Mayor and Corporation were competent possible hypothetical tenants, whereas in Owen's College case the college was not. So matters, so far as material, rested until the year 1893, when these three lastmentioned cases came under review in the House of Lords in the case of The London County Council v. Churchwardens of Erith Parish, 42 W. R. 330, [1893] A. C. 562, at pages 590 and 596. It was there held that the cases of Reg. v. School Board for London, and of the Mayor and Corporation of Burton-upon-Trent, in which it had been held that the occupying owner was to be taken into account as a possible hypothetical tenant, were rightly decided; but that the case of Owen's College, in which he was excluded, was not rightly decided. Lord Herschell, C. ([1893], A. C. 562, at page 596), gives his reasons for this conclusion as follows: "An owner who is in occupation of premises can, of course, never reasonably be expected to take them as tenant from year to year-he cannot become tenant to himself. Yet it has been held that the rent which, if the property were in other hands, he would be willing to pay may be taken into account when inquiring what is its annual value that is, at what sum it might reasonably be expected to let from year to year. If the hypothesis be admissible that the owner might himself be amongst the possible tenants, although as a matter of fact he could not be so, it seems to me no more violent hypothesis to conceive him as amongst the possible tenants, even although he may be subject to certain legal restrictions which would prevent him becoming so." This opinion of Lord Herschell, C., was approved of by the House. There can be at the present day no doubt whatever that the London County Council, as occupying owners of Brockwell Park, are to be taken into consideration as possible hypothetical tenants; and this brings me to the point, which in my judgment is the real point, whether the facts stated in the special case show, as a matter of law, that the London County Council would, as hypothetical tenants, have been willing upon the 7th of April, 1894, to have given a rent in excess of what any other hypothetical tenant would have given, which it is not contended would have been in excess of a nominal rent.

The London County Council owed no duty whatever to anyone to provide a park for the public at Brockwell or anywhere else, though their doing so was, no doubt, prompted by philanthropic purposes for the benefit of the public, whose representatives they were; but benefit to the public is not a value which can be taken into consideration when ascertaining what rent a hypothetical tenant would give for a hereditament.

The question is, What value is the hereditament to the hypothetical tenant? Blackburn, J., in Jones v. The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, 11 H. L. C. 443, at p. 478, pointed this out. He said: " The rate is to be withheld" (this must be a misprint for either "imposed 66 ΟΙ upheld ") "not in respect of the value of the benefit conferred on the public, or on that portion of it which uses the dock, but is to be imposed on the occupier of the docks in respect of the valne to them" (i.e., the dock company) derived from the payments taken for that use." In the case of Hare v. The Overseers of Putney, 29 W. R. 721, 7 Q. B. D. 223, in this court, this statement of the law, as it appears to me, was adopted. In that case the Metropolitan Board of Works, pursuant to statute, purchased Putney Bridge from its owners, took off the tolls, and threw it open to the public toll free. The occupation of the bridge thereafter never was of value to the Metropolitan Board of Works, though it undoubtedly was of the greatest value to the public whose representatives the Metropolitan Board of

