which is more than precarious and which is well known to the Allied Powers.

The German Austrian Delegation therefore appeals to the courtesy of the President of the Peace Congress to request the opening of negotiations with German Austria as soon as possible.

It seems, in fact, consistent with the intentions of this High Assembly not to adjourn before reaching a decision on which depends the fate and the future of a nation now suffering in uncertainty and anguish.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high consideration.

211 30

Appendix V to CF-32

RENNER

RESPONSIBILITIES AN

Translation of Note From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau [to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]

VERSAILLES, May 24, 1919.

SIR: The contents of your Excellency's note of 20th inst.', concerning the question of Germany's responsibility for the consequences of the war, have shown the German Peace Delegation that the Allied and Associated Governments have completely misunderstood the sense in which the German Government and the German nation tacitly gave their assent to the note of Secretary of State Lansing of November 5th 1918.8 In order to clear up this misunderstanding the German Delegation find themselves compelled to remind the Allied and Associated Governments of the events which preceded that note.

The President of the United States of America had several times solemnly declared that the world-war should be terminated not by a Peace of Might, but by a Peace of Right, and that America had entered the war solely for this Peace of Right. For this war-aim the formula was established:

"No annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages". On the other hand, however, the President demanded the unconditional restitution of the violated Right. The positive side of this demand found expression in the fourteen points which were laid down by President Wilson in his message of January 8th 1918. This message con

་ Appendix II (B) to CF-20, vol. v, p. 742.

Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 468. et

8

Message to Congress, January 8, 1918, ibid., p. 12.

tains two principal claims against the German nation: firstly, the surrender of important parts of German territory in the West and in the East on the basis of national self-determination; secondly, the promise to restore the occupied territories of Belgium and the North of France. Both demands could be acceded to by German. Government and the German Nation, as the principle of self-determination was concordant with the new democratic constitution of Germany, and as the territories to be restored had by Germany's aggression, undergone the terrors of war through an act contrary to the Law of Nations, namely by the violation of Belgium's neutrality.

The right of self-determination of the Polish nation had, as a matter of fact, already been acknowledged by the former German Government, just the same as the wrong done to Belgium.

When, therefore, in the note the Entente transmitted by Secretary of State Lansing on November 5th 1918 to the German Government, a more detailed interpretation was given of what was meant by restoration of the occupied territories, it appeared from the German point of view to be a matter of course that the duty to make compensation, established in this interpretation, could not relate to territories other than those the devastation of which had to be admitted

as contrary to Right, and the restoration of which had been proclaimed as a war-aim by the leading enemy statesmen. Thus President Wilson, in his message of January 8th 1918. expressly termed the reparation of the wrong done to Belgium as the healing act without which the whole structure and validity of international law would be for ever impaired. In a like manner the English Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech held in the House of Commons on October 22nd 1917 proclaimed: 10

"The first requirement always put forward by the British Government and their Allies has been the complete restoration, political. territorial and economic, of the independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be obtained for the devastation of its towns and provinces. This is no demand for war indemnity, such as that imposed on France by Germany in 1871. It is not an attempt to shift the cost of warlike operations from one belligerent to another."

What is here said of Belgium, Germany had to acknowledge also with regard to the North of France, as the German armies had only reached the French territories by the violation of Belgium's neutrality.

It was for this aggression that the German Government admitted Germany to be responsible: it did not admit Germany's alleged

The passage quoted is actually from the address of Lloyd George before the Trade Union Conference at London, January 5, 1918. For text, see ibid., p. 4.

responsibility for the origin of the war or for the merely incidental fact that the formal declaration of war had emanated from Germany. The importance of State Secretary Lansing's note for Germany lay rather in the fact of the duty to make reparation not being limited to the restoration of material value, but being extended to every kind of damage suffered by the civilian population in the occupied territory, in person or in property, during the continuance of warfare, be it by land, by sea or from the air.

