nitial power had levelled the boundary between patricians and plebeians, what followed? The distinction between rich and poor was substituted. He meant not, however, to enlarge on the subject. He rose principally to remark, that Mr. Sherman seemed not to recollect that one branch of the proposed government was so formed as to render it particularly the guardians of the poorer orders of citizens; nor to have adverted to the true causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Connecticut. Under the British system, as well as the federal, many of the great powers appertaining to government particularly all those relating to foreign nations-were not in the hands of the government there. Their internal affairs, also, were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes, many of which were peculiar to that country. Of late the government had entirely given way to the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary functions, in order to prevent those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He asks Mr. Sherman, whether the State, at this time, dare impose and collect a tax on the people? To these causes, and not to the frequency of elections, the effect, as far as it existed, ought to be chiefly ascribed.

ment.

Mr. Gerry wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a permanent governAll aim at the same end, but there are great differences as to the means. One circumstance, he thought, should be carefully attended to. There were not one thousandth part of our fellow-citizens who were not against every approach towards monarchy, will they ever agree to a plan which seems to make such an approach? The Convention ought to be extremely cautious in what they hold out to the people. Whatever plan may be proposed will be espoused with warmth by many, out of respect to the quarter it proceeds from, as well as from an approbation of the plan itself. And if the plan should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent opposition, it is easy to foresee that discord and confusion will ensue; and it is even possible that we may become a prey to foreign powers. He did not deny the position of Mr. Madison, that the majority will generally violate justice when they have an interest in so doing; but did not think there was any such temptation in this country. Our situation was different from that of Great Britain; and the great body of lands yet to be parcelled out and settled, would very much prolong the difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms of injustice which had marked many of our public councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to leave hopes that there would be a sufficient sense of justice and virtue for the purpose of governHe admitted the evils arising from a frequency of elections, and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four or five years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would be adopted by the people.

ment.

Mr. Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others, but would add an observation or two which he believed had not yet been suggested. Every nation may be regarded in two relations-first, to its own citizens; secondly, to foreign nations. It is, therefore, not only liable to anarchy and tyranny within, but has wars to avoid, and treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably be the depository of the powers concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign nations. The true reason why Great Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty with us, has been because she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of our government. Nine years, with a rotation, will provide these desirable qualities, and give our government an advantage in this respect over monarchy itself. In a monarchy, much must always depend on the temper of the man. In such a body, the personal character will be lost in the political. He would add another observation. The popular objection against appointing any public body for a long term, was, that it might, by gradual encroachments, prolong itself first into a body for life, and finally

become an hereditary one. It would be a satisfactory answer to this objection, that, as onethird would go out triennially, there would be always three divisions holding places from unequal times, and consequently acting under the influence of different views and different impulses.

On the question for nine years, one-third to go out triennially,

Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia-aye, 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia-no, 8.

On the question for six years, one-third to go out biennially,—

Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina-aye, 7; New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia-no, 4. 5 Elliott's Debates, 242.

Modern reform has not made as great an innovation upon the judicial tenure, as it has upon the mode and manner of choosing judges. In many of the States the judges of the Supreme court still hold their offices "during good behavior." Such is the case in Maine, New Hampshire and Connecticut, but not beyond the age of seventy years; in Massachusetts, Virginia, Delaware, North and South Carolina, Kentucky,. Florida, and some other States, the judicial tenure still is "during good behavior." In Rhode Island it is practically the same, the judges holding their offices until removed by a resolution of both houses of the Legislature. In Pennsylvania, the Supreme judges hold their offices for fifteen years, and those of the Common Pleas for ten years; in Missouri and Tennessee, the Supreme judges have a tenure of twelve years; in Louisiana and Arkansas, eight years; in Indiana and Michigan, seven years; in New Jersey, Mississippi, Alabama, Iowa and Texas, six years; in Georgia, three years; and in Vermont, one year. In the six New England States, the executive and legislative branches are elected annually. In New York, Ohio, Texas, Michigan, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, North and South Carolina, and several other States, the executive term of office is two years; in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and some other States, three years; and in Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Kentucky, Missouri, and some others, four years. In some of the States, the senators are chosen to serve four years, in some three, and in some two, and in a number of the States the senators and representatives are chosen biennially. The landmarks of the primary Constitutions of the old thirteen States are thus still preserved; and our State governments, formed by the public men of the present day, are repub lican in their structure, and not democracies, without qualifications and restrictions, in which the people rule without regard to form, law or order.

By the first regular Constitution of New Hampshire, the Governor and Senate were to be chosen annually, but judges were to hold their offices "during good behavior." In Massachusetts just the same. In New York, the Governor's term was fixed at three years, that of senators at four, and the judicial tenure was by good behavior determinable at

the age of sixty. In New Jersey, the Governor and Senate were to be annually chosen, and the term of the judges was to be seven years. In Pennsylvania, the Governor's term was one year, senators were to hold for three years, judges for seven. In Delaware, the Governor's term was three years, that of senators three, and that of the judges during good behavior. In Maryland, the Governor held for one year only, senators for five, and judges (as also the attorney general) during good behavior. In Virginia, the Governor was chosen for three years, the Senate for one, and judges held for life or good behavior. In North Carolina, the terms of the Governor and senators were one year only, those of the judges during good behavior. In South Carolina, the Governor and both houses of the Legislature were appointed biennially, the judges. during good behavior. By the Georgia Constitution, the Governor and Senate were to hold for one year, but the tenure of the judicial office was not specified in that instrument. In brief, three governors held for three years each, one for two and the rest for one; there was one senatorial term of five years, one of four, two of three, one of two, and six of but one; and of the eleven regularly formed States, eight put their judges upon a tenure of good behavior, two gave them terms of seven years, and as to the remaining one, the Constitution is inexplicit. So that we may fairly say the sentiment of the country was divided between one and three years, as regarded the proper term for a chief magistrate, between one and five for the senatorial office; while in reference to judges it was nearly unanimous in favor of life-terms, with a tenure of good behavior.

