to be useless and expensive in the extreme; and so far from answering the vaunted ends for which it was raised, that it was proved, in his masterly and comprehensive reports upon the subject, to be highly detrimental to the navy and militia of the country, by screening the most active and able men from the impress and ballot; a new code, which went to the entire correction of these abuses, was suggested by this excellent officer, Admiral Berkeley, which met with the most unqualified approbation of the minister.

About this time, the project of converting the harbour of Falmouth into a royal arsenal, for refitting the ships of the channel fleet, was adopted, and endeavoured to be carried into execution, as being farther to the westward than Plymouth, and approximating more to the ports of the enemy. In the prosecution of this wild and visionary scheme, much expence was incurred, and many buildings were erected for different offices. But a very short trial verified the predictions of some of the most intelligent of the old officers of the navy, who had early asserted, that its diminutive size and the narrowness of its entrance, would preclude line-of-battle ships from getting readily to sea; and after nearly risking the loss of two three-deckers, and a seventy-four, this plan, perhaps originating in interested motives, was at length abandoned.

It was, however, to be regretted, during this period, in other respects honorable to the naval administration of the country, that a total want of intelligence of the enemy's designs, state of preparation, or movements, prevailed in an unaccountable degree.

Not only the frigates and single ships of the enemy, but even their entire fleets, escaped from their ports, which were supposed to be in a state of strict blockade, and it was only by the accounts of their depredations, or the news of their return to Europe, that even their having sailed came to be known!

An action took place, arising out of a circumstance of this kind, so honorable to the parties concerned, that it is worthy of particular mention. The Cleopatra, a small 32-gun British frigate, commanded by Sir Robert Laurie, after sustaining a very long but unequal contest with the Ville de Milan, one of the enemy's largest frigates, was compelled to surrender, but not until he had so completely disabled his huge opponent as to render both vessels, (now French,) an easy capture to the Leander, Captain Talbot, one of the most promising young officers in the service, who, by this means, and scarcely firing a gun, had the option of commanding one of the very finest and most desirable frigates in the French navy. But with that generosity of spirit, which ever characterises the British officer, Captain Talbot referred this material object to

Sir Robert Laurie, to whose spirit, bravery, and BOOK VI. perseverance alone, he generously ascribed the double capture of the Ville de Milan, and her CHAP. X. prize the Cleopatra, as if the Frenchman had not been so beaten, she certainly would not have proved so easy a prize.

Before we proceed to the account of the evermemorable transactions of Lord Nelson, whom we left waiting the arrival of the Toulon squadron in the Sicilian seas, it may not be deemed uninteresting to state another proof of the genuine nobleness of character of the British seaman, which was perhaps never more fully conspicuous, than as exemplified in an attack upon some vessels in Muros Bay, on the coast of Spain, by the Loire frigate, Captain Maitland, who not only captured the ships, the object of the enterprize, but stormed and took the fort which pretected them; at the same time, he manifested so much humanity towards the inhabitants, as to call forth the personal thanks of the bishop of the diocese:-conduct, which must have impressed the Spaniards with the most exalted ideas of British humanity and heroism!

The alarm existing in the public mind, respecting the proceedings of the Rochfort squadron in the West-Indies, had scarcely been calmed, before it was again, and in a much more serious manner, excited, by the certain information, received about this period, that Admiral· Villeneuve had again put to sea. This officer, who returned to Toulon to refit, having been much shattered upon his first cruize, once more tried his fortune upon the ocean, and under more auspicious circumstances. He, on the 30th of March, sailed to Carthegena, with the intention of strengthening himself by the Spanish ships of the line equipping in that port, but not finding them in a state of sufficient readiness, he continued his way unmolested to Cadiz, whence, having been joined there by one French and six Spanish sail of the line, he directly proceeded to the West-Indies, with an accumulated force of eighteen sail of the line, carrying, beside their full complement of seamen, and in a perfect state of equipment, ten thousand veteran soldiers! On the approach of Villeneuve to Cadiz, Admiral Sir John Orde, who blockaded that port with five British sail of the line, thought it prudent to retire, which he did without molestation or notice, on the part of the enemy, and succeeded in joining the English fleet off Brest under Lord Gardner.

It may easily be conceived, how great must have been the apprehension and uneasiness throughout the British empire, when the sailing of so considerable an armament became known; but the consternation was at its height, when it was certainly announced, that it had proceeded for the West-Indies, intelligence of which was

1805.

