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1. War should never be undertaked without just cause-2 2. Reasons and motives of a war- 23. Justifiable causes of war 4. To secure what belongs, or is due to us- 5. To punish an agression - 6. To protet ourselves from a threatened danger-27. Difficulty in ascertaining the real causes of a war-28. The agrandizement of a neighbor not a just cause of war-29. Opinion of Grotius-10. Remarks of Kent - 11. The motives of a war- - 12. Commendable motives- 13. Vicious motives-14. Pretexts, or alleged reasons - 15. Unjust wars always criminal-16. Opinions of the early fathers of the church on war17. Dr. Wayland's objection that war is forbidden by the bible - 18. That even defensive war is not justifiable - 19. That if moral suasion fail to prevent war, we must suffer the evil - 20. That war is necessarily injurious to public morals- 21. That its expenses exceed its benefits-22. That men, being rational beings, should never resort to force23. That war fails to accomplish its object- 24. That one party is necessarily in the wrong - 25. That nations, like individuals, should refer their differences to some tribunal - 26. That the benefits of a war are more than counterbalanced by its evils- 27. Remarks of Dr. Leiber on

war.

§1. "Whoever," says Vattel, "entertains a true idea of war,-whoever considers its terrible effects, its destructive and unhappy consequences, will readily agree that it should never be undertaken without the most cogent reasons. Humanity revolts against a sovereign who, without necessity, or without very powerful reasons, lavishes the blood of his most

faithful subjects, and exposes his people to the calamities of war, when he has it in his power to maintain them in the enjoyment of an honorable and salutary peace. And if to this imprudence, this want of love for his people, he moreover adds injustice toward those he attacks, of how great a crime, or rather of what a series of crimes, does he not become guilty? Responsible for all the misfortunes which he draws down upon his subjects, he is, moreover, loaded with the guilt of all those which he inflicts on an innocent nation. The slaughter of men, the pillage of cities, the devastation of provinces-such is the black catalogue of his enormities. He is responsible to God, and accountable to human nature, for every individual that is killed, for every hut that is burned down. The violences, the crimes, the disorders of every kind, attendant on the tumult and licentiousness of war, pollute his conscience, and are set down to his account, as he is the original author of them all. Unquestionable truths! alarming ideas! which ought to affect the rulers of nations, and all their military enterprises, inspire them with a degree of circumspection proportionate to the importance of the subject!" The foregoing words of Vattel, remarkable for the age in which they were written, are well worthy the consideration and study of the statesmen and rulers of our own time. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, § 24; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 96; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 6, §5; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit Nat., liv. 3, ch. 1; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, §3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 7; Real, Science du Gouvernement, tome 5, ch. 2, sec. 2, § 1.)

§ 2. The reasons which determine a nation to undertake a war, are divided, by publicists, into two distinct classes: those which relate to the right to make the war, and those which relate to the expediency or propriety of doing so. The former are called the causes of the war, and the latter the motives; these causes may be justifiable or unjustifiable, and the motives may be commendable or vicious. The distinction has not always been observed by publicists and historians, and we not unfrequently find reasons alleged as causes of a war which were only motives or mere pretexts for undertaking it. (Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12; Vattel, Droit, des Gens,

liv. 3, ch. 3, §§ 25, 26; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, caps. 1, et. seq; Burlamaqui, Droits de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt, 4, ch. 2; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit Nat., liv. 3 ch. 1; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 7.)

§3. The justifiable causes of a war are injuries received or threatened. There must be a strong probability that the threat may be attempted to be carried into execution, as mere empty words will seldom justify us in declaring war. It is not necessary that the injury should be material or physical, as a national insult is often as injurious as the robbery of a province. The justifiable objects of a war may, therefore, be divided into three classes or sub-divisions: 1st, To secure what belongs or is due to us; 2d, To provide for our future. safety by obtaining reparation for injuries done to us, and 3d, To protect ourselves and property from a threatened injury. We will consider each of these classes separately. (Puley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, § 25; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap, 1, § 1; Phillimore, on Int. Law, vol. 3, § 49; Garden, de Diplomatie, liv. 6, § 5; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21, Real, Science du Gouvernement, tome 5, ch. 2, sec. 2, § 6.)

