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public minister, and the office cannot exist without it. International law has conferred it upon the state or sovereign which he represents, and to divest him of that quality, is to divest him of his office, as the two are inseparable. Not so with respect to the fiction of ex-territoriality. So far as that is not necessary to the exercise of his functions, or, in other words, to secure his inviolability, it is not an essential quality of the public minister, and therefore, may be dispensed with by renouncement or otherwise. It will be seen hereafter, that this distinction, which is made by the best writers on public law, leads to very important results. As a consequence of the sacredness and inviolability of the person of a public minister, he is entitled to an entire exemption from the local jurisdiction, both civil and criminal. This exemption commences the moment he enters the territory of the state to which he is sent, and continues, not only during the whole time of his residence, but until he leaves the country, or at least till he loses his official character, and the protection due to his office. The state to which he is accredited may at any time require him to leave, either before or after his recall by his own government. Sometimes the period within which he must leave is designated in his letter of dismissal; and, at the termination of that period, the protection due to his office necessarily ceases. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 3, ch. 1, § 14; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 219; vol. 2, § 153; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac, lib. 2, cap. 18, §§ 1-6; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 2, ch. 9, § 20; Wicquefort, de l'Ambassadeur, liv. 1, § 27; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 7, §§ 81-125; Kluber, Droit des Gens Mod., pt. 2, tit. 2, § 203; Horne, On Diplomacy, sec. 3, §§ 23-24; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 5, §§ 19, 20; Bynkershoek, de Foro Legat. c. 17-19; Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 253; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, ch. 3; Martens, Guide Diplomatique, §§ 26, 27; Foelix, Droit Int. Privé, §§ 169, 188, 210, et seq.; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 204, 205, 212-215; Bello, Derecho Inter-" nacional, pt. 3, cap. 1, § 3; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 2, cap. Ad., 2; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Ministre Public, sec. 5; Villefort, Priviléges Diplomatiques, pp. 7, et seq.)

§ 14. But to this general exemption of a public minister, from the local jurisdiction of the country of his residence,

there are certain exceptions which are well recognized and established in international jurisprudence. These exceptions are: 1st, Where he plots against the safety of the government to which he is accredited; 2d, Where he owes allegiance to the country of his residence, and has been received on condition of renouncing any claim to be exempt from the local jurisdiction.

The first of these can hardly be considered a full exception to the general rule of exemption, for it only authorizes the enforcement of local jurisdiction, and the exercise of local authority, so far as may be necessary for the defense of the state. "In case of offenses," says Wheaton, "committed by public ministers, affecting the existence and safety of the state where they reside, if the danger is urgent, their persons and papers may be seized, and they may be sent out of the country. In all other cases, it appears to be the established usage of nations to request their recall by their own sovereign, which, if unreasonably refused by him, would unquestionably authorize the offended state to send away the offender. There may be other cases which might, under circumstances of sufficient aggravation, warrant the state thus offended, in proceeding against an ambassador as a public enemy, or in inflicting punishment upon his person, if justice should be refused by his sovereign. But the circumstances which would authorize such a proceeding, are hardly capable of precise definition, nor can any general rule be collected, from the examples to be found in the history of nations, where public ministers have thrown off their public character and plotted against the safety of the state to which they are accredited. These anomalous exceptions to the general rule resolve themselves into the paramount right of self-preservation and necessity. Grotius distinguishes here between what may be done in the way of self-defense, and what may be done in the way of punishment. Though the law of nations will not allow an ambassador's life to be taken away as a punishment for a crime after it has been committed, yet this law does not oblige the state to suffer him to use violence without endeavoring to resist it." The weight of authority is, that an ambassador cannot be punished by the government to which he is accredited, for plotting against it,

although he may be forcibly resisted, and if necessary, forcibly ejected from the country. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 3, ch. 1, § 15; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 7, §§ 94–102; ch. 8, §§ 111-112; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 18, § 4; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 216, 218; Martens, Guide Diplomatique, §§ 23-27; Kluber, Droit des Gens, pt. 2, tit. 2, § 186; Ward, Hist Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 291–334; Bynkershoek, de Foro Legat., caps. 17, 18, 19; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 2, ch. 9, § 20; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Ministre Public, sec. 5; Horne, On Diplomacy, sec. 3, § 24; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 2, § 158; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 103-119; Foelix, Droit Int. Privé., § 217; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 204-215; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 3, cap. 1, § 3; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 2, cap. Ad., § 2; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens., tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 15.)

