him for costs. Moreover, the defendant may present and establish counter-claims to a larger amount than his demand, and thus obtain judgment for the difference. And again, the opposing party may appeal to a higher tribunal, and thus carry the minister, against his consent, to a higher court. Does the minister, by voluntarily submitting to, or claiming the local jurisdiction, become liable to all the consequences the same as an ordinary litigant? It would certainly be very absurd to allow him to claim it in any particular case, and then to withdraw himself from it whenever such a course suited his interest or convenience. And yet to execute, against him as against an ordinary litigant, the judgment of the court, would seriously compromise the inviolability of his diplomatic character. In order to obviate this difficulty, some make a distinction between the judicial proceedings of the court before final judgment, and the supplementary proceedings for the execution of that judgment. "This last theory," says Villefort, "although vague and somewhat arbitrary, is, perhaps, the best in a matter where it may be said more reasonably than in any other, that there is no absolute rule. It, moreover, has the advantage of conforming to the principles laid down by the ancient publicists who founded the science." According to this view, no proceedings by way of execution of judgment can be taken against the person of the minister, or against any of his property which, by the rules of international jurisprudence, is entitled to the privilege of exemption; in other words, although a minister may renounce his right of ex-territoriality, he cannot divest himself of the inviolability which the law of nations attaches to his person and office.

The following consequences seem to result from this discussion: 1st, If a minister renounces his privilege of exemption, and submits to local jurisdiction by appearing in a civil action, either as plaintiff or defendant, and judgment be rendered against him, he is bound to pay it; 2d, If the judg ment be in his favor, and the other party appeal to a higher tribunal, he must submit to the jurisdiction of appeal; 3d, A final judgment against a minister, can only be satisfied out of property which he possesses separate and distinct from his diplomatic character, and no proceedings can be taken

against his person, or against property privileged by the law of nations. (Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 3, ch. 1, § 15; Villefort, Priviléges Diplomatiques, pp. 4-18; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 2, cap. Ad., §2; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 93-103; Heffter, Droit International, §42; Bynkershoek, de Foro Legat., cap. 14, § 13; cap. 16, § 2; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Ministre Public, sec. 5; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 8, § 111.)

§ 18. Second, of criminal jurisdiction. This, also, involves two classes of cases: 1st, Where the minister is charged with crime and submits to be judged by the local tribunals; and 2d, Where he appears in the local tribunals, charging another with crime. The two classes of cases seem, at first sight, to be very different, and yet their result may be nearly the same with respect to the inviolability of the minister. A distinction, however, must be drawn in the second class, between the case where the minister appears simply as an informer, to give notice of the commission of a crime by another, and where he appears as a civil party in a criminal prosecution. In the former case, his official character is not involved, for he is no party to the judicial proceedings But if he appears as a civil party, in a criminal prosecution, he may be seriously compromised. According to French law, if the accusation be declared slanderous, (calomnieuse) he is liable to fine and imprisonment. Such a sentence, if attempted to be carried into execution, necessarily affects the inviolability of his official character, in the same manner, though in less degree, than where he himself is the original subject of the criminal proceeding. Wheaton, in speaking of the right of a minister to deliver his domestics up for trial, under the laws of the state where he resides, says, he may do this, "as he may renounce any of the privileges to which he is entitled by the public law." Villefort says this statement is not only incorrect, but entirely unsupported by authorities. Perhaps he mistakes the meaning of Wheaton, by giving too literal a construction to his words. If the latter means to say that a public minister may submit himself to a criminal prosecution, which involves corporal punishment, disgrace or infamy, and still retain his official position as the representative of a foreign state, he is evidently in error, for the two characters are

utterly incompatible. How could the government, to which he is accredited, continue its official intercourse with a man which its tribunals are trying as a criminal under its laws? Again, suppose he be condemned, and the sentence be executed, will it continue to recognize him, when declared infamous, or immured in the walls of a prison? But if Mr. Wheaton means to say that a public minister may renounce his official character, and, having ceased to be the representative of his government, deliver himself up as a private individual, for trial under the laws of the state where he resides, the correctness of the statement will not be disputed. (Villefort, Priviléges Diplomatiques, pp. 18-25; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 3, ch. 1, §§ 15, 16; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Ministre Public, sec. 5; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv, 4, ch. 8, § 111; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 1, p. 325; Helie, Traité de l'Instruction Crim., tome 2, ch. 4, § 124; Code Pénal, French, Art., 373; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 2, cap. Ad., § 2; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 103-119; Heffter, Droit International, § 42.)

