"If," says Dr. Armstrong, "I was to reduce my own private idea of the best language to a definition, I should call it the shortest, clearest, and easiest way of expressing one's thoughts, by the most harmonious arrangement of the best chosen words, both for meaning and sound. The best language is strong and expressive, without stiffness or affectation; short and concise, without being either obscure or ambiguous; and easy, and flowing, and disengaged, without one undetermined or superfluous word."*

The want of precision is an unpardonable error in a writer who treats of philosophical subjects. On this account, the style of Lord Shaftesbury is highly exceptionable. The noble author seems to have been well acquainted with the power of words; those which he employs are generally proper and sonorous; and his arrangement is often judicious. His defect in precision. is not so much imputable to indistinctness of conception, as to perpetual affectation. He is fond to excess of the pomp and parade of language; he is never satisfied with expressing anything clearly and simply; he must always give it the dress of state and majesty. Afraid of delivering his thoughts arrayed in a mean and o dinary garb, and allured by an appearance of splendour, he heaps together a crowd of superfluous words, a id inundates every idea which he means to express with a torrent of copious loquacity. Hence perpetual c.rcumlocutions, and many words and phrases employed to describe what would have much better been described by one. If he has occasion to introduce any author, he very rarely mentions him by his proper name. In the treatise entitled Advice to an Author, he employs two or three successive pages in descanting upon Aristotle, without naming him in any other manner than as "the master critic," the prince of critics," "the consummate philologist," "the grand master of art," "the mighty genius and judge of art." In the same manner "the grand poetic sire,' