to the Consul to recognise the Zemstvos Committee unofficially as a temporary administrative institution. The British Embassy have been instructed, in bringing the above to the attention of the State Department, to add that in the view of the British Government it is urgently desirable that similar unofficial recognition should be accorded by the consuls of the other powers at war with Germany. The Embassy would therefore be grateful if they could be informed at an early date whether the United States Government feel able to issue similar instructions to their consular representative at Vladivostok. WASHINGTON, January 4, 1918. [Received January 5.] File No. 861.00/898 The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, January 5, 1918, 2 p. m. Your January 1, 1 a. m. You are authorized to deal with Zemstvo Committee unofficially as temporary administrative institution. LANSING File No. 861.00/898 The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, January 5, 1918, 3 p. m. Your January 1, 1 a. m. Brooklyn now at Manila has been ordered to proceed immediately to Yokohama for further instructions. Embassy Tokyo also advised of this. File No. 763.72/8405 LANSING The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] TOKYO, January 5, 1918, 10 p. m. Russian Ambassador advises me Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon informed him that the Japanese Government yesterday had decided to send to Vladivostok a cruiser which is now coaling and is expected to arrive there about the 9th and that the British Government has ordered a cruiser to proceed there from Hongkong coaling at Nagasaki on the 8th. I assume that these arrangements have been made in consultation between the British Government and Japanese although British Ambassador made no mention of them in discussing the situation in Vladivostok with me to-day. MORRIS File No. 861.00/916 The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] TOKYO, January 7, 1918, 8 p. m. [Received January 7, 4.50 p. m.] Upon my communicating with Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, your telegram of January 5, 3 p. m.,1 he advised me that 26th Lord Robert Cecil had urged upon Japanese Ambassador in London the inadvisableness of antagonizing Maximalist Party now in control in Russia, but that on the 1st instant he had urged the necessity of taking some steps short of actual military intervention to protect military stores lying at Vladivostok. Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs said his Government is waiting further explanation of the apparent change of attitude of the British Government and of its immediate intentions before taking final decision. In reply to inquiry as to his personal feeling, he stated he thought it would be premature to land troops, as he understood British Foreign Office proposes, inasmuch as that might incur anti-Ally feeling. Stevens announces credit entirely satisfactorily arranged. MORRIS File No. 861.00/945 The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State [Translation] WASHINGTON, January 8, 1918. MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Immediately upon hearing through the French Chargé d'Affaires at Peking of the events that took place at Irkutsk, the Government of the Republic decided that it should take the measures needed to secure the lives of its nationals which 'See telegram to the Consul at Vladivostok, ante, p. 19. might again be threatened on account of the growth of anarchy in Siberia. Consequently the immediate sending to Harbin and thence to Irkutsk of the largest possible French force, detailed from the corps of occupation in China and placed under the command of Major de la Pornarède, has been considered by the French Government which would desire the cooperation of its allies and a joint arrangement as to the final organization of a military mission in the matter of men, appropriations and supplies. China should be treated as an ally and therefore asked to detail to the mission a part of the troops that have been operating at Harbin and all available contingents. Besides, since the mission is to appear as being inspired by the desire of bringing the cooperation and support of the Allies to the Russian elements in Siberia that have remained true to the cause of the Entente, the accession of Russian military elements should also be asked. As is known to your excellency, the attention of the Allies was already drawn, at the last Paris conference, to the desirability of some joint action tending to protect, if possible, Siberia from Maximalist contagion, to secure the use of the Trans-Siberian and Russian railways for southern Russia to the advantage of the Allies and by isolating Vladivostok, if not too late, to protect the stocks of all kinds that are stored there. This would offer a chance to prevent German influence, which in the event of a separate peace might predominate in northern Russia, from getting a foothold in Vladivostok to the great detriment of the situation of the Allies in the Far East. By order of my Government I have the honor to make this plan known to your excellency and to say how great a value it would attach to obtaining the adhesion and cooperation of the Federal Government in immediately carrying it out. Be pleased to accept [etc.] JUSSERAND File No. 861.00/953a The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, January 8, 1918, 7 p. m. Department desires immediate and specific information following points: (1) What authorities now control Vladivostok ? (3) How are authorities constituted? (4) What is their attitude towards Bolshevik authorities Petrograd? (5) Are they supported unanimously by soldiers and sailors? (6) Is port open; is it likely to remain so? (7) What is attitude of authorities, of soldiers, and of sailors toward foreign population? (8) How many troops at Vladivostok and how many sailors? Ditto in Province ? (9) What prospect Stevens party landing safely Vladivostok? No answer telegram December 28, 5 p. m.1 Department desires full information. LANSING File No. 861.00/924 The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PEKING, January 9, 1918, 5 p. m. [Received January 9, 4.45 p. m.] 2 Moser requests authorization Drysdale proceed Siberia to gather the information on conditions there as requested your instructions to him. Please instruct Moser directly. Naval attaché suggests advisability of sending to assist Drysdale a Serbian Colonel Speskov, now here, available, who has offered his services and is thoroughly familiar with the situation, speaking all necessary languages. Please instruct me whether this and necessary expenses are authorized. REINSCH File No. 861.00/931 The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] HARBIN, January 10, 1918. Reliable telegram dated 9th states Irkutsk quiet under Bolshevik control. Consuls active protecting foreigners and have refused deliver to Bolsheviks high provisional officials who took refuge in Chinese Consulate. 1 Vol. I, p. 214. 'Lieut. Col. W, S. Drysdale, Military Attaché at Peking. MOSER File No. 861.00/929% Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) January 10, 1918. The Russian Ambassador called this morning and read me three telegrams which he had received during yesterday and to-day, one from each of his colleagues, respectively, at Tokyo, Paris and London. Each of them expressed not only the fear but the conviction that the Japanese intended and were making preparations to effectuate an occupation at Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. At the latter place there are large supplies of munitions and war materials. The Ambassador said that it was necessary for the Allies to insist that all decisions made and all actions taken in the Far East be by the Allies combined and not by Japan alone. He suggested that warships be sent to protect the various interests of the United States, Great Britain and Japan at Vladivostok to operate in unison but to be under the command of an American senior officer. He felt that this would effectually checkmate Japan's activities. He said that he had been slow to take the position he now was forced to take but that he felt convinced, from the telegrams, that there was needed action on the part of the Allies if they would prevent the occupation of eastern Siberia by the Japanese. He said, confidentially, that the British Ambassador had just told him that he had information to the effect that the Germans were sending submarine parts across the Trans-Siberian to a point of assembly on the Pacific Asiatic coast. I told him that in regard to that matter there was absolutely no foundation for it as it was a physical, military and naval impossibility. He requested that we send telegrams to our Ambassador at Tokyo requesting the Japanese Government to act in unison with us. I told him that I would be very glad to consider his suggestions and that if there was anything to communicate I would do so. I told him that possibly the Japanese feared that all the German and Austrian prisoners in Russia and Siberia would be reofficered and rearmed and sent eastward through Siberia to direct a blow against Japan and her interests in the Far East. He said that of course they might fear that, but that there was no foundation for that fear; that such a move could not be effected, and that most of the prisoners in Russia were Austrians and not Germans. I asked him if he had heard the press report that Russia had made a separate peace with Bulgaria. He expressed great surprise and said that he had not heard it, but, that if it was so, it might be advantageous, because (1) it would be additional cause for dissen |