The German nation was certainly conscious of the one-sidedness in their being charged with the restoration of Belgium and Northern France, but being denied compensation for the territories in the East of Germany which had been invaded and devastated by the forces of Russian Tsarism, acting on a long premeditated plan. They have, however, acknowledged that the Russian aggression must, according to the formal provisions of the Law of Nations, be placed in a different category from the invasion of Belgium, and have therefore desisted from demanding compensation on their part.

If the Allied and Associated Governments should now maintain the view that compensation is due for every act contrary to the Law of Nations which has been committed during the war, the German Delegation does not dispute the correctness in principle of this standpoint; they beg, however, to point out that in such case, Germany also has a considerable damage-account to set up and that the duty to compensate incumbent on her adversaries-particularly in respect of the German civilian population, which has suffered immeasurable injury from starvation owing to the Blockade, a measure opposed to the Law of Nations-is not limited to the time when actual warfare was still being carried on from both sides, but has special effect in regard to the time when a one-sided war was being waged by the Allied and Associated Powers against a Germany which had voluntarily laid down arms. This view of the Allied and Associated Governments, at any rate, departs from the agreement which Germany had entered into before the Armistice was concluded. It raises an endless series of controversial questions on the horizon of the Peace negotiations and can only be brought to a practical solution through a system of impartial international arbitration, an arbitration as provided for in Article 13, part [para.] 2, of the Draft of the Conditions of Peace. This clause prescribes:

"Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration."

Your Excellency has further pointed out in your note of the 20th instant that according to the principle of international law no nation could, through an alteration of its political form of government or through a change in the persons of its leaders, cancel an obligation once incurred by its government. The German Peace Delegation is far from contesting the correctness of this principle; they also do not protest against the execution of the agreement introduced by the former government in their proposal of October 5th 1918," but they do take objection to the punishment, provided for by the Draft of the Peace Treaty, for the alleged offences of the former political and military leaders of Germany. The President of the United States of America on December 4th 1917 declared12 that the war should not end in vindictive action of any kind, that no nation or people should be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of the country had themselves done deep and abominable wrong. The German Delega tion does not plead these or other promises to evade any obligation incumbent on Germany by the Law of Nations, but they feel entitled to call them to memory if the German nation is to be held responsible for the origin of the war and made liable for its damages.

Whilst the public negotiations immediately preceding the conclusion of the Armistice were still going on, the German nation was promised that Germany's lot would be fundamentally altered if it were severed from the fate of its rulers. The German Delegation would not like to take your Excellency's words to mean that the promise made by the Allied and Associated Governments at that time was merely a ruse of war employed to paralyse the resistance of the German nation, and that this promise is now to be withdrawn.

Your Excellency has finally contended that the Allied and Associated Governments had the right to accord to Germany the same treatment as had been adopted by her in the Peace Treaties of Frankfort" and Brest Litowsk.14 The German Delegation for the present refrains from examining in what respects these two Acts of Peace differ from the present Peace Draft, for it is now too late for the Allied and Associated Governments to found a claim of right on these precedents. The moment for so doing had come when they had before them the alternative of accepting or rejecting the fourteen points of the President of the United States of America as a basis of Peace. In these fourteen points the reparation of the wrong done in 1870/ 1871 was expressly demanded and the Peace of Brest Litowsk was

"See note from the German Imperial Chancellor to President Wilson, Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 338.

"Address to Congress, ibid., 1917, p. ix.

"Treaty of peace between France and Germany, May 10, 1871, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. LXII, p. 77.

24 Treaty of peace between Russia and the Central Powers, March 3, 1918, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.

695921-46—vol. vi

spoken of as a deterrent example. The Allied and Associated Governments at that time declined to take a peace of violence of the past as a model.

The German nation never having assumed the responsibility for the origin of the war, has a right to demand that it be informed by its opponents for what reasons and on what evidence these conditions of Peace are based on Germany being to blame for all damages and all sufferings of this war. It cannot therefore consent to be put off with the remark that the data on the question of responsibility collected by the Allied and Associated Governments through a special Commission are documents concerning those Governments alone. This, a question of life or death for the German nation, must be discussed in all publicity; methods of secret diplomacy are here out of place. The German Government reserve to themselves the liberty of reverting to the subject, Accept [etc.]

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU