The Committee of Claims, to whom was referred the memorial of John Dawson, late a pension agent in the State of Illinois, submit the following report:

The memorialist represents that, under the administration of Mr. Tyler, he was a pension agent in said State, and performed the duties of the office for more than three years, and that he received and disbursed about $100,000-paid clerk hire and office rent; for all which he has received nothing. He asks compensation, and thinks, in equity, he ought to receive it.

But the committee know of no case in which direct compensation has been paid to pension agents by the government, nor of any law authorizing such payment; nor of any special act allowing compensation to any individual pension agent for the ordinary services or expenses incident to the office. It does not appear that the memorialist performed any services not usually performed by other officers of the kind in other places. Such being the fact, the committee can see no good reason why he should be entitled to be made an exception to the general rule.

If direct compensation ought to be allowed pension agents, let a general law be passed, under which all may receive compensation. Establish the precedent by legislating specially, as asked in this case, and it is to be apprehended that Congress will be beset with numerous applications of the same kind, importuning special legislation in each particular case. The committee think such would be the result. And they are of the opinion. that if any legislation is needed-of which they are not aware-it should be by a general law, alike applicable to all pension agents for similar services and expenses performed and incurred.

The committee ask to be discharged from the further consideration of the memorial.

1st Session.

No. 31..

The Committee on Public Lands, to whom was referred the petition of Robert Butler, praying compensation for his property taken for public use, report, as follows:

The petitioner claims compensation for the loss of certain buildings and improvements on the northeast quarter of section one, township one south, range one west, adjoining the town of Tallahassee, in Florida. These improvements, the petitioner alleges, were commenced by one Ambrose Crane, and were purchased of him by the petitioner near the close of the year 1824, or in the early part of 1825. The land was then the unsold lands of the United States, and the subsequent disposition of it without allowing to the petitioner a pre-emption right to it, or compensation for his improvements, is the subject of his complaint.

The petitioner's claim to compensation appears to be two-fold:

1. By virtue of an act of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Florida of the 16th September, 1822, under which he made the purchase of Crane. This act provides that all persons making improvements on public lands, so long as they continue to possess and occupy the same, shall enjoy the free and undisturbed use of such improvements, embracing only the land within the limits of their enclosure. Such improvements are also made transferable, in the same manner as real estate, and are made liable to execution; "provided, that no part or parts of this act shall be so construed as to vest in the purchaser or purchasers of said improvements any legal right to the soil on which the said improvements are made, or to affect any dispositions which may be made by the general government in relation to such improvements.

From this proviso it is evident that, as against the United States as the owner of the soil, no rights were given to the possessor of the improvements. He could not claim of the government to withhold the land frem sale, or to allow him any rights in it more than a stranger, or to receive pay for his improvements when sold to another. It merely protected him in his possession as against strangers, at the same time expressly recognising the full right of the government to sell not only the land, but the improvements as incident thereto. In the subsequent disposition made by the United States, then, no constitutional provision or other legal right of the petitioner was violated, nor was any liability to the petitioner for his improvements assumed by the government.

2. By virtue of the pre-emption laws of the United States, it is claimed that the petitioner was justly entitled to rights in the premises, of which he has been deprived by the action of the government, and for which remuneration ought to be granted.

By an act of Congress approved May 24, 1824, there was granted to the Territory of Florida a quarter section of land for the seat of government, to be located by the governor of that Territory previous to the sale. of the adjacent lands. The same act reserves from sale "three entire quarter sections of lands of the United States, lying contiguous to and adjoining the quarter section," selected for such seat of government. By the same act the appointment of a surveyor of public lands for Florida was authorized. This appointment was conferred on the petitioner, and in the summer or fall of 1824 he entered on the duties of that office. He was required to keep his office at the seat of government, and went there for that purpose. He alleges that, near the close of 1824, or early in January, 1825, he "purchased of Ambrose Crane, a settler on public lands, certain improvements made, and then occupied by him, for a valuable consideration paid, and entered into possession immediately;" and afterwards erected buildings and made other improvements thereon.

