district. It would appear that up to the year 1875 there was no Act vesting the highways in any local board, but no doubt they were under the control of a highway board or some other authority. The soil was vested in the adjoining owners. However, by section 149 of the Public Health Act, 1875, it was provided that all streets being, or which at any time become, highways repairable by the inhabitants at large within any urban district shall vest in, and be under the control of, the urban authority. Under the Local Government Act, 1894, the defendants as district council succeeded the urban authority. By section 26 (1) it is provided that it shall be the duty of every district council to protect all public rights of way, and to prevent as far as possible the stopping or obstruction of any such right of way, where the stoppage or obstruction thereof would in their opinion be prejudicial to the interests of their district, and to prevent any unlawful encroachment on any roadside waste within their district.

I do not at all mean to say that there is not something in the contention of the learned counsel for plaintiff as to the nature of the right of the District Council to abate. The authorities ought not to act act in a high-handed manner, especially in cases where there is an element of doubt. In such cases they should be circumspect, and obtain a judicial decision in their favour before taking the law into their own hands. If they do not do so, they run the same risk that a private person runs who removes such an obstruction; and the burden would be upon them to show that there was an obstruction. If they, however, are able to show that an obstruction did exist on property vested in them under the Public Health Act of 1875 they would have the same right to abate as is possessed by a private owner under similar circumstances.

A private owner has the right, if any special damage is done to him, to remove the obstruction, and in the case of trees it is not necessary, as was decided in the case of Lemon v. Webb, [1895] A. C. 1, 43 W. R. Dig. 125, to give the owner notice before cutting away any branches overhanging his property. These highways were vested in the defendants, and the right to remove obstructions follows in consequence. therefore come to the conclusion that the defendants did no more in this case than they were justified in doing.

I

It seems to me that the sections which apply to this case are section 149 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and section 26 of the Local Government Act,

1894.

I do not base my judgment in any way upon section 69 of the Highway Act, 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50), and therefore it is not necessary for me to touch upon that section.

WRIGHT, J.-I entirely agree, and for the same reasons. I will only add that, while I agree that as a general rule it is not desirable that a district council should take the law into their own hands, I think it is doubtful whether under the special circumstances of this case any other remedy was open to the defendants, for I am not at all sure that all these obstructions could have been the subject of an indictment or summary proceedings, and therefore I think the defendants were entitled to take the law into their own hands.

Appeal allowed.

Solicitors, Norris, Allens, & Chapman, for Clifford Jones, Presteign; Meredith, Roberts, & Mills, for E. L. Wallis, Hereford.

KIRKWOOD v. SMITH AND ANOTHER. (a.) Promissory note-Unnecessary provisions-Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), s. 83, subsection 3.

A document provided for the payment of a certain sum by instalments with interest, the whole to become due on default of one instalment, and that “no time given to, or security taken from, or composition arrangements entered into, with either party hereto shall prejudice the rights of the holder to proceed against any other party.” Held, that the document was not a promissory note.

Appeal of the plaintiff from the county court of Hampshire.

The action was brought on a document, as a promissory note, under the provisions of the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855 (which Act is by section 7 of the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act, 1883, in force as to county courts). The document in question provided for the payment of certain money by instalments with interest, the whole to become due on default in payment of one instalment. The document contained the following proviso: "No time given to, or security taken from, or composition arrangements entered into, with either party hereto shall prejudice the rights of the holder to proceed against any other party."

The county court judge held that the document was not a promissory note, and gave judgment for the defendants.

The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 83 (1): “A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another and signed by the maker, engaging to pay on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer." (3) "A note is not invalid by reason only that it contains also a pledge of collateral security with authority to sell or dispose thereof."

Daldy, for the plaintiff.

J. E. Bankes, for the defendant.

Davies v. Wilkinson, 10 A. & E. 98, was cited.

Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J.-In this case the point is a small one. It is not alleged that this document was not an agreement upon which the plaintiff had a right to sue. The sole point is whether the instrument was one of a certain character, and one which entitled the plaintiff to the benefit of the bills of exchange and promissory notes, including summary procedure. That procedure is restricted to cheques. On the whole, though with some doubt, I come to the conclusion that the county court judge was right in his view that this instrument is not a promissory note. The Act of 1882 is undoubtedly in its main character a codification of the existing law, and when we find that the Act introduces into the definition of a promissory note additions which may be made to a note without destroying its negotiable character, I think the prudent view is, to take the Act as saying definitely what additions may and what may not be introduced into a promissory note. Having regard to the provisions of section 81 (3) of the Act, I come to the conclusion that this instrument is not a promissory note, and therefore is not within the Act under which these summary proceedings were taken.

