valid. While the statute allows the courts of this state cognizance of causes of divorce originating without the state that is subject to the limitation that in some way the respondent is brought within the jurisdiction of our courts.

Where after the cause of divorce has arisen the injured party betakes him or herself to this state he or she cannot thereby draw the domicil of the other party in it so as to give our courts jurisdiction. The redress must be brought in such cases in the forum of the respondent.-Rose Zeno vs. Albert Zeno, 140.

EJECTMENT.

In 1896 plaintiff brought an action of ejectment. It resulted in a verdict for the A second ejectment brought in 1899 resulted in a non-suit for deA third ejectment was brought in April, 1903.

defendant. fendant.

The defendant claims that because the latter suit was not "pending" when the act of 1901, P. L. 142, was approved; therefore, the plaintiff is not within the protection of the exception of the third section of the act.

Held:

*

*

That the matter depends upon the interpretation of the first section of the act. "Where one verdict shall * * * be given a judgment be entered thereon, no new ejectment shall be brought, etc."

The act must be construed as operating prospectively where rights existing at the time of its passage were concerned. Unless a legislative intent to the contrary is declared or necessarily implied from the circumstances or language used, an act of assembly must be construed as prospective in its operation.

This is a general principle always recognized in the interpretation of statutes. Therefore, the act of 1901 does not bar the plaintiff from his third ejectment.

Where parties waive a 'jury trial and submit the case to a judge, his decision is equivalent to a verdict. A compulsory non-suit, however, does not take the place of a verdict. Upon application proceedings will be stayed until costs in a former action are paid.-W. G. Miller vs. George W. Cramer, et al., 22.

Elizabeth Litts et al. vs. Margaret Cook, 197

EMBEZZLEMENT.

Commonwealth vs. Miller, 174.-See Indictment.

EQUITY.

The testatrix, a widow upwards of seventy-five years of age, conveyed to her grandson two years previous to her death all of the property of which she was possessed, in consideration of one dollar ($1.00) and "upon consideration of the moneys which the said Joseph E. Hosie has from time to time contributed to the support of the said Mary Hosie during the last three years and the care and attention that he had given to her comfort in her old age and infirmity.

The said testatrix left living two sons and three grandchildren, one being the grantee in the deed hereinbefore mentioned.

The deed was read to her by a notary public, who explained its contents and the testatrix stated she understood the full import of the deed and her act in executing it.

One of her sons sought to have the deed set aside alleging undue influence, or that the grantor was not of sound and normal mental capacity when she executed the deed.

Held: That even though it was shown that the deed was prepared at the instance of the grantee by counsel who never had any instruction directly from the grantor with reference to it; that the grantee requested a notary public to go to the old lady's house to take her acknowledgment and witness the execution of the deed; and he also procured the assistance of another to act as witness, and that at the time of the execution of the instrument the parties present were the grantor,

the grantee, the notary public and the other witness, yet the deed having been read over to her by the notary public, who asked her if she realized what she was doing and told her she was deeding all of her property to Joseph for one dollar ($1.00); Joseph also telling her she was deeding all of her property over to him, and she stating that she did understand and if it was twice as much she would give it to him, showed that the deed was the free and intelligent act of the grantor, and was in every respect an honest transaction.—Michael H. Hosie vs. Joseph E. Hosie, 44.

The question to be determined was whether a county treasurer, taking the office the first Monday of January, 1901, after the county had passed into the salary class, was entitled to commission, or to the salary fixed by the act of 1895.

Court was also asked to state an account between the treasurer and the county and in effect to enter the judgment against him as well as the commissioners for any excess he had received over and above the amount of said salary.

The act of 15th April, 1834, P. L. 537, Section 47, et seq., prescribed how and by whom such account shall be settled, viz. by the county auditors.

The act of 27th June, 1895, P. L. 403, transfers this duty of the auditors to the county controller, in counties having a county controller.

From the settlement stated and filed by the auditors and controller, an appeal may be taken to the common pleas by either party. By the act of 12th June, 1879, P. L. 208, any ten or more taxpayers may appeal in behalf of the county, from the report of the auditors.

It is provided by the 15th section of the act of 1895, supra, relating to duties of controllers, that his report "shall have the same effect as the report of the auditors, under said act of 15th April, 1834, with like rights of appeal therefrom."

