1813.]

65

for the sake of fighting.-In answer, Lord Mulgrave, then Secretary of State, informed Bonaparte, That there was no object which his Majesty had more at heart than to avail himself of the first opportunity to procure again for his subjects the advantages of a peace founded on bases which might not be incompatible with the permunent security and essential interest of his dominions; but, that his Majesty felt it impossible to answer more particularly to the overture that had been made to him, till he had time to communicate with the powers on the Continent, WITH WHOM HE WAS ENGAGED IN CONFIDENTIAL CONNECTIONS AND RELATIONS; and particularly the Emperor of Russia, who had given the strongest proof's of the wisdom and elevation of the sentiments by which he was animated, and the lively interest which he took in the safety and independence of the Continent. Of course no further correspondence took place.

the

treaty of

to

II. On the 8th March, 1806, M. Talleyrand transmitted to Mr. Fox, an ex. tract from a speech of Napoleon the Legislative Body, to the following efect:-" I desire peace with England. On my part I shall never delay it a moment: Ishall always be ready to conclude it, taking for its basis the stipulations of Amiens." This led the way to the negociation carried on by Mr. Fox to the time of his death, and after wards by Lord Grey, and which was broken off by our refusing to negotiate otherwise than in conjunction with Russia; Lord Lauderdale having declared, that England was resolved not to make peace, without obtaining for Russia all the objects on which she insisted, which were BOTE INTERESTING, IF POSSIBLE, to Eng. land, than those points which might be considered as peculiarly connected with her own interests.

This result was the more to be regretted, as it had been proposed on the part of the French Emperor not only to restore Hanover to His Majesty with out any compensation, but also to give up Malta and the Cape of Good Hope; his minister, Talleyrand, having observed, that Hanover was for the honour of the Crown, Malta for the honour of the Navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the honour of the British Commerce.

III. On the 13th April, 1807, the Austrian Ambassador in London, Prince Stahremberg, transmitted to his Majesty's ministers, a proposal from the Einperor of Austria, of his friendly intention

1

IV. On the 1st August, 1807, Μ. Alopeus, the Russian Ambassador at London, notified to the British ministry, that the Emperor of Russia had, by the treaty of Tilsit, offered himself as a mediator of peuce between England and France, provided his mediation was accepted within the space of one month. -In reply, Mr. Canning required, as a preliminary, the communication of the treaty of Tilsit, and the statement of those equitable and honourable principles, upon which hisImperial Majesty expresses his belief that France is desirous of concluding a peace with Great Britain. The negotiation was afterwards carried on by Lord G. L. Gower, at Petersburgh, with the Russian ministry in the course of which it was con. ceived, that an opportunity was atforded of detaching Russia from the interests of France. The discussion was accordingly continued with other views than those of peace. In the official correspondence ic appears, that Mr. Canning informed the British Envoy, that the establishment of future good understanding between this country and Russia, and the concert of measures to be taken, with a view to future exertion, were ALONE the proper subjects of discussion between the two governments. This negotiation was, however, suddenly terminated by our attack upon Copenhagen; włuch so exasperated the Emperor of Russia, that he declared, that no arrangements should take place between Russia and England, until the latter should have given satisfaction to Denmark; at the same time expressing his expectation, that his Britannic Majesty, instead of permitting his ministers, as had lately been the case, to scatter anco the seeds of war, would lend his assistance to the conclusion of peace with France.

V. On the 20th of November, 1807,
Price

Prince Stahremberg, the Austrian ambassador, officially and earnestly requested bis Britannie majesty, to declare kis intentions in evincing his disposition to enter into a negotiation for a maritime peace, upon a basis suitable to the reciprocal interests of the powers who might take a part, in it. To this Mr. Canning rephed, that his Majesty was then, as he had all times been, prepared to enter into a negotiation, for the conclusion of such a peace as should settle on equal terms the respective interests of the powers engaged in the war; as should be consistent with his Majesty's fidelity to his allies, and should provide for the tranquillity and security of Europe. In consequence of this answer, the Austrian minister, about five weeks afterwards, informed the British ministry, that, in consequence of the pacific disposition of his Britannic Majesty, he was charged to propose to the British ministry to send immediately plenipotentiaries to Paris for the purpose of treating for the establishment of peace be tween all the powers at war with England; adding, that this must furnish a proof of the good faith and of the sincere intention of France to put an end to the calamities of war. He notified, at the same time, that he was authorized to give passportsto the ministers appointed for that purpose. After a long correspondence Mr. Canning informed the Austrian minister, that this Majesty could not again consent to send his plenipotentiaries to a hostile capital, The further interference of Prince Stahremberg was, at the same time, effectually prohibited by Mr. Canning informing him, that his Majesty had not given him any authority to speak in the name of his Majesty to the government of France. The Austrian ambassador immediately demanded his passports; and Austria was added to the list of our enemies.

VI. In October, 1808, the Emperors of France and Russia met in amity at Erfurth, for the purpose of adjusting the peace of Europe, and avoiding the delays and alleged equivocations, which had attended former negociations; aud, as England had recently declared that she continued the war for Russian objects, the participation of Russia in the first ovèrture appeared likely to remove every difficulty. The two emperors accordingly addressed the following perspicuous letter to the King of England:

SIRE, The present circumstances of Europe have brought us together at Erfurth. Our first thought is to yield to the wish and the wants of every people,

and to seek, in a speedy pacification with your Majesty, the most efficacious remedy for the miseries which oppress all nations. We make known to your majesty our sincere desire in this respect by the present letter.

The long and bloody war which has torn the continent is at an end, without the possibility of being renewed. Many changes have taken place in Europe; many states have been overthrown. The cause is to be found in the state of agitation and misery in which the stagnation of maritime commerce has placed the greatest nations. Still greater changes may yet take place, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace, then, is at once the interest of the Continent, as it is the interest of the people of Great Britain.

to listen

We unite in entreating your Majesty to the voice of humanity, silencing that of the passions; to seek to conciliate all interests, with the intention of arriving at the object, and by that means to preserve all the powers which exist, and so insure the happiness of Europe and of this generation, at the head of which Providence has placed us.

ALEXANDER-NAPOLEON.

To this overture, characterized by a frankness which has perhaps no example in ancient or modern history, Mr. Canning, the English secretary, replied to the Russian minister, that, "bowever desirous bis Majesty might be to reply di. rectly to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, be found it impossible to adopt that mark of respect towards the Emperor of Russia, without at the same time acknowledging titles which bis Majesty never had acknowledged; that bis Majesty will hasten to communicate to bis Majesty the King of Sweden, and 13 the existing government of Spain, the proposals which have been made to him, and that it is absolutely necessary bis Majesty should receive an immediate assurance that France acknowledges the government of Spain as party to any negociation, and that such is the intention of the Emperor of Russia bis Majesty cannot doubt. To this unhappy answer the Russian and French ministers replied in a style which bordered on remonstrance, in which the Russian minister exclaimed that, after fifteen years of war Europe bad a right to demand peace; and the French minister contended, that the French government bad as much right to demand the admission of the Irish insurgents to be parties to the negociation as the English bad to claim the admission of the Spanish

Spanish insurgents. Mr. Canning, in his reply to the Russian minister, appealed with much energy to Russia against France; and, in his answer to the French minister, he insisted that the cause of the Spanish insurgents was that of the Spanish nation, and the legitimate monarchy of Spain, and that the central and supreme government, acting for Ferdinand VII. must be a party to the negotiation. No answers were given, and thus the alleged purpose of the imperial meeting at Erfurth was unfortunately deprived of its

effect.

VII. In the month of February 1810, Bonaparte gave the government of Holland to understanml, that its political exis. tence as an independant state would depend upon the dispositions of the British govern ment with respect to peace with France. In consequence of this Mr. Labouchere was dispatched, at the instance of Louis Bo. naparte and the Dutch government, from Amsterdam to London, to lay this state of affairs before the British ministry, and to impress upon them how much it would be for the advantage of England, that Holland should not fall under the sovereign dominion of the French empire, but remain an independant power. On his ar rival in London, he had an audience with the Marquis Wellesley; to whom he communicated the substance of his instructions, and on whom it appears he endeavoured to impress the conviction, that the general interest, well understood, and the lasting prosperity of every commercial state, imperiously required that the crisis in which Holland was, should not be looked at with indifference. To this application no official reply was made; but, from the verbal communications of Lord Wellesley, and the general observations and information of Mr. Labouchere, it appeared to him, as stated in his report to the Dutch governinent, "that the moin question of peace or war engaged little of the public attention. That they were reconcied by hubit to the continuance of the wur; and thet its consequences, far from being felt, were rather favourable to privale interest. That it must not, however, be inferred that a seitled resolution had been taken to reject all proposals for peace, but that probably, if France showed any inclination of this kind, the British m mistry would afford many facilities; but that, under all the considerations of the times, those which related to Holland were only of a secondary and very remote inter. est; and that the conviction of the impos. sibility that any convention respecting that MONTHLY MAG. No. 237.

65

country, could ever, under the influence of France, offer any chance of security to England, unless it was connected with a general arrangement, had blunted all the feeling which Holland could otherwise have inspired-so fur indeed as not to draw any attention to the very important motives which should induce them to consider this question separately, and under an immediate point of view. In consequence of this, the Dutch envoy took his departure from this country, and Holland at this moment composes an integral part of the dominions of France. Thus the very object for which the war was ostensibly commenced, was given up without an effort. On this singular transaction, which was not publicly known in this country till about twelve months after it had taken place, and which we believe never hecame the subject of parliamentary discussion, we shall only remark, that, although Holland was acting under the influence and control of France, yet, whilst she existed under a separate government, there still remained a possibility of de. taching her, under favourable circum cumstances, and even of directing her power against our enemies. She was an implement, grasped for the present by the French ruler, but which might possibly have been wrested from, and turned against him; whereas she is now annihilated, and her population and resources added to the immense mass of the French empire. And thus, whilst we are inter esting ourselves with the capture or the loss of a frigate, alterations are silently suffered to take place in the affairs of Europe, which consolidate the dominions of our enemies, and confirm that power which we consider it as the object of the war to destroy.