Works were, and it was held that this fact did not support the rate made upon the Metropolitan Board of Works. There is no finding in this case that the London County Council would give a farthing of rent for Brockwell Park. All that is found is this (paragraph 21): "If the appellants had had a duty to provide an open space for the public in the said locality, and for the purpose of carrying out that duty had had the power and wish, instead of purchasing the said park, to take it as lessees and tenants have had to pay a rent for the same sufficient to support the figures of the rate." On the other hand, it is found that the London County Council must necessarily be annual heavy pecuniary losers by reason of being bound by statute to keep up the park for ever for the recreation of the public. Then how, as a matter of law, is it to be said that the London County Council would be willing to give as hypothetical tenants more than a nominal rent? In all the cases cited in which an occupying owner has been brought within the category of hypothetical tenant as being willing to give more rent than any other hypothetical tenant, there has been not only the duties imposed upon such owner of providing what the Legislature has required shall be provided by him, but (except in the case of Reg. v. School Board for London) there has been a specific finding that if he had not been occupying owner he would have given a rent sufficient to support the rate. In Reg. v. School Board for London there was the duty to provide a school house, and the sole point decided by this court (and the judgments are explicit as to this) was that the occupying owner was to be considered as a possible hypothetical tenant, nothing more. In the Owen's College case there was the duty to provide premises for educational purposes, and in that case, as before stated, the argument proceeded upon the admission that the college as hypothetical tenant would give a rent sufficient to uphold a rateable value of either £1,000 or £1,300, although the college could not be worked at a profit. There was a similar duty in the case of Mayor and Corporation of Burton-upon-Trent v. Assessment Committee of Burton-upon-Trent, namely, a duty to provide a sewage farm to deal with the sewage, and in that there was also the finding that, although the farm and pumping station as part of the sewage system could not be worked at a profit, if the farm and pumping station belonged to a private owner, the appellants would hire them at a rent sufficiently high to maintain the rate; and lastly, in the Erith case, in the House of Lords, Lord Herschell, at p. 579, commences his speech-and it is the foundation of his opinion-by pointing out that it was found in the special case, paragraph 10, that the London County Council, if they had not been occupying owners of the outfall works and pumping station sought to be rated, would have been willing to pay as yearly tenants a rent for the same sufficient to support the rate. This same finding will be found in all the three cases which were then argued together in the House of Lords. Now, a great deal has been said in this court, both in this case and in the Hull Docks Company v. Guardians, &c., of Sculcoates Union, 42 W. R. 595, [1894] 2 Q. B. 69, as to what the House of Lords decided in the Erith case, and I desire to state what in my judgment the House of Lords laid down therein. It is this. First, it reaffirmed what had been affirmed in the year 1864 by the House of Lords in Jones v. The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, namely, that to render a hereditament rateable its occupation must be of value to someone, and that it was not essential to rateability that a particular occupier of the land should be able to

and pay a rent for the same, they would

a

make a pecuniary profit out of it; secondly, it held that the occupying owner was to be taken into account as a possible hypothetical tenant when ascertaining what rent a hypothetical tenant would give for the premises about to be rated, even although the occupying owner was prohibited by statute from renting the premises; thirdly, it left the rule as to the method of ascertaining the rateable value precisely where it was before. And as regards the case of an occupying owner being taken as hypothetical tenant, Lord Herschell, at page 593, says: "The whole of the circumstances and conditions under which the owner has become occupier must be taken into consideration, and no higher rent must be fixed as the basis of assessment than that which it is believed the owner would really be willing to pay for the occupation of the premises." The question as to what rent the hypothetical tenant, whether occupying owner or not, would be willing to give as tenant from year to year, over and above the expenditure to command the rent, is necessarily one of fact.

The argument that the House of Lords has determined in the Erith case that an occupying owner must in every case be willing to give more than a nominal rent is in my judgment wholly untenable. The House of Lords decided no such thing, and the subsequent case of Sculcoates Union in the House of Lords, 43 W. R. 623, [1895] A. C. 136, shows that this is so. To state it shortly, it decided that, it having been found as a fact that had the London County Council not been occupying owners of the works sought to be rated they would have been willing to pay a yearly rent for the same sufficient to support the rate, applying the ordinary well-known rule, this rent was the basis upon which to ascertain the rateable value of the works, even although the London County Council were by law prohibited from renting the premises; and that it was nihil ad rem to show in answer to such a finding that no profit could be made out of the occupying of the premises by the London County Council. Now, as before stated, there is no finding in this case that the London County Council would have been willing to have paid any rent other than nominal, or indeed any rent at all; and I must point out that this is very remarkable and worthy of notice, seeing what the special findings in the Erith case and other cases argued therewith, and in the case of Mayor, &c., of Burtonupon-Trent v. Assessment Committee of Burton-uponTrent Union, had been, and which must have been before the advisers of the respondents when this special case was settled. It is obvious that the respondents have been unable to obtain any such finding, and have been obliged to content themselves with the finding that if the London County Council had had a duty to provide an open space for the public in the said locality (which they had not), they would have had to pay a rent for the same sufficient to support the figures in the rate, a very different finding indeed from that upon which the prior cases were adjudicated. There being no such finding, how can this court, as a matter of law, hold that the London County Council would have been willing to give anything in excess of a nominal rent for the occupying of the park, when upon the facts found they must for ever be large annual pecuniary losers by having to keep up the park? The point taken in argument, that because the London County Council had given towards the purchase of the park £60,000 that shows, as a matter of law, that they would have been willing to give more than a nominal rent for the park, is in my judgment unsound. Take, for instance, the case, now unfortunately in some counties of England by no means of uncommon occurrence, of an

as

occupying owner having in years gone by purchased an agricultural farm which of late years can only be worked at a dead out-of-pocket loss, and for which no tenant can be found to give any rent at all over and above the expenditure necessary to command the rent. Is it to be said, a matter of law, that the occupying owner, because he had sunk his money in the farm, would give more than a nominal rent for that farm at the present time? Again, how can it be said, as a matter of law, that either from philanthropic motives or in order to ingratiate themselves with their constituents the London County Council would have given more than a nominal rent for Brockwell Park? Even if this could legitimately be considered, it appears to me impossible so to hold, and yet this is what we are in reality asked to do upon this special case by the respondents. I cannot come to the conclusion, upon the facts stated, that the London County Council would have been willing, as a matter of law, on the 7th of September, 1894, to have given other than a nominal rent; and I therefore disagree with the Divisional Court, which held that the rateable value of Brockwell Park, upon the facts stated must have been, as a matter of law, something in excess of nil; and I would point out that it is only with a question of law arising out of facts that either the Divisional Court or this court has jurisdiction to deal. I may perhaps add that, upon the facts as stated, I am not at all surprised that the respondents have been unable to obtain a finding as in the Erith case and the other cases above mentioned.

A subsidiary point was taken by the respondents that certain parts of the park--for instance, that part of the old mansion-house which is used for refreshments for the public, and the other part of the old mansion which was not occupied at all, and also the lodge and cottage-were subject matters for separate assessments distinct from the park itself, and had a rateable value of their own. The Divisional Court held that this was not so, and I agree with them. The obligation imposed upon the London County Council by the Act of 1890 was to lay out, maintain, and preserve Brockwell Park, and every part of it, as a park for the perpetual use thereof by the public for exercise and recreation. As before stated, the London County Council could let off no part of it. The Legislature enacted that if the London County Council purchased Brockwell Park they should take it as a whole, and for ever maintain it as a whole, and that the whole should be used for a public purpose for ever. being so, in my judgment it must be rated as a whole, as one entity, and in one assessment; and consequently this small point will not avail the respondents.

This

This appeal must therefore, for the reasons above, be allowed, with costs.

RIGBY, L.J.-Ever since the passing of the Statute of Elizabeth the measure of rateability of an occupier in respect of property has been the value of the property for occupation. This may be said to be the fundamental principle of the Act. The Parochial Assessment Act, which differs in no material respect from the Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869, points out with precision how the proper figure is to be ascertained. The assessment is to be on the net annual value. But net annual value is explained to be the excess (if any) over expenditure necessary to command the rent, of the rent which might reasonably be expected to be obtained from year to year from a tenant subject to usual tenant's rates and taxes, and commutation rent-charge, if any. The inquiries therefore always are, first, what rent might reasonably

be expected to be obtained; secondly, what average expenditure would be required to command that rent; and if the sum ascertained in answer to the first inquiry is either nothing at all or not in excess of the amount of expenditure shown by the answer to the second inquiry, the property has no rateable value. The rent which might reasonably be expected is to be ascertained by taking into consideration every person to whom the property can have an occupation value, including the owner himself if the property would have to him a special occupation value. Of course, from the nature of the case, the owner cannot be tenant; but for the purpose of ascertaining the net annual value or rent it is clear on the decided cases that he must be treated as a possible tenant for the purpose of calculation only. What I have called the fundamental principle of the Act is clearly pointed out, and made the foundation of the judgment in the Mersey Dock case. In that case also it is laid down that it is not value in the sense of advantage to the public which has to be taken into account, but_value | to the occupier. In the London School Board case, the Owen's College case, the Burton case, and the Erith case, and other cases dealt with by the House of Lords at the same time with the Erith case, there was no doubt that the school buildings, the college buildings, and the sewage works were of annual value to the occupying owner. In each case the owners, if they had not already acquired the property in respect of which they were sought to be rated, would have had to acquire other property at a great expense, and the net annual value to them of the property actually acquired was not less than the rent (less proper outgoings) which it would have been worth their while to pay for the property if they had not been owners. In each case, also, the property, by reason of its special adaptability for the purposes of the Occupying owner, was obviously of greater value to the occupying owner than to anyone else, and the question really was whether that greater value was to be taken into account in fixing the hypothetical rent which, according to the Parochial Assessment Act, was to govern the measure of rateability. No such question arises in the present case. It is admitted that if the land in question were or could be of any net annual value to the London County Council or to anyone else as occupiers, that value must be taken into account. But it is denied that the land is of any net annual value for occupation either to the London County Council or to anyone else. In the existing state of the statute law as to this particular property that is clearly made out, since no conceivable income which could be obtained from the property so long as it remains devoted to the public use as a park can exceed the necessary outgoings for its maintenance which the Act of Parliament imposes. It cannot even be said that the possession of the park relieves the County Council from expenditure which it would have otherwise to incur, since they are under no duty to provide a park for the public use, and no power, even if they had the wish, to do so. The advantage to the public of having the land kept as a park cannot be taken into account. It has, however, been argued that, although by statute the land is devoted in perpetuity as a park for the recreation of the public, it ought for the purpose of ascertaining its annual value to be treated as though it were not so devoted; and it is said truly that on this assumption it would have an undoubted and considerable annual value to an occupier. Another way of stating the argument is that, in ascertaining the value of land for rating purposes, regard should he had only to unproductiveness arising from natural causes, and not from legal restrictions. This argument appears equally opposed to principle and authority.

It

is the real net annual value which is always to be the foundation of the assessment. The real net annual value to an occupying owner has, as above appears, to be arrived at by supposing a tenancy, which cannot at law exist, for the purpose of fixing the hypothetical rent which by statute is made the measure of net annual value. But the supposition of a tenancy is only for the purpose of calculation, and it is the real net annual value to the occupying owner which is arrived at. The argument now being dealt with attributes to the property a fictitious annual value, having no relation whatever to its real annual value. There is nothing in the Statute of Elizabeth, or in any decided case, to justify this. Authority as well as principle is opposed to it. The Putney Bridge case, for instance, seems to be very closely in point. But it is not necessary to go through earlier authorities, since in the Erith case, which is supposed I know not why to lend some plausibility to the argument, Lord Herschell (in a judgment adopted by all the noble and learned lords) says, at page 591: "Now, if land is struck with sterility in any and everybody's hands,' whether by law or by its inherent condition, so that its occupation is and would be of no value to anyone, I should quite agree that it cannot be rated to the poor "; and other words to a similar effect are contained elsewhere in the judgment. It has been suggested that part of the property might be separately rated, but the answer to this is that no part can be separated in use from the rest without breach of the statutory provisions, and therefore the whole must be taken together for the purpose of assessment.

A. L. SMITH, L.J.-The Master of the Rolls desires me to say that he agrees with the judgments which have been delivered by myself and my brother Rigby.

recover.

Application by the defendants for judgment or a (a.) Reported by W. F. BARRY, Esq., Barrister-atLaw.

new trial in an action, tried before Cave, J., and a special jury, upon a policy of insurance against accident.

The plaintiff was a signalman in the employment of the defendants, and by the policy the defendants agreed, subject to the conditions endorsed thereon, to pay to the plaintiff's representatives the sum of £200 in case of his death from accident occurring in the discharge of his duty in the company's service, and to pay to the plaintiff the weekly allowance specified in the endorsement thereon "in case of his being incapacitated from employment by reason of accident sustained in discharge of his duty in the company's

service."

The weekly allowance, in case of permanent disability proved by medical certificate, was to be £1 a week until the amount paid equalled what would have been payable in case of death, and £1 a week in case of temporary disablement for a period not exceeding fifty-two weeks.

By one of the conditions endorsed on the policy, "the insurance is absolute for all accidents however caused to the insured in the fair and ordinary discharge of his duty."

It appeared that while the plaintiff was on duty in his signal-box he saw an express train approaching at considerable speed, and dust and sparks flying from it, the wheel of the Pullman car bogie having broken, and the carriage having a tilt and projecting beyond the rest of the train.