Held. That the appeal provided for by the act of 1878, from a report of the auditors will also lie to the report of the controller, if necessary, to protect the county. It follows, therefore, that there is a specific remedy for the injury complained of in the bill. and the case falls under the provision of the act of 21st March, 1806, 4 S. M. L., 332, Sec. 13, which enacts that "where a remedy is provided, a duty enjoined, or anything directed to be done by the act of assembly, the directions of the act shall be strictly pursued."-J. J. Jermyn et al. vs. Joseph A. Scranton, County Treasurer et al., 74.

Norton vs. Kramer, 86.

The Borough of Taylor vs. W. P. Boland et al., 109.

Commonwealth ex. rel., P. J. Moore, Inspector of Mines, etc., vs. The PricePancoast Coal Company, 111.

Warren LeFrance vs. The Lackawanna & Wyoming Valley Railroad Co., 129.

Hiram Cole vs. Emmet M. Lowery, 225.

Providence and Abington Turnpike & Plank Road Co. vs. Jane Reap. 251.

Ann Finnegan vs. Martin Walsh. Patrick Finnegan and Mary E. Boyd, 266.See Fraud.

Plea and Answer.

Joseph J. Jermyn et al. vs. City of Scranton et al., 293.

Joseph J. Walsh vs. John F. Langan, 303.-See partnership.

Commonwealth ex. rel., L. M. Evans, etc. vs. The Morss Hill Coal Co., 364.

FEIGNED ISSUE.

A gave B a judgment note for $6,845, date Oct. 30, 1899. Subsequently an item
of $2,645.83 was applied as a credit to the said judgment. This credit represented

the amount realized from four executions issued on four judgments.

On these executions the stock and goods of B were sold, mostly to the plaintiff.
His attorneys receipted the amount of the purchases, after the costs were paid,
upon the four executions pro rata.

The sheriff's return showed a credit, by receipt of plaintiff's attorneys, of
$2,645.83 to apply on the judgment of $6,845.

At the trial A contended that the sheriff's return was not conclusive; that it
was only prima facie proof of a credit on the judgment to the amount of $2,645.83,
and that the right to this credit was rebuttal and extinguished by the evidence.

Held: The return not being obscure nor ambiguous; and there being no mis-
take or fraud in connection with it, the sheriff's return is conclusive between the
parties. The law is settled that the return cannot be contradicted by either party
in the action in which it is made.-J. O. Ackerman vs. Joseph Josephs, 25.

Evidence of.

FRAUD.

An absolute conveyance will not be set aside on the testimony of a grantor
and another person, when the testimony is doubtful, inconsistent and contradictory
of other facts in the case.

Evidence of fraud must be clear, precise and indubitable to support a decree
for cancellation of a deed.

Natural love and affection is a good and sufficient consideration for deed
between parent and child.

In the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, a conveyance of real estate by
deed, will not be set aside by a court of equity.

When the answer of defendant is responsive to the bill of plaintiff, the testi-
mony of two witnesses, or of one witness and other evidence equivalent to a second
witness is necessary to support a decree for plaintiff, even if there be no testimony
on the part of defendant.-Ann Finnegan vs. Martin Walsh, Patrick Finnegan and
Mary E. Boyd, 266.

GARNISHEE.

Judgments upon interrogatories and answers can only be entered where it
appears that the plaintiff is clearly entitled to it and that it would be useless
expense and waste of time to require the case to be proceeded with to issue and
trial.

If the facts stated in the answer are insufficient to sustain it, a judgment will
be refused.

The Court cannot go outside the admitted facts or receive extraneous proofs
to qualify or contradict them. The admissions, like ȧ special verdict, form the ex-
clusive foundation of the judgment.-George A. Walker vs. Annette Reynolds, et
al., 246.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

When, in an action brought by a wife against her husband's father and mother
for the alienation of her husband's affections, it appears that plaintiff went to New
York with the son of the defendants, a minor of seventeen, and was married to
him, and as soon as the defendants discovered the marriage, they consulted coun-
sel in New York, and being advised by him that, under the laws of that state, the
marriage was void, they instituted proceedings to have it annulled, and there is no
evidence that the defendants prevented their son from returning to the plaintiff,
nor that they had alienated his affections, a non-suit will be entered.-Becker vs.
Becker, 144.

With the probate of the will the register's judicial powers cease. Under the constitution all questions thereafter touching the probate or the validity of the will are to be determined by the Orphans' Court, on appeal from the register's decision, when the proper issue may be framed.