VIII. On the 17th of April, 1812, the French minister of Foreign Affairs ad. dressed a letter to the English Foreign Minister, stating, that Napoleon, "constantly actuated by sentiments friendly to moderation and peace, again made a solemn and sincere attempt to put on end to the miseries of war." In proot of the sincerity of the overture, the French mauster submitted a project of the terms on which peace might be concluded, stating that, us the affuirs of the Peninsula, and the Tao Sicilies, were the points of difference which appeared least to admit of being adjusted, he was authorized to propose an arrangement of them on the jet. lowing basis: -The integrity of Spar, to be guaranted, France to renounce all idea of extending her dominion beyond

K

yond the Pyrennees. The present dynasty to be declared independent, and Spain to be governed by a National Constitution of her Cortes. The independence and integrity of Portugal to be also guaranteed, and the House of Braganza to have the sovereign authority. -The kingdom of Naples to remain in possession of the present monarch, and the kingdom of Sicily to be guaranteed to the present family of Sicily; and, as a consequence of these stipulations, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily, to be evacuated by the French and English land and naval forces. -With respect to the other objects, he proposed that each power should retain that of which the other could not deprive it by war; and stated that, the Emperor, in taking this step, did not look either to the advantages or losses which France might derive from the war, if it should be prolonged; but was influenced simply by considerations for the interests of humanity, and the peace of his people; and, if this fourth attempt should not be attended with success, like those which had preceded it, France should at least have the consolation of thinking, that, whatever blood might yet flow, would be just lyimputable to England alone." To these overtures Lord CASTLEREAGI replied, that "If, as his Royal Highness feared, the meaning of the proposition was, that the royal authority of Spain, and the government established by the Cortes, shall be recognized as residing in the brother of the head of the French government, and the Cortes formed under his authority, and not in the legitimate sovereign Ferdinand VII. and his heirs, aud the Extraordinary Assembly of the Cortes, now invested with the power of the government in that kingdom in his name; he was commanded frankly and explicitly to declare, that the obligations of good faith do not permit his Royal Highness to receive proposition for peace founded on such a basis - But, if the expressions apply to the actual government of Spain, which exercises the sovereign authority in the name of Ferdinand VII. upon an assurance to that effect, the Prince Regent will feel himself disposed to enter into a full explanation upon the basis which has been transmitted, in order to be taken anto consideration by his Royal Highness; it being his most earnest wish to contribute, in concert with his allies, to the repose of Europe, and to bring about a peace which way be at once honorable, not only for Great Britain and France, but also for those States which are in relations of amity with each of these Powers.

the

pre

We might fill a volume with observations on these successive proposals and their respective answers-on the spirit indicated by the two parties-on the impossibility of peace being at any time concluded if the overtures of one party are coldly rejected, without some proposed modification, or some conciliatory counter-projet-on the magnitude of the concession made by a soliciting party-on the presumption of sincerity, afforded by a first overture on the impropriety of carrying a pre-existing hostile spirit into negociation-on the unreasonableness of demanding concessions as a basis which involves the consequences of successful war-on the ungraciousness of not recognizing the dignities of those who repre sent a nation, and are competent to wield its powers of aggression on the impracticability of concluding any peace, if all the real or assumed alhes and auxiliaries of the principal Belligerents are to be made assenting parties to liminary basis on the impossibility of peace being negociated, as long as either party envelopes itself in general demands of undescribed satisfaction, and in sweeping accusations of undefined, and perhaps of undefinable, aggressions-and finally, on the interminable duration of war, if its unhappy and destructive cокsequences in one year, are to be assumed as justitiable causes of its continuance during succeeding years. We, however, submit these and other considerations to the intelligence of our readers, having discharged our duty to our own consciences, to our country, and to suffering humanity, in thus collecting into one point of view, the results of the attempts that have been made to put an end to a War, which has already covered with blood the fairest portion, of the CIVILIZED WORLD, and carried sorrow and misery into every family of all those countries which, by eminence, bear the name of CHRISTIAN.

In estimating the pecuniary expenses of the campaign in our last Magazine, we placed the Russian losses at 108 millions; this, their subsequent losses and devastations may have extended to 120 millions; but the Moniteur carries their loss up to 4 milliards French, 165 mil lious sterling. In like manner, the loss of the French magazines, and of other 38,000 men, must have doubled our estimate of the French losses, and have raised them from 6 to 12 millions sterling.

To