was to procure as much aid as possible for its selfish undertaking, and to make the smallest possible concessions to the spirit of religious innovation. From this compromise the Church of England sprung in many respects, indeed, it has been well for her, that in an age of exuberant zeal, her principal founders were mere politicians. To this circumstance she owes her moderate articles, her decent ceremonies, her noble and pathetic liturgy. Her worship is not disfigured by mummery. Yet she has preserved, in a far greater degree than any of her Protestant sisters, that art of striking the the senses, and filling the imagination, in which the Catholic Church so eminently excels. But, on the other hand, she continued to be, for more than a hundred and fifty years, the servile handmaid of monarchy, the steady enemy of public liberty. The divine right of kings, and the duty of passively obeying all their commands, were her favourite tenets. She held them firmly through times of oppression, persecution, and licentiousness; while law was trampled down; while judgment was perverted; while the people were eaten as though they were bread. Once, and but once,—for a moment, and but for a momei,-when her own dignity and property were touched, she forgot to practise the submission which she had taught.

Elizabeth clearly discerned the advantages which were to be derived from a close connexion between the monarchy and the priesthood. At the time of her accession, indeed she evidently meditated a partial reconciliation with Rome. And throughout her whole life, she leaned strongly to some of the most obnoxious parts of the Catholic system. But her imperious temper, her keen sagacity, and her peculiar situation, soon led her to attach herself completely to a church which was all her own. On the same principle on which she joined it, she attempted to drive all her people within its pale by persecution. She supported it by severe penal laws, not because she thought conformity to its discipline necessary to salvation; but because it was the fastness which arbitrary power was making strong for itself; because she expected a more profound obedience from those who saw in her both their civil and their ecclesiastical head, than from those who, like the Papists, ascribed spiritual authority to the Pope, or from those who, like some of the Puritans, ascribed it only to Heaven. To dissent from her establishment was to dissent from an institution founded with an express view to the maintenance and extension of the royal prerogative.

This great Queen and her successors, by considering conformity and loyalty as identical, at length made them so. With respect to the Catholics, indeed, the rigour of persecution abated after her death. James soon found that they were unable to injure him; and that the animosity which the Puritan party felt towards them, drove them of necessity to take refuge under his throne. During the subsequent conflict, their fault was any thing but disloyalty. On the other hand. James hated the Puritans, with far more than the hatred of Elisabeth. Her aversion to them was political,-his was personal. The sect had plagued him in Scotland, where he was weak; and he was determined to be even with them in England, where he was powerful. Persecution gradually changed a sect into a faction. That there was any thing in the religious opinions of the Puritans, which rendered them hostile to monarchy, has never been proved to our satisfaction. After our civil contest, it became the fashion to say that Presbyterianism was connected with Republicanism; just as it has been the fashion to say, since the time of the French RevoJution, that Infidelity is connected with Republicanism. It is perfectly

true, that a church constituted on the Calvinistic model, will not strengthen the hands of the sovereign so much as hierarchy, which consists of several ranks, differing in dignity and emolument, and of which all the members are constantly looking to the government for promotion. But experience has clearly shown that a Calvinistic Church, like every other church, is disaffected when it is persecuted, quiet when it is tolerated, and actively loyal when it is favoured and cherished. Scotland has had a Presbyterian establishment during a century and a half; yet her General Assembly has not, during that period, given half so much trouble to the Government as the Convocation of the Church of England gave to it during the thirty years which followed the Revolution. That James and Charles should have been mistaken in this point is not surprising. But we are astonished, we must confess, when writers of our own time, men who have before them the proof of what toleration can effect,-men who may see with their own eyes that the Presbyterians are no such monsters, when government is wise enough to let them alone, should defend the old persecutions, on the ground that they were indispensable to the safety of the church and the throne.

How persecution protects churches and thrones was soon made manifest. A systematic political opposition, vehement, daring, and inflexible, sprang from a schism about trifles, altogether unconnected with the real interests of religion or of the state. Before the close of the reign of Elizabeth it began to show itself. It broke forth on the question of the monopolies. Even the imperial Lioness was compelled to abandon her prey, and slowly and fiercely to recede before the assailants. The spirit of liberty grew with the growing wealth and intelligence of the people. The feeble struggles and insults of James irritated instead of suppressing it. And the events which immediately followed the accession of his son portended a contest, of no common severity, between a King resolved to be absolute, and people resolved to be free.*

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92.

