was appropriately, though not in good taste, called "squatter sovereignty." It involved, at least in appearance, an extension of popular rights, and was therefore well calculated to enlist public sympathy in its favor. It was presented and enforced by its advocates in such captivating colors, that before the date of the decision it had secured many enthusiastic adherents in the North, whilst it was utterly repudiated in the South. The Douglas Democracy contended that this their favorite theory had been recognized in May, 1854, by the Kansas and Nebraska Act, declaring it to be "the true intent and meaning of this Act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom; but to leave the people thereof free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States."

They ought to have reflected that even if this provision had in plain language conferred upon the first settlers the power to abolish slavery, still, according to its very terms, it was “subject to the Constitution of the United States," and like all other laws it would be void if in conflict with this Constitution. What tribunal was to decide this question? Certainly the Supreme Court. Indeed the law itself had, in express terms, recognized this, by prescribing the appropriate method of bringing the question before that Court. After the Court, therefore, in March, 1857, had decided the question against their ideas of Territorial sovereignty, they ought to have yielded. They ought to have acquiesced in the doctrine that property, including that in slaves, as well in the Territories as in the States, is placed under the protection of the Constitution, and that neither a Territorial Legislature nor Congress possesses the power to impair or destroy it.

This decision ought surely to have ended the question; but Instead of this, the Douglas Democracy disregarded the decision altogether. They treated it as though it had never been made, and still continued to agitate without intermission, and with powerful effect, until the very day of President Lincoln's election. . Absolute non-interference with slavery in the Territories, on the part of any human power outside of them, was their watchword; thus leaving the people thereof en

tirely free to regulate or destroy it according to their own discretion.

On the other hand, the old Democracy, true to its ancient and time-honored principles in support of law and order, at once yielded a willing obedience to the decision of the Supreme Court. Whatever differences of opinion previously existed among them in regard to the correctness of the decision, at once disappeared. Without being the advocates of domestic slavery, they held themselves bound by the compromises made and recorded in the Constitution by its illustrious authors, and sustained the decision from an imperious sense of public duty. It did not require the authority of the Supreme Court to convince a large majority of them that a Territorial Legislature had not power to deprive a citizen of his property which was denied both to a State Legislature and to Congress. This extreme power of sovereignty in the latter cases they knew could only be conferred by an amendment to the State or Federal Constitution.

The Douglas Democracy still placed their principal reliance, as they had done before the decision, on the language of the Kansas and Nebraska Act. The difference between them and the old Democracy related to the point of time intended by the act, when the people of the Territories were recognized to possess the power "to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way." Was this at any time they pleased after the arrival of the first settlers, or not until the people should assemble in convention to form a State government, when, in the language of the act, they were to be admitted into the Union "with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission"? According to the construction of the Douglas Democracy, the act recognized their right to abolish slavery at any period of the Territorial existence; but according to the construction of the old Democracy, there was no recognition of this right, until the period when they should meet in convention to form a State constitution; and such was in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court.

If the Douglas construction of the act be correct, it is morally certain that the Southern Senators and Representatives who

were warm advocates of its passage, could not possibly have so understood it. If they had, they would then have voluntarily voted away the rights of their own constituents. Indeed, such a construction of the act would be more destructive to the interests of the slaveholder, than the Republican doctrine of Congressional exclusion. Better, far better for him to submit the question to Congress, where he could be deliberately heard by his representatives, than to be deprived of his slaves, after he had gone to the trouble and expense of transporting them to a Territory, by a hasty enactment of a Territorial Legislature elected annually and freed from all constitutional restraints. Such a construction of the Kansas and Nebraska Act would be in direct opposition to the policy and practice of the Government from its origin. The men who framed and built up our institutions, so far from regarding the Territories to be sovereign, treated them as mere wards of the Federal Government. Congress, as a faithful and kind guardian, watched over their infancy and promoted their growth and prosperity until they attained their majority. During the period of their pupilage the persons and property of the inhabitants were protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. When the population had so far increased as to render this expedient, Congress gave them a Territorial Government. But in conferring upon the settlers the privilege to elect members to the popular branch of the Territorial Legislature, they took care to reserve the appointment of the Governor and the members of the Council to the President and Senate. Moreover, they expressly provided, in the language of the compromise measures of 1850, "that all the laws passed by the Legislative Assembly and Governor shall be submitted to the Congress of the United States, and if disapproved, shall be null and of no effect." This limitation on their powers was intended to restrain them from enacting laws in conflict with the Constitution, the laws, or the established policy of the United States. It produced the happiest effect. The cases are rare, indeed, in which Congress found it necessary to exercise this disapproving power. It was not then foreseen that any political party would arise in this country, claiming the right for the majority of the first settlers of a Territory, under the plea of popular sovereignty,

