as shall be prescribed by law.' It is insisted that the assessment in question was not made under any uniform rule of taxation provided by the legislature, and that it was therefore void. It is not now necessary to determine what is the true import of the first clause of this section. No new rule of taxation had been provided by the legislature when the assessment was made, and it is not pretended that this provision of the constitution executes itself." And an assessment under the old law was held proper.

In People v. Bradley, 60 Ill. 390, this same principle was discussed. In that state a court had been established by statute, known as the "Recorder's Court of the City of Chicago," with its jurisdiction defined, judge, clerk, juries, and officers provided for. The constitution of 1870 continued this court as the "Criminal Court of Cook County," but with a change of judges, and enlarged geographical jurisdiction, but with a portion of the jurisdiction of the former court expressly denied, and none of the jurisdiction of that court expressly conferred. The case was habeas corpus, issued from the criminal court of Cook county. It was urged that this court was without authority to issue that writ; but the supreme court, after quoting the constitutional provision, say: "This provision, as clearly appears from the context, was intended to be self-executing, and operate upon the court in question immediately upon the constitution. being adopted. In short, all the machinery through which the functions of the criminal court are exercised is afforded by the statute creating the recorder's court, or else such functions must be considered as dormant until the means for their exercise shall be provided by legislation." In Nevada a law of 1861 provided for a homestead that should be exempt. A subsequent constitution declared "a homestead, as provided by law, shall be exempt from forced sale under any process of law," etc. There was also a clause similar to § 2 of schedule to our constitution. Property had been levied upon by a sheriff that was claimed as a homestead, and the position taken by the officer was that the constitutional provision repealed the former law, and, as no homestead had been provided by legislation subsequent to the adoption of the constitution, that therefore the

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homestead right was gone. The court, in discussing the case, say: "If it requires future action of the legislature to provide what a homestead shall be, then this section of the constitution is inoperative to protect a homestead until such act is passed. It appears strange to us that it should be contended that this clause of the constitution is legislation so completely covering the whole ground of homestead exemption as to suspend all former laws on that subject, and at the same time that it is so incomplete as to be wholly inoperative." Goldman v. Clark, 1 Nev. 610.

We are, then, inevitably led to this position: Whether or not article 20 of our constitution repealed chapter 26 of the Laws of 1879 depends upon whether or not said article is self-executing, and this latter position, in turn, depends upon whether or not the legal machinery exists for its enforcement. On the argument both parties contended that the article was self-executing, but from widely different views as to the result. Relator claims it to be self-executing, and as a result the repeal of the entire license system, including penalties, follows. Respondent claims it was self-executing, but did not repeal the license law, except as to selling as a beverage, or, at most, repealed only the sections providing for license, and that the remaining provisions, being not inconsistent, stood, and that article 20 attached to it, for its own enforcement, the penalties of the old law, and in that form stood a complete penal law. Counsel for relator cites on this point Norton v. Taxing District, etc., 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322. The case went up from Tennessee. The constitution of 1834 of that state gave the legislature "power to authorize the several counties and incorporated towns in this state to impose taxes for county and corporation purposes, respectively, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law; and all property shall be taxed according to its value, upon the principles established in regard to state taxation." Article 2, § 29. Under that constitution the legislature authorized the city of Brownsville, by act of Feb. 8, 1870, by a majority vote, to issue bonds and subscribe to the stock of railroad corporations. At an election held for that purpose all the votes cast were in favor of the proposition. But before the bonds were issued, or the election held, the state

adopted an amendment to the constitution which added to the language before quoted the following: "But the credit of no county, city, or town shall be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any person, company, association, or corporation, except upon an election to be first held by the qualified voters of such county, city, or town, and the assent of three-fourths of the votes cast at said election." The constitution also contained the provision similar to § 2 of the schedule of our constitution. The supreme court of the United States, by Chief Justice Fuller, said: "It is clear that the inhibition imposed by § 29 of the constitution of 1870 operates directly upon municipalities themselves, and is absolute and self-executing; and, although power is reserved to the legislature to enable them to give or loan their credit, and to become stockholders, upon the assent of threefourths of the votes cast at an election to be held by the qualified voters, the county, city, or town is destitute of the power to do so until legislation authorizing such election, and action thereupon is had." Then, after citing various authorities, he says: "These cases sufficiently illustrate the distinction between the operation of a constitutional limitation upon the power of the legislature and of a constitutional inhibition upon the municipality itself. In the former case past legislative action is not necessarily affected, while in the latter it is annulled. The inhibition

