been discussing are provided for, though somewhat more in detail, in the second, third, fourth, and fifth articles of the before mentioned Treaty with the Federation of the Centre of America. They may serve as models for those which you are now authorized to propose; and you will consider yourselves empowered to agree to articles similar with all the others of that treaty, a copy of which accompanies this letter.

It is possible that you may not find the Ministers of the other American States prepared to agree to the second principle; that they, may be unwilling to subscribe to it in the extent now proposed; they may not be ready to allow, at the same rate of duties, a reciprocal liberty of exportation and importation, without restriction as to the place of origin of the cargo, the ownership, or destination of the vessel. You will not abandon the effort to establish that principle, in its widest scope, until you have exhausted every means of argument and persuasion, and become perfectly satisfied that its adoption is wholly impracticable. If you find their opposition to it unyielding, you will then propose a modification of the principle, so as to make it, at least, comprehend the productions and manufactures of all the American nations, including the West India Islands. When so limited, it will still have great practical benefit; all vessels of the several American Powers will enjoy under it a reciprocal liberty of exportation and importation of what ever of American productions and manufactures, comprehending the produce of the sea, is allowed, by the separate laws of each, at the same standard of duties for the vessel and her cargo. If the reasoning be correct, in support of the principle in

its greatest latitude, it will, of course sustain it in this more restricted operation. To which may be added, as a strong consideration in favour of its embracing, at least the American States, that there is great similarity in the produce of various parts of them, and, consequently, a great difficulty in tracing articles, having a common character, and striking resemblance, to the countries of their respective origin, and subjecting them to different rates of duty, as they happen to be imported in different vessels, or blended together in the same vessel.

If you find the principle still ob. jected to with that modification, you will lastly propose it with the still greater restriction of only furnishing the rule which shall be observed between any two of the American nations who may agree to it, in regard to their mutual navigation, when employed in transporting their respective produce and manufactures. Under this form, it is proposed by the United States, on the 3d March, 1815, [see 4th vol. of the Laws, page 824] to all nations. On the 3d of July, of the same year, it was engrafted on the Convention with Great Britain, [see 6th vol. of the Laws, page 608.] Subsequently, it was applied to the Netherlands, the Imperial Hansea. tic Cities of Hamburg, Lubec, and Bremen, the Dukedom of Olden. burg, Norway, Sardinia, and Russia, [see acts 1st Session, 18th Congress page 4.] It was also embraced in our Treaty with Sweden, of 1816, [see 6th vol. of the Laws, page 642,] and has recently been agreed to by Colombia. In the event of a concurrence in the principle, in this more limited import, the first, second, and third articles of the beforementioned Convention with Great Britain, will furnish models which

may

be followed in the draft of those to which you are authorized to agree. These three articles embrace other subjects beside that principle, but they are such as to have either a direct connexion with it, or are necessary to give full and complete effect to it. In describing the territories of the new American States with which we are to maintain hereafter a commercial intercourse, you will see the propriety of employing, in any treaty which you may conclude, such terms as may embrace whatever territories, insu. lar or continental, may appertain to each, upon the termination of the present war. During its future progress, possession may be won or lost, which, as the case may be, should be comprehended or excluded by those terms.

In December, 1823, the then President of the United States, in his annual Message, upon the opening of Congress, announced, as the principle applicable to this Continent, what ought hereafter to be insisted upon, that no European nation ought to be allowed to plant upon it new colonies. It was not proposed, by that principle, to disturb pre-existing European Colonies already established in America; the principle looked forward, not backward. Several of the new American States have giveh intimation of their concurrence in the principle; and it is believed that it must command the assent of the impartial world.

