Chung How, of more recent date than any I am about to produce, will best serve as an example in point. When on his way to France on his mission of apology after the Tientsin massacre, and before taking his departure from Hong Kong for Europe, this high officer (a fair type of the better order of Chinese statesmen) addressed a memorial to the Emperor requesting him to confer some mark of approval-not upon deserving officers or good administrators -but the Queen of Heaven as a reward for the way in which she had recently looked after the grain junks upon the coast. The following may be taken as a free translation appearing in one of the local newspapers at Shanghae. steamships for the transport of rice to Tientsin-and the importance of conciliating the native shipping interests suffering from the permanent sudden displacement of capital, and the numbers of a sea-faring population thrown out of employment. These take to piracy as a means of subsistence and a natural alternative, as did the sea-kings of old among our Norse ancestors. To a superficial reader there would very likely be nothing in this memorial worthy of attention further than an evidence of folly and superstition which is usually assumed by foreigners to be the common characteristics of the race. But to anyone better informed as well as more thoughtfully disposed, what does it say? Chung How Chung How reports that having for many years filled the office of Superintendent of Trade at the Northern many years employed as Superintendent of Trade, he has had constant opportunities of observing to what an extent coasting craft and the ships from Fukien and Kuangtung depend upon the grace of the Queen of Heaven, each vessel having on board a tablet inscribed to her. In obedience to the Imperial will, your slave is now departing for foreign countries, having already passed by seven provinces, namely, Chihli, Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, and Kuangtung. During this passage he has observed that all along the ten or fifteen thousand li of coast which bounds the empire, the people everywhere derive their support from labour on the sea. Whether they are fishermen or salt collectors, they work day and night in tempest and amid the waves. Therefore it is especially necessary to invoke the mercy of the sacred spirit on their behalf. The importance of the traffic by sea is enormous, whether between the ports or with foreign countries, whence warlike stores of all kinds are brought to supply our wants. This, indeed, demands even greater attention than the industry of the people; wherefore it is begged that an honourable epithet may be conferred upon the goddess, and that offerings may regularly be made at her altars, whereby the people will be led to display increased reverence for her. The memorial is chiefly interesting as an evidence of two important facts, well known and appreciated by Chung How. The increasing necessity for resorting to foreign ports, has naturally had his atten- Of The desire to propitiate these by an evidence of interest in their welfare and prosperity is the true motive and meaning of the memorial. That a Chinese high officer should seek this end by showing honour to the 'Queen of Heaven 'rather than any real boon to the junk population, is susceptible of a double interpretation. Either he himself shares in the superstition of his countrymen, and in a devout spirit thus sought to aid them-or as a Statesman above such superstitions, he is yet willing to avail himself of its existence in others to influence their minds,-and at no cost to himself confer a cheap benefit or favour to which they attach some value. But assuming the first to be the true one, is there anything more foolish or superstitious in a Chinese high officer wishing the aid of the 'Queen of Heaven' as a sacred spirit able to assist-than similar invocations from high places to the Roman Catholic 'Queen of Heaven' -or in Protestant lands to the 'Lord of Hosts' for victory over their enemies? or for rain or for fair weather? Another memorial, of Mu-tu-shan, a high officer on the western frontier, prays that a temple may be erected to the god of war for assisting the imperial troops against the rebels at Kanchow. We do not raise temples 'to the God of Battles' in Europe, but, as just observed, it is common enough in telegrams and despatches announcing great victories,-to take it for granted that God was on the side of the victorious, and to give Him the glory. Is it not a difference rather in name than in fact? (To be continued.) THE GUNS AND ARMOUR. BY COMMANDER WM. DAWSON, R.N. THE best way to defend your own ships is to attack the enemy vigorously-such, in effect, was the late Admiral Farragut's advice to the United States Fleet during the American Civil War. And the old Admiral's example nobly seconded the precept, as, in the wooden frigate