The first sales of public lands in that region took place in May, 1825. The three quarter sections, out of the four which surrounded the quarter section selected for the seat of government, were selected by the acting governor, under the act of May 24, 1824, on the 16th February, 1825. The quarter section claimed by the petitioner was one of these selections. It was subsequently, under the provisions of the act of February 22, 1827, granted by the United States; that portion of the premises on which the improvements were situated being donated to the town of Tallahassee, and the balance sold to aid in erecting public buildings for the Territory.

It is admitted that at the time of the purchase from Crane, and during the time intervening between that and the selection of the quarter section occupied by the petitioner, by the acting governor, on the 16th February, 1825, there was no law giving any pre-emption right to the premises. The first law recognising pre-emption rights in Florida was passed in April, 1826. The petitioner alleges that this act was pending when he went into the possession of the premises, and he intended either to purchase the land at the sale, or otherwise to be entitled to pre-emption right, if that law passed.

The act of the 3d March, 1807, was during the time last mentioned in full force, declaring that if any person shall take possession of, or make a settlement on, lands ceded or secured to the United States, and not previously sold, ceded, or leased by the United States, such offender or offenders shall forfeit all his or their right, title, and claim, if any he hath, of whatsoever nature or kind the same may be, to the lands aforesaid;" and the President is authorized to cause to be removed by military force any person or persons who shall hereafter take possession of the same, or make or attempt to make a settlement thereon, until thereunto authorized by law." Under this act Crane was a trespasser, and liable to be removed at any time, even by military force, if necessary. It is possible that the act of the territorial legislature above mentioned, of the 16th September, 1822, might have the effect to protect Colonel Butler as the purchaser of the improvements made by Crane from some of the liabilities attaching to

the acts of trespass under the above-cited act of Congress. Without expressing any opinion on this subject, it is evident that the territorial act does not secure to the purchaser any rights, as against the United States, to the improvements made on the land, or any privilege of pre-emption. This is expressly declared in the provision of the act itself as above cited; and, in this respect Colonel Butler had no better rights than Crane, and could claim nothing of the government.

Nor does the claim of the petitioner stand on any better foundation when it is tested by the pre-emption law of April, 1826. That act gives the right of pre-emption, in Florida, under the same restrictions as are contained in a previous law on the same subject in reference to lands in Illinois; and one of the restrictions in that act provides that there shall be no pre-emption rights in lands reserved from sale.

When the petitioner made his purchase of Crane, the act of May 24, 1824, reserving three entire quarter sections contiguous to and adjoining the quarter section granted for the seat of government, must have been known to him. Of the four quarter sections, it was then settled by law that three were to be reserved for special purposes, and it remained only for the governor to designate the three out of the four to be taken; and the use for which the grant of that part of the premises occupied by the petitioner was afterwards given to the town of Tallahassee, its location, and the nature of the improvements upon it, show clearly that the quarter section in question was not likely to be omitted in the selection. The design of the law was to give the right of pre-emption to the cultivator of the soil, who had settled on public land, honestly intending to make it his farm and his home. The petitioner could hardly be regarded in this light. He went there as an officer of government engaged in the public surveys, and purchased, knowing that there were at least three chances to one that the land on which he settled would never be in market, and that he had no legal right to retain the same.

Besides, the terms of the act of May 24, 1824, are such, as in effect not only to reserve the three quarter sections which should be selected by the governor, but in fact to reserve the four quarter sections adjoining the seat of government until such selection was made. Prior to this selection, no portion of it could be sold, for it could not be determined what would and what would not be taken for public use.

If this view of the case be correct, it follows, not only that the land in question was never within the description of lands to which the pre-emption law applied, but that there could never have been a rational expectation that it would become so. It was reserved from sale by the act of May, 1824, and so continued until the selection was made on the 16th of February, 1825, which forever withdrew it from market. To such reservations the pre-emption law never applied.

But there are other reasons why the case could never, under the statement made by the petitioner, even if there had been no reservation by the government of the premises, have entitled the petitioner to a pre-emption right.

The act of 1826 required that the claimant of a pre-emption right should "actually inhabit and cultivate" the land claimed, on or before the 1st of January, 1825. The petitioner claims through Crane, but the petition. contains no sufficient allegation that Crane lived on the land, nor any statement that he ever cultivated any portion of it; neither does it allege