(a.) Reported by F. O. ROBINSON, Esq., Barristerat-Law.

House of Lords.

From C. A.) (England).

March 24.

Decision of the Court of Appeal in Loftus v. Heriot, [1895] 2 Q. B. 212, 43 W. R. Dig. 112, reversed.

Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2), 42 W. R. 631, [1894] 2 Q. B. 567, and Pillers v. Edwards, 71 L. T. 788, 43 W. R. Dig. 111, overruled on this point.

This was an appeal by Mr. Hood Barrs from a decision of the Court of Appeal in Loftus v. Heriot, [1895] 2 Q. B. 212, 43 W. R. Dig. 112 (Lord Esher, M.R., and Kay and A. L. Smith, L.JJ.), reversing that of Day, J.

The facts and the whole course of the proceedings will be found in Lord Herschell's judgment.

The

The Appellant in person.-Until Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2), 42 W. R. 631, [1894]2 Q. B. 567, and Pillers v. Edwards, 71 L. T. N. S. 788, it was never held that the time at which the restraint on anticipation ceased was the actual receipt by the married woman. restraint ceases when the money is due: Rennie v. Ritchie, 12 Cl. & Fin. 204, 234; Rowley v. Unwin, 2 Kay & J. 138, 4 W. R. Dig. 86; Cox v. Bennett, 39 W. R. 401, [1891] 1 Ch. 617; Fitzgibbon v. Blake, 3 Ir. Ch. Rep. N. S. 328; Davey, L.J., in the unreported case of Hulbert v. Cathcart (Feb. 26, 1894); Pybus v. Smith, 3 Bro. C. C. 340; Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1; Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. C. C. 16; Moore v. Moore, 1 Coll. 54; Stogdon v. Lee, 39 W. R. 467, [1891] 1 Q. B. 661; Chassaing v. Parsonage, 5 Ves. 15; Baggett v. Meux, 1 Ph. 627; Harman v. Richards, 22 L. J. Ch. 1066; In re Glanvill, 34 W. R. 309, 31 Ch. D. 532; Claydon v. Finch, L. R. 15 Eq. 266, 21 W. R. Dig. 146; Butler v. Cumpston, 17 W. R. 24, L. R. 7 Eq. 16; Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 29 W. R. 551, 17 Ch. D. 454.

The respondent did not appear.

The House took time for consideration,

Lord HERSCHELL.-In this case a Mrs. Loftus obtained judgment, on the 15th of November, 1892, for £39 9s. debt and £4 12s. costs, for goods sold and delivered to the respondent, a married woman. Upon the respondent's marriage certain property was

(a.) Reported by C. H. GRAFTON, Esq., Barristerat-Law.

date of the judgment sufficient to satisfy the plain tiff's debt and costs. On the same day he continued an interim injunction of Wright, J., restraining the defendant from receiving such income.

The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the defendant from these orders and discharged the orders of Day, J. (see the report of Loftus v. Heriot, [1895] 2 Q. B. 212).

The present appellant, having paid the debt and costs of the plaintiff, and obtained an assignment from her, was, prior to the hearing of the appeal, substituted for her in all future proceedings.

The ground of decision in the Court of Appeal in Loftus v. Heriot was that the appellant was not entitled to enforce payment of his judgment out of the arrears of income which were due to the re

spondent at the date of the judgment, inasmuch as, not having come into her hands, they were within the restraint upon anticipation. In arriving at this conclusion they followed the views expressed in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2). The question in that case arose with regard to rents of property to which the defendant was entitled, subject to a restraint upon anticipation, which had accrued due after the date of judgment. But the reasoning of Kay, L.J., who delivered the judgment of the court (42 W. R. 631, [1894] 2 Q. B. 567), applied also to a case where the income had become due to a married woman before the date of the judgment, but had not yet reached her hands. In the subsequent case of Pillers v. Edwards the decision was treated as governing a case of that description, though Lindley, L.J., said: "I confess that, but for the decision referred to of Hood Barrs v. Cathcart, I should have thought that the restraint on anticipation was over the moment that the money settled to the married woman's separate use had become due and payable to her. That was my impression, founded on what one may call tradition. Moreover, on looking into the cases, I think that there is considerable authority in support of that view."