Hartford he fearlessly led his wood-built squadrons through lines of torpedoes and floating obstructions, past formidable batteries, and against, even, ironclad ships. The defensive value of gunpowder smoke was well illustrated when passing between long lines of batteries. On such occasions, Admiral Farragut never returned the fire in heavy shot or shell, but in clouds of grape, which annoyed his opponents and distracted their aim, whilst obscuring the sides of his ships in their own smoke. Such practical lessons in real war are apt to be forgotten by those who measure the relative values of ships by the thickest portion of their defensive armour, without respect to their It was the Americans who taught us that frigates might have as thick VOL. VII.-NO. XXXVIII. NEW SERIES. scantling or timbers, and carry as heavy ordnance, as ships of the line. And long before the screw steamship era the British Navy had adopted the principle that every vessel, large or small, should carry guns of equal calibre, differing only in their number and in the ranges at which perforation was attainable. One of the last and noblest unarmoured steam screw line-of-battle ships was the Duke of Wellington, a three-decked ship of 6,071 tons weight, armed with 131 guns. But many steam sloops of war and gunboats carried heavier though fewer ordnance, and no steam frigate was provided with guns of less calibre. The armaments were, in short, so arranged that a couple of frigates, a squadron of sloops, or a cloud of gunboats might have successfully grappled with a hostile two or three decked ship. It was, in fact, the number and not the size of the guns, much less the scantling of the timbers, which determined a ship's place in the line of battle. And had a general action occurred in the steam-screw woodbuilt era, no admiral would have been justified in ordering the frigates, sloops and gunboats to hold aloof from the engagement. The armaments of modern ships are no longer arranged on the principles painfully taught us by the Americans in 1812; but, rather, on the system which prevailed in antecedent times. So that British wooden ships are expected to run away from hostile ironclads, however thin their armour. Only one unarmoured frigate, the Inconstant, could come successfully out of such an encounter. The captain of the Inconstant would certainly deserve to be shot if that ship did not thrash such foes as our own ironclads Zealous, Warrior, Minotaur, T &c., or at least if he didn't try to do so. But he might well be deterred from seeking an artillery encounter with the Peter the Great, seeing that the Inconstant's armament could not perforate the Russian's armour. Similarly, it would be madness for any half-dozen other British unarmoured frigates to enter upon an artillery combat with the weakest hostile ironclad, their armaments being gauged for perforating their own sides rather than those of possible foes. It seems from this to be an accepted dogma that British unarmoured frigates shall always decline to fight hostile ironclads. It is well, however, to note that the foe would not obtain the command of those seas so much because of the thickness of his armour, as because of the weakness of British armaments. This point is of some importance on distant seas, as we cannot hope to have British ironclads at every possible point where a hostile armoured ship may appear. And it is simply absurd that fifthrate powers in the Pacific or Southern Oceans should be able to drive British squadrons from their shores by the action of single ironclads. No doubt there always would be great risk in pitting an unarmoured ship against an ironclad, whatever their respective armaments; but in the case of an unmaritime foe the hardihood involved is no greater than we have a right to expect from British seamer. If Farragut could successfully lead his badly armed wood-built ships against badly armoured ironclads manned by Anglo-Saxons like himself, surely British seamen, if allowed to have well-armed wooden ships, might be expected to risk, on occasion, an artillery encounter with a wellarmoured ironclad belonging to certain weak naval powers. Seamanlike skill, pluck, and historical traditions, will always stand for some inches of armour; and where these happen to be all on our side, no unnecessary physical impediment to their employment ought to exist. When, however, 'Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of war;' and when the British seaman meets 'a foeman worthy of his steel,' then he may fairly take into account the relative thicknesses of the opposing armour. Nevertheless, even then, he would do well to weigh first the respective armaments. Let us suppose two hostile ironclads to meet on equal terms in every respect except as regards their armour and armament. Let the guns on either side be capable of perforating the other's armour