in the constituent parts of the body politic, and in their relations to each other, do not affect the character of the body itself, in its external relations to other communities,—that is, in international law. The state itself remains the same political body, until its identity is destroyed by interruption in its existence as a separate and distinct society; and it neither loses any of its rights nor is discharged from any of its obligations, by any mere municipal change or internal revolution. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol 1, § 126; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1. ch. 2, §7; Grotius, de Jur Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 9, § 3; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 2, ch. 10, §§ 12, 13, 14; Heffler, Droit International, § 24; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 1, § 8; Merlin, Repertoire, verb, Soveraineté.)

§ 20. Vattel has laid down the rule, that when a country is divided by a civil war, each faction is to be deemed an independent state, and that a foreign power may assist those whose cause it deems to be just. This doctrine of Vattel is probably founded upon a misconstruction of a passage of Grotius; it is not reconcilable with reason or precedents, but is opposed to what Vattel himself has said with respect to the interference of one state in the internal affairs of another. If a foreign state may take part in the civil wars of its neighbors, there would be no limit to its right to interfere in their domestic affairs. His principle, that the parties to a civil war are independent of all foreign authority, and that no foreign power has any right to judge of their acts toward each other, is correct. Both parties may be entitled to the rights of war toward each other, and consequently to the rights of belligerents with respect to foreign states as neutrals in the contest, such as the rights of blockades, of sieges, etc. But beyond those rights which are necessarily incidental to a state of war, a foreign power cannot, during the war, regard the two factions as independent states, and give assistance to the one whose cause it may deem to be just! Such conduct would be a direct violation of the rights of sovereignty and independence. But even supposing that the two parties, from the very commencement of a civil war or a revolution, are to be treated in every respect as independent states, it by no means follows that a foreign power may render assistance to

the one whose cause it may deem to be just. This would be constituting such foreign power a judge of the justice of the war; whereas, if both parties are to be considered as independent states, the war is to be deemed, in international law, as just on both sides! Moreover, would the justice or injustice of the war be in itself a sufficient reason for the interference of a foreign power? Certainly not.

The above mentioned rule of Vattel has been copied by Wheaton without comment, and apparently without questioning its correctness. But, notwithstanding this implied endorsement of so high an authority, we have no hesitation in pronouncing the doctrine as not only erroneous, but exceedingly dangerous, from the fact that it justifies the most objectionable species of intervention in the internal affairs of states. But the language of Wheaton is more limited and cautious than that of Vattel; and when he says that other states "may espouse the cause of the party which they believe to have justice on its side," and that by so doing a state becomes "the enemy of the party against whom it declares itself, and the ally of the other," he probably means merely to express the legal results of such a declaration, and not to say that the justice or injustice of the cause would in itself justify such declaration, or authorize such interference. In this view, his language is reconcilable with other parts of his work. (Vat tel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 6, § 56; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 18, §2; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 51, 57; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. 2, cap. 3; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, §7; Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. 8, cap. 9, § 3; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, pp. 24-25.)

§ 21. Whilst the civil war continues, or while a revolted colony or province is shaking off the bonds of its former government, a foreign state should either remain a passive spectator, or, if its own relations require diplomatic intercourse with the revolted society, it should treat such revolted society as a de facto government only, in its foreign relations, and not as an independent state, with respect to its relations with its own sovereign, or its own metropolitan government. But when the contest is virtually determined, and the revolted province or colony has virtually established its inde

pendence, foreign powers, without any just offense to the metropolitan country, may recognize that independence and enter into full diplomatic and commercial relations with the new state as a separate and distinct sovereignty. It is not necessary in such cases to await the acknowledgement of that independence by the former sovereign; of the fact of such independence, each state may judge for itself. "The absence of all jurisdiction," says Wildman, "to determine the right, leads to the necessary consequence, that, when in the result of a civil war, a state changes its government, or a province, or colony, that before had no separate existence, is in the possession of the rights of sovereignty; the possession of sovereignty de facto is taken to be possession de jure: and any foreign power is at liberty to recognise such sovereignty by treating with the possessor of it as an independent state. Where sovereignty is necessary to the validity of an act, no distinction is or ought to be made between sovereignties founded on a good or bad title. Few governments have been founded on free suffrage and election; most have originated in violence and faction. In international transactions possession is sufficient. Otherwise it would be necessary to inquire into the origin of sovereignties, and to ascertain whether they are founded upon a good or upon a had title. Such an inquiry could answer no good purpose, and would furnish ample occasion to disturb the peace of nations." (Wildman, International Law, vol. 1, p. 57; Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, §§ 7-10; Puffendorf, Jus. Naturae et Gent., lib. 8, ch. 12, § 3; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. 2, ch. 3; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 25; Wicquefort, l'Ambassadeur, etc., lib. 1, pp. 40, 57, 58; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 79–82; Alison, Hist. Europe, second series, chs. 4, 12.)

§ 22. The recognition of the independence and sovereignty of a revolted province by other foreign states, when that independence is established in fact, is therefore a question of policy and prudence only, which each state must determine for itself; but this determination must be made by the sovereign legislative or executive power of the state, and not by any subordinate authority, or by the private judgement of individual subjects. And until the independence

of the new state is recognised by the government of the country of which it was before a part, or by the foreign state where its sovereignty is drawn in question, courts of justice, and private individuals, are bound to consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered. (Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, §10; Martens, Nouvelles causes, etc., tome 1, pp. 370-494; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 2, §6; Webster, The Works of, vol. 6, pp. 488-506; Kennett v. Chambers, 14 Howard's Rep., p. 38; Hoyt v. Gelston, 3 Wheaton's Rep., p. 324, note; The Manilla, 1 Ed., Ad. Rep., pt. 1; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 1, §7; The Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton's Rep., p. 305; The Pelican, 1 Edw. Rep., Appen. D.)

§ 23. The sovereignty of a state may be lost in various ways. It may be vanquished by a foreign power and become incorporated into the conquering state as a province, or as one of its component parts; or it may voluntarily unite itself with another in such a way that its independent existence as a state will entirely cease. Again, two sovereign states may become incorporated into one, so as to form a new sovereign state in place of the other two whose independent existence, as states, is entirely destroyed by such incorporation.

Thus, the incorporation of the Seven United Provinces. and the Austrian Low Countries, by the treaties of Vienna, under the Prince of Orange, as King of the Netherlands, was the union of two distinct sovereignties, forming a new single sovereign state. By the incorporation of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, into Great Britain, and of Normandy and Britanny into France, these incorporated states lost their existence as distinct and substantive political bodies. (Philli more, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 125; Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, §§ 8, 9; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 9, §6; Puffendorf, de Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. 8, cap. 12, § 9; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 1, §8; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 24, 25.)

§ 24. Questions of great importance sometimes arise with respect to the international effects produced by internal changes in the form of government, and by a change in the sovereignty of a state, with respect to its duties and obligations toward others. These questions relate to treaties, public debts, the public domain, private rights of property,

and to responsibility for wrongs done to the governments or subjects of other states. We will consider these matters, 1st, with respect to the effects of a change in the internal form of the government; 2d, with respect to the effects of a dismemberment of a state by the revolt or loss of a province; 3d, the effects of a division of one into two or more separate and independent states; and, 4th, the effects of an incorporation of two or more separate states into one, forming a new and distinct sovereignty. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, §11; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §§ 126 et seq; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, p. 68; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac, lib. 3, cap. 9, §§ 8, 9, 10; Heffter, Droit International, § 25; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Souveraineté.)

§ 25. As a general rule, a mere change in the form of government, or in the person of the ruler, does not affect the duties and obligations of a state toward foreign nations. All treaties of amity, commerce, and real alliance, remain in force precisely as if no intervening change had taken place, except in cases where the compact relates to the form of government itself, or to the person of the ruler in the nature of a guaranty. Public debts, whether due to or from the revolutionized state, are neither canceled nor affected by any change in the constitution or internal government of a state. So, also, of its public domain and right of property. If a revolution be successful, and a new constitution be established, the public domain and public property pass to the new government. The state, on the other hand, remains responsible for the wrongs done to the government or subjects of another state, notwithstanding any intermediate change in the form of its government or in the persons of its rulers. These results flow necessarily from the principle that the identity of a state is preserved, notwithstanding the accidental changes in its internal constitution. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 11; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 12, §§ 183-197; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 126; Mably, Du Droit Publique, tome 1, pp. 111-112; D'Aguesseau, Euvres de M. le C., tome 1, p. 493, § 4; Montesquieu, l'Esprit des Lois, liv. 26, ch. 20; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib 2, cap. 9, §8; Tindall, Essay on the Laws of Nations, p. 12; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, pp, 25-26; Bynkershoek,