M. LOUCHEUR said that the French proposal was not intended to obtain special protection for the bond-holders. It was merely intended to provide a solution of a practical problem which was sure to arise. Here is a Company which is going to be split into five different pieces and it is necessary to say how this Company is to function and whether and in what manner it is to be allowed the right of exploiting the five separate parts. If the case is really covered by paragraph 6 of the Treaty the object of the French proposal is gained. It was agreed that the Financial Clauses should be included in the Treaty with Austria as drafted, subject to the amendment of Clause 1 as proposed by President Wilson. (See paragraph 2 above.) Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/361 CF-36A Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's [House] in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 27, 1919, at 4 p. m. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA President Wilson. PRESENT BRITISH EMPIRE The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P. FRANCE M. Clemenceau. Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary. 1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had made a very full investigation in regard to the various points raised by Mr. Lloyd George at the morning meeting. The first point related to the dispatch to General Pilsudski. The Polish Ukrainian GENERAL MORDACQ said that on May 22nd, M. Clemenceau had given him the dispatch, which he had sent to the Head of the French Mission at Warsaw, with instructions that it was to be given both to General Pilsudski and to General Haller, and that he was to telegraph when he had done this. On the 23rd May, the Head of the French Mission had replied, asking for the dispatch to be repeated. This had been done and an acknowledgment had been asked for. No reply was received on Saturday and so a telegram had been sent asking whether the dispatch had been received. The reply had been that the dispatch could not be deciphered and it turned out that the wrong key had been used for deciphering. The right key to the cipher had then been communicated. On Sunday no reply was received, and a telegram was sent to ask whether the message had been received, deciphered and understood. It was only on Monday, the 26th, that a telegram had been received to say that the dispatch had been deciphered and understood, and the necessary action taken. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had a telegram which showed that General Henrys said that General Haller had now done the right thing and sent his troops to the German front. He was not satisfied, however, about the treatment of the dispatch. COLONEL KISCH said that General Henrys said that General Haller's troops had first been sent to the North of Lemberg but now they had been brought back to the German front. M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Lloyd George's story that the French Minister had supported the employment of General Haller's Army on the Ukrainian front probably had its foundation in the fact that the French Minister presided at a Committee, one of the recommendations of which by a large majority was that the Allied and Associated Powers should not make a reservation about the employment of General Haller's Divisions. General Henrys had said that M. Dmowski1 wanted the whole matter transferred to Marshal Foch, and this probably was the foundation of the idea that the French were supporting the action of the Poles. Rightly or wrongly the Poles believed that they had the support of Marshal Foch. MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that Marshal Foch had wanted to send General Haller's Army to Poland through Lemberg. He said he was perfectly satisfied now that the matter was in M. Clemenceau's own hands. VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 27 May, 1919. 1 1 Roman Dmowski, Polish plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/37 CF-37 Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 27, 1919, at 4 p. m. PRESENT AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF President Wilson. Hon. R. Lansing. Mr. L. Harrison. BRITISH EMPIRE Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P. Secretary-General Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B. Secretary. Mr. H. Norman. BRITISH EMPIRE Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G. Mr. Leeper. Major Temperley. AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF.... Lieut. E. C. Burden. BRITISH EMPIRE. Major A. M. Caccia. Capt. A. Portier. ...Lieut. Zanchi. FRANCE. ITALY. JAPAN. Interpreter-Professor P. J. Mantoux. .... M. Saburi. Frontiers of 1. PRESIDENT WILSON said that the problem the Council was called upon to solve had reference to the frontiers between Austria and Jugo-Slavia in the region of Klagenfurt. He thought the problem could be stated as follows. As far as the so-called Klagenfurt Basin was concerned, it would be found that the economic boundary line ran south of the ethnic line. The ethnic line divided the Basin into two parts, a northern and a southern part. The southern part, although it contained a large number of Slovenes, was indissolubly tied up, economically, with the northern part. Furthermore, the southern part of the Klagenfurt Basin was itself cut off from the country to the south by one of nature's most impressive lines of demarcation, namely, a mountain range, which was far steeper on its southern side than on its northern side, thus constituting a most serious barrier on its southern side. In his opinion, the question of the delimitation of the Klagenfurt Basin resembled in every respect the case of the Italian boundary line, running down the Istrian Peninsula. In that case, although it was acknowledged that many Slovenes resided on the Italian side of that line, nevertheless, it had been agreed that nature had made that the natural boundary line of the Italian Peninsula. A similar situation presented itself here in the Klagenfurt Basin. The Slovene people in the southern part of the Basin, were, economically, intimately connected with the northern people. The question could not, therefore, be considered merely from a political and ethnical point of view. In other words, the Council would have to decide whether an unnatural arrangement should be accepted for political expediency, or a natural arrangement, thus disregarding purely political consideration. He, personally, felt very much embarrassed to depart from the principle which he had agreed to follow in the case of the Italian settlement. He certainly had no desire to re-consider the arrangement made with Italy which followed the dictates of nature. (After some private consultation, between the Heads of Governments, it was decided to adjourn the further consideration of the question.) 2. It was pointed out that the question of Bessarabia had been omitted from the despatch to Admiral Koltchak, and that this would probably cause difficulties with Roumania, when the despatch was eventually published. Russia. The Despatch to Admiral Koltchak (After some discussion, the following addition to the despatch was approved : "Sixthly, the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Roumanian part of Bessarabia be recognised". The original Article "Sixthly" to be renumbered "Seventhly".) |