The introduction of a restraint on anticipation in settlements of property to the separate use of a married woman is of comparatively modern origin. It was decided in Pybus v. Smith, in 1791, and other cases that, though property was settled upon trust to pay the income to a married woman for her separate use, free from the control of her husband, this did not prevent her from assigning her interest in such income, or charging it with the payment of her husband's debts. The object of settling it to her separate use became thus defeated. It is stated in a note to Pybus v. Smith that these decisions suggested to Lord Thurlow, in a case where he was trustee, the intro

duction of a clause in restraint of anticipation. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the earliest form of the clause against anticipation provided that the trustees should, from time to time, pay the income to such person or persons, and for such intents and purposes, as the married woman, by writing signed with her own hand, should, notwithstanding her coverture (but so as the same was not by way of anticipation), direct or appoint, and in default of appointment, and in the meantime, pay the same into her proper hands-see Chassaing v. Parsonage, where it is stated that a clause of this nature had been introduced into these settlements, in consequence of the decision in Pybus v. Smith. A clause in substantially the same form certainly continued in use for a considerable time. It will be observed that it expressly empowered the married woman to alienate the income after it became due, and authorized the trustees to pay it to her appointee. It was only when the appointment was by way of anticipation that it was prohibited. Such a provision was regarded as a sufficient protection for the wife by those who devised the restraint on anticipation. At all events, it is clear that they did not regard an assignment after the income became due as made by way of anticipation, I am therefore unable to agree with the view entertained by Kay, L.J., that a restraint on anticipation by its nature forbids an alienation before the fund reaches the wife's hands, although the income be due to her when the alienation is attempted. In more recent times the clause restraining anticipation has assumed different forms, but its purpose and effect have, I think, always been the same. That effect was well expressed by Lord Cottenham in Rennie v. Ritchie, where he said that it prevents the person entitled to the income for her separate use "having the dominion till it becomes due." The restraint on anticipation does not, in my opinion, prevent her disposing of it as she pleases after that date. However she may then deal with it, she does not, I think, do so by way of anticipation any the more when it is in the hands of a trustee, than if it were in her own hands. In considering whether there is anticipation, this circumstance appears to me wholly immaterial. If she persuaded the trustee to pay the income to herself before it became due, she would be anticipating it, and the trustee would be guilty of a breach of trust, just as much as if she then gave a charge upon it, and the trustee recognized the charge, and paid the money accordingly. So, too, after the money becoines due, I think she is not anticipating it, whether she receives it herself or transfers her right to it to another. Such an act does not, in my opinion, fall, on any reasonable construction of them, within the words of the prohibition. I should have arrived at this conclusion had there been no authority on the point one way or the other, but there is, I think, ample authority to support it.

In Harnett v. M'Dougall, 8 Beav. 187, the very question arose before Lord Langdale. In that case the trust of a settlement was to pay the dividends of the settled property during the life of Mrs. A. to such person and for such interests and purposes as she by any writing should "from time to time when, and as the same became due, and not by way of assignment, charge, or other anticipation," direct or appoint, and in default of appointment, into her proper hands, for her sole and separate benefit. Mrs. A. purported to charge the dividends then and thenceforth to accrue, with certain debts. A petition was presented for purpose of giving effect to this charge upon a fund in court. The Master of the Rolls said that to give effect to such a charge would be in direct contradiction to the language and intention of the settlement, and he must therefore refuse the petition

the

HOUSE OF LORDS.

"except so far as it seeks to dispose of dividends already accrued due."

In Pemberton v. M'Gill, 8 W. R. 290, 1 Dr. & Sm. 268, a testatrix bequeathed the residue of her estate to trustees on trust to pay an annuity of £300 to a married woman, for her separate use without power of anticipation, and appointed her executrix. She misappropriated assets of the testatrix. The question was whether her annuity could be applied to making good these misappropriations. The arrears of the annuity due amounted to a considerable sum. Kindersley, V.C., said that he has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the arrears of the annuity, "which, of course, were not affected by the restraint on anticipation," must be applied in making good the misappropriations. Kay, L.J., in his judgment in Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2), observed that the restriction in that and other cases must have been peculiarly worded. Your lordships have been furnished with an extract from the will which created the annuity, the arrears of which were in question, in Pemberton v. M'Gill. In that case, at all events, there was nothing peculiar in the wording of the restriction. The trustees were directed to pay the annuity by four equal quarterly payments into the hands of S. M., or empower her to receive the same during her life for her own sole and separate use, free from the control of her present or any future husband, but so that she shall not have any power to alienate or anticipate the same. There is certainly no distinction between those words and the language used in the settlement upon the present respondent's marriage.

In the case of In re Brettle 12 W. R. 562, 33 L. J. Ch. 471, the trust was to pay the income of the trust moneys from time to time, when and as the same should be due and received, but not by way of anticipation, into the proper hands of the beneficiary for her sole and separate use and benefit, and it was declared that her receipts in writing should alone be effectual discharges for the same. The beneficiary having executed an assignment by way of charge, it was held by Knight-Bruce and Turner, L.JJ., that it was only operative "as to any arrears which had accrued due" at the date of the assignment.

In Fitzgibbon v. Blake the Lord Chancellor of Ireland held that a married woman could dispose of and charge the arrears of income settled to her separate use without power of anticipation, on the ground that the clause against anticipation did not apply to such arrears.

Other cases might be cited, and notably Rowley v. Unwin before Wood, V.C., in which the same view of the law has been acted upon. And I am not aware of any decision until a quite recent date which is in conflict with it. It was assumed to be correct in Cox v. Bennett in the Court of Appeal. And, indeed, that court, previous to the decision in Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2), and when it was differently constituted, appears to me, in Hulbert v. Cathcart, to have laid down the law in complete accordance with the view which I am asking your lordships to adopt. Unfortunately, that case was not reported, and it does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned judges before whom the case of Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2) came for decision.

If the restriction against anticipation be, as I think it is, inapplicable to the arrears of income now in question, the 19th section of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, obviously does not affect them.

I move your lordships that the judgment appealed from be reversed. The effect of this will be to restore the orders thereby discharged. They have, however, become quite ineffectual, inasmuch as the arrears to which they applied have been received by the

respondent, there having been, unfortunately, no stay pending this appeal. The respondent must be ordered to repay to the appellant all costs paid by him, and to pay the costs of this appeal.

Lord MACNAGHTEN.-The order under appeal depends upon the proposition that it is not competent for a married woman, entitled for her separate use without power of anticipation, to dispose of income accrued due unless and until it reaches her own hands or the hands of her agent. This proposition was laid down for the first time in 1894 by the Court of Appeal in Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2). There is nothing to suggest it in the circumstances which orginally gave rise to the restraint on anticipation. Nor can it, I think, be supported on principle or on any grounds of convenience, or on authority.

In early days, when the effect of placing a married woman in the position of a feme sole with regard to her separate property came to be understood, there was an inclination to treat separate income as a purely personal provision intended for maintenance. Arguments more or less plausible were founded on the various expressions employed in the copious style of conveyancing to limit or develop "separate use." Where the direction was that the income was to be paid "from time to time," it was argued that the prescribed mode of payment was inconsistent with an absolute power of disposition. But the authorities the other way were too strong, and that attempt failed. The usual direction that the income was to be paid "into the proper hands" of the married woman, and that "her receipts alone were to be a good discharge' was not more efficacious. The court always said that a married woman might dispose of her separate estate, "and her assignee," to use Lord Eldon's words in Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429, "would take it; as if there was a contract entitling the assignee, this court would compel her to give her own receipt, if that was necessary to enable him to receive it." Nor did words requiring payment to be made on "personal appearance and receipt carry the matter any further, for no payment, as Lord Cranworth observed in In re Ross's Trusts, 1 Sim. N. S. 199, could be made into her proper hands without her personal appearance. In fact, these and such like expressions, however stringent they appear at first sight, were regarded as only an unfolding of all that is implied in a gift to the separate use."

It is important, as it seems to me, to bear this in mind, because the error into which the Court of Appeal appears to have fallen comes, I think, from treating words which are no more than the unfolding of the separate use, and which were known and well understood before the clause in restraint of anticipation was invented, as belonging to and forming part of that clause, or, at any rate, as having acquired some new force or efficacy by reason of their connection with it.

The clause which Lord Thurlow introduced into Miss Watson's settlement, and which soon came into general use, was intended to prevent married women dealing with their income in advance. It was designed to prevent the mischief which happened in Pybus v. Smith, where a lady who was a ward of court and had the protection of a settlement framed in the master's office, made away with all her property in less than three months. The clause has no application to arrears of income actually accrued due. Indeed, if it had the effect which the Court of Appeal attributed to it, it seems to me that the result would be mischievous. Everybody, I suppose, would concede that in limiting income to the separate use of a married woman without power of anticipation the

HOUSE OF LORDS.

primary intention is that if things go wrong she may have a sure and certain provision for her maintenance. But what is to happen if things do go wrong, and her income is in arrear? Tenants are sometimes behindhand; mortgagors are not always prompt. If the Court of Appeal is right, it might well happen that a married woman with an ample provision, and striving honestly to live within her income, would be brought into great straits. If her income fell into arrear, she would be unable to procure an advance; she could make no contract even for the necessaries of life. It is all very well to prevent a married woman from gathering the fruit, which will be hers in time, before it becomes ripe. When it is ripe, why should she be forbidden to touch it? Why should she have to wait until it falls into her lap? Why should the court, in its zeal for the security of her property, place it out of her reach when it ought to be in her pocket, and when, perhaps, she wants it most, and all for fear it should come into her husband's hands? So long as things go well, there is no reason why a married woman should not let her husband have her income if she knows what she is about. If things go amiss, there is the restraint on anticipation ready for use, and as useful for all practical purposes as if it had the effect attributed to it by the Court of Appeal, and without the disadvantage of bringing with it liability to a most inconvenient embargo.

Take another case. There is no doctrine, I suppose, better settled than this, that when husband and wife are living together the wife's separate income, received by the husband with her permission, to be inferred merely from conduct and circumstances, cannot be recalled. The rule, according to Lord Cottenham in Caton v. Ridout, 1 Mac. & G. 599, is founded on broad grounds of convenience, and is necessary for the peace of families. Now, a clause restraining anticipation is a usual clause. In marriage settlements it is rarely omitted. And it is not an uncommon thing to pay the wife's income to the husband, or to his account with his bankers. The practice prevails equally, whether there is a restraint against anticipation or not, and rightly too, as the law stood before the decision in Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2). But if the Court of Appeal is right, every payment where there is a clause restraining anticipation would be open to question, and it would be " impossible," if I may use Lord Cottenham's words, "to tell what confusion might not be introduced into a family." Your lordships may remember that this doctrine was lately considered and approved in this House in the case of Edward v. Cheyne, 13 App. Cas. 385, 36 W. R. Dig. 173, and applied to a case of a Scotch alimentary provision, where a claim was made by the representatives of the deceased wife against the representatives of her deceased husband.

So the case stands apart from authority. Is there any authority to be found for the proposition which has commended itself to the Court of Appeal? I have read all the cases referred to by Kay, L.J., but I cannot find in any one of those cases, or in any text-book of authority, even a casual expression supporting the view of the Court of Appeal, or tending to show that the question has ever been regarded as an open question. In most of the cases which were cited the point was noticed incidentally and arose without argument. But the stream of authority when uniform and unbroken is not less weighty and powerful on that account. There are, however, at least two reported cases, one in England and one in Ireland, where the point was raised directly, argued, and decided. Those two cases have stood unchallenged and undoubted for forty

COURT OF APPEAL.

HOUSE OF LORDS. years. Neither the one or the other seems to have been referred to in Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2).

In Rowley v. Unwin, which was decided by Wood, V.C., in 1855, the plaintiff, a married woman, was entitled to the income of £1,000 for her separate use without power of anticipation. In January, 1845, the trustees allowed the husband to receive the principal, on the understanding that it should be secured by a mortgage of some real estate which he had contracted to buy. The mortgage was not actually executed until February, 1849. The lady separated from her hushand in the following September. Soon afterwards she filed a bill against the trustees and her husband, claiming, among other things, interest on the £1,000 from the time when the sum was received

by the husband to the date of the execution of the mortgage, and claiming also a lien on the mortgaged property in respect of such interest. The case was argued for the plaintiff by Mr. W. M. James and Mr. G. M. Giffard. Everything was disposed of at the conclusion of the argument, except the claim to interest on the £1,000. "If that point is to be pressed," said his honour, "I must look into the authorities." In his judgment on a later day the Vice-Chancellor pointed out that the wife could not beforehand consent to the husband receiving the interest, and that during the period in question the husband had had the use of the money, for which he was bound to pay interest. The case, he said, was the same as if the husband had given a mortgage for it; he would then have been indebted for interest to the wife de anno in annum, and if the wife's trustees had appointed a receiver who had paid the rents of the mortgaged property to the husband, it would fall within the ordinary rule which precludes a wife from recovering the past income of her separate estate upon the ground of a supposed gift by her of such income to her husband. He could, he added, draw no distinction between moneys in the hands of the husband, the interest of which the wife might have elaimed, and moneys out on mortgage. His honour therefore declared that the plaintiff was not entitled to the arrears of interest which she claimed. I cannot imagine a case raising the question more directly, or in a manner more favourable to the claimant.

In Ireland, Blackburne, L.C., came to a similar decision, after argument, in the case of Blake v. Fitzgibbon.

I have not said anything about the form or extent of the order which was discharged by the Court of Appeal. The point was touched upon in the course of the argument. But, as it is immaterial for the present purpose, it seems better to leave it for future consideration.

I cannot help expressing my regret that, under the circumstances, the Court of Appeal did not think it proper to hold the fund in medio pending the appeal to your lordships' House, and to put the respondent's solicitors on terms to repay the costs in the event of the appeal being successful.

The appeal, in my opinion, ought to succeed, but I am afraid success will be only a barren victory.

Lord MORRIS and Lord SHAND concurred. Judgment appealed from reversed. The respondent to pay the appellant all costs paid by him, and to pay the costs of the appeal.

Solicitors for the appellant, Hood Barrs & Co.

Court of Appeal.

From Chan Div. (Lindley, Lopes, and Kay, L.JJ.) [and Chan. Div.] (North, J.)

In re WARD, (a.)

May 8.

Solicitor Costs Taxation - Several bills- Order of course to tax one only.

A solicitor to whom a balance of £101 158. was due upon seven bills gave up the client's documents upon payfrom him upon taxation. He afterwards wrote acceptment of £50, undertaking to return any sum found due ing the £50 in full discharge of all claims. No answer was given to this letter, but a common order of course to tax one only of the bills was obtained by the client.

Held, that the order of course was right under the circumstances.

Appeal from North, J.

In the month of March, 1895, R. H. Ward was instructed by the Hand-in-Hand Investment and Mortgage Co. (Limited) to act as their solicitor, and he acted as their solicitor accordingly up to the 16th of November, 1895, when he received notice of change of solicitor in a pending action and a retainer of another solicitor. Seven bills, amounting to £261 15s. in all, were due to Mr. Ward, and payments on account of £160 had been made. A balance of £101 15s. was due, and the papers were handed over on payment of £50 more on the 31st of December. On the 1st of January, 1896, Mr. Ward wrote offering to accept the £50 instead of the £101 15s. The letter is set out in the judgment.

On the 27th of January, 1896, an order of course to tax only one of the seven bills was obtained, and it was now sought to set this order aside.

Cordery, for the motion. -The order is irregular, being a common order to tax part only of one large bill, or at all events one only of the bills delivered by Mr. Ward. The other bills have not been paid or settled, Mr. Ward's offer to accept £50 in full settlement has not been accepted, and a balance may be found due to him. On payment of one bill the solicitor is ordered to give up papers upon which he has a lien for unpaid bills.

He cited Holland v. Gwynne, In re Byrch, 8 Beav. 124; Law v. Gould, 21 Beav. 481; In re Wavell, 22 Beav. 634; In re Yetts, 33 Beav. 412, 12 W. R. Ch. Dig. 101.

Beddall, for the client.-The other bills have all, in fact, been paid, and the common order is right. The cases cited have no application to the present case. Cordery replied.

NORTH, J.-In my opinion this order was properly obtained. There are two objections made to it. First, that it is one large bill of costs, and that the client who applied to tax has got an order that part of that only is to be taxed. I do not think that that is a correct statement of the facts. If there were seven bills delivered by the solicitor to the client, all relating to totally different matters, they might possibly have been all included in one bill, but as a matter of fact they were not. They were kept quite distinct, and, although to a considerable extent they were treated as one, they were in fact at the time kept separate because they were different bills. In (a.) Reported by R. C. MACKENZIE and G. B. HAMILTON, Esqs., Barristers-at-Law.