to confiscate the property of the minority. When the population in the Territories had reached a sufficient number, Congress admitted them as States into the Union under constitutions framed by themselves, "with or without slavery," according to their own discretion.

Long experience had abundantly sanctioned the wisdom of this policy. Under its benign influence many powerful and prosperous States have been admitted into the Union. No serious difficulties had ever occurred until the attempt was made to abolish it under the construction in favor of "squatter sovereignty" given to the Kansas and Nebraska Act.

The Southern people, who had expected that after the decision of the Supreme Court their equal rights in the Territories would be respected by the Northern Democracy, were deeply mortified and 'disappointed to find that a large portion of this party still persevered in assailing these rights. This exasperated them, and placed in the hands of Southern disunion agitators a powerful weapon against the Union.

President Buchanan, ever since the commencement of his administration, has been persistently denounced, especially by the Douglas Democracy, for sustaining the law as pronounced by the highest judicial authority of the country. He has been charged with proving faithless to the Cincinnati platform, which he accepted and on which he was elected. To prove this would be impossible, because it is altogether silent in regard to the power of a Territorial Legislature over the question of slavery. Nay, more; whilst affirming, in general terms, the provisions of the Kansas and Nebraska Act, it specifically designates a future time when slavery may be rightfully abolished, not by the Territorial Legislature, but by the people. This is when, "acting through the legally and fairly expressed will of a majority of actual residents, and whenever the number of their inhabitants justifies it, [they assemble] to form a constitution with or without domestic slavery, and be admitted into the Union upon terms of perfect equality with the other States." Before this period the Cincinnati platform is silent on the subject. The power is claimed by its advocates as a mere inference from the general language of the Kansas and Nebraska Act. But even if the

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right of a Territorial Legislature to abolish slavery had been affirmed in express terms by the Cincinnati Convention, which · was the President bound to obey?-a political platform, or the Constitution as expounded afterwards by the Supreme Court? the decree of a nominating convention, or the supreme law of the land? He could not hesitate in the choice under his oath faithfully and to the best of his ability "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States." Sad must be the condition of any country where an appeal can be taken from judicial decisions to excited popular elections! Under our free government all citizens are equal before the law. The law and the law alone is their master. When this is disregarded and defied by excited and exasperated popular majorities, anarchy and confusion must be the inevitable consequence. Public and private rights are sacrificed to the madness of the hour. The Government itself becomes helpless for their protection, and to avoid such evils history has taught us that the people will at last seek refuge in the arms of despotism. Let all free governments in future times profit by our example. Let them take warning that the late disastrous civil war, unjustifiable as it was, would most probably never have existed had not the American people disobeyed and resisted the Constitution of their country as expounded by the tribunal which they themselves had created for this express purpose.

The great Democratic party might have maintained its ascendency and saved the Union, had it not been thus hopelessly divided at this critical period. Encouraged and emboldened by its irreconcilable divisions, the Abolition or Republican party no longer confined itself to an opposition to slavery in the Territories. It soon extended its agitation to the suppression of slavery within the States. At the first it sought to save appearances, but the veil was too transparent to conceal its purposes.