possible French force to be detailed from the corps of occupation in China and hopes for the cooperation of the Allies and a joint arrangement for the organization of a military mission. Your excellency's Government further proposes that China, as one of the Allies, should be asked to detail for the proposed mission such contingents of troops as may be available and that the accession of Russian military elements also should be asked since the object of the proposed mission is to support those elements in Siberia which have "remained true to the cause of the Entente." Your excellency further, in obedience to the instructions of your Government, suggests the adhesion and cooperation of the American Government in the execution of the proposed plan. In reply I have the honor to state that a telegram dated the 10th instant at Harbin reported the situation at Irkutsk on the 9th as quiet and stated that the consuls were active in protecting foreigners. This would seem to indicate that the earlier reports, which appear to have come from Petrovski Zavod, two hundred miles east of Irkutsk, greatly exaggerated the danger to the foreign residents. The American Government is disposed to believe that such a military mission as is proposed is not required by the present condition of affairs in Siberia. It is believed that it would be likely to offend those Russians who are now in sympathy with the aims and desires which the United States and its cobelligerents have at heart in making war and might result in uniting all factions in Siberia against them. The American Government regrets, therefore, that it is unable to give its support to the proposals as suggested in your excellency's note. Accept [etc.] ROBERT LANSING File No. 861.11/967 The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] TOKYO, January 17, 1918, 5 p. m. In order that Admiral Knight might have benefit first-hand information he joined me yesterday in talks with my colleagues, the French, the British, and the Russian Ambassadors. Subsequently I had informal conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs; from these talks and other reliable information we agreed on the following facts: As a result of requests from the consuls growing out of the fear that serious disorders, reported to have occurred elsewhere, might be repeated at Vladivostok the British Government and the Japanese Government dispatched war vessels to that port. Neither before nor since their arrival have disorders occurred and the messages received to date report everything perfectly quiet. While deeming additional ships unnecessary the Japanese Government would have no objection whatever to the presence of Brooklyn at Vladivostok. If, however, conditions should hereafter require occupation of Vladivostok and the lines of the Chinese Eastern and Amur Railways, Japan asks that this task be left to her alone and has definitely requested the British Government to agree to this as evidence of confidence of the Allies in her good faith, and is greatly pleased at reported refusal of our Government to a suggested plan joint occupation if conditions should require more drastic action. Would suggest for consideration of the Department that the Brooklyn be directed to remain at Yokohama to be in readiness to proceed to Vladivostok if conditions there become threatening. This would leave Admiral Knight in a position to act with but little delay, and would also leave the United States free from the appearance of joining in a demonstration to coerce the authorities in control of Vladivostok at a time when no necessity for such coercion is apparent. MORRIS File No. 861.00/968 The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] TOKYO, January 17, 1918, 10 p. m. [Received January 18, 1.55 a. m.] Supplementing my January 17, 5 p. m. I have just received the following telegram from Caldwell: January 16, 7 p. m. Is Brooklyn at Yokohama? Additional Japanese cruiser Asahi is due to-morrow. Considered superfluous and produces situation making presence here of Admiral Knight with the Brooklyn most desirable if not imperative. This view has been expressed voluntarily by Russian officials, British consul and commander British cruiser. Japanese Government confirms statement that the cruiser Asahi will arrive Vladivostok to-morrow; also supply ship will follow shortly. Including ice breaker this will total four Japanese naval vessels in port and one English; Admiral Knight doubts whether the addition of Brooklyn will allay feeling as reported by Caldwell and fears it may result in including us in suspicions now entertained by the Russian peoples of Japan's intentions. MORRIS File No. 861.00/945 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)1 [Telegram] WASHINGTON, January 20, 1918, 6 p. m. Your January 17, 5 p. m. and 10 p. m. You are instructed to call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and in oral conversation remind him of the attitude of this Government towards a military mission to Siberia as set forth in Department's telegram of January 16, 4 p. m.,2 in which you were informed of the reply made to the French proposals, declining to cooperate in a joint military expedition to Irkutsk and expressing the conviction that a military mission to Siberia would have disastrous results. The American Government has not learned since that France has taken any action in the direction proposed. The American Government feels very strongly that the common interests of all the powers at war with Germany demand from