tie, tome 1, pt. 3; Massé, Droit Commercial, liv. 1, tit. 1; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 17.)

§14. The general right of trade, and the general duty of a state to facilitate commercial intercourse with others, are well settled principles of international law; nor is it anywhere denied that a nation has a right to decline a particular commerce which it may deem disadvantageous or injurious. But the question has sometimes been discussed, whether a state has a right to absolutely decline commercial intercourse with others, and whether, by so doing, it does not subject itself to punishment for a violation of a positive law of nations. Vattel says, that as every state has a perfect right to determine. what is useful or salutary for it, it becomes a duty, as well as a right, for a nation to judge whether it is expedient to engage in a proposed trade, or to refuse any commercial overtures from others, and that such others have no "right to accuse it of injustice, or to demand a reason for such refusal, much less, to use compulsion. It is free in the administration of its own affairs, without being accountable to any other. The obligation of trading with a foreign state is imperfect in itself, and gives them only an imperfect right; so that in cases where the commerce would be detrimental, it is entirely void." "The Spaniards, falling on the Americans, (Indians) under a pretence that these people refused to traffic with them, endeavored in vain to cover their insatiable avarice." (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 2, § 25; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 139, et seq.; Massé, Droit Commercial, liv. 1, tit. 1; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2. lec. 17; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 3; Burlamuqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 4.)

§ 15. China and Japan for a long time declined all commercial intercourse with other nations, and even now permit only a very restricted trade, in particular articles, and at particular places. The question was at one time discussed, whether these people could not be compelled to open their ports to forigners, and engage in trade and general intercourse with the rest of the world. But, as a question of international jurisprudence, it scarcely merits consideration. No doubt on this point could arise in the mind of any person except those who contend that the rules of international law, adopted

by christian nations, are wholly inapplicable to the countries of Asia. But this opinion, although at one time supported by writers of unquestionable ability, is now almost universally rejected by publicists. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 1, § 10; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §§ 31-34; The Madona del Burso, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 172; The Hurtige Hane, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 326; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 150; Massé, Droit Commercial, liv. 1, tit. 1.)

§ 16. We have already discussed the duty of diplomatic intercourse, of legation, treaty, etc., and it is only necessary, in this place, to add a few remarks on the general character of the obligations resulting from this class of imperfect rights and duties. As already stated, a right is no less a right because it belongs to the class called imperfect in international law; so of a duty, it is none the less obligatory because it is imperfect, and cannot be enforced under the rules of international jurisprudence. Thus it is with the principles of natural law with respect to the mutual commerce of states. It is not difficult to point out the general duties of nations with respect to trade, but as each state is the exclusive judge of its own duty in any particular case, the application of a rule founded on generalities must always be uncertain. Therefore, says Vattel, if nations wish to secure to themselves something constant, punctual and determined in trade, treaties are the only means of procuring it. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv, 2, ch. 2, § 26; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 2, ch. 10; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 4, § 18, 19; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 143; Massé, Droit Commercial, tome 1, §§ 45, et seq.)

§ 17. With respect to the mutual duties of states, not established or taken cognizance of by the positive law of uations, but resting entirely on natural law, Vattel lays down the general principle, that one state owes to another state whatever it owes to itself, as far as this other stands in need of assistance, and the latter can grant it without neglecting the duties it owes to itself. Such, he says, is the eternal and immutable law of nature. In limitation, or explanation of this rule, he makes the following observations: "Social bodies, or sovereign states, are much more capable of supporting themselves than individuals, and mutual assistance is not

so necessary among them, nor of such frequent use. Now, whatever a nation can do itself, no succor is there due to it from others." (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, § 3; Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et Gen., lib. 3, cap. 3; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 3, pt. 3, ch. 4; De Felice, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 2, lec. 16; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 4.)

§ 18. Among the mutual duties of states, arising from natural law, are the offices of humanity, such as relieving the distresses and wants of others, so far as is reconcilable with our duty toward ourselves. Thus, if a nation is suffering under a famine, all others having a quantity of provisions, are bound to relieve its distress, yet, without thereby exposing themselves to want. "But," continues Vattel, "if this nation is able to pay for the provisions thus furnished, it is entirely lawful to sell them at a reasonable rate; for what it can procure is not due to it, and, consequently, there is no obligation of giving for nothing such things as it is able to purchase. Succor, in such a severe extremity, is essentially agreeable to human nature, and a civil nation very seldom is seen to be absolutely wanting in such." Contributions of provisions, by the people of the United States, to the starving population of Ireland and Madeira, are examples of the performance of this natural duty. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, § 5; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 4; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 16; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 4.)