at the extreme biting or nonglancing, angle. Then, it matters comparatively little that one ship is plated a couple of inches thicker than the other. But it would matter immensely if the ship with the thinner armour carried the weight of the missing two-inch plates in the form of extra artillery. If by throwing off a couple of inches of armour, double the number of heavy guns capable of perforating the thicker plates could be carried, then, equal skill and pluck being assumed, the chances of victory are doubled. We speak now simply of the artillery duel, and we assume what is probably true, that British artille rists are ignorant of the vulnerable points of hostile ships, and would aim as though all parts were equally thickly plated. But we need hardly point out that future naval combats will not necessarily be decided invariably by artillery; and that the thickest plates cover a very small portion of the ship, & portion which an intelligent gunner would carefully avoid if beyond the perforating powers of his par ticular weapon. When we see certain thickly plated ships tenderly convoyed by more seaworthy vessels from Sheerness to Portsmouth, from Portsmouth to Portland, and back again in the same way, at midsum mer and after careful barometrical studies, the authorities holding their breath tightly when such ships are outside of land-locked harbours, the proper way of attacking such vessels in the open sea would obviously not be by artillery fire. Still, the defensive use of towing torpedoes by such low-freeboard ships might save them from being run over by more seaworthy high-sided vessels, and compel an unskilful foe to rely exclusively on his artillery. It is, indeed, on the assumption that naval torpedoes will be defensively employed by every ship, as safeguards against being rammed, that the question of guns and armour retains its old importance. The imaginary ironclads, Artillerist and Architect, differ only in their armour and armament. The Architect is own sister to the Devastation, protected by 12 inch plates and armed with four 35 ton guns; and the Artillerist is covered with 10inch plates, but armed with fourteen 35 ton guns. These guns are so rifled that they will not destroy themselves, during training practice, in 38 horizontal discharges, but are capable of enduring a well-contested naval action. Moreover, as such mechanical rifling has not decidedly the lowest velocities,' and does not compel the employment of reduced charges as at present, the 35 ton gun would consequently perforate the 12 inch plate at an angle of 40° as readily as it would the 10 inch plate. Practically, then, both ships are equally pervious to the other's ordnance. But the Artillerist is able to discharge fourteen 700 lb. shells for every four discharged by the Architect. If only 10 per cent. of each discharge prove to be good hits, perforating the opponent's side, the advantage will still be enormously in favour of the Artillerist. No doubt the Architect's 12 inch armour would stand her in good stead as against a ship armed with lighter ordnance; and so long as ships are armed for the perforation of their own sides, and not for penetrating those of any enemy they may fall in with, the Architect's defensive superiority is advantageous. If, however, all ships were provided with 35 ton guns, in number proportioned to their tonnage, the Architect's defensive superiority would be of small avail. It is only an unmechanical rifling which limits the endurance and size of guns. If this rifling were got rid of, there would be no reason why 50 ton guns should not be built to perforate 24 inch plates; and the same argument would, therefore, obtain should the Architect be clothed in armour of double thickness, which would be penetrable to mechanically rifled ordnance. The questions thence arise: Why should not the Artillerist be stripped of her armour 2 inches farther, and have that weight substituted in guns? and What is the limit to this diminution of armour and increase in number of the heaviest ordnance? Obviously there is a point at which space forbids additional weapons; and there is also a point at which the perforation of the less heavy guns commonly carried, say the 12 ton guns, begins. Again, there is a thickness of armour and backing, at which the perforating 700 lb. shell ceases to do the maximum of destructive work. Let us suppose that experimental research determines 8 inch armour to be the correct via media. Then a very broad short ship, clothed from end to end in 8 inch armour, thinned towards the extremities, and mounting about ten 35 ton guns on each broadside, would form the artillerist's ideal of an extremely offensive ironclad. The artillery duel off Portland, on the 5th of July last, resulting, as it did, in the signal defeat of the gun by the armour, has revived the general interest in this question. |