ought to be kept in view, but thought too much stress was laid on the rank of the States as political societies. There was a gradation, he observed, from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to the largest empire, with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the limitations of the sovereignty of the States, as now confederated. Their laws, in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy, were analogous to that of by-laws to the supreme law within a State. Under the proposed government, the powers of the States will be much further reduced. According to the views of every member, the General Government will have powers far beyond those exercised by the British Parliament when the States were part of the British Empire. It will, in particular, have the power, without the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money directly from the people themselves, and, therefore, not to divest such unequal portions of the people as composed the several States of an equal voice, would subject the system to the reproaches and evils which have resulted from the vicious representation in Great Britain.

He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce a principle which was confessedly unjust, which could never be admitted, and which, if admitted, must infuse mortality into a Constitution which he wished to last forever. He prayed them to ponder well the consequences of suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been said that the want of energy in the large States would be a security to the small. It was forgotten that this want of energy proceeded from the supposed security of the States against all external danger. Let each State depend on itself for its security, and let apprehensions arise of danger from distant powers or from neighboring States, and the languishing condition of all the States, large as well as small, would soon be transformed into vigorous and high-toned governments. His great fear was, that their governments would then have too much energy; that this might not only be formidable in the large to the small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of all. The same causes which have rendered the old world the theatre of incessant wars, and have banished liberty from the face of it, would soon produce the same effects here. The weakness and jealousy of the small States would quickly introduce some regular military force, against sudden danger from their powerful neighbors. The example would be followed by others, and would soon become universal. In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the executive magistrate. Constant apprehension of war has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown executive, will not long be safe companions of liberty. The means of defence against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim, to excite a war whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved, the people. It is perhaps, questionable, whether the best concerted system of absolute power in Europe could maintain itself, in a situation where no alarms of external danger could tame the people to the domestic yoke. The insular situation of Great Britain was the principal cause of her being an exception to the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence which could not be used for the purpose of oppression. These consequences, he conceived, ought to be apprehended, whether the States should run into a total separation from each other, or should enter into partial confederacies. Either event would be truly deplorable, and those who might be accessary to either could never be forgiven by their country, nor by themselves.

Mr. Hamilton observed, that individuals forming political societies modify their rights differently, with regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all the States. In

all of them some individuals are deprived of the right altogether, not having the requisite qualification of property. In some of the States the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases and refused in others. To vote for a member in one branch, a certain quantum of property, to vote for a member in another branch of the Legislature, a higher quantum of property is required. In like manner, States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the large States exercising a larger, the smaller a smaller share of it. But as States are a collection of individual men, which ought we to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulted from the composition? Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been said that, if the smaller States renounce their equality, they renounce, at the same time, their liberty. The truth is, it is a contest for power, not for liberty. Will the men composing the small States be less free than those composing the larger? The State of Delaware, having forty thousand souls, will lose power, if she has one-tenth only of the votes allowed to Pennsylvania, having four hundred thousand; but will the people of Delaware be less free, if each citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pennsylvania? He admitted that common residence within the same State would produce a certain degree of attachment, and that this principle might have a certain influence on public affairs. He thought, however, that this might, by some precautions, be in a great measure excluded, and that no material inconvenience could result from it, as there could not be any ground for combination among the States whose influence was most dreaded. The only considerable distinction of interests lay between the carrying and non-carrying States, which divides, instead of uniting, the larger States. No considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of the State of New York into different districts of different sizes.

nature.

Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed out. He would add another of a most serious Alliances will immediately be formed with different rival and hostile nations of Europe, who will foment disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties to all their own quarrels. Foreign nations having American dominion, are, and must be, jealous of us. Their representatives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate; and for the result of this meeting, which must have an essential influence on it. It had been said, that respectability in the eyes of foreign nations was not the object at which we aimed; that the proper object of republican government was domestic tranquillity and happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No government could give us tranquillity and happiness at home, which did not possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical moment for forming such a government. We should run every risk in trusting to future amendments. As yet we retain the habits of Union. We are weak, and sensible of our weakness. Henceforward, the motives will become feebler, and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we are now here, exercising our tranquil and free deliberations on the subject. It would be madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct a reproduction of them.

Mr. Pierce considered the equality of votes under the Confederation as the great source of the public difficulties. The members of Congress were advocates for local advantages. State distinctions must be sacrificed as far as the general good required, but without destroying the States. Though from a small State, he felt himself a citizen of the United States.

Mr. Gerry urged, that we never were independent States, were not such now, and never could be, even on the principle of the Confederation. The States, and the advocates for them, were intoxicated with the idea of their sovereignty. He was a member

of Congress at the time the Federal Articles were formed. The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote was long insisted on. He voted for it, but it was against his judgment, and under the pressure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser States. The present Confederation he considered as dissolving. The fate of the Union will be decided by the Convention. If they do not agree on something, few delegates will probably be appointed to Congress. If they do, Congress will probably be kept up till the new system should be adopted. He lamented that, instead of coming here like a band of brothers, belonging to the same family, we seemed to have brought with us the spirit of political negotiators.