The plaintiff thereupon waved a red flag to stop the train, and the train was brought to a standstill.

The plaintiff was so excited and so terrified that an accident would happen to the train that he received a nervous shock to his system, and was incapacitated from any employment.

He thereupon brought this action to recover £52, being the weekly allowance of £1 for fifty-two weeks, contending that he had sustained an accident" within the meaning of the policy.

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment was given accordingly.

Buckmill, Q.C., and Hammond Chambers, for the defendants. There was no "accident sustained" by the plaintiff within the meaning of the policy. There was only an accident to the train. The mere sight of something which he did not expect to see is not an "accident" within the meaning of the policy. There must be impact or something equivalent to impact. A mere shock to the nerves would be an injury, but not an accident, to the plaintiff. Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 36 W. R. Dig. 64; Sneesby v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., 24 W. R. 99, 1 Q. B. D. 42, were referred to.

Spencer Bower, for the plaintiff, was stopped.

Hammond Chambers replied.

Lord ESHER, M.R.-In this case the liability of the defendants depends, not upon negligence, but upon contract. The question is whether the defendints are not contractually liable. It is therefore unnecessary to say anything about the case of Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas. We must first see what are the facts to which we have to apply the contract. The plaintiff was a signalman in the employment of the defendants, and at the time of the Occurrence in question he was on duty in his signalbox.

While he was there he saw a train approaching at great speed, accompanied by a volume of dust and sparks, which showed that there was something wrong with it. Can anyone doubt that that train was in a dangerous condition? He was bound to act promptly. If he allowed the train to proceed, a fear

If a

ful accident might happen. The responsibility thrown upon the plaintiff was very great, as the safety of the train depended upon his action. man is called upon to act under these circumstances, a condition of great excitement will be produced. The immediate result was a shock to his nerves. He was from that time incapacitated from any employment. He was incapacitated by nervous prostration which prevented him from physically doing work. That is a physical disease to the nerves caused by fright arising from the state of the train and the feeling that upon his action the lives of the passengers depended. It was an accidental fright which so prostrated his nervous system, that is, the physical condition of his body, that it incapacitated him from employment. The case therefore came within the policy, and the application must be dismissed.

KAY, L.J.—I am of the same opinion. It cannot be denied that what occurred to the plaintiff occurred in the discharge of his duty. He saw the express train approaching, and sparks and dust issuing from part of it which showed that a calamity might ensue. He was in his signal-box, and was called upon to act. He had to determine what to do in a moment, and he waved his red flag to stop the train. He acted in the discharge of an imperative duty to prevent an accident to the train, which seemed to be imminent. He succeeded in stopping the train, but received such a shock to his nervous system through fear of the disaster which he thought might happen that he has been incapacitated from employment ever since. The only question argued was whether that incapacity was brought about by reason of accident sustained by the plaintiff in the discharge of his duty, or, to take the words in the condition indorsed on the policy, by an accident caused to the plaintiff in the fair and ordinary discharge of his duty. The argument was brought down to this. It was admitted that if the train had struck the plaintiff, or the boiler of the engine had exploded, and the impact of the air had struck him so as to produce physical injury, in either case there would be an accident within the policy. But it was said that because the plaintiff was not touched by the train or injured by the impact of the air caused by the engine, but was only injured by the shock to his nerves caused by fear of an accident, and the responsibility thrown upon him, there was no liability. I confess that I am unable to follow that argument. It seems to me as much an accident as if he had been struck by the train. Supposing the plaintiff had been in the four-foot way, and he saw a train coming suddenly upon him, and in escaping out of its way he received such a shock to his nervous system that he became incapacitated from work or died, would not that come within the policy? In my opinion the plaintiff is entitled to recover.

A. L. SMITH, L.J., concurred.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitor for the plaintiff, H. Keeble. Solicitors for the defendants, Rose & Co.

COURT OF APPEAL.

From Q. B. Div. (Lord Halsbury, C., and Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ.)

Jan. 23, 24.

This was an appeal by the petitioner from an order made by Lawrance, J., at chambers, striking out certain particulars of charges contained in an election petition.