Whilst America was, comparatively, a boundless waste, and an almost unpeopled desert, claimed, and probably first settled with civilized men, by the European Powers who discovered it, if they could agree among themselves as to the limits of their respective territories,

there was no American State to oppose, or whose rights could be affected by, the establishment of new colonies. But now the case is entirely altered; from the northeastern limits of the United States, in North America, to Cape Horn, in South America, on the Atlantic Ocean, with one or two inconsiderable exceptions; and from the same cape to the fifty-first degree of north latitude, in North America, on the Pacific Ocean, without any exception, the whole coasts and countries belong to sovereign resi dent American Powers. There is, therefore, no chasm within the described limits in which a new Eu. ropean colony could be now introduced, without violating the territorial rights of some American State. An attempt to establish such a colony, and by its establishment to acquire sovereign rights for any European power, must be regarded as an inadmissible encroachment. If any portion of the people of Europe, driven by oppression from their native country, or actuated by the desire of improving the condition of themselves or their posterity, wish to migrate to America, it will no doubt be the policy of all the new States, as it ever has been ours, to afford them an asylum, and, by naturalization, to extend to such of them as are worthy, the same political privileges which are enjoyed by the native citizen. But this faculty of emigration cannot be allowed to draw after it the right of the European State, of which such emigrants shall have been natives, to acquire sovereign powers in America. The rule is good by which one, in judging of another's conduct, or pretensions, is advised to reverse positions. What would Europe think of an American at、

tempt to plant there an American colony? If its power would be provoked, and its pride exerted, to repress and punish such a presump tuous act, it is high time that it should be recollected and felt, that Americans, themselves descended from Europeans, have also their sensibilities and their rights.

To prevent any such new European colonies, and to warn Europe beforehand that they are not here. after to be admitted, the President wishes you to propose a joint de. claration of the several American States, each, however, acting for, and binding only itself, that, within the limits of their respective territories, no new European colony will hereafter be allowed to be established. It is not intended to commit the parties who may concur in that declaration, to the support of the particular boundaries which may be claimed by any one of them; nor is it proposed to commit them to a joint resistance against any future attempt to plant a new European colony. It is believed that the moral effect alone of a joint declaration, emanating from the authority of all the American nations, will effectually serve to prevent the effort to establish any such new co. lony; but if it should not, and the attempt should actually be made, it will then be time enough for the American powers to consider the propriety of negotiating between themselves, and, if necessary, of adopting in concert the measures which may be necessary to check and prevent it. The respect which is due to themselves, as well as to Europe, requires that they should rest in confidence that a declaration, thus solemnly put forth, will command universal deference. It will not be necessary to give to the de

claration now proposed the form of a Treaty. It may be signed by the several Ministers of the Congress, and promulgated to the world as evidence of the sense of all the American powers.

Among the subjects which must engage the consideration of the Congress, scarcely any has an interest so powerful and commanding as that which belongs to Cuba and Porto Rico, the former especially. Cuba, from its position, the present amount and the character of its population, that which it is capable of sustaining, its vast, though almost latent resources, is at present the great object of attraction both to Europe and America. No power, not even Spain itself, has, in such a variety of forms, so deep an interest in its future fortunes, whatever they may happen to be, as the United States. Our policy in regard to it is fully and frankly dis. closed in the before-mentioned note to Mr. Middleton. It is there stated, that, for ourselves, we desire no change in the possession or political condition of that island; and that we could not, with indifference, see it transferred from Spain to any other European power. We are unwilling to see its transfer or annexation to either of the new American States. If the present war should much longer continue, there are three conditions, into some one of which that island may fall during its further progress, and all of them deserve the most particular and se. rious consideration. The first is, its independence, resting at the close of the war upon its own unassisted resources to maintain that independence. 2dly. Its independence, with the guaranty of other powers, either of Europe or of America, or both. And, 3dly. Its

conquest and attachment to the dominions of the Republic of Colombia or Mexico. We will now examine each of those predicaments of the island, in the order in which they have been stated.

1. If Cuba had the ability, within itself, of maintaining an independent self-government against all as. saults from without or within, we should prefer to see it in that state; because we desire the happiness of others as well as ourselves, and we believe that it is, in general, most likely to be secured by a local government springing directly from, and identified in feeling, interest, and sympathy, with the people to be governed. But a mere glance at the limited extent, moral condition, and discordant character of its population, must convince all of its incompetency, at present, to sustain self-government, unaided by other powers. And if at this premature period an attempt at in. dependence should be so far attended with success as to break the connexion with Spain, one portion of the inhabitants of the island, as well as their neighbours in the United States, and in some other directions, would live in continual dread of those tragic scenes which were formerly exhibited in a neigh. bouring island, the population of which would be tempted, by the very fact of that independence, to employ all the means which vicinity, similarity of origin, and sympathy, could supply, to foment and stimulate insurrection, in order to gain ultimate strength to their own

cause.

