tion of the republic." The church gave its sanction to this doctrine, and the councils pronounced excommunication against those who deserted, even in time of peace. The various objections to war, made by the earlier fathers of the church, have been often repeated by modern writers on moral science, and more recently, Dymond, Wayland, and others, have pressed them upon the public with great zeal and eloquence. We propose a brief summary of these objections to war, and of the answers which have been made to them. The arguments of Dr. Wayland, which are mostly copied from Dymond's Essays, are given in brief space, and in more moderate and tempcrate language than that used by most of his followers. We shall copy his own words so far as our limits will permit. (Dymond, Essays on Morality, essay 3, ch. 19; Wayland, Elem. Moral Science, b. 2, p. 2, d. 2, ch. 4; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, § 17; Neander, Gesch. der Christ. Religion, b. 1, p. 249; Neander, Hist. of Ch. Religion and Church, Torrey, trans., vol. 1, p. 272; Origenes, Opera, c. Celsum, 5, 33; Laurent, Droit des Gens, tome 4, liv. 4, ch. 1; Tertulian, Opera, De Jd. 19; de la Corona, c. 11; St. Augustinus, Opera, Epist., pp. 136-238; Athanasius, Opera, lib. 2, p. 960; St. Basilius, Opera, Epist. ad. Amphil., can. 8; Council of Arles, can. 3; Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the R. Empire, ch. 43; St. Polinus, Opera, Epist. 25.)

§ 17. Dr. Wayland's first objection is, that "all wars are contrary to the revealed will of God." But in this assertion, he assumes what is to be proved. There is no direct prohibition of war in the bible. In the old testament, we find war, in some cases, positively commanded; and in the new testament, there is not a word against the lawfulness of war. On the contrary, the soldier was told to be content with his wages. Again, he says: "God commands us to love every man, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, as ourselves," and, from this, infers that inasmuch as we are to love all men as ourselves, we are forbidden, as a nation, to engage in war. To this it is answered, that we are nowhere commanded to love all men in the same degree, for Christ had his beloved disciple, one whom he loved preeminently and above all the others, though he loved the others none the less on that account. Again, this command, taken literally and as con

strued by Dr. Wayland, would render sinful the best affections of our nature, those which we bear for our parents, our wives and children, for our kindred, and our countrymen. Moreover, the use of force to resist an attack or punish an offense, is by no means opposed to the command of love to all mankind. We resist the murderer and the robber, and we punish them for crimes and offenses committed, but these acts do not imply hate or revenge. So it is in war, the soldier has no personal malice against his opponent. (Dymond, Essays on Morality, e. 3, ch. 19; Wayland, Moral Science, b. 2, p. 2, d. 2, ch. 4; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, §17; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12; Halleck, Elem. Military Art and Science, pp. 9-12.)

§ 18. Dr. Wayland next considers the question, whether we may engage in war for self-defense, and concludes that, to forcibly repel the attack of another nation, would be establishing the principle that it is "for the advantage of him.who lives among a community of thieves, to steal, or for him who lives among liars, to lie." My living among thieves would not justify me in stealing, nor would it be any reason why I should neglect the security of my property, or leave the thief unpunished. Our living among nations who carry on unjust wars, would not justify us in doing so, nor should it prevent us from repelling or punishing those who wage an unjust war against us. The argument used against war, equally applies against the prevention and punishment of individual offenses and crimes. (Wayland, Moral Science, b. 2, p. 2, d. 2, ch. 4; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, § 17; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 3, pt. 2, ch. 10; b. 4, ch. 1; b. 6, ch. 12; Halleck, Elem. Military Art and Science, pp. 13–14.)

§ 19. Dr. Wayland admits that, however just and benevolent a nation may be, its moral character will not always protect it from the aggression of others, but he adds: "if this method, (that is, moral suasion,) fail, why then let us suffer the evil." This maxim, if applied to its full extent, would be subversive of all right, and soon place all power in the hands of the worst men in community, and of the worst nations that inhabit the world. Reason with the robber and murderer, and if they will not desist, why then let them take our property and the lives of our families! Reason with the

foreign nations who invade our soil, and if they will not resist, why then let them destroy our government and reduce us to slavery! But says the Dr.: "I believe aggression, from a foreign nation, to be an intimation from God that we are disobeying the law of benevolence, and that is his mode of teaching nations their duty, in this respect, to each other. So that aggression seems to me in no manner to call for retaliation and injury, but rather, for special kindness and good will." This is certainly carrying the principle of non-resistance very far; we are not only to suffer the evil, but to thank the evil-doer, for thus reminding us of our forgetfulness of the law of benevolence! (Dymond, Essays on Morality, e. 3, ch. 19; Wayland, Moral Science, b. 2, p. 2, d. 2, ch. 4; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 4, ch. 1; b. 6, ch. 12; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, §§ 17-19; Halleck, Elem. Military Art and Science, pp. 15-21.)

