Atty's. Genl., vol 8, pp. 73, et seq.; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, pt. 2, cap. 9; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, lib. 2, ch. 13.)

§ 25. Where there are no express prohibitions, the ports of one state are considered as open to the public armed and commissioned vessels of every other nation with whom it is at peace. Such ships are exempt from the jurisdiction of the local tribunals aud authorities, whether they enter the ports under an express permission, stipulated by treaty, or a permission implied from the absence of prohibition. This exemption extends not only to the belligerent ships of war, privateers, and the prizes of either, who seek a temporary refuge in neutral waters from the casualties of the sea and war, but also to prisoners of war, on board any prize or public vessel of her captor. Such vessels, in the command of a public officer, possesses, in the ports of a neutral, the rights of ex-territoriality, and are not subject to the local jurisdiction. But if such prisoners of war be taken on shore, in a neutral port, they become subject to the local jurisdiction, or not, according as it may be agreed between the political authorities of the belligerent and the neutral powers. Foreign troops, stationed in, or passing through the territory of another state, with whom the foreign state is in amity, are undoubtedly exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. But this right of passage is derived from an express and not an implied permission, which may be given with specified limitations. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 9; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 157, note; Cushing, Opinions U. S. Atty's Genl., vol. 7, p. 123; Foelix, Droit International Privé., § 164; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 2, ch. 13; The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden et al., 7 Cranch Rep., p. 135; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 341; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tome 1, pp. 475, 476; The Betsey, 3 Dallas Rep., p. 6; The Cassius, 3 Dallas Rep., p. 121; The Alerto, 9 Cranch Rep., p. 359.)

§ 26. Private vessels of one state entering the ports of another, are not, in general, exempt from the local jurisdiction, unless by express compact, and to the extent provided by such compact. But there are certain exceptions to this rule, which result from the right of asylum, based on the

laws of humanity. A vessel driven by stress of weather, or carried by unlawful force into a prohibited port, or into an open port with prohibited articles on board, incurs no penalty or forfeiture, in either case. The cases of blockade and carrying contraband, are familiar examples of the principle. But the rule of law, and the comity and practice of nations, go much further then these cases of necessity, and allow a merchant vessel of one state, coming into an open port of another, voluntarily, for the purposes of lawful trade, to bring with her, and keep over her, to a very considerable extent, the jurisdiction and authority of the laws of her own country, excluding, to this extent, by consequence, the jurisdiction of the local law. This jurisdiction of a nation over its vessels, while lying in the port of another, is wholly exclusive. For any unlawful acts done by her while thus lying in the port of another state, and for all contracts entered into while there, by her master or owners, she is made answerable to the laws of the place. Nor, if her master or crew, while on board in such port, break the peace of the community by the commission of crimes, can exemption from the local laws be claimed for them. But the comity and practice of nations have established the rule of international law, that such vessel, so situated, is, for the general purpose of governing and regulating the rights, duties and obligations of those on board, to be considered as a part of the territory of the nation to which she belongs. The local authorities, therefore, have a right to enter on board a foreign merchantman in port, for the purpose of inquiry universally, but for the purpose of arrest, only in matters within their ascertained jurisdiction. It, therefore, follows, that, with respect to facts happening on board, which do not concern the tranquility of the port, or persons foreign to the crew, or acts committed on board while such vessel was on the high seas, are not amenable to the territorial justice. All such matters are justiciable only by the courts of the country to which the vessel belongs. So firmly is this doctrine incorporated into the practice of nations, that the Freneh regard it as a positive rule of international law, and the French laws do not hesitate to prescribe that, when crimes are committed on board a French vessel in a foreign port, by one of the crew against another of the same

crew, the French consul is to resist the application of the local authority to the case. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 9; Webster, Dip. and Off. Papers, pp. 85, 86; Massé, Droit Commercial, tome 2, §§ 31-44; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, liv. 2, ch. 13; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, § 123; Legaré, Opinions of U. S. Attorney's General, vol. 4, p. 98; Riquelme, Derecho Internacional, lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 9; Cushing, Opinions of U. S. Atty's Genl., vol. 8, pp. 73, et seq.; De Clercq, Formulaire, tome 1, p. 366; tome 2, p. 65; The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Cranch Rep., p. 144; The Creole, Com. between the U. S. and Great Britain, p. 241; The Enterprise, Com. between U. S. and G. B., p. 187; Hello, Revue de Législation, tome 17, p. 143; Wirt, Opinions U. S. Atty's Genl., vol. 2, p. 86; Berrien, Opinions U. S. Atty's General., vol. 2, p. 378.)