BOOK VI. received about the beginning of May, but none whatever of the movements of Lord Nelson.

During this anxious period, that great man, after having traversed the Mediterranean, with his squadron of ten sail of the line, and visited Alexandria, whither he had conceived Villeneuve to have proceeded in the first instance, and had taken in provisions and water at Palermo, again put to sea, and cruised in those latitudes, in eager expectation of the arrival of the enemy. It was not until the middle of April, that he received indubitable information of Villeneuve having quitted the Mediterranean. His lordship immediately proceeded for the Straits of Gibraltar, and anchored in the Bay of Tetuan, on the Barbary coast, early in May. From the various accounts which he received here, as well of their number as strength, he no longer doubted of the WestIndies being the place of the destination of the combined squadrons of the enemy. The dan gerous situation in which their arrival there would place the British colonies, with all the train of evils which would attach to the mothercountry upon their capture, rose at once upon his mind, and he instantly took the heroic determination of pursuing the enemy thither, with a force of little more than one half their strength! His lordship having hastily taken in, at Tetuan, such articles of the first necessity as the wants of his fleet immediately required, next proceeded to Lagos Bay, where he was fortunate enough to find some transports and store-ships belonging to Sir John Orde's squadron, when that officer had retired before the French fleet. From these vessels be received still farther supplies of stores and provisions, and being more and more confirmed in the course which the enemy had steered, on the 11th day of May he sailed in pursuit of them.

To appreciate, as it deserves, all the merit of this extraordinary man, (in this part of his glorious career of public duty, perhaps the most glorious) many circumstances should be taken into consideration. Let it be remembered, that, with ten sail of the line, foul, and after a cruize of more than two years, he undertook to pursue, across the Atlantic, or to whatever part of the globe they might have shaped their course, the enemies' combined squadrons of eighteen sail of the line, in a state of the most complete equipment, fresh from their ports, with their full complement of sailors on board, carrying 10,000 landtroops, commanded by some of the best officers of France and Spain, and under the positive commands of the French ruler to strike a grand and decisive blow against the British power and empire in the West Indies, and destroy her commerce upon the western ocean!

Considerations of the purest patriotism, acting the most heroic mind, and combined with the utmost professional science and judgment, de

upon

termined this energetic character; who, therefore, despising the superior force of the enemy, and setting at nought the vast responsibility he incurred, by thus acting without orders, in a case of the utmost risk and emergency; superior to every personal consideration, he hazarded his great name and reputation upon the issue. That Providence, to whose watchful care he had so often piously, and wisely ascribed the glory of his greatest and most splendid actions, did not now desert him, and Lord Nelson was once more to be hailed as its instrument in saving his country. Before we proceed to the further particulars connected with the pursuit of the combined squadrons by Lord Nelson, it may be necessary to mention a movement, at this period, of the enemy's Brest fleet, evidently calculated to divide and distract the attention of the British government, keep its naval force divided, and spread a wider alarm in the minds of the English nation. Having been sometime in the bustle of preparation, about the middle of May the French fleet put to sea from Brest, apparently with a design to fight the English squadron blockading that port, commanded by Lord Gardner: the former consisting of twenty-five sail of the line, the latter but of seventeen. Notwithstanding this great disproportion of strength, the French fleet returned into harbour, satisfied with the bravado of having ventured once out of it in so many years, and left the English admiral to pursue his system of blockade, without any attempt at its further interruption.

The expedition of Lord Nelson had been such, that, on the 15th of May, he was twenty leagues to the eastward of Madeira, and on the 4th of June he came to anchor in Carlisle bay, off Barbadoes, after a fortunate passage, where he received intelligence that the combined fleet, under Admiral Villeneuve, had arrived at Martinique on the 14th of May, nearly three weeks before; but that, most providentially, this powerful armament had hitherto remained inactive, with the exception of its having attacked and carried the Diamond Rock, by a force detached for that purpose. The most sanguine hope or expecta tion of Lord Nelson could hardly have suggested this extraordinary inactivity to have resulted from such great preparation and such real strength; he, accordingly, having been joined by Admiral Cochrane, and two ships of the line, prepared to sail in quest of the enemy, to attack them wherever they might be found.

