irregularities. Either it should appear that the property is exempt from taxation, or that the levy is without legal power, or that the persons imposing it were unauthorized, or that they have proceeded fraudulently." Mining Co. v. Auditor General, 37 Mich. 391. In that case it was claimed that the assessment roll was not completed until after the time allowed for review by the supervisors. In Burt v. Wadsworth, 39 Mich. 126, the chairman of the board of supervisors did not sign the certificate of equalization, and no certificate was attached to the tax-roll; and the same rule was announced, and relief refused.

In Illinois the leading case is Railroad Co. v. Frary, 22 Ill. 34. Chief Justice Caton then announced the rule of non-interference by courts of equity in its full scope, and, speaking of the exceptions to the rule, he says: "They are confined almost, if not entirely, to cases where the tax itself is not authorized by law; or, if the tax itself is authorized, it is assessed upon property not subject to the tax." And see Du Page Co. v. Jenks, 65 Ill. 286; Swinney v. Beard, 71 Ill. 27; Nunda v. Crystal Lake, 79 Ill. 314; Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 357; Moore v. Wayman, 107 Ill. 192.

In Warden v. Supervisors, 14 Wis. 618, it is said: "It will not be enough to show that the taxes are irregular, or even void. Courts of equity do not sit to remove and correct errors and mistakes of law. To be entitled to their assistance, the party applying therefor must show that he is in danger of losing a substantial right, and that he is in no fault."

In City of Lawrence v. Killam, 11 Kan. 375, the court, by Brewer, J., say: "Where a definite portion of the tax is legal, and the balance illegal, equity will refuse to interfere, unless that which is legal be first paid."

In Challiss v. Commissioners, 15 Kan, 49, it was held that "an injunction will not lie to restrain a tax proceeding without a prior payment or tender of all legal taxes." And in Knox v. Dunn, 22 Kan. 683, the same was held in an action to quiet title as against a tax-certificate holder. And see Pritchard v. Madren, 24 Kan. 486; Wilder v. Cockshutt, 25 Kan. 504; Cartwright v. McFadden, 24 Kan. 662; Miller v. Ziegler, 31 Kan. 420, 2 Pac. Rep. 601.

In Land Co. v. City of Crete (Neb.) 7 N. W. Rep. 859, it is held: "An injunction to restrain the collection of a tax will not be granted unless the tax complained of is either void, or its enforcement decidedly inequitable." And further: "A formal assessment, although not made in the mode contemplated by the law, if not inequitable, will support a levy otherwise legal." In this case it was alleged that no assessment whatever was made of plaintiff's property for the year 1874 as required by law. Instead of valuing the property according to his own judgment of its worth, the city assessor adopted a valuation made by a precinct assessor when assessing under a state law for general revenue, and returned it to the city council as his own valuation, and that this pretended assessment placed an excessive valuation on plaintiff's property, and would thereby cause plaintiff to pay more than his just proportion of taxes, and that said council never sat as a board of equalization, and plaintiff had no opportunity to show that pretended assessment was too high, and that no oath was attached to the assessment roll. Plaintiff's bill was dismissed, with costs. See also, Dundy v. Richardson Co., 8 Neb. 508, 1 N. W. Rep. 565.

Wood v. Helmer, supra, was an action brought to cancel tax certificates on the sole ground that the assessment roll was not verified. Plaintiff neither paid, nor offered to pay, the taxes justly chargeable against the land. It was held that there was no equity in the petition, and judgment dismissing it was affirmed; and the court say: "But, if the owner of the land does not wish to take the hazard of an adverse title being made to his land by tax-deed, the legality of which remains undetermined, and files his petition in equity to enjoin the execution of such deed, he must do equity, by paying, or offering to pay, his just proportion of the public burdens." And to precisely the same effect is Boeck v. Merriam, 4 N. W. Rep. 962.

In Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa 271, the court say: "We understand that it is a settled rule in equity that, where a party is in conscience bound to pay a certain sum of money which, together with an amount he is not legally bound to pay, is brought as a legal claim against him, equity will not restrain the collection of the whole unless he pay or offer to pay, by tender, the sum

which he justly and legally owes." And see cases there cited. See, also, Parsons v. Childs, 36 Iowa 108, and Snell v. City of Fort Dodge, 45 Iowa, 564. Harrison v. Haas, 25 Ind. 281, and Roseberry v. Huff, 27 Ind. 12, are strong cases requiring the payment of all just taxes as a condition precedent to any relief at the hands of a court of equity. In the former case, it is said a court of equity "will not so much as lift a finger to remove a cloud while a moral obligation remains undisturbed.”