§ 19. As ministers are exempt from the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the country where they reside, whether civil or criminal, the question has often been dicussed, how are they to be punished for their offenses, and how are their creditors to obtain justice? The answer is easily deducible from the principles already discussed. The minister is the officer of the state which he represents, and, by the fiction of ex-territoriality, he is considered to be within the limits of his own country. His state is responsible for his acts the same as if committed within its own territory. If he commit an offense upon a citizen of the state where he resides, or refuse to do justice in any of his dealings, the injured party must submit his case to his own government, which will demand satisfaction and redress from the state to which the minister belongs. For offenses against the laws of the country to which he is accredited, the government of that country may not only dismiss the minister and send him out of the country, but may demand justice and punishment of his own. country, a refusal of which demand will constitute a sufficient cause for complaint, and, perhaps, for actual hostilities. History furnishes numerous cases of this kind. Thus, the

Bishop of Ross, ambassador of Mary Queen of Scotts, was banished from England for conspiring against the sovereign, while the Duke of Norfolk, and other conspiritors, were tried and executed. It is true that the crown lawyers deemed him liable to a penal action, but the correctness of their opinion was afterward denied by Albericus Gentilis, Zouch, Sir Robert Cotton, Blackstone, and other eminent English authorities. Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in England, was ordered, in 1584, to depart the realm, for conspiring to introduce foreign troops and dethrone the queen, and a commissioner was sent to Spain to prefer a complaint against him. Again, in the reign of James I., the Spanish ambassadors, Inoyosa and Colonna, were complained of to the king of Spain for a scandalous libel on the Prince of Wales and Duke of Buckingham, but allowed to depart without trial. In 1654, De Bass, the French minister, was ordered to depart the country in twenty-four hours, on a charge of conspiracy against the life of Cromwell. In 1717, the Swedish ambassador in England, was arrested and his papers seized, on a charge of conspiring against the king. This act was justified solely on the ground of necessity for self-defense. In 1718, the Prince of Cellamare, Spanish ambassador in France, was arrested, and his papers seized, under the same charge, and he was conducted, under a military escort, to the frontier. In neither of these cases was any attempt made to try and punish the minister, nor did any of the ambassadors from other courts complain of an infringemeut of the privileges of their order, though a protest from this body has always been usual when an injury has been done to any member of it resident at the same court. In the case of Gyllenburg, the Spanish ambassador, Monteleone, simply observed that he was sorry some other way than the arrest of an ambassador, and the seizure of his papers, could not have been fallen upon for preserving the peace of the kingdom. In the case of Da Sa, brother of the Portugese ambassador in England, charged, in 1653, with being accessory to a murder, he claimed the privileges of an ambassador; but, on examining his credentials, it was found that he was simply promised a commission at a future time, on the recall of his brother. He was therefore ordered to plead to the indict

ment. It was generally admitted that if Da Sa had actually been an ambassador, he would not have been liable to trial. At that time the laws of England did not extend, to the suite of a minister, the exemption of the minister himself from the jurisdiction of the courts of the country, in case of murder. It is now, however, generally admitted, that the exemption extends to all the officers and members of his household, and the minister and his government must be held responsible that they be properly punished for any offenses they may commit. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 8, §§ 116; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib, 2, cap. 18, $10; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §§ 159-171; Ward, Hist. Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 486, et seq.; Bynkershoek, de Foro Legatorum, caps. 6, et seq.; Wicquefort, l'Ambassadeur, liv. 1, § 29; Martens, Causes Célèbres, tome 1, pp. 139, et seq.; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 103-119; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 204, 212-215; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 2, cap. Ad., 2; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Ministre Public, sec. 5.)

§ 20. But if the dependents of a foreign minister are exempt from local jurisdiction, who is to punish them for crimes, and for offenses against the local laws? May the minister himself try, and punish them? Or may his state organize a tribunal, in a foreign country, for that purpose? Or may the minister arrest and send them home for that purpose. Or should he discharge them from his service, and deliver them up for trial, under the laws of the state where he resides? These are important questions, upon which there has been some diversity of opinion and practice. In 1603, a man named Combaut, one of the retinue of the Duc de Sully, the French ambassador at London, killed an Englishman at a brothel. Sully tried the offender by a council of Frenchmen, and condemned him to death, after which he delivered him over to the English authorities, for execution. But James I. pardoned the culprit. The French, however, contended, (and, we think, correctly,) that, although King James might refuse to carry the sentence into execution, or might remit the execution in England, yet, as Combaut was a Frenchman, tried and condemned by a French tribunal, the English king had no power to grant him a pardon. The right of the French authorities to try and condemn in England, seems not to