The joy and exultation which prevailed in the British islands, at this period, may easily be conceived. Abandoned of all hope, they had seen their successive and entire destruction, in the arrival of one of the most formidable fleets that had ever been witnessed in that quarter of the globe, without any force adequate to even the

chance of effectual resistance. From this gloom of despair, they were roused by the appearance, on a day auspicious to the prospect of their deliverance from the surrounding peril of the British fleet, on the anniversary of the birth of his Britannic majesty; and that fleet commanded by Lord Nelson. From that moment not a doubt remained of relief: the inferiority of force, great as it was, was never once taken into consideration; for Nelson and victory were inseparable, even in idea; nothing was looked for but the discomfiture and disgrace of the arrogant invader.

To what the strange inactivity of the enemy's force was owing, was not clearly understood: by some it was attributed to the mortality among the troops, of whom it was asserted, not less than 3,000 perished in Martinico, from the disorders incident to those climates, while the remaining force was sickly in the highest degree. By others, it was as confidently stated, that the best understanding did not exist between the French and the Spanish commanders, as to the objects of the enterprize. Probably their inertness might have proceeded from both causes, for the first alleged fact was certain; and, without any apparent motive, it was ascertained, that the Spanish squadron under Admiral Gravina had, about this period, separated from that of the French, and was supposed to have sailed upon some secret expedition. As the recovery of the island of Trinidad, the ancient possession of Spain, would, probably, be the object of Admiral Gravina, and concurring reports strengthening this conjecture, Lord Nelson having employed only twenty-four hours in taking in water for the whole fleet, and in embarking 2,000 troops under Sir William Myers; on the 5th of June steered to the southward, and arrived off Trinidad on the 7th. Here, however, he found, that the enemy had not made his appearance; and, much disappointed, he quitted the island on the following day, and reached Granada on the ninth, where he had the mortification to learn, that the enemy's squadrons, again acting in conjunction, and consisting of seventeen sail of the line, had, that very morning, sailed from Martinique, and had taken a course to the northward. Immediately conceiving that Antigua must now be the object of the enemy; to prevent that island from falling a prey to such a formidable force, he lost no time in proceeding thither; but here again disappointment awaited him, and he was clearly ascertained in a fact he scarcely could give credit to, that this superior fleet, terrified by the news of his arrival, and profiting of the delay which his ill information had occasioned, betook himself to a precipitate and shameful flight, and was actually on his return to Europe! A transaction, which, while it stamped the highest reputation upon the British name and arms, covered with indelible disgrace the naval character of the enemy.

1805.

When assured that Admirals Villeneuve and BOOK VI. Gravina had declined the contest in those seas, the unceasing activity of Lord Nelson impelled CHAP. X. him to, what even his modesty could not refuse the term of, a pursuit, and the novel scene presented itself to an admiring world, of seventeen sail of French and Spanish ships of the line flying before a force of eleven of the same class, bearing the British ensigns, the Spartiate ship of the line Lord Nelson having taken with him from the West Indies, as an addition to his original force. Lord Nelson, accordingly, having debarked the troops at Antigua, once more set sail, in the hope of overtaking the fugitives before they reached a friendly port in Europe. In taking this resolution, his lordship, however, was not so occupied by the hurry and bustle necessarily attendant upon its being carried into effect, as to neglect those means which his unerring judgment suggested, of apprizing the different British squadrons at sea, as well as the government at home, of the proceedings of both fleets, in order that every means should be taken to intercept the enemy on his return, should he not be fortunate enough to overtake him. Accordingly, his lordship dispatched the Curieux sloop of war to England, on the 13th of June, and on the 15th the Decade frigate to Lisbon, the latter with instructions to cause any light vessels he might find there or on his passage, to spread the intelligence of the return of the enemy in every direction, and then proceed herself upon the same service. The Marten sloop was sent off to Gibraltar for a similar purpose: measures of precaution equally wise and efficacious, and which, subsequently, were greatly instrumental to the glorious events which took place, as, by this timely information, the different British squadrons were reinforced, and collected in the most probable situations of meeting with the enemy on his return to Europe.

The safety of the West Indian colonies being now ascertained at home, the mind of the British public was at its greatest stretch of hope and expectation. It was not unreasonable to expect, that the combined squadrons, baffled and disgraced, might fall in either with Admirals Calder or Collingwood, who were cruizing in different directions, with strong divisions of the British fleet on the watch, to prevent his return to port, either in France or Spain. Many imagined it possible that Lord Nelson might overtake his prey, and contemplated, with hope, alloyed by some slight reflection on the disproportion of strength, the tremendous conflict which must have ensued. Nor were there wanting some sanguine enough to see the possibility, if not the probability, of his lordship coming up with Villeneuve when he should be engaged with one of the British squadrons already adverted to, and thus place him between two fires, to his inevitable destruction.