In Frost v. Flick, 1 Dak. 131, the supreme court of the territory of Dakota gave full and emphatic endorsement to the rule of equitable non-interference except in cases where the tax is illegal or unauthorized, or where the property is exempt from taxation, or where fraud has been practiced by the taxing officers.

Clarke v. Ganz, 21 Minn. 387, was an action brought to restrain the collection of a tax on personal property on the ground that it had been illegally assessed. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained. The supreme court declined to consider the question of the legality or illegality of the assessment, holding that, under the equitable rule as laid down in High, Inj., which they quote and approve, equity could not interfere in either case. The court further say: "In some of the states, exceptions have been allowed to this rule. There is so much diversity in the decisons allowing these exceptions that it is hardly profitable to discuss them, especially as none of them have any principle of equity jurisprudence to sustain them." In that case, too, it was alleged that the collector was about to sell plaintiffs' property, "thereby subjecting the plaintiffs to great injury, costs, and expense, and involving them in expensive and vexatious litigation and a multiplicity of suits, in order to keep control of their property, and prevent an unjust sacrifice thereof." Say the court: "This quoted part of the complaint does not state any traversable facts, but only an inference or prediction as to what will be the consequences of the threatened levy. If such statements will make a case for injunction, it can be made in every case." The corresponding allegations in this case are of exactly the same nature, and are fully disposed of by the Minnesota case.

But see on same point Association v. Austin, 46 Cal. 416; Desty, Tax'n, 901, and cases cited.

The rule of non-interference by courts of equity in tax proceedings has been repeatedly recognized and enforced in New York. See cases collected in Susquehanna Bank v. Supervisors, 25 N. Y. 313. In State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, it is said in the head-notes: "While this court does not lay down any absolute rule limiting the powers of a court of equity in restraining the collection of taxes, it declares that it is essential that every case be brought within some of the recognized rules of equity jurisprudence, and that neither illegality or irregularity in the proceedings, nor error or excess in the valuation, nor the hardship or injustice of the law, provided it be constitutional, nor any grievance which can be remedied by a suit at law, either before or after the payment of a tax, will authorize an injunction against its collection." And again: "No injunction, preliminary or final, can be granted to stay collection of taxes until it is shown that all the taxes conceded to be due, or which the court can see ought to be paid, or which can be shown to be due by affidavits, have been paid or tendered without demanding a receipt in full." See, also, Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108; Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 Wall. · 548; Cummings v. Bank, 101 U. S. 153.

Cases may be found holding opinions more or less opposed to the doctrine of the foregoing cases. Upon this subject, Mr. High says: "Upon the other hand, the decisions are neither few in number, nor wanting in respectability, which have inclined to a departure from the doctrine of non-interference in equity with the collection of taxes; and it will be found, as we proceed, that the courts have in many instances extended preventive relief by injunction against the exercise of the taxing power in cases where such relief was unwarranted either upon principle or upon the clear weight of authority." High, Inj. § 484.

Courts of equity should, in general, extend the strong arm of their preventive power to restrain the collection of a tax or annul tax proceedings only where the property sought to be taxed is exempt from taxation or the tax itself is not war

ranted by law, or the persons assuming to assess and levy the same are without authority so to do, or where the proper taxing officials have acted fraudulently; and, in addition, plaintiff must bring himself within some recognized rule of equity jurisprudence; and, in the absence of statutory provisions regulating the subject, as a condition to relief in equity, the applicant must pay or tender the amount of taxes properly chargeable against his property. The rule as thus established works the tax-payer no wrong, and preserves the revenues of the state. Injustice could scarcely go further than to permit property which asks and receives the protection of the laws-property which unhesitatingly absorbs the full benefit of the expenditures and improvements made possible by public revenue-to escape its equitable contribution to the public burden because some official, through inefficiency or inadvertance, had failed, in time, manner, or form, in the performance of his duties. It is common knowledge that in a new state, with unsettled and shifting revenue laws, depending for their execution upon parties not familiar with fine distinctions or technical terms, grave mistakes and omissions must be, and are, of frequent occurrence. To depart from this salutary rule of non-interference would necessarily bring financial confusion, if not destruction, upon a large portion of the taxing municipalities within the state, and upon the state itself. We can only make the departure when we are ready to invite the result. In courts of law the rules are wholly different. In possessory actions between the holder of the tax-title and the patent title, where the interests of private parties alone are involved, and where the rule of caveat emptor applies in all its strictness, courts of law are scrupulously careful that no man be deprived of his property through tax proceedings that are not in all respects in substantial compliance with the statutory requirements.

Applying the principles herein before enumerated to the facts in this case, we find that the plaintiff has invoked the equity powers of the court by a complaint that shows that a cloud bas been cast upon the title to the real estate therein described by the issuance to the defendant corporation, by the treasurer of said county, of tax certificates, upon plaintiff's lands, issued