When the term for members of the House of Representatives came to be considered, Messrs. Sherman and Ellsworth moved to fill the blank with the words every year. Mr. Rutledge proposed every two years. Mr. Jenifer proposed every three years, "observing that the two great frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them, and made the best unwilling to engage in so precarious a service." The following discussion then followed between Messrs. Madison and Gerry:

Mr. Madison'seconded the motion for three years. Instability is one of the great vices of our republics to be remedied. Three years will be necessary, in a government so extensive, for members to form any knowledge of the various interests of the States to. which they do not belong, and of which they can know but little from the situation and affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing for and travelling to and from the seat of national business.

Mr. Gerry. The people of New England will never give up the point of annual elections. They know of the transition made in England from triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an innovation here as a prelude to a like usurpa. tion. He considered annual elections as the only defence of the people against tyranny. He was as much against a triennial house as against an hereditary Executive.

Mr. Madison observed, that, if the opinions of the people were to be our guide, it

would be difficult to say what course we ought to take. No member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his constituents were at this time; much less could he say what they would think, if possessed of the information and light possessed by the members here; and still less, what would be their way of thinking six or twelve months hence. We ought to consider what was right, and what was necessary in itself for the attainment of a proper government. A plan adjusted to this idea will recommend itself. The respectability of this Convention will give weight to their recommendation of it. Experience will be constantly urging the adoption of it; and all the most enlightened and respectable citizens will be its advocates. Should we fall short of the necessary and proper point, this influential class of citizens will be turned against the plan, and little support, in opposition to them, can be gained to it from the unreflecting multitude.

Mr. Gerry repeated his opinion, that it was necessary to consider what the people would approve. This had been the policy of all legislators. If the reasoning (of Mr. Madison) was just, and we supposed a limited monarchy the best form in itself, we ought to recommend it, though the genius of the people was decidedly adverse to it, and, having no hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute of the essential materials for such an innovation.

On the question for the triennial election of the first branch,

New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia—aye, 7; Massachusetts, (Mr. King, aye: Mr. Gorham, wavering,) Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina-no, 4. 5 Elliott's Debates, 183.

The term thus agreed upon was however subsequently reduced to two years, at which time the discussion was resumed, and continued as follows:

Mr. Randolph moved to strike out "three years," and insert "two years." He was sensible that annual elections were a source of great mischief in the States, yet it was the want of such checks against the popular intemperance as were now proposed that rendered them so mischievous. He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the extent of the United States, and the inconvenience which would result from them to the representatives of the extreme parts of the empire. The people were attached to the frequency of elections. All the Constitutions of the States, except South Carolina, had established annual elections.

Mr. Dickinson. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the ancient usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours. He supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial, and in order to prevent the inconvenience of an ̧ entire change of the whole number at the same moment, suggested a rotation by ar .annual election of one-third.

an

Mr. Ellsworth was opposed to three years, supposing that even one year was preferable to two years. The people were fond of frequent elections, and might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature. He moved for " one year."

Mr. Strong seconded and supported the motion.

Mr. Wilson, being for making the first branch an effectual representation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it. This frequency was most familiar and pleasing to the people. It would not be more inconvenient to them than triennial elections, as the people in all the States have annual meetings, with which the election of the national representatives might be made to coincide. He did not conceive that it

would be necessary for the National Legislature to sit constantly; perhaps not half, perhaps not one-fourth, of the year.

Mr. Madison was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely inconvenient, and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so; he did not mean inconvenient to the electors, but to the representatives. They would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the Union, and would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of their expenses. Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would remain at the seat of government, confiding that their absence would not affect them. The members of Congress had done this with few instances of disappointment. But as the choice was here to be made by the people themselves, who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a rival candidate, it must be supposed that the members from the most distant States would travel backwards and forwards at least as often as the elections should be repeated. Much was to be said also, on the time requisite for new members, (who would always form a large proportion,) to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the States in general, without which their trust could not be usefully discharged.

Mr. Sherman preferred annual elections, but would be content with biennial. He thought the representatives ought to return home and mix with the people. By remaining at the seat of government they would acquire the habits of the place, which might differ from those of their constituents.

Col. Mason observed, that the States being differently situated, such a rule ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as possible on a level. If elections were annual, the Middle States would have a great advantage over the extreme ones. He wished them to. be biennial, and the rather as in that case they would coincide with the periodical elections of South Carolina, as well as of the other States.

Col. Hamilton urged the necessity of three years. There ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence on the popular sentiments. The checks in the other branches of the government would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The British House of Commons were eleeted septennially, yet the democratic spirit of the Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to them, and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This evil was complained of in all the States. In Virginia, it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance and voting of the people by severe regulations.

On the question for striking out "three years,"

Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia-aye, 7; New York, Delaware, Maryland-no, 3; New Jersey, divided. The motion for "two years" was then inserted, nem. con. 5 Elliott's Debates, 224.

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