BOOK VI.

These expectations, however, were but partially realized. Lord Nelson reached the straits CHAP. X. on the 19th of June, without having seen the enemy, after having, in seventy-eight days from 1805. the time he quitted Tetuan bay to his return to Gibraltar, twice traversed, with his whole, fleet, the Atlantic ocean; and visited all the Leeward West India islands, without calculating the time necessarily employed in taking in provisions and stores, and the embarking and re-embarking troops, together with the delay induced by collecting information of the enemy: a scene of activity unparalleled, and within a space of time inconceivably limited. Having ascertained that the enemy had not entered the Mediterranean, Lord Nelson found himself constrained, from the absolute want of water and provisions, to steer for the bay of Tetuan, where he anchored on the 22d. Having here procured some supplies, he made sail again, on the 26th, and re-passed the Straits, in hopes of encountering the fugitive fleet of the enemy, which, in fact, he had outstripped, off the Capes of St. Vincent, or, by taking a northward direction, fall in with him in a higher latitude.

It should seem, however, as if fate had decreed, that Nelson should have the immortal honor of saving his country, upon this occasion, merely by the terror of his name, and without his firing a gun; circumstances which, at the time, were doubtless of extreme mortification to this great man, but which, in point of fact, redound more to his fame, and place it higher than even his most splendid victories.

His lordship neared Cadiz on the 27th of July, but finding the enemy had not entered that port, he sailed for Cape St. Vincent, and subsequently traversed the Bay of Biscay without seeing or hearing any thing of him. With unabated perseverance and zeal, this indefatigable man next pursued his course, as a last hope, to the northwest coast of Ireland, where being still disappointed, and being worn out with an activity, which seemed only fated to meet with mortification, he resolved on returning to England; his last measure being, with his usual sagacity and foresight, to dispatch nine ships of the line to reinforce the channel fleet under Lord Gardner, lest the enemy, by making for Brest, should, with the co-operation of the French fleet in that port, place his lordship in a dangerous situation, by their great superiority of force.

On the 18th of August Lord Nelson, in the Victory, accompanied by the Superb, arrived at Portsmouth, and on the 20th reached London, where the reception he received, from the crown to the meanest citizen, was such as to console him for the fatigues and disappointments he had endured, and must have been the more gratifying to him, as he saw that his want of success

in the main object of his late cruize, was attributed to its true cause; and that a reflecting and a grateful people saw in his conduct, upon that occasion, a public service as useful as any, though, perhaps, generally speaking, less splendid than some of his former brilliant achievements. Scenes of activity, however, yet awaited the hero, and the year was not to pass over without witnessing a further, though fatal, proof of his energy and prowess!

We must now return to Admiral Villeneuve, who had nearly accomplished the object of his precipitate flight from the West Indies, and had almost reached a friendly port in Europe, without the so-much dreaded encounter with a British force but it was decreed that that event should not take place before he suffered yet additional disgrace and shame. His fleet, now increased to twenty sail of the line, French and Spanish, three large ships armed en flute, five frigates, and three brigs, fell in with the English squadron under the command of Admiral Sir Robert Calder, consisting of fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter, and a lugger, and which was cruizing off Cape Finisterre, in the hope of intercepting the enemy. This event took place on the 22d of July, three days after Lord Nelson had reached Gibraltar, on his return from the West Indies.

An action immediately took place, which was begun by the English admiral with skill, intrepidity, and judgment, and lasted four hours, the enemy fighting the whole time with the most determined resolution. At the end of that period, two of the enemy's ships of the line, the St. Raphael of 84 guns, and the El Firme of 74, hav ing been captured, Sir Robert Calder deemed it necessary to bring to the squadron, to cover them; a measure rendered still more necessary by the state of the weather, which was so foggy as to prevent the English ships seeing the vessels a-head or a-stern of them; of course it was impossible to manoeuvre with any effect, and all the advantage which could be derived from superiority of naval tactics, was no longer to be looked for. The wind and weather were, during the whole of the day, highly favorable to the enemy. The night was spent by both fleets in the necessary repairs, and the following morning the combined squadrons seemed disposed to renew the action, which it was completely in their power to have done, having the advantage of the wind; but they never approached nearer the British line than four leagues, the English admiral constantly keeping such a course as would best protect the captured ships, and the Windsor Castle, one of his own, which had been so much crippled in the action, as obliged it to be taken in tow by a line-of-battle ship. Repeatedly, in the course of the day, the enemy bore up in order of battle,

and as often hauled their wind upon perceiving no disposition in the English admiral to avoid him. At night the fleets were about six leagues asunder, and when day broke on the 24th, the enemy were seen steering away about south-east, under easy sail, and kept this course till six in the evening, when they could no longer be distinguished.

Thus terminated an affair in which British valour and skill were eminently conspicuous, and which, considered abstractedly, may certainly be deemed as matter of pride and triumph to the country. That fifteen sail of the line should not only withstand twenty of those of the enemy, and three large 50-gun ships, but also capture two of their largest vessels, was an event certainly well calculated to maintain the character of superiority which the navy of England so justly challenges. At the same time, it must be confessed that all was not done, upon this occasion, that the public thought it had a right to expect. It had happened, unfortunately, that the admiral's dispatches, as well as the verbal report of the officer who brought them home, gave the strongest foundation for the belief that the action would be renewed upon the following day; the result of which, to an enemy already beaten, must be deemed almost total destruction. The disappointment therefore was extreme, when intelligence arrived which put an end to all hopes of the kind, and led to the belief that the shattered squadrons of the enemy had gained, without further molestation, a Spanish port. The murmurs of disapprobation at the conduct of the British admiral became indeed so frequent, and so little restrained, that Sir Robert Calder returned to England for the purpose of demanding an investigation of his proceedings; to which government having acceded, he was tried by a courtmartial in Portsmouth harbour, on the 22d of December; when, upon a full examination of the circumstances which took place posterior to the action of the 22d of July, the court decided that the admiral had not done his utmost to take or destroy every ship of the enemy which it was his duty to engage; but, at the same time, ascribed such conduct to error in judgment, acquitting him absolutely of any imputation of fear or cowardice, and therefore only sentencing him to be severely reprimanded.

The desultory attempts which took place during the summer, to impede the assemblage of the enemy's flotilla at Boulogne, or to destroy them in that harbour, although frequent, were attended with too little success to merit particular mention, were they not, on every occasion, conducted with the utmost skill and gallantry by the naval officers entrusted with the service. The shallowness of the water, and the strong defences of the harbour, prevented any thing serious from

being achieved; little good resulted from the BOOK VI. attempt, save that the British sailors were kept in constant action, and accustomed to contemn a CHAP. X. force with which they were hourly becoming more familiar.

It became now certainly known, that the combined squadrons, after the encounter off Cape Finisterre, having reached the port of Ferrol in safety, had there received a very considerable augmentation of strength, and were seen on the 13th of August at sea, to the number of twentyseven sail of the line, and eight vessels of war of a lower order; which event was speedily followed up by news arriving of its having entered Cadiz on the 21st of the same month, the small force under Admiral Collingwood in that station not offering it any opposition, which it would have been equally rash and ineffectual to have attempted; and, indeed, it seems to have been the result of the utmost prudence and judgment, which enabled that officer to maintain his footing there until reinforced from England.

It is little to be doubted, but that the French emperor severely felt the mortification arising out of the complete failure of the vast armament he had sent out to the West Indies, its shameful flight home before the small squadron of Lord Nelson, and the event of the action with Sir Robert Calder, each and all of them disgraceful in themselves, and totally subversive of his boasted project of striking a fatal blow to the colonies and commerce of Great Britain. Great resources, however, yet remained to him: the accession of ships of the line which Admiral Villeneuve had received at Ferrol, together with those which he found at Cadiz, amounted in the whole to a very formidable force, and with which much might still be done. It was also essential to the views of Bonaparte, as war was now inevitable on the continent, to have as large an armament on foot as possible, in order to divert the attention of the English to whatever quarter it might be directed, and to act in the Mediterranean as circumstances might require. Fortunately this design could not immediately be put in execution; the disabled state of the ships engaged with Sir Robert Calder was such as to require some time for their re-equipment in port, nor could they be got ready for sea till the British fleet in that quarter became again respectable.

As the designs of the enemy were become sufficiently manifest, and they were also known to be in a state of the most active refitment at Cadiz, scarcely had Lord Nelson arrived in Londou, when he was, in the month of August, offered the command of an armament, to be prepared immediately, of sufficient force to cope with that of France, in any quarter of the world to which it should be destined to act. His lordship, without a moment's hesitation, embraced the opportunity

1805.