It was my intention to select more copiously from the historical department of the Edinburgh Review. The length of the articles precludes the possibility of doing so; and it would be impracticable to condense them without breaking the connexion necessary to preserve undiminished the interest of the narrative. In consequence of this, I have been reluctantly compelled to exclude many useful Essays. I beg to direct the reader's attention to the following:-History of the Deposition of the King of Sweden. Vol. xxi. page 152.-Abstract of the Life of James the 2nd, containing a mass of very curious information concerning that Monarch, not to be found in any other Biography of him. It was compiled from the Stuart MSS. in Carlton House. Vol. xxvi. page 402. Exposure of Hume's Prejudices and Inconsistencies as an Historian. Vol. xl. page This elaborate Dissertation is a Review of Brodie's Life of Charles the 1st, and has been ascribed, I believe on unquestionable authority, to Sir James Mackintosh.-History of the Cortes of Spain, Vol. xxiii. page 347.-A Discussion of the long-contested Question, Who wrote Icon Basilike. Vol. xliv. page 1.—Historical Account of the Political Affairs of Portugal down to the Period of Canning's Administration. Vol. xlv. page 199-Constitutional History has afforded materials for a series of excellent papers contributed by writers eminently qualified for investigations of that See the Reviews of Olfield's Representative History of Great Britain, Vol. xxvi. page 338; A History of the English Legislature, Vol. xxxv. page 1; and of the Ancient English Commons. Vol, xxxvi, page 287,

kind

PART EIGHT.

FOREIGN POLITICS.

EXPEDITION AGAINST COPENHAGEN. *

THE privilege which we enjoy in this country, of discussing every publie occurrence with all the freedom and the keenness which belong to our political or physical constitution, though productive of incalculable benefit on the whole, has been the source of some evils. The most considerable, perhaps, of these, is the habit to which it has formed us of limiting our attention to the subject of the day, and dismissing entirely from our reflection every topic upon which our contending parties have once fairly delivered their opinions. Among a nation of newsmongers and politicians, this can scarcely be otherwise. Novelty is the great demand of the superficial; and, where every day supplies something new and disputable, the most important measures must take their turn with the most insignificant; and discussions which are to influence the fate of future generations must give place to the paltry recriminations of individuals whose names are notorious.

There are topics, however, which it seems to be a duty to try, at least, to rescue from this periodical oblivion, and to which the public attention ought, if possible, to be directed, after they have ceased to be the watchwords of faction, or the vehicles of personal abuse. There are objects now and then to be seen above the political horizon, which, though confounded, by the dazzled and short-sighted eyes of party or of idle curiosity, with the transient meteors of the atmosphere, are yet destined to hold their course in the eyes of many generations, and to exert a visible influence on every part of the system in which they appear. There are events of great example, and of terrible warning. There are measures which leave a taint or a healing virtue behind them, long after the period of their individual consummation; and principles which, though first disclosed in events that seem but common subjects of wrangling or censure, yet entail a blessing or a curse on the nations by which they are adopted. The partition of Poland excited less sensation in England than a Westminster election, or the capture of a solitary frigate; and yet, by that blow, the keystone was struck out of the arch of European independence. The expedition to Copenhagen is less thought of at this moment than the City Address, or the merits of Sir Arthur Wellesley; and yet that one measure has probably ensured the subjugation of the North, and confirmed the alienation of the whole Continent from this country. We do not know whether any thing that we can say can recall the attention of the public to a topic which, in the language of the quidnuncs, is now so completely gone by; but the time *An Examination of the Causes which led to the late Expedition against Copenhagen. By an Observer.--Vol. xiii. page 488. January, 1809.

which we have chosen for its discussion will be received, we hope, as a proof that we engage in it for better purposes than those of faction; and that we wish to address ourselves to the reason, and not to the passions or prejudices, of our readers.

It is of the utmost importance, in the outset, to consider the conjuncture at which this extraordinary proceeding was adopted. In the year 1807 we beheld the continent of Europe apparently prostrate before the armies of France. The discipline of Austria and Prussia had disappeared before their numbers, their enthusiasm, and the predominant genius of their leader. The sovereigns of those countries had seen their capitals filled with hostile armies, and their flying courts hovering on the frontiers of their former dominions. The house of Hapsburgh had ceased to give emperors to Germany; and the downfall of a constitution, transmitted from the feudal ages, beheld without astonishment, and possibly without regret. The King of Prussia saw the ancient possession and recent acquisitions of the house of Brandenburgh alike a prey to the overwhelming power of the conqueror; and, from the remote city of Koningsberg, contemplated the mighty ruin with which the wretched politics of his own cabinet had overspread the regions of the North. On the banks of the Vistula the Russians still disputed the further progress of the enemy; but neither the protracted severity of a northern winter, the difficulty of procuring supplies and reinforcements at so great a distance from France, nor the reluctant and indignant submission of the intermediate countries, could encourage them to hazard a decisive action. The return of summer had permitted Bonaparte to resume offensive operations, facilitated the communication of his different armies, and led to the battle of Friedland, which appears to have convinced the Emperor of Russia of the necessity of peace. The treaty of Tilsit, concluded on the 8th of July, rather proclaimed than confirmed the power of Bonaparte, and the weakness of his adversaries.