2. A guarantied independence of Cuba, although it might relieve the island from the dangers which have been just noticed, would substitute others not less formidable,

and which, it is believed, are almost insuperable. Who shall be the guaranteeing powers? Shall they be exclusively American, or mixed, partly American and partly European? What shall be the amount of their respective contributions to the protecting force, military and naval, and to the other means necessary to uphold the local govern. ment? Who shall have the command of that force? Will not the guaranteeing powers, not in command, entertain continual apprehensions and jealousies of the commanding power? The candid must own that these are perplexing questions; and that, upon the whole, although all thought of that modification of independence should not, perhaps, be dismissed as absolutely inadmissible, under any possible circumstances, it must be agreed to be one, to which, if assent is ultimately yielded, it must be reluct antly, from a train of unforeseen and uncontrollable events.

3. With respect to the conquest and annexation of the island to Colombia or Mexico, it should be remarked that, if that be attempted, the whole character of the present war will be entirely changed. Hitherto, on the part of the republics, the contest has been for independence and self-government, and they have had, on their side, the good wishes and the friendly sympathies of a large portion of the world, and those especially of the people of the United States. But in the event of a military enterprise directed against Cuba, it will become a war of conquest. In such a war, whatever may be the result of that enterprise, the interests of other powers, now neutral, may be seriously affected, and they may be called upon to perform important

duties, which they may not be at liberty to neglect. The issue of such a war may have great influence upon the balance and stability of power in the West Indies. Nations of Europe may feel themselves required to interpose forcibly, to arrest a course of events to which they cannot be indifferent. If they should limit their interposition merely to the object of preventing any change in the existing state of things, in respect to the islands, the United States, far from being under any pledge, at present, to oppose them, might find themselves, contrary to their inclination, reluctantly drawn by a current of events to their side. In considering such an enterprise as has been supposed, if it be undertaken, there ought to be an anxious and deliberate examination, first, into the means of Colombia and Mexico to accomplish the object; and, secondly, their power to preserve and defend the acquisition, if made. We have not the data necessary to form a certain judgment on the first point. We ought to possess, to enable us to form such a judgment, a knowledge, first, of the force, mi. litary and naval, which the repub. lics can apply to the operation; secondly, that which Spain can exert in resistance; and, thirdly, what portion of the inhabitants of the island would take part on the one and on the other side of the belligerents. Although we have not this information in ample detail, we know that Spain is in ac. tual possession, with a very considerable military force; that this force, recently much strengthened, occupies the Moro Castle, deemed almost impregnable,and otherstrong holds in the island; that driven, as she has been, from the continent of

America, all her means and all her efforts will now be concentrated on this most valuable of her re maining American possessions ; that to this end she will apply her attention, which has been hitherto too much distracted by the multitude of her belligerent exertions in North and South America, exclusively to this most important point; that to its succour she will gather up from her vast wreck, the residue of her once powerful army in Europe and America; and that there is reason to believe, that if she should not be openly assisted by any of the European powers, she may receive from them covert but irresponsible aid.

With all these resources and favourable circumstances com. bined, it must be admitted that the conquest of Cuba is very difficult, if not impracticable, without extensive and powerful means, both naval and military. But, secondly, do either Colombia or Mexico possess such means? We doubt it. They have both to create a marine. A single ship of the line, two fri gates, and three or four vessels of a smaller grade, badly manned, compose the whole naval force of the United Mexican States. That of Colombia is not much greater, nor better manned. But the means of transporting and defending, du ring its voyage, the military force necesary to achieve the conquest, are absolutely indispensable. Nay, more; it would be in the last degree rash and imprudent to throw an army into Cuba, unless the two republics possessed and could retain a naval superiority, at least in the Gulf of Mexico, to provide for those contingencies which ought always to be anticipated in the vicissitudes of war. And, in the third place,