act entitled "An act relating to bituminous coal mines and providing for the lives, health, safety and welfare of persons employed therein," approved June 30, 1885, P. L. 205. While it is true that anthracite mining and bituminous mining are, in a sense, two distinct subjects, and have been regulated by Acts of Assembly such as those quoted in the title above mentioned, applying only to the one and not to the other, yet they are species of a single genus, and it is no doubt competent for the legislature to enact laws applying to both of them. The title, therefore, cannot fairly be said for that reason to contain more than one subject. The Constitution, however, provides that no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but that so much of it as is revived and amended shall be re-enacted and published at length. It seems to us that the amendment of two distinct Acts of Assembly which refer to different subjects of legislation in one act, even though they may be parts of a general subject constitutes two subjects within the meaning of the Constitution, each subject being the amendment of a particular act so that it shall read in a particular way. It is further claimed that the Act of June 30, 1885, cited for amendment, was repealed by the Act of May 15, 1893, P. L. 52, and was not, therefore, in force at the time of the passage of the act in question; but that article XVII., section 1, of the Act of May 15, 1893, regulates the subject of the employment of boys and women in coal mines. The Act of May 15, 1893, contains a repealing clause of all acts inconsistent therewith, and it seems to us plain that the Act of 1893 was the law in force at the time of the passage of the act in question. The title of the act in question declares the intention of the legislature to amend section 17 of the act of 1885. The body of the act provides that the first section of article IX. of the act of 1885, which alleged in the act to read as therein set out, shall be amended. An inspection of the act of 1885 will show that it is not divided into articles at all; that there is, therefore, no section I of article IX. of the act, and that section 9 of the act and section 17 of the act are both entirely different from the section set out to be amended, which corresponds with section 16 of the act of 1885. So that the title of the present act speaks of one section of the act of 1885; the body of the act speaks of another section, and recites for amendment a stil! different section. It seems to us, therefore, that the act of 1903 is void, for the reason that it is an attempt to amend two distinct acts of Assembly by one act, for the further reasons that its title is misleading in that it declares it to be the intention of the legislature to amend a section of the act which is not mentioned in the act itself; and, further, because it is not competent for the legislature to amend in effect the act of May 15, 1893, without reciting is provisions instead of reciting the provisions of an act on the same subject which was not in force. The indictment is therefore quashed. In the Qrphans' Court of Philadelphia County No. 521, October Term, 1903. CITATION FOR AN ACCOUNT. Maule's Estate. Testator died April 3, 1902. He provided in his will "I will give and bequeath unto my friend C. the sum of $10,000. The said sum of $10,000 shall be paid by my executors to the said C. within five years from the date of my death, and pending the payinent of the same there shall be paid to the said C. the sum of 5 per cent. per annum upon such sum of $10,000.” All the personal estate of the testator consisted of his interest in a firm of which he, in his lifetime, was a copartner, and which he authorized his executors by will to allow to remain in a limited partnership between them and his son as copartners. It appeared the limited copartnership had been formed and the interest of testator in the old firm contributed by the executors towards the capital thereof. The legatee filed a petition for an account. Held, that it should be dismissed. Messrs. John A. Brown and Thomas R. Elcock, for petitioner. Opinion by Hanna, P. J., Jan. 30, 1904. If the legacy was now payable, instead of “within five years" from the death of testator, the executors might with great propriety be required to file an account. But it seems they have no personal estate for which now to account. All the personal estate of testator consisted of his interest in a firm of which he in his lifetime was a copartner, and which he authorized his executors by his will to allow to remain in a new limited copartnership between them and his son as copartners. It appears the limited copartnership has been formed, and the interest of testator in the old firm been contributed by the executors towards the capital thereof. There is nothing therefore to be gained by requiring the executors now to file an account. It would needlessly burden them to expend moneys for costs and expenses from income required to pay interest upon a mortgage upon the real estate of testator and upon the legacy to petitioner, to which she is entitled under the provisions of his will. And, in addition, no award can now be made of the principal of the legacy. The petition is accordingly dismissed. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, No. 886, W. W. Baylor et al. vs. J. W. Tiffany. Under a fair and reasonable construction of the act of 22d March, 1814, the defendant's affidavit, that the title of land would come in question, was presented in 'due time, even though the plaintiff had sworn a witness. Mr. W. W. Baylor, for plaintiffs. Messrs. Vosburg & Dawson, for defendant. Opinion by Newcomb, A. L. J., November 16, 1903. The question raised by the exceptions in this case is whether the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace who rendered the judgment was ousted by the defendant's affidavit that the title to lands would come in question under Sec. 2, Act. 22 March, 1814, 6 Sm. L., 182: 1 P. Dig. 1148, pl. 133. The summons was in trespass, and the claim manifestly for trespass quare clausam fregit. The transcript shows that the affidavit was presented after the plaintiff had sworn one witness and rested, and that this testimony was preceded by an oral statement, in a general way, of the plaintiff's claim. The point in controversy is whether the affidavit was not too late at that stage of the proceedings. The act provides that the case shall be dismissed (now, under supplement of July 2, 1901, P. L. 608, `certified to the Common Pleas) "if the defendant shall before the trial of the action make oath that the title to lands will come in question, etc.” In a similar case in the Common Pleas of Berks County, a literal construction of the act was contended for and it was urged that the oath was tendered too late; that to make it effective it should have been made before the trial began. But it was held by Woodward, P. J., that such construction of the law would be entirely too technical to secure justice to parties litigant before a justice of the peace. The learned judge goes on to say, "Cases can readily be conceived where, in the absence of a declaration, a written statement, and the aid of counsel the first knowledge of the precise point in controversy is derived from the testimony of the opening witness. It would be a harsh rule that would exclude a party from the benefit of the statute when perhaps he would only be prepared to swear to the positive statement he is required to make by ascertaining the facts in the course of the trial." Geiger vs. Geiger, 1. Wood., 404. This view of the question commends itself to us as sensible and reasonable, and as being calculated to best subserve the ends of justice without hardship to either party; especially so since the change of procedure effected by the supplement of July 2, 1901, supra. For, instead of dismissing the case and leaving the plaintiff to begin de novo in Court, as he had to under the old act, the justice now takes security for the plaintiff's damages and costs, and certifies the case to the Common Pleas, where it proceeds like any other cause. The case is promptly transferred from one tribunal to the other, and with the important advantage to the plaintiff of having security for whatever amount he may recover with costs. But we are referred to Raif vs. Chamberlain, 2 Lacka. 'Jur. 381, in which it is claimed that this Court is on record with a contrary construction of the act of 1814. Analysis of that case, however, shows that the conflict between the two cases is more apparent than real. The transcript in Raif vs. Chamberlain fails to show an affidavit filed at any stage. The plaintiff in error was allowed to show the facts by depositions. Both parties proceeded upon the assumption that the appellant's case depended upon proof that the affidavit was presented before any witness was sworn. This he attempted to do, and the whole contention was around that disputed question of fact. While it does not affirmatively appear that counsel for appellant conceded that the affidavit was too late if presented after the trial was begun by calling the opening witness, yet the opinion filed is inconsistent with any other theory. No question was raised as to the proper construction of the statute. The burden was on the appellant to show the facts to be as alleged by him. Judge Archbald held that the presumption was in favor of the regularity of the proceedings as shown by the transcript, and that the appellant's testimony, being contradicted by the justice and several other witnesses, was not sufficient to overcome that presumption. Geiger vs. Geiger was neither considered nor adverted to. No such view of the case as is therein taken appears to have been suggested. The decision in Raif vs. Chamberlain was logically correct as the case was presented. But we cannot resist the conviction that if the attention of the learned judge had been called to Geiger vs. Geiger, the reasoning of Judge Woodward would have met with approval and his construction of the statute been followed. We note that the transcript in this case is silent as to any offer of security for damages and costs in connection with the affidavit, as required by the act of 1901, supra, but proof of such offer has been made dehors the record without contradiction, and we understand there is no controversy on that point. Being of opinion that under the fair and reasonable construction of the act of 1814 in question, the defendant's affidavit was presented in due time, and that thereupon the case should have been certified to the Common Pleas, it follows that the judgment was erroneous, and it is, therefore, reversed. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, No. 361, January Term, 1904. CERTIORARI. Baylor et al. vs. Tiffany. The act of 22d March, 1814, and the supplement of July 2, 1901, P. L. 608, requires that the affidavit ousting the jurisdiction of justices of the peace must be made and security tendered before the trial, and the making of the affidavit without tendering security amounts to nothing and is of no effect. Mr. W. W. Baylor, for plaintiffs. Messrs. Vosburg & Dawson, for defendant. Opinion by Kelly, A. L. J.,, May 23, 1904. The plaintiff sued the defendant before a justice of the peace, claiming damages for fishing upon their lake, or pond, in Benton township, in the county of Lackawanna, called "Baylor's Pond." At the time fixed for trial the plaintiffs and the defendant appeared and W. W. Baylor, one of the plaintiffs, made an opening or statement that the claim was for so fishing in July and August, 1903, whereupon the defendant presented his affidavit that in the trial of the cause the title to land would come in question, but he offered no security, nor did he offer or tender any costs. The trial was proceeded with and one witness for plaintiffs testified that he saw defendant fishing in "Baylor's Pond" on July 25th, 1903, and another testified to seeing him fish there in August, 1903. After these two witnesses were sworn and had given |