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Cochin denies that real estate derived from inheritance, is any proof of domicil. But, when taken in connection with actual residence, they may be received as proofs of intention to remain. So, of the purchase of property, real or personal; if a man has invested his capital in the country where he resides, in property, or enterprises which would require his personal attention and supervision for a long or indefinite period, or, if he has formed a partnership in business which is to continue for a number of years, the inference usually drawn from these facts is, that he intends to make that place his permanent residence, although no positive declaration to that effect is proved. (Phillimore, Law of Domicil, §§ 221– 224, 256-258; Touillier, Droit Civil, liv. 1, tit. 3, n. 371; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 497; Ennis et al. v. Smith et al., 14 Howard Rep., p. 423; Burge, Com. Conflict Laws, pp. 42, 43; Cochin, Oeuvres, tome 3, p. 328; The Dree Gebroeders, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 235; Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Clarke and Finn. Rep., pp. 502-521; Westlake, Private Int. Law, § 48; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, §§ 2, 3; Dalloz, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, § 2.)

§ 14. Another material circumstance by which intention is determined, is the character of the trade, or business, in which the party is engaged. If his commercial enterprises have their origin and centre in the country of his residence, although extending to other countries, or if his business is of such a character and extent as to require an indefinite period to bring it to completion, the fair inference is, that he intends to reside there permanently, and the court will therefore regard it as his domicil. (Phillimore, Law of Domicil, §§ 208, et seq.; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 497; The Vigilantia, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 15; The Anna Catharina, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 118; The Rendsborg, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 121; Westlake, Private Int. Law, § 48; Dalloz, Repertoire verb. Domicile, § 2.)

§ 15. Another and most significant circumstance by which the intention may be ascertained, is the time of residence. In most cases, this circumstance is unavoidably conclusive in determining domicil. Even where the party had first gone to a foreign country for a special purpose, which would repel the presumption that he intended to make it his permanent residence, yet if he has remained a great length of

time, it will be presumed that his first intention has been changed, and that a general residence has grown, as is frequently the case, upon a special purpose. Hence, the plea of an original special purpose is not to be averred against a residence continued for a long period of time. If, however, a merchant has gone to a foreign country just before the war, for a special purpose, a fair time should be allowed to him to disengage himself; but if he should continue there during a good part of the war, contributing, by his industry and means, to the strength and security of the enemy, the plea of a special purpose cannot be urged with effect against the rights of hostility. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 498; The Harmony, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 322; The Two Brothers, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 131; Phillimore, Law of Domicile, §§ 259, et seq.; Dalloz, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, § 2.)

§ 16. In former times the particular situation of America, with respect to distance, was considered by the English courts as entitling the merchants of that country to some favorable distinctions in the matter of domicil, as determined by length of residence. It was, therefore, held that they might remain in an European state for a longer period than a merchant of a neighboring country, without being considered as a permanent resident. But, with the present facilities for communication afforded by steam and telegraph, it is doubtful if this favorable distinction would now be made. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 499; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 303; Ennis v. Smith, 14 Howard Rep., p. 400; The Harmony, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 323; The Oriental, 7 Moore Rep., p. 398.)

§ 17. The presumption of law with respect to residence in a foreign country, is, that the party is there animo manendi, and it lies upon him to explain it. Thus, when the property of a foreigner, who, at the time of its shipment, was living in a hostile country, is seized as that of an enemy, the captors are not bound to prove that his place of residence was his actual domicil; but it rests upon him to disprove the presumption of the law, and, to redeem his property from the noxious imputation, he must give such evidence of his intentions and plans, as shall be effectual to destroy it. (Westlake, Private Int. Law, § 38; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 500; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 40; The Bernon, 1 Rob. Rep.,

p. 103; The Ann, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 221; Elbers v. U. Ins. Co., 16 Johns. Rep., p. 128; Munro v. Munro, 7 Cl. and F., p. 842.)

§ 18. In order to repel this presumption of the law, it is necessary for the party to prove that his original intention was to remain only for a short and definite period, that to accomplish the purpose of his visit, neither a long nor an indefinite period would be required; that his past residence had not been long enough, by the mere operation of time, to establish a domicil, and that he had not been so mixed up with the trade and navigation of the country, as to have acquired its national character, by the very nature of his occupation. The presumption is not repelled, by merely showing that his wife and family are still residing in his native country, nor by proving that he contemplates returning to his own country at some future period, or after he has accomplished some particular object. He may have separated himself from his family, or the period of his return may be wholly uncertain and indefinite; or, if definite, it may be after a long interval of time, or his neutral character may have been superceded by his occupation, or by his being so incorporated in the trade or navigation of the country, that its national character is completely fixed upon him. In order to repel this presumption of the law, he must show clearly and conclusively, that such residence in the foreign country, has not by the law of domicil, or otherwise, had any effect in changing his national character. This brings us to the examination of the different classes of what is called necessary domicil. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 40; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 17; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 500; Phillimore, Law of Domicil, § 39, et seq.; The Bernon, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 103; Elbers v. The U. Ins. Co., 16 Johns. Rep., p. 1288; Westlake, Private Int. Law, § 38.)

§ 19. The national character of an ambassador, or public minister is not affected by his residence in a foreign country, no matter what may be its duration, or the circumstances indicative of the intent of the party to render it permanent. This results from the rule of exterritoriality as already discussed. Being deemed a resident within the territory of his own state, the law of foreign domicil does not apply to him. But a consul does not come within this exception, although

mere residence in the performance of his official duties may not confer upon him a foreign domicil, nevertheless, his consular character affords no protection to his mercantile adventures. "If," says Duer, "he reside in a belligerent country, his ships and goods are liable to confiscation as those of an enemy, by the hostile belligerent; and they are subject to the same penalty in the country in which he resides, if they be employed in a trade with its public enemies, which is prohibited to its own subjects. Nor, to warrant the confiscation of his property, is it requisite that the consul should bear the character of a general merchant. If the transaction that leads to the seizure, is the only commercial speculation in which he is, or ever has been engaged, he is still a merchant, so far as that transaction extends, and must bear the consequences of the character he has assumed. The rule which thus distinguishes between the commercial and the official character of a consul, may sometimes operate in his favor. Where the consul of a belligerent power is engaged as a merchant, in the commerce of a neutral country, in which he resides, his property on the ocean, if employed in a trade strictly neutral, is exempt from hostile capture. His neutral character as a merchant, is unaffected by his belligerent character, as consul." (Phillimore, Law of Domicil, §§ 132, et seq.; Kent, Com. on Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 44-77; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 513, 514; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 17; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 8,; The Indian Chief, 3 Rob. Rep., pp. 27, 28; The Josephine, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 25; The Dree Gebroeders, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 233; The Sarah Christina, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 239; Albrecht v. Sussman, 4 Ves., and Beams Rep., p. 323; Arnold v. U. Ins. Co., 1 Johns. cases, p. 363; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 41; The Falcon, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 197; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. Rep., p. 834; Westlake, Private Int. Law, § 47; Dalloz, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, § 4.)

§ 20. The French jurists have laid down the following rules respecting the domicil of officers, civil or military, employed in the public service: 1st, If the office be for life, and irrevocable, the domicil of the holder is in the place where its functions are to be discharged, and no proof of the contrary will be admitted, "for the law will not presume an intention

contrary to indispensable duty." 2d, If the office be temporary or revocable, the law does not presume that the holder has changed his original domicil, but proof will be admitted to establish the fact that he has done so. These two divisions, says Phillimore, seem to warrant a 3d: Where the office, although for life and irrevocable, requires the holder to reside only a part of the time in the place where its functions are to be discharged, the law will presume his domicil to be in that place, but this presumption will yield to proof that the seat of his family affairs, the residence of his wife and children is elsewhere, and that he has described himself, in all legal instruments, as belonging to the place of former domicil, and not to the place of his employment. Thus, in the case of Lord Somerville, the presumption was repelled, and it was held that his parliamentary duties in London, as a peer of Scotland, was no proof that his domicil was there. So, in the case of M. de Courtanel, it was held that the office of "grand mâetre des eaux et forêts," not requiring a fixed residence, did not prevent the law of original domicil from operating. (Phillimore, Law of Domicil, §§ 113, et seq.; Denisart, Domicile, ch. 2, § 5; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, § 3; Duranton, Droit Francais, liv. 1, tit. 3; Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Vesey Rep., p. 757; Munroe v. Douglas, 5 Mod. Rep., pp. 379-406; Bruce v. Bruce, 6. Brown. cases, p. 566; Marsh v. Hutchinson, 2 Bos. and Pul. Rep., p. 229, note; Craigie v. Lewin, 3 Curteis Rep., p. 435; Bempde v. Johnstone, 3 Vesey Rep., p. 200; Westlake, Private Int. Law, § 44; Dalloz, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, § 4.)

§ 21. It was a maxim of the Roman law, which has been incorporated into modern jurisprudence, that as the wife takes the rank, so does she also take the domicil of her husband; and, by the same analogy, the widow retains it after "her husband's death. But if she marry again, her domicil becomes that of her second husband. The most noted case involving the domicil of the widow, was the disputed succession to the personal estate of Henrietta Maria, (widow of Charles the First,) who died in France. The betrothed, although in many respects enjoying the privileges of the wife, according to the Roman and civil law, retains the domicil which she had before her betrothment. It is generally con

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