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and best able to relieve each others necessities. It also extends to cases of national hostility. Frequent wars and mutual aggressions sometimes produce feelings of deep-seated hostility between citizens and subjects of different states. Such enmities do not in any way effect the general obligations of humanity; unfortunately, however, they are not unfrequently made a pretext or excuse for neglecting their performance. The excuse is not admissible in morality, nor will it ever avail much in the general opinion of the world. National enmities, and national vanities, often blunt the sense of natural and moral duty, and are sometimes mistaken for patriotism. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, §§ 15, 16; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 3, §§ 65-67; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 16; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 3; Cicero, De Officiis, lib 3, cap. 6.)

§ 23. As the reciprocation of the duties, or offices of humanity, says Vattel, “is to take place betwixt nation and nation, according as one stands in need, and the the other can reasonably comply with them, every nation being free, independent, and having the disposal of its actions, each is to consider whether its situation warrants asking or granting anything on this head. Every nation has a right to ask of another that assistance and kind offices which it conceives itself to stand in need of. This it cannot be denied without injury. If the demand be unnecessary it is thereby guilty of a breach of duty; but herein it does not depend on the judgment of another. A nation has a right of asking, but not of requiring." Again, the same author remarks that these offices of humanity, "being due only in necessity, and by a nation which can comply with them without being wanting to itself; the nation which is applied to, has, on the other hand, a right of judging whether the case really demands them, and whether circumstances will allow it to grant them consistently with what is owing to its own safety and concerns. For instance, a nation is in want of corn, and makes a demand to purchase of another, this latter is to judge whether such a compliance will not expose itself to scarcity; and a denial is to be acquiesced in without resentment." (Vattel, Droit

des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, §9; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 16; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 3; Gardner, Institutes, p. 682.)

§ 24. With respect to the rule and measure of the duties of nations to extend to others the offices of humanity and assistance, Vattel makes the following sensible and judicious remarks: "Melancholy experience shows that most nations mind only strengthening and enriching themselves, at the expense of others, or lording it over them, and even, if an opportunity offers, of oppressing and bringing them under the yoke. Prudence does not allow us to strengthen an enemy, or him in whom we discover a desire of plundering and oppressing us, and the care of our safety forbids it. We have seen that a nation does not owe its assistance and the offices of humanity to another any further than as they are reconcilable with the duties toward itself. Hence, it evidently follows, that though the universal law of mankind obliges us to grant, at all times, and to all, even to our enemies, those offices which are of a tendency to render them more moderate and virtuous, because no inconveniency is to be feared from such dispositions, yet we are not obliged to give them such succors as probably may be pernicious to ourselves. Thus, the exceeding importance of trade, not only to the wants and conveniences of life, but likewise to the forces of a state for furnishing it with the means of defending itself against its enemies, and the insatiable avidity of those nations which seek totally to engross it exclusive of others; thus, I say, these circumstances authorize a nation, possessed of a branch of trade, or the secret of some important manufacture or fabric, to reserve to itself those sources of wealth, and so far from communicating them, to take measures against it; but things necessary to the life or conveniency of others, this nation must sell them at a reasonable price, and not abuse its monopoly by iniquitous and hateful exactions. * * As to things more directly useful for war, a people is under no obligation of selling them to others of whom it has any well-grounded suspicion; and even prudence declares against it." (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, § 16; Cicero, de Officis, lib. 3, cap. 6; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 16; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 3.)

§25. Nothing tends more to the peace of the world, and the general comity and intercourse of nations, than mutual

friendship and kind offices. The cultivation of international good-will and friendship is, therefore, one of the first and highest duties imposed upon every sovereign state. Rulers, however, are too apt to neglect this duty, and to seek to exalt their own patriotism by depreciating other countries, and inciting in their own people feelings of unkindness and hostility to their neighbors. Such conduct is very reprehensible, and its results are generally dangerous, if not disastrous. For the authorities of one state to abuse and depreciate the government of another, is a sure indication of weakness and want of civilization and refinement. National irritability is mentioned by Dymond as a most prominent cause of war. "It is assumed," he says, "not indeed upon the most rational grounds, that the best way of supporting the dignity, and maintaining the security of a nation, is, when occasions of disagreement arise, to assume a high attitude and a fearless tone. We keep ourselves in a state of irritability, which is continually alive to occasions of offense, and he that is prepared to be offended, readily finds offenses. So well, indeed, is national irritability known to be an efficient cause of war, that they who, from any motive, wish to promote it, endeavor to rouse the temper of a people by stimulating their passions, just as the boys in our streets stimulate two dogs to fight. These persons talk of insults, or the encroachments, or the contempts of the destined enemy, with every artifice of aggravation; they tell us of foreigners who want to trample upon our rights, of rivals who ridicule our power, of foes who will crush, and of tyrants who will enslave us. They pursue their object, certainly, by efficacious means; they desire war, and, therefore, irritate our passions; and when men are angry, they are easily persuaded to fight." (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 1, §§ 11, 12; Dymond, Essays on the Prin. of Morality, essay 3, ch. 19; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 16; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 3.)

* * *

CHAPTER XII.

SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

CONTENTS.

1. Duty of moderation in international disputes-2. Two classes of means for their settlement - 3. Amicable accommodation-4. Compromise5. Mediation-26. Rejection of offers of mediation -27. Arbitration 28. Conferences and congresses-39. Retortion-10. Retaliation-3 11. Nature of reprisals-12. General and special reprisals 13. Positive and negative reprisals 14. Seizure of the thing in dispute - 15. Necessity of proving title before seizure-16. Reprisals upon persons - 17. Seizure and punishment of the individuals offending 18. If the government of the offenders assume their acts-19. Case of McLeod20. Decision of the New York court-¿ 21. Opinion of Mr. Webster22. The New York decision not authority- 23. Opinions of American writers 24. Opinions of European publicists 25. Embargoes of property found within territory of injured state- 26. General effect of reprisals, seizures and embargoes - 27. Sir William Scott's opinion of the embargoes of 1803- 28. Reprisals and embargoes, by whom authorized — 29. In general, not in favor of foreigners - 30. May be in favor of domiciled aliens.

§ 1. The precepts of morality, as well as the principles of public law, by which human society is governed, render it obligatory upon a state, before resorting to arms, to try every pacific mode of settling its disputes with others, whether such disputes arise from rights denied, or injuries received. This moderation is the more necessary, as it not unfrequently happens that what is at first looked upon as an

injury or an insult, is found, upon a more deliberate examination, to be a mistake rather than an act of malice, or one designed to give offense. Moreover, the injury may result from the acts of inferior persons, which may not receive the approbation of their own government. A little moderation and delay, in such cases, may bring to the offended party a just satisfaction; whereas, rash and precipitate measures often lead to the shedding of much innocent blood. The moderation of the government of the United States, in the case of the burning of the American steamboat "Caroline," in 1837, by a British officer, led to an amicable adjustment of the difficulties arising from a violation of neutral territory, and saved both countries from the disasters of a bloody The moderation of the British admiral, in the recent affair of San Juan Island, is deserving of the highest praise. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 18, §§ 323, et seq.; Webster, Dip. and Off. Papers, pp. 104, et seq.; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 8; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat et des Gens, tome 5. pt. 4, ch. 4; President's Message, Dec., 1859.)

war.

§2. The different modes of terminating disputes between independent states, short of actual war, are divided into two classes: first, amicable, or measures taken via amicabili; and second, forcible, or measures taken viâ facta. The amicable modes or measures have been variously divided by publicists; the division most generally adopted is, into accommodation, compromise, mediation, arbitration, and conference. The forcible modes or measures are commonly known as retortion, retaliation, reprisal, seizure, and embargo. These divisions are, perhaps, not the most natural, nor are the lines of distinction between them always obvious or easily drawn. Nevertheless, as they have been adopted by writers of authority, and as these several terms are frequently used in works on international law, and require to be defined, we shall proceed to discuss each one separately. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 18, §§ 326, et seq.; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, §1; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, §2; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, ch. 5; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 6; Wolfius, Jus Gentium, cap. 5; Heffter, Droit International, § 106; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 11, §1.)