This Government believes that no exception can be taken to assisting them and accordingly desires that the acquiescence and approval of the Chinese Government be sought so that they can pass over the Chinese Eastern Railway if such a movement becomes necessary. POLK File No. 861.09/3380 The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State No. 791 MEMORANDUM The British Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and has the honour to inform him that the Commander of H. M. S. Suffolk has reported the establishment of a combined naval patrol at the entrance to the port of Vladivostok, this step having been taken partly to stop the exit or entry of enemy prisoners and agents, and partly as a demonstration of unity amongst the Allies and the Czechs. The vessels available for the patrol are, however, at present quite inadequate for the protection of the length of coast involved and it is urgently desired that further destroyers should be furnished from Japan. His Majesty's Government have instructed the British Ambassador at Tokyo to communicate with the Japanese Government on this subject and to ask that the necessary destroyers for this purpose may be sent as soon as possible. The British Ambassador has received instructions to bring this question to the notice of the United States Government, and to express the hope that instructions may be sent to the American representative at Tokyo to support the request made by His Majesty's Government. WASHINGTON, July 16, 1918. File No. 861.00/2385 The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State [Translation] WASHINGTON, July 16, 1918. MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: With the object of furthering the union movement reported from eastern Siberia and of assisting in the recruitment of military elements capable of bringing effective aid to the Czech troops, General Paris, a French officer attached to these troops at Vladivostok, has asked to have a lump-sum credit of 5,000,000 rubles immediately opened. The Government of the Republic has given its full assent to the request and in view of the urgency has assumed the following ex penditures: 3,500,000 rubles for the upkeep of the Czecho-Slovak troops; 250,000 rubles for the recruiting of soldiers who would join the Czechs. Believing that the extension of financial aid to those Bohemian contingents that are fighting in Siberia in the cause of the Allies is an urgent necessity, my Government would be glad if the Federal Government would also agree to opening the aforesaid credit and in that case would kindly direct the payment of its quota to be effected without delay either at Peking or Tokyo. I should be very thankful to your excellency if you would kindly let me know whether the American Government is disposed to accede to this proposition of the French Government. Be pleased to accept [etc.] JUSSERAND File No. 861.00/2467 The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State No. 2150 PEKING, July 16, 1918. SIR: Referring to my telegram of July 12, 5 p. m., on the subject of General Horvat's proclamation of the establishment of a provisional Siberian government on the 9th instant, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a despatch on that subject, addressed to the Legation by the Consulate at Harbin under date of the 12th instant.1 In this connection, I have to report that late in the evening of July 11, the Russian Minister communicated to me a French translation of a telegram addressed to him by General Horvat, embodying the substance of this proclamation, which telegram, it may be remarked, was dated as early as July 3. It is also to be noted that the program of General Horvat's government, as set forth in this telegram to the Russian Legation here, and as communicated in my telegram above cited, did not include the twelfth item as given in the proclamation published in Harbin, of which the translation is enclosed with Mr. Moser's despatch, this item reading as follows: 12. Right of autonomy of Siberia and other provinces to be acknowledged, on condition that the unity of Russia be preserved. On the morning of the 12th instant, the British Minister called a meeting of certain of his colleagues-the French, Japanese and Russian Ministers, and myself to consider the situation created by 'Not printed. General Horvat's action, with particular reference to its effect upon the transfer of Czecho-Slovak troops from the Maritime Region to assist their fellow nationals in western Siberia. The Russian Minister was apparently disposed to urge, though somewhat diff dently, General Horvat's claim to the support of the Allied Governments, but was persuaded to concur with his colleagues in the opinion that General Horvat must be induced to refrain from any action which might impede the movements of the Czecho-Slovaks. The French Minister was particularly insistent that the Allied Ministers should decline to recognize any of the pretensions of General Horvat, an opinion in which his British and Japanese colleagues concurred, the Japanese Minister stating his conviction that General Horvat should be removed as an obstacle to the proposed transfer of the Czecho-Slovak troops, although the Japanese Government would thereafter regard with indifference the establishment of General Horvat's or any other government in eastern Siberia. In the absence of instructions, I did not feel warranted in taking any part in the decision reached. That decision, as reported in my telegram above cited, was to send to General Horvat, through the Russian Minister, but in the names of the British, French, and Japanese Ministers, a telegram to the following effect: The representatives of Great Britain, Japan, and France, being in receipt of telegrams from their respective consuls at Vladivostok pointing out the danger of civil strife which may result from the proclamation of General Horvat and which may prevent the passage of the Czechs through Manchuria, which is all important and has a purely military object directed against the Germans, advise General Horvat to withdraw his proclamation and return to Harbin so as to facilitate the passage of the Czechs over the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Ministers beg General Horvat to be good enough to favor them with a prompt reply to their communication. At the present time, telegraphic communications with Siberia (except Vladivostok) are interrupted; and it is not known whether General Horvat has in fact received the telegram sent in the names of the three Allied Ministers. I am to-day informed by the French Minister, however, that the Russian Legation received on the 14th instant a further telegram from General Horvat, stating that he would not oppose the transfer of the Czecho-Slovak troops from eastern to western Siberia. It has not thus far been possible for the Legation to obtain any information, supplementing that embodied in the telegram from Harbin, which was repeated to the Department by me, July 12, 7 p. m., as to the support apparently given to General Horvat by the Japanese. I have [etc.] J. V. A. MACMURRAY American Proposals for Military Action, July 17, 1918; Discussion with the Japanese and British Governments-Chinese Request for Participation-Rivalry of Local Organizations File No. 861.00/3054b The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors AIDE-MÉMOIRE The whole heart of the people of the United States is in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United States is to do everything that is necessary and effective to win it. It wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the Allied Governments, and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it has no ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common counsel and intimate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confidence that, if it finds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations either of policy or of fact. In full agreement with the Allied Governments and upon the unanimous advice of the Supreme War Council, the Government of the United States adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the fighting on the western front into which all its resources of men and material were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible, and it has carried out that plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more rapidly forward and literally putting into it the entire energy and executive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing and hearty response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military advisers and of the advisers of the Allied Governments. It is now considering, at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of making very considerable additions even to this immense program which, if they should prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its resources upon this single absolutely necessary object. In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so long as the military situation on the western front remains critical, consent to break or slacken the force of its present effort by diverting any part of its military force to other points or objectives. The United States is at a great distance from the field of action on the western front; it is at a much greater distance from any other field of action. The instrumentalities by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost and with great difficulty been created in France. They do not exist elsewhere. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not practicable for her to do anything of importance or on a large scale upon any other field. The American Government, therefore, very respectfully requests its associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its force by attempting important operations elsewhere. It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the Supreme Command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander in Chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer in all others, particularly because it considers these two fronts so closely related as to be practically but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the ports now used by the armies of the United States. It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It can not, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or selfdefense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or Allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immedi |