them an attitude of sympathy with the Russian people in their present unhappy struggle and that any movement looking towards the occupation of Russian territory would at once be construed as one hostile to Russia and would be likely to unite all factions in Russia against us thus aiding the German propaganda in Russia. The American Government trusts the Imperial Japanese Government will share this conviction and hopes that no unfortunate occurrence may make necessary the occupation of Vladivostok by a foreign force. The information received by this Government indicates that the situation there is quiet and is not one to cause alarm. You will say to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that in the opinion of the American Government the presence of more than one Japanese war vessel at Vladivostok at present is likely to be misconstrued and create a feeling of mistrust as to the purposes of the Allied Governments which Japan does not desire any more than the United States. POLK 'Repeated Jan. 21, 7 p. m., to the Ambassadors in Great Britain (No. 6313) and France (No. 3092) "for your information and to be shown informally to Government to whom you are accredited," and to the Minister in China, "for your confidential information and not to be communicated to Chinese Government." 2 See footnote 2, ante, p. 28. File No. 861.00/993 The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PARIS, January 23, 1918, 11 p. m. 3086. Department's No. 3092, January 21.1 On seeing Mr. Pichon at the Foreign Office this afternoon, informally showing him copy of the telegram sent to the American Ambassor at Tokyo, he explained to me at considerable length the original attitude of the French Government toward sending a joint military expedition to Irkutsk. He said that what prompted his Government to send out the circular note to the Allied Governments was the killing of three French citizens at that place by Russians. He had felt that united action on the part of such powers as England, France, Japan, and the United States in sending such a military expedition would have a salutary effect. He informed me that the answer from the British Government was rather evasive and not at all encouraging while the reply he received from Japan was very clear and direct after stating that Government had asked to be allowed to meet the situation by sending its own war vessels exclusively without the cooperation of the other Governments. Mr. Pichon however expressed great respect for the views of the American Government as conveyed in its telegram to Tokyo. Under the circumstances I do not think that the French Government will press the matter further. Nevertheless he said that he had very little confidence in either the strength or the good faith of the Russian government as now constituted. I find that this feeling is quite prevalent in governmental circles. The French press has been for a long time very uncomplimentary in its reference to anything coming out of Petrograd or the conferences being held at Brest Litovsk. I learned to-day from inside and authoritative sources that French troops at the front not only decline to have any comradeship whatever with the Russian soldiers early sent over to the west front-none of whom are now put into the trenches-but that the commanding officers keep them apart from each other so that there will be no danger of hostile encounters between them. SHARP 1 See footnote 1, ante, p. 31. File No. 861.00/999 The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] LONDON, January 24, 1918, 11 p. m. [Received January 25, 2.34 a. m.] 8388. Your 6313, January 21, 7 p. m.1 Mr. Balfour informed as instructed. He intimated that as things are at the moment he agreed with your position but events may at any time create a different situation. I discover a growing conviction that the Bolshevik régime will soon end and that southern Russia will come forward as the real Russia but no British diplomatic change in attitude to Russia has taken place. The British Ambassador has arrived from Petrograd. I am to see him to-morrow and will report if I learn anything worth while. PAGE Proposed Japanese Occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway-The Reported Activities of German and Austro-Hungarian Prisoners-British and Japanese Support of Semenov File No. 861.00/1003 The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PARIS, January 24, 1918, midnight. [Received January 25, 10.55 a. m.] 3092. Following joint telegram dated Jassy, January 22, received from Ministers of United States, Italy, France and England: It is confirmed to us on all sides both from Russian and Rumanian sources that the only remedy for the anarchy reigning in Russia lies in the sending immediately to that country of Japanese or American troops. 1. All Russian or Ukrainian officers assert that if the government of Kiev succeeds in maintaining its independence and in forming an army it will not only not want to fight but will also refuse to occupy the line trenches. The Ukrainian army, like the present Russian army, will not admit the idea that the war can recommence. It is ready for anything rather than to fight. Only an inter-Allied impetus could change this state of affairs. 2. Three or four Japanese or American divisions would suffice to ruin the authority of the Bolsheviks and to rally around them with the defenders of order those who to-day are hiding and dare not voice their opinion. A real army could quickly be formed round 'See footnote 1, ante, p. 31. |