Mr. L. Martin remarked, that the language of the States being sovereign and independent, was once familiar and understood; though it seemed now so strange and obscure. He read those passages in the Articles of Confederation which describe them in that language.

On the question, as moved by Mr. Lansing, Shall the word "not" be struck out?Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware—aye, 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia-no, 6; Maryland, divided.

On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, "that the rule of suffrage in the first branch ought not to be according to that established by the Articles of the Confederation :"

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia— aye, 6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware-no, 4; Maryland, divided. 5 Elliott's Deb., 257.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

BASIS OF REPRESENTATION-CONTINUED.

MR. ELLSWORTH moved, "that the rule of suffrage in the second branch be the same as that established by the Articles of Confederation." He said :

He was sorry, on the whole, he said, that the vote just passed had determined against this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a ground of compromise with regard to the second branch. We were partly national, partly federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was conformable to the national principle, and would secure the large States against the small. An equality of voices was conformable to the federal principle, and was necessary to secure the small States against the large. He trusted that on this middle ground a compromise would take place. He did not see that it could on any other, and if no compromise should take place, our meeting would not only be in vain, but worse than vain. He would mention another considera

tion of great weight. The existing Confederation was founded on the equality of the States in the article of suffrage, was it meant to pay no regard to this antecedent plighted faith? Let a strong executive, a judiciary, and legislative power, be created, but let not too much be attempted, by which all may be lost. He was not in general a half-way man, yet he preferred doing half the good we could, rather than do nothing at all. The other half may be added when the necessity shall be more fully experienced.

Mr. Baldwin should vote against the motion of Mr. Ellsworth, though he did not like the resolution as it stood in the report of the Committee of the Whole. He thought the second branch ought to be the representative of property, and that, in forming it, therefore, some reference ought to be had to the relative wealth of their constituents, and to the principles on which the Senate of Massachusetts was constituted.

Mr. Wilson did not expect such a motion after the establishment of the contrary principle in the first branch, and considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the first branch. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Ellsworth) had pronounced that, if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States north of Pennsylvania, one only would agree to any general government. He entertained more favorable hopes of Connecticut and of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a country to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday against the just principle of representation were as twenty-two to ninety of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure, if there was any room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority,—the question will be, Shall less than one-fourth of the United States withdraw themselves from the Union, or shall more than three-fourths renounce the inherent, indisputable, and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial system of States? If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would choose to join it.

Mr. Ellsworth. The capital objection of Mr. Wilson, " that the minority will rule the majority," is not true. The power is given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the many? Is it not the case in the British Constitution, the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation, a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights against the encroachments of the Commons! No instance of a confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to another razing the foundation of the building, when we need only repair the roof.

We are

Mr. Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning of Mr. Ellsworth, but must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another occasion, the large States were described by him as the aristocratic States ready to oppress the small. Now, the small are the House of Lords, requiring a negative to defend them against the more numerous Commons. Mr. Ellsworth had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated States had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German system, in which the King of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr. Ellsworth of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component members had votes proportional to their importance, and which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of government.

But he contended that the States were divided into different interests, not by their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having, or not having, slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the United

States. It did not lie between the large and small States. It lay between the Northern and Southern; and if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth, that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was, that, instead of proportioning the votes of the States, in both branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants, computing the slaves in the ratio of five to three, they should be represented in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants only; and in the other. according to the whole number, counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement the southern scale would have the advantage in one House, and the northern in the other. He had been restrained from proposing this expedient by two considerations; one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself; the other was the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two branches, and which would destroy the equilibrium of interests.

Mr. Davy was much embarrassed. *

He thought that, in general, there were

extremes on both sides. We were partly federal, partly national, in our union; and he did not see why the government might not, in some respects, operate on the States, in others on the people.

Mr. Wilson admitted the question concerning the number of senators to be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked forward to the time when the smallest States will contain a hundred thousand souls at least. Let there be then one senator in each, for every hundred thousand souls, and let the States not having that number of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the small States; and threw out the idea as a ground of compromise.

Dr. Franklin. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger. When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner, here, both sides must part with some of their demands, in order that they may join in some accommodating proposition. He had prepared one, which he would read, that it might lay on the table for consideration. The proposition was in the words following:

"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose and send an equal number of delegates, namely, -, who are to compose the second branch of the General Legislature.

"That in all cases or questions wherein the sovereignty of individual States may be effected, or whereby their authority over their own citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General Government within the several States augmented, each State shall have equal suffrage.

"That in the appointment of all civil officers of the General Government, in the election of whom the second branch may by the Constitution have part, each State shall have equal suffrage.

"That in fixing the salaries of such officers, and in all allowances for public services, and generally in all appropriations and dispositions of money to be drawn out of the general treasury, and in all laws for supplying that treasury, the delegates of the several States shall have suffrage in proportion to the sums which their respective States do actually contribute to the treasury"

Mr. King observed, that the simple question was, whether each State should have an