§ 27. It may be stated, in general terms, that the judicial power of every sovereign state extends: 1st. To all civil proceedings, in rem, relating to immovable or real property within its territory; 2d. To all civil proceedings, in rem, relating to movable or personal property within its territory; 3d. To all mixed actions, relating to real and personal property within its territory; 4th. To all its public and private vessels on the high seas, to its public vessels and their prizes in foreign ports, and, in certain cases, to its private vessels in foreign ports; 5th. To all controversies respecting personal rights and contracts, or injuries to the person or property, when the person resides within the territory, wherever the cause ef action may have originated. In this class of controversies, the judicial power may or may not be exercised, according as is provided by municipal law. This general principle is entirely independent of the rule of the decision. which is to govern the tribunal.

With respect to criminal matters, the judicial power of the state extends, with certain qualifications: 1st. To the punishment of all offenses against its municipal laws, by whomsoever committed, within its territory; 2d. To the punishment of all such offenses, by whomsoever committed, on board its public or private vessels on the high seas, and on board its public vessels, and, in some cases, on board its merchant vessels in foreign ports; 3d. To the punishment of all such offenses by its own subjects, wheresoever committed;

4th. To the punishment of piracy, and other offenses against the law of nations, by whomsoever and wheresoever committed. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 1-13; Phillimore, On Int. Law, part 3, chs. 18, 19, 20; Story, Conflict of Laws, § 530-583; Henry, Foreign Law, chs. 8, et seq.; Huberus, Praelectiones, lib. 1, tit. 3; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, chs. 16, 17; Cushing, Opinions U. S. Atty's Genl., vol. 8, p. 73; Riquelme, Derecho Internacional, tomo 1, pp. 243-245; Gardner, Institutes, pp. 1–37.)

§ 28. The power of a state over the person of the party guilty of, or charged with, criminal offenses, is necessarily limited to the extent of its own territory, or to the high seas which is the common territory of all, or to its vessels in foreign ports; for no sovereign state is bound, unless by special compact, to deliver up persons, whether its own subjects or foreigners, charged with, or convicted of, crimes under the laws of another country, upon the demand of a foreign state or its officers. The extradition of persons charged with, or convicted of, criminal offenses affecting the general peace and happiness of society, is voluntarily practised by most states, where there are no special compacts, as a matter of general convenience and comity. Some distinguished jurists have treated this question as a matter of strict right, and as constituting a part of the law and usage of nations. Others, equally distinguished, explicitly deny it as a matter of right. The weight of authority is in favor of regarding it as a matter of comity, rather than of strict right, under the rules of international law as universally received and established among civilized nations. If it be regarded as a right at all, it is one of those imperfect rights which cannot be enforced, as the obligation on the other party is also imperfect, and not universally, even if generally, admitted. (Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib, 2, cap. 11, §§ 3-5; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 13; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §§ 349, et seq.; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, pp. 35–38; Story, Conflict of Laws, §§ 626-628; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 3; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 6, §§ 76, 77; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 2, ch. 9, § 12; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 91-101; Kluber, Droit des Gens, pt. 2, tit. 1, ch. 2, § 66; Foelix, Droit Int. Privé, liv. 1, tit. 9,

ch. 7; Massé, Droit Commercial, tome 2, § 44; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. 17; Cushing, Opinions U. S. Atty's Genl., vol. 8, p. 73; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 2, tit. 2, cap. 5.)

§ 29. A criminal sentence, pronounced under the municipal law of one state, can have no legal effect in another. If it be a conviction, it cannot be executed without the limits of the state in which it is pronounced; and if such conviction be attended with civil disqualifications in the country where pronouned, these disqualifications do not follow the offender into another independent state. In the words of Martens, "a sentence which attacks the honor, rights, or property of a criminal, cannot extend beyond the courts of the territory of the sovereign who has pronounced it, so that he who has been declared infamous, is infamous in fact but not in law. And the confiscation of his property cannot effect his property situate in a foreign country. To deprive him of his honor and property, judicially, there also, would be to punish him a second time for the same offense." It follows, from this well established principle, that if a delinquent should fly from one jurisdiction to another, for the purpose of obtaining a milder punishment, or an acquittal in the tribunals of the country where he should take refuge, such sentence would be a nullity, and of no avail to protect him against a prosecution in the state to which he owed allegiance, or in which the crime was committed. But a conviction or acquittal, in the state where the offense was committed, or to which he owed allegiance, would, of course, be an effectual bar to a prosecution in any other state. (Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 14; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 86, 94, 104; Kluber, Droit des Gens Mod., pt. 2, tit. 1, ch. 2, §§ 64, 65; Foelix, Droit Int. Privé, § 565; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. 17; Westlake, Private Int. Law, ch. 11; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 2, tit. 2, cap. 3.)

§ 30. The conclusiveness of foreign sentences and judg ments, where they are drawn in question in the tribunals of another state, will depend upon the nature of the action, and the usage of the different nations, and the special compacts between them. In personal actions, res adjudicata, in one country, can have, per se, no effect in another. The effect attached to a foreign judgment is different in different coun