§ 20. Again, it is argued that war necessarily begets immorality, and "that the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to community, inasmuch as it aggravates the scource of the evil, the corrupt passions of the human heart." The correctness of this statement is denied, for war is not necessarily demoralizing. Unjust war results from immoral causes, and is generally injurious in its moral effects upon society. The same may be said of unjust litigation. But suppose that all wars and all courts of justice were abolished, and nations, as well as individuals, were suffered to commit injuries with impunity, would not immorality and vice increase, rather than diminish? Few events rouse and elevate the patriotism and character of a nation more than a just and patriotic war. Such was the Dutch war of independence against the Spaniards, the German war against the aggressions of Louis XIV., the French war against the coalition of 1792, and the war of the American revolution. (Wayland, Moral Science, b. 2, p. 2, d, 2, ch. 4; Dymond, Essays on Morality, e 3, ch. 19; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, § 20; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 3, pt. 2, ch. 10; b. 6, ch. 12; Halleck, Elem. Military Art and Science, ch. 1, pp. 22, 23.)

§ 21. With respect to "pecuniary expenditure," it is not to be denied that wars, and the means of military defense, have cost vast sums of money; so, also, have litigation, and the

means deemed requisite in all civilized countries, in all ages, for maintaining justice between individuals. If these vast sums of money are necessary to secure justice between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that the means of international justice can be maintained without expenditures commensurate with the object in view? If we cannot rely exclusively upon the "law of active benevolence," for maintaining justice between brothers of the same country, can we hope that, in the present state of the world, strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its requisitions? (Wayland, Elem. Moral Science, b. 2, p. 2, d, 2, ch. 4; Halleck, Elem. Mil. Art and Science, ch. 1, p. 28; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, §§ 19, 20.)

§ 22. Again, it is objected to war, that men, being rational beings, should contend with one another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes. To this, it is answered, that force properly begins only where argument ends. If he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make reparation, I apply to the court, that is, to legal force to compel him to do me justice. So ought we resort to military force only when all other means fail to prevent aggression and injury. War should always be the last resort of nations, the ultima ratio regi. (Hooker, Eccles. Pol., b. 1, § 10; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 49; Halleck, Elem. Mil. Art and Science, ch. 1, p. 28; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, §§ 18, 23; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21.)

§ 23. But it is objected to war, that it does not accomplish the object for which it is used, because it often fails to procure a redress of grievances, or to prevent repeated and continued aggression. So does a resort to civil force, but such a resort is none the less proper and just on that account. The uncertainty of litigation is proverbial. The injured party often fails to procure a redress of his grievances, and the aggressor is not unfrequently triumphant. Moreover, even if successful in his suits, the injured party often loses more than he gains pecuniarily by litigation, and, after all, he fails to prevent a repetition of the aggression. But would any sane man say that, for this reason, all litigation and courts of justice should be abolished? In civil, as well as in military life, the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer.

(Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 50; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, §19; Halleck, Elem. Military Art and Science, ch. 1, p. 28; Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace, vol. 8, p. 181.)

§ 24. But, it is said, in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the war is unjust on both sides. Precisely so in suits at law; one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently both resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends. But for this reason must all courts of law be abolished, and no one be allowed to resort to the civil tribunals to procure a redress of grievances? Must individuals in civil life rely solely upon the "law of active benevolence," for the security of their persons and property, and shall all wrong-doers and criminals go "unwhipt of justice?" This is the legitimate conseqence of the argument. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, § 39; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, § 19; Halleck, Elem. Mil. Art and Science, ch. 1, p. 29; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 50; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21.)

§ 25. But, it is said, nations do not resort to civil tribunals, like individuals, to settle their differences, but resort to brute force, to war. For the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character-a congress of nations-for the settlement of international differences, would be productive of more evil than good. By such an arrangement, the old and powerful nations of Europe would acquire the authority to interfere in the domestic affairs, and control the influence and power of the weaker states. Republics, and governments founded on popular sovereignty, could never act in unison with those kings and despots. Moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent war, for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its decisions. For these, and other reasons, it is deemed better and safer to rely on the present system of international law. Under this system, and with a constitutional government of limited and divided powers, a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of impulse and passion, a yielding to the mere "bestial propensities" of our nature; it is usually, in such governments, the deliberate and solemn act of the legislative power, of the representatives of the national mind, convened as the high council of the people. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 50; Leiber, Political Ethics,

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