It

§ 19. The like assistance is due, whatever be the calamity by which a nation is afflicted. Whole sections of countries are sometimes devastated by floods, and cities and towns destroyed by fires or earthquakes, leaving vast numbers of people destitute of the means of shelter or subsistence. is, first, the duty of their own government to provide for these wants; but not unfrequently the calamity is so great that the government is unable to give its aid to the extent and within the time required to render it efficacious. In such cases, the laws of humanity would impose a duty upon others. In many instances of this kind, however, the active charity of individuals and commuuities, renders any action on the part of the governments of other states unnecessary.

But a government may always stimulate and assist such charity, and by thus reflecting and giving effect to the general feelings of its people, manifest its sympathy and generosity. Of such a character was the assistance rendered by the government of the United States for transporting to Ireland the contributions of provisions spontaneously offered by the American people. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, § 5; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 16.)

§ 20. A question here arises, how far one state may afford assistance to another nation suffering famine and distresses which immediately result from the operations of a war. We refer, of course, to to the offices of humanity, and not to assistance in the means of carrying on hostilities. The furnishing of provisions and clothing to a starving and suffering people, may, or may not, assist in prolonging the war. In case of a siege or blockade, no neutral state can furnish food to the inhabitants of the place so besiged or blockaded, without a violation of its neutral duties, no matter how much they may suffer, or how strong may be the dictates of humanity to relieve such suffering. So, also, an enemy may sometimes devastate whole sections of a country, and reduce the inhabitants to the miseries of famine, but this would not, ipso facto, justify another state to furnish them with relief. The rights and duties of the neutral will be determined by the peculiar circumstances of each case, and it would, therefore, be difficult to lay down any positive and invariable rule on this subject. There can be no doubt, however, that when the war is ended, or its operations are removed from the particular place or section of country, foreign nations may extend the offices of humanity to relieve the distresses of a suffering people. Of such a character was the assistance rendered by the people of the United States to the suffering inhabitants of modern Greece, in their struggle against the Turks. (Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 3, cap. 1, §5; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. 1, cap. 11; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, §5; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 16; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 4; Gardner, Institutes, p. 682.)

§ 21. Another question discussed by publicists is, how far it is the duty of one sovereign state to assist in preserving the independence of another state against the designs or attacks of its enemies. There can be no doubt of its duty to exert its moral influence, by way of advice, proffered mediation, etc., for the accomplishment of such an object; but this duty toward others does not extend to the use of force. The use of force for the benefit of others, is not a matter of obligation, (unless of treaty stipulation,) and the question is entirely one of policy, which every state determines for itself. In Europe the question has been connected with that of preserving the equilibrium of power, and of preventing the aggrandisement of a particular state by the absorption of the dominions of another; as the case of Russia and Turkey in 1854. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, §4; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §§ 386, et seq.; Ortolan, Domaine International, tit. 3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 16; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 4; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 3.)

§ 22. Having based the obligation of performing the offices of humanity solely on the law of nature, Vattel infers that no nation can refuse them to another on the plea of a difference of religious belief. "A conformity of belief and worship," he says, "may become a new tie of friendship between nations, but no difference in them can warrant us to lay aside the quality of humanity, or the sentiments annexed to it." He quotes with approbation the conduct of Pope Benedict XIV, who, on being informed that several Dutch ships at Civita Vecchia, could not put to sea for fear of some Algerine corsairs, immediately ordered the frigates of the ecclesiastical states to convoy them out of danger; and his nuncio at Brussels was directed to signify to the statesgeneral that His Holiness would perform the duties of humanity without reference to any difference of religion. The same rules extends to commencial rivals. The fact that a state, or any of its inhabitants, are our rivals in trade, would furnish us with no excuse for neglecting toward them the duties of humanity; on the contrary, those engaged in like. pursuits are usually best acquainted with each others wants,