The petitioner and the respondent were the candidates at a Parliamentary election for the Haggerston Division of the Borough of Shoreditch, which took place on the 16th of July, 1895; the respondent being elected. On the 7th of August the petitioner presented a petition against the respondent's return, alleging that he, by himself or his agents, had been guilty of bribery, treating, undue influence, and other specified offences, and further alleging in another paragraph that he had committed other corrupt and illegal practices before, during, and after the said election."

66

On the 14th of August the respondent took out a summons for particulars of the specific charges and of the other charges, and Day, J., on the 16th, made an order that the petitioner should give particulars of the specific charges ten days before the day fixed for the hearing of the petition, and that he should give particulars of the general charges within seven days from the date of the order. On the 19th the respondent filed a return of his election expenses. On the 23rd the petitioner delivered his particulars of the general charges. These particulars included allegations that the respondent had been guilty of illegal practices in connection with the return and declarations in respect of his election expenses.

On the 22nd of October the respondent took out a summons for further and better particulars of the general charges, and on the 25th Pollock, B., made an order for the delivery of such further and better particulars ten days before the day fixed for the hearing of the election petition.

On the 15th of January, 1896, the petitioner delivered full particulars. On the 22nd the respondent applied at chambers to strike out certain of these particulars, namely, particulars 105-158, which related to the alleged illegal practices in connection with the return of his election expenses, and particulars 101 and 103, which related to matters which occurred before the petition was presented. Lawrance, J., made an order that these particulars should be struck out on the ground that the petition did not cover them. The petitioner now appealed.

Willis, Q.C., and B. S. Foster, for the appellant. Jelf, Q.C., and Lewis Coward, for the respondent. Lord HALSBURY, C.-I am of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed. This case divides itself into two parts, one a question of law as regards particulars 105-158 and the other as regards particulars 101 and 103. As to the latter part we hesitate either (a.) Reported by E. G. STILLWELL, Esq., Barristerat-Law.

COURT OF APPEAL.

to alter, to affirm, or to overrule the decision of the judge, as we are of opinion that the point was not really argued in chambers. We have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal on that point, but think that it would be more satisfactory to send the matter back to the learned judge for further argument on that point. Our judgment has therefore no reference to that part of the case.

The question we have to determine arises on the objection that the illegal practices alleged in connection with the return of the election expenses are not covered by the petition. The language of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 51), upon which statute the petitioner relies, is "corrupt practices before, during, or after the election," and he especially relies on the word after." The point of departure to be looked at is the election or return, twenty-one days from which is the time within which a petition must be presented.

The charges of which particulars may be ordered are charges made by the petition, and they must be charged in respect of offences already committed at the date of the petition. It is impossible that charges founded on offences alleged to have been committed since the presentation of the petition can be held to be charges contained in the petition.

"has

The very language made use of in the petition is of the past tense where it says the respondent been guilty of certain offences, and therefore it cannot possibly include offences not then committed. It is clear that the argument of the petitioner is untenable when one looks at the provision in the statute as to the limit of twenty-one days for the presentation of the petition; for if his contention were right, and the trial of the petition did not take place for some months after its presentation, a member might be unseated for an offence committed months after the election. I am therefore of opinion that the respondent cannot be proceeded against by this petition in respect of charges which did not arise until after the date of the petition. It is said that, in that case, offences committed after the presentation of the petition will go unpunished; but that is not correct. By section 40 of 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, a member may be charged with such an offence either by amendment of the petition made within the time limited for amendment, or by a fresh petition filed within the prescribed time after the offence was committed. I am therefore of opinion that this appeal must be dismissed.

LOPES, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. As to the question of the objection by the respondents that the particulars 105-158 relate to matters which are not covered by the charges in the petition, but to matters which in fact occurred after the date of the petition, I think that the very statement of the objection is of itself sufficient to show that those particulars were rightly struck out. A petition must be in respect of charges then existent, and the petitioner is only entitled to give particulars of those offences alleged in the petition. If such particulars as were given in this case were allowed, the petition would become prophetic.

I do not think the contention of the petitioner gives sufficient effect to the words “before, during, and after the election"; it rather treats the word election" as though it were "petition." Offences may have occurred between the date of the election and the date of the petition, and it is quite right that such matters should be included in the petition. Offences, however, which are alleged to have been committed after the date of the petition are on quite a different footing. There is no hardship in our decision, for the petitioner might have