$15. In the second case, that is, where the minister owes allegiance to the country where he resides, and has been received on condition of renouncing any claim to be exempt from the local jurisdiction, a question may arise as to whether such minister is to be considered as really the representative of the country by which he is accredited. And if he is to be regarded as such representative, can the renouncement of his privilege of exemption from local jurisdiction extend to the inviolability of his person and office? In other words, must not such renouncement, however general in its terms, be limited to his right of ex-territoriality, and with respect to civil jurisdiction only? Would it not be utterly incompatible with his official character, for him to submit to be tried and punished under the local laws as a criminal? But these questions will be more particularly considered in the following paragraphs. The case here supposed is one of theory only, and of little practical importance in modern jurisprudence, as states now never permit their ministers to make any such general renouncement of their diplomatic rights and character. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 3, ch. 1, §§ 5, 15; Martens, Manuel Diplomatique, ch. 3, § 23; Kluber, Droit des Gens Mod., § 186; Bynkershoek, De Foro Legat., caps. 11, 22; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 8, § 112; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, cap. Ad., §2; Heffter, Droit International, §42; Martens, Causes Célèbres, tome 1, p. 229.)

§ 16. In the third case, that is, where the minister makes a special renouncement of his privilege of exemption and voluntarily submits to the local jurisdiction, several important questions will arise with respect to the manner of making the renouncement, and with respect to the extent of jurisdiction which may be exercised, even where the renouncement is duly made. In the first place, is it sufficient that the minister himself renounces his privileges of exemption, and submits to local jurisdiction, in order to authorize the courts to exercise that jurisdiction; or is it necessary to have the permission of his own government for that purpose? Admitting the necessity of such assent or permission, how is the government to which he is accredited, or its local authorities, to ascertain the fact? Can they go behind the act of the minister to examine his instructions, or to judge between him and his government, as to his authority to act in a matter of this kind? In doing so, would they not assume the character of Mentor over the representative of a foreign state? No doubt, the act of the minister must be presumed to have the consent of his government to which alone he is responsible. But this consent being presumed, and the renouncement being within the acknowledged limits of the minister's powers, how is it to be made? Wicquefort is of opinion that a minister who contracts before a notary, (qui avait contracté pardevant notaire) thereby renounces his privilege of exemption from local jurisdiction, so far as concerns that particular contract. In the case of the American minister at Berlin, who had entered into a contract of lease for the house in which he resided, the landlord, on his removal at the expiration of the lease, retained the minister's goods as security for alleged damages to the premises, under a general provision of the Prussian civil code, giving him the right to the goods of a tenant, as hypothecated for the payment of the debt. The Prussian government, when appealed to by the American minister, refused to interfere. In the case of M. de Silveira, conseiller of the Portuguese legation at Paris, who had been separated from his wife, and had entered into a contract to give her a certain allowance, in which the parties had declared themselves to be domiciled in Paris, and the husband had deposited for this allowance a certain sum in the Caisse de

consignations;-in a suit by his wife for, among other things, the said alimentary allowance, he pleaded his exemption as diplomatic agent. This title was not contested, and the courts admitted his general exemption from local jurisdiction, but sustained it with respect to the alimentary provision. But neither the opinion of Wicquefort, nor the cases above referred to, are regarded as good authority. The better opinion is, that there must be a special submission to local jurisdiction in the particular case, either directly made, or necessarily implied, by the act of bringing suit as plaintiff, or of consenting to appear as defendant, in a civil action; and certainly, a renouncement of the privilege of exemption must be equally as unequivocal in criminal proceedings. Supposing the renouncement of the diplomatic privilege, and submission to local jurisdiction, to be duly made, we have next to inquire into the extent of jurisdiction which is conferred by such acts, and may be lawfully exercised by the local tribunals. We shall consider this question, first, with respect to civil suits, and second, with respect to criminal matters. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 8, § 111; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Ministre Public, sec. 5; Villefort, Priviléges Diplomatique, pp. 10, et seq.; Gazette des Tribunaux, Aug. 15th, 1857; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 3, ch. 1, §§ 15, 17; Revue Etrangère et Francais, tome 2, p. 31; Heffter, Droit International, §42; Bynkershoek, De Foro Legat., cap. 23; Martens, Causes Célèbres, tome 1, p. 229.)

817. First, of civil jurisdiction. Voluntary submission to local civil jurisdiction presents two classes of cases: 1st, Where the minister voluntarily appears as defendant in a civil action and admits jurisdiction; and 2d, Where he appears as plaintiff, and avails himself of the local jurisdiction against another as defendant.

The former class of cases seems, at first sight, to present more difficulties, with respect to extent of jurisdiction, than the latter; for, if judgment be given against the minister as defendant, the execution or other process for its satisfaction issued against his property or person, might seriously infringe upon his diplomatic privilege of inviolability. But, in fact, the same result might follow in a case where he is plaintiff; for, if he fail in his suit, judgment might be decreed against

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