A register is a statutory official and may exercise no powers except those expressly granted; and the only instance where he is authorized to revoke letters of any kind granted by him is contained in the 28th Section of the Act of 1832, where insufficient security has been given.

His power to revoke letters of administration rests on exactly the same ground as does his power to revoke letters testamentary and the latter power being declared unwarranted, it follows that the present practice of petitioning the register to revoke letters of administration must be abandoned.

The register has no power to review his action in probating a former will.

The proper course for a petitioner is to take an appeal to the Orphans' Court from the action of the register in probating the first will and not from his refusal to revoke it.-Estate of Maria Donnelly Nallin, Deceased, 10.

Estate of William Bestford.

The courts recognize parol partitions, and when followed by the taking of possession, they are regarded as valid. Where a petition for an inquest is presented to the Orphans' Court for partition and the party in possession of the premises denies the title of the petitioner and produces testimony to show that the petitioner has no title in the property, the court will decline to exercise jurisdiction and will require the petitioner to prove title before a jury.-Estate of William Bestford, 13.

The Act of April 12, 1903, P. L., 224, provides that "No objections, of any nature whatever, shall be filed unless accompanied by proof of notice of the proposed objections upon at least one of the candidates named in the certificate, etc."

Held: That the meaning which should attach to the phrase "notice of the proposed objections,' is that either the copy of the objections or notice specifying the nature of the objections should be given to the party interested.

When two or more caucuses are held in a ward in which there is no uniform custom for calling caucuses, the court would be compelled to sustain the first caucus, on the sole ground that it was the first one called, especially if it was generally participated in by the voters.

Of course to sustain this view the caucus must be regular in every other respect. 1st. It must be legally called; 2d. It must be the first called; 3d. It must be held by the legally elected primary officers; and, 4th. It must be participated in by the voters of some party or policy.-In Re: Certificate of Nomination of M. J. Burns et al., 17.

Estate of John Handley.

Where a testator has made two bequests to the same person, it sometimes becomes a question whether the legatee is entitled to both or to one only, i. e. where the second bequest is to be regarded as given in addition to the first one, in which case it is cumulative, or whether the second bequest is merely a repetition of or is given as a substitute for the first that is substitutional in respect to the thing bequeathed.

The objects of the courts is to ascertain, not the intention simply, but the ex

pressed intention of the testator, i. e. the intention which the will itself, either expressly or by implication, declares; or, which is the same thing, the meaning of the words of the will, properly interpreted, convey.

Whether an additional bequest is cumulative or merely repetition depends solely on the testator's intention as deducible from his testamentary language.

There is no law that prohibits a man from giving two or more pecuniary legacies to the same person, either upon the same or upon different contingencies; but there is a law, or a rule of construction, which is the same thing, that requires the courts to give effect to every clause and word of a will consistently with the principles of law and without contradicting the manifest intent of the testator. It is, therefore, a pure question of intention.

A testator is presumed to have an additional purpose for each additional expression and to intend such meaning as will give most effect to the context.

Where bequests vary in their dates of payment, and in conditions respecting their vesting, the presumption is that they are cumulative. The contention for accumulation will be strengthened by any difference between the gifts, whether the diversity of the latter be found in the amount, in the character in which it is given, in the mode of enjoyment, in the extent of interest, or in the motive for the bounty.

If the second gift is different in nature, or in amount, the prima facie presumption is that it is intended as an cumulative gift..-Estate of John Handley, 33.

Estate of Joseph Chase, 65.

McCuen's Estate, 93.

Balmforth's Estate. 94.

Ephrata Township Road, 95.

Volan's Estate, 101.

Martin's case, 102.

138.

Appeal of Dunmore School District from report of Borough Auditors for 1903,

Rhoades' Estate, 154.

Maule's Estate, 160.

Hortz's Estate.

Circumstances considered under which an admission made by counsel under a mistake of fact may be withdrawn.-Hortz's Estate, 166.

Wyoming County Road, 176.

Sunderland's Estate, 190.-See Auditor.

Appeal of Dunmore District from report of Auditors, 206.

Petition of William Silkman, deceased, 299.-See Register of Wills.

The 17th section of the act of 1836, which provides, inter alia, that where the damages found against the defendant exceed $100, he shall not be entitled to be