§4. First, of wars undertaken to secure what belongs or is due to us. We have shown, in the preceding chapter, that the party in possession has a right to retain his possession till the other claimant shows a clear and valid title to the thing in dispute; and if, before proving such title, he should attempt to oust the actual possessor by force, the latter may employ force to resist the attack. So, if the latter be removed from his possession by fraud or surprise, or violence, he may employ force to recover it; but if the former shows a clear and valid title to the thing in dispute, and has first resorted to the amicable modes of settling the question upon an equitable footing, and has been refused all reasonable modes of adjustment, he may be justifiable in resorting to force for the recovery of what really and truly belongs to him, and is unjustly withheld by his opponent. The burthen of proof, in such cases, rests upon the party who makes the seizure or

attack, and he is bound to show, not only that the thing seized is clearly and indisputably his, but, also, that all amicable modes of recovery, or adjustment, had been tried without effect; in fine, that justice had been absolutely denied him, and could be obtained only by a resort to war. (De Felice, Droit, de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 18, § 337; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 1, §§ 2, et seq.; Burlamaqui, Droit, de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 2; Real, Science du Gouvernement, tome 5, ch. 2, sec. 2, § 6.)

§ 5. Second, of wars undertaken to provide for our future safety, by obtaining a reparation of injuries done to us. We have stated, in a former chapter, that a sovereign state is not liable to punishment in the strict technical sense of that term; but, that where one state is injured or insulted by another, the former may require not only indemnity for the past, but security for the future, by making war upon the aggressor. This is regarded, in ordinary language, as a punishment for the offenses committed, and is intended to prevent their recurrence. But, in public law, it is considered in the light of a reparation of injuries received, and as an act of self-defense in providing for future security. A war, undertaken for such a cause, must be limited to the object in view; beyond this, it is unjustifiable. It is proper to remark here, that injuries done to a citizen of the state, is an injury to the whole state, for it is the duty of every state to maintain the security and welfare of all its citizens, and this obligation gives to it the right to make war upon any one from whose unlawful conduct they have suffered injuries, which the aggressor refuses to repair. (Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 20, § 38; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, § 41; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 2, ch. 9, § 11; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 37; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 6, § 5; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Real, Science du Gouvernement, tome 5, ch. 2, sec. 2, § 6.)

§ 6. Third, of wars undertaken to protect ourselves and property from a threatened injury. Self-defense is not limited to the repelling of unjust violence; if it be seriously threatened, we may resort to such forcible measures as may be necessary to prevent its occurrence. It is not required of a state that

it wait till an injury is actually received, and then make war to obtain reparation; it is its duty to provide against the threataned danger, by making war, if needs be, upon the threatening party, in order to deprive him of the means of inflicting the injury. (Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, § 44; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 2, ch. 9, § 11; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 37; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 7; Rayneval, Ins. de la Nat., etc., liv. 3, ch. 1, § 2; Real, Science du Gouvernement, tome 5, ch. 2, sec. 2, § 6.)

§7. The causes of war are sometimes of such a mixed character that it is difficult to distinguish between what is justifiable and what is not. As already stated, a war which is offensive in its military character, may, or may not, be for justifiable causes, according to the necessities of the case; for, as both nature and morality forbid our resorting to physical force to redress our wrongs, till we have tried the milder modes of procuring justice, without success, all the circumstances of each particular case must be taken into consideration before we can fully determine the character of the causes which induce the undertaking of such a war. Sometimes, however, the cause is single, and its character may be determined directly and without relation to the attending circumstances, or to the measures previously resorted to in order to obtain satisfaction. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, §§ 37, 38; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, ch. 3, § 23; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 96; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, §3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21.)

§ 8. Of this class, are wars undertaken simply for the purpose of weakening another state, whose power, if allowed to increase, we have good reason to believe, will be used to our injury. Here the question arises, how serious must be the danger to our own safety to constitute a justifiable cause for our taking up arms to prevent the aggrandizement of a neighbor? This question is discussed, at considerable length, and with great clearness, by Vattel. "On the one hand,' he says, "a state that increases her power by all the arts of good government, does no more than what is commendable,

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