being self-executing, and operating directly upon the municipality, and not in itself enabling the latter to proceed in accordance with the prescribed limitation, further legislation is necessary before the municipality can act." In this case it is apparent that the Constitution of 1870 acted directly upon the municipalities themselves, and was self-executing, because there then existed, in full force, all the legal machinery necessary to compel obedience on the part of the city. Any tax-payer of the city could go into a court of equity and restrain the issuance of any bonds contrary to the provisions of the new constitution. Hence, being effective, the old law was repealed, not amended, and no bonds would issue under the old law; and the power of the city to issue bonds was in abeyance, and so far not self-executing, until the legislature should give the power in accordance

with the constitution of 1870. Relator also cites on this point State v. Tonks, (R. I.) 5 Atl. Rep. 636. The opinion is short and unsatisfactory. The court hold that the prohibition amend-⚫ ment in that state repealed the prior license law. We have no means at hand of knowing in what respects, if any, that amendment and the prior laws differ from article 20 of our constitution and our prior laws, but assume that they are practically identical. The question of the self-executing character of the amendment was not presented to or considered by the court. The thirteenth amendment to the federal constitution, prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude, provided that congress should enact laws for its enforcement, but was nevertheless held self-executing, at least in part; and that must be true, because, immediately upon adoption of that amendment, any person held in violation of its terms had all the legal means of redress that he would have in case of any other unlawful restraint of his liberty. All the legal machinery was at hand. Mr. Cooley, speaking on this same point, well says: "And, while courts shall be in existence competent to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and to administer common-law remedies, it seems difficult to imagine a case of attempt at a violation or evasion of this declaration of universal liberty that shall be wanting in appropriate redress." Cooley, Const. Law, 221. But it was feared that in some portion of our land it might be necessary to reinforce the common-law remedies by penalties to be inflicted for any violation of the principles of that amendment, and congress was authorized to provide therefor, and no such penalties could be inflicted until congress took the contemplated action.

We recognize the well-settled principle that when, by constitutional provisions, any personal or private right is granted to the citizen, such right is placed beyond the reach of legislative interference, the bill of rights of all the state constitutions furnishing numerous examples of this class; and the reason is plain. The common-law is the ever ready and efficient means of enforcing private rights and redressing private wrongs. But we are considering in this case a constitutional provision that confers no affirmative rights, but, on the contrary, restricts the right of a citizen, and is strictly prohibitory in its nature;

and there is no action known to the law by which any private party could enforce its provisions. Those provisions can be enforced only by penalties for their violation,-penalties prescribed by the legislative power of the state. If such penalties do not exist, then article 20 is barren of the elements of a complete law, and, while prohibitory in form, is in fact simply a declaration of principles. In this connection we must briefly notice respondent's position. He is sustained by the Kansas Prohibition Cases, 24 Kan. 700. We will not stop to refine upon the differences between the Kansas prohibition clause and our own; but we hold that, if article 20 of our constitution be self-executing, then chapter 26, Laws 1879, falls in its entirety. This is in accord with the clear weight of authorities. See U. S. v. Tynen, supra; Fraser v. Alexander, supra; State v. Tonks, supra; and also, as very pertinent to this point, see comments of Justice Brewer in the Kansas Prohibition Cases, page 724. The whole scope and purpose of said chapter 26 was to provide a license law for selling intoxicants as a beverage. It is idle to say that such law would have been enacted to authorize such sales for medicinal, sacramental, and scientific purposes, and still more idle to say that the penalties would have been inflicted for such sales without license. Chapter 26 must all stand or all fall. It falls, if article 20 be self-executing. But to say that that article receives life through the penalties in said chapter 26, immediately destroys those penalties, and leaves the prohibition powerless of enforcement. Another and all-sufficient reason why we cannot attach such penalties to article 20 is that it was never so intended by the constitution makers. They expressly provided that future legislation should provide the regulations for the enforcement, and penalties for the violation, of said article. That intention must be respected. It follows that said article is not self-executing, no common-law or statutory provision existing for its enforcement, hence it remains dormant, as a restriction upon the citizens, until given life by subsequent legislation, and has no force as a repealing measure, and chapter 26 of the Laws of 1879 stands in its entirety.

We must not be understood to hold that article 20 does not