficiently appear from the judgments.

Section 124 of the Lunacy Act, 1890, enacts: "The committee of the estate shall, in the name and on behalf of the lunatic, execute and do all such assurances and things for giving effect to any order under this Act as the judge directs, and every such assurance and thing shall be valid and effectual accordingly.'

Cookson Crackanthorpe, Q.C., and Borthwick, appeared for the committee, and argued that, notwithstanding the dicta of Cotton, L.J., in In re Fox, 35 W. R. 81, 33 Ch. D. 37, the court had jurisdiction to sanction a conveyance by a committee of a lunatic containing the usual covenants for title; and that if the lunatic was expressed to convey 66 as beneficial owner" his estate would be bound. LINDLEY, L.J.-I do not think there is much difficulty in this case apart from In re Fox. I was a party to the decision in that case; and although one's memory may be rather treacherous, I cannot believe that we meant to go so far as to say that under no circumstances was there, under section 116 of the then Lunacy Act (Lunacy Act, 1853) jurisdiction to authorize a covenant to repay money. In re Fox was a peculiar case. We were asked to sanction a covenant by a committee of the lunatic to pay moneynot for debts of his own, but other people's debts

(a.) Reported by WM. SCOTT THOMPSON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

and we doubted whether that could be done, and would not do it. Certainly there are passages in the report which look at first as if Cotton, L.J., thought there was no power to do it. I doubt, myself, whether we intended to go to that length, and if we did we put an uncommonly narrow construction on section 116 of the Lunacy Act, 1853, and one not likely to be abided by.

Now, having made those observations, when we look at the present case we find it is a different one, and turns upon a different Act of Parliament. I think it would be a very unfortunate decision if we construed it so narrowly as to say there was no jurisdiction on the part of the judge in lunacy to sanction such a clause in a conveyance like this. The lunatic has been so found by inquisition, and he is entitled as tenant for life to one moiety of an estate. There is an advantageous proposition to sell both moieties of an estate, and the owner of the other moiety agrees, and there is no doubt felt by the judge in lunacy or anybody else that the proposed sale of the whole estate upon the terms which have been provisionally approved would be extremely beneficial to the lunatic.

Now, how is the lunatic to convey the half of the estate in which he is interested as tenant for life? Of course, apart from the Settled Land Act, he could only convey his life interest; but under the Settled Land Act, especially section 62, the judge in lunacy has power to authorize the committee of the lunatic to sell the whole estate as if the lunatic were sui juris. If one looks at sections 3, 4, 20, and 55 of the Settled Land Act of 1882, it will be found that a tenant for life who is not a lunatic can certainly enter into an arrangement of this kind, and I do not think there is any real difficulty about an ordinary tenant for life selling and expressing to convey as beneficial owner. What that means is that if those words are put in and he purports to sell under the powers of the Settled Land Act, and expresses to convey as beneficial owner, then section 7 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, will be implied and incorporated. I do not see any difficulty so far. When you look at section 62 of the Settled Land Act, you find that when the tenant for life or a person having the powers of a tenant for life under this Act is a lunatic, or so found by inquisition, the committee may, in his name and on his behalf, under an order of the Lord Chancellor or other person entrusted with the care of a lunatic, "exercise the powers of a tenant for life under this Act, and the order may be made on the petition of any person interested in the settled land or of the committee of the estate." What does that mean? That means he may sell the fee simple under the powers conferred by sections 3 and 4, and the sale must be for the best price.

Then we go a little further. When we come to the Lunacy Act, 1890, there is a power to sell, and section 124 says: [His lordship read the section]. That appears to me to authorize the judge in a proper case to sanction an assurance by the committee in the way in which assurances are commonly executed according to the practice of conveyancers in dealing with real property. I do not see how it is possible for this committee to exercise his powers in the most beneficial way unless he enters into some covenant of title such as is proposed. It is a common one, and not an onerous one. First of all it imports the covenants which, by the Conveyancing Act of 1881, are implied when a man conveys as beneficial owner; but that is followed by a proviso that cuts it down immensely, and the whole effect of the covenant which we are asked to sanction is one that confines the covenant to the life estate of the lunatic. If we did not sanction this we should

LUNACY.

put a fetter on his power, which would be most prejudicial to the interests of those whom we are bound to protect. I think the language is sufficient for the purpose and that we ought to approve of this sale.

KAY, L.J.-Under the Settled Land Act a tenant for life is authorized to sell and convey the fee simple of the land, but he is not authorized to enter into any covenant at all. It was not the purpose of the Act, and it had nothing to do with covenants. It gave him a statutory power to convey the fee simple, and of course prima facie it applied to a case where the tenant for life was sui juris and could enter into such covenants as he pleased. But there is nothing in that Act referring to any covenants to be entered into by a tenant for life when he is selling and conveying land. Then section 62 provides: [His lordship read the section.] As I pointed out, it is no part of the power of a tenant for life under this Act to enter into covenants. Any covenant he had to enter into is not a statutory covenant under the Settled Land Act, and therefore this section does not by itself in any way authorize the committee of a lunatic to enter into any covenant. So far it is perfectly clear.

owner.

Then comes the Conveyancing and Law of Real Property Act, 1881, and I confess there is a little difficulty upon that. That provides by section 7 that in a conveyance for valuable consideration other than a mortgage the following covenants by a person who conveys and is expressed to convey as "beneficial owner shall be implied. Then follow the usual covenants for title, but that only applies to where a person conveys and is expressed to convey as beneficial owner. It is rather difficult to say that a tenant for life under the Settled Land Act conveys the fee simple as beneficial That he may be expressed to convey as beneficial owner I can understand, but perhaps it is expedient to give this clause of the Conveyancing Act the meaning that the main object was to prevent the necessity of setting out all these covenants at length, and when a person conveys as beneficial owner or is expressed to convey as beneficial owner these covenants are to be implied. It is a sort of compendious mode of having these covenants in a conveyance when they are not set out at length. Moreover, the tenant for life has some beneficial interest because he has a life interest, and therefore a conveyance which passes the fee simple includes his life interest. I think it is possible to say, without straining the words, that a tenant for life may convey under the Settled Land Act expressing himself to be conveying as beneficial owner for the purpose of introducing these covenants, and when he does so the covenants which I have referred to in the Conveyancing Act, may be considered as contained in the conveyance. So far the ground is clear.

Now we come to the Lunacy Act, 1890. So far I find nothing whatever to authorize a committee to enter into a covenant for title so as to bind the lunatic. The Conveyancing Act does not refer to a committee at ali but to an ordinary person who is sui juris and is conveying as beneficial owner. By the Lunacy Act of 1890, s. 120, it is enacted that "the judge may by order authorize and direct the committee of the estate of a lunatic to do all or any of the following things," and the first is, sell any property belonging to the lunatic. Then it states in clauses lettered from A. to L. the various things the judge may authorize and order a committee to do. There is not in any one of those clauses any power to authorize the committee to bind the lunatic by any covenant. Then, in sub-section (1) of section 122, we find this: “The power to authorize leases of a lunatic's property