At that period, the humiliation of the continental sovereigns was very generally mistaken in England for the forcible and complete subjugation of their territories. An interval of fifteen years of war and revolution had almost caused it to be forgotten that the fate of a brave and unanimous people cannot be permanently decided by a few pitched battles. The fortune of every country depends on the numbers and character of its inhabitants; and the immense population of Germany, with their atheletic forms, hardy habits, and native courage, would not have struggled in vain, in a contest which had really called their powers into action. But the German nations had witnessed the weak and versatile policy, and experienced the oppression, of their own governments. In their military leaders they saw no talents adequate to defence; and, in the absence of all motives fitted to inspire enthusiasm, the advantage of submission or resistance became a matter of calculation, and the celerity of the enemy's marches afforded little time for deliberation. On England, indeed, the eyes of all were fixed. In her they beheld a power which had uniformly resisted, with vigour, and with com-parative success, the encroachments of the continental despot. She had always supplied the enemies of France profusely with the pecuniary means of warfare; her insular situation, her invincible fleets, and the loyal unanimity of her inhabitants, held out a permanent encouragement to every nation disposed to assert their independence, and reared up a bulwark against universal dominion. Her enemics, indeed, had found occasion to dissemi

nate more than suspicions as to the purity of the motives which prompted this conduct. But though she had stooped after sugar islands and plantations of pepper, she had been faithful to her engagements with her allies; and had adopted no measure obviously the result of a selfish policy. In struggling to support the political system of civilised Europe, she had respected the laws by which it was regulated. She was evidently regaining character even with her commercial rivals; and the tone of high honour and inflexible justice, which sounded in her public declarations, and in the speeches of her parliamentary orators, had unquestionably established a very general sentiment of admiration and confidence. In the actual posture of affairs, indeed, these sentiments were mere latent sparks, which subsequent events might kindle or extinguish. Her influence and reputation were placed in her own keeping; and if the sketch we have ventured to delineate of the state of Europe be at all correct, it will be easy to see of what importance it was to the whole civilised world, that England should have persevered in a line of conduct calculated to conciliate confidence, and to command respect. In her transactions with the court of St. Petersburgh she had recently displayed considerable magnanimity. Her unqualified rejection of all terms of peace (during an administration confessedly pacific,) in which her ally should not be included, must have left on the mind of the Russian monarch a very favourable impression of the councils then prevalent in his Majesty's cabinet. Sweden, with more zeal than prudence, had ventured to become a principal in the war. The fall of Prussia had paved the way for an attack on Swedish Pomerania; and, unless England furnished speedly a numerous and well appointed army of auxiliaries, all that was left to hope for was an unmolested retreat across the waves of the Baltic. We shall never appreciate rightly, the character of the expedition against Copenhagen, unless we recollect that it was contemporary with the siege and evacuation of Stralsund and Rugen; and that the forces employed in the spoliation of a neutral state might have averted that of an ally, actually perpetrating at the same time, and at no great distance.

In the midst of so much error and so much diaster, Denmark had remained unmolested,-protected by the firm but temperate politics of her court; by the attachment of her inhabitants to the family of the sovereign, and to their own national independence, by the rigid observance of a strict neutrality; and by the moral turpitude attached to a profligate aggression. But mere innocence has always been a feeble barrier against unprincipled power; and the precautions of this state betrayed, without mitigating, her alarm for that portion of her territory exposed to invasion. From the general policy of the ruler of France, every thing was to be apprehended. The open country of Holstein opposed no barrier: its fertility and riches invited and facilitated the entrance of that army which had long hovered on its frontiers; and as it was uncertain how long it might continue to respect them, the Crown Prince, draining the rest of his dominions of their forces, had for three years kept the flower of the Danish youth assembled on the borders of Holstein, to defend the only quarter in which aggression was then conceived to be possible. Still it was apprehended, that, in the extensive plains of Holstein, numbers would assert their usual superiority: Jutland, however, protected by its poverty and its mountains, was deemed capable of a successful defence; and, whilst the fleet of Denmark was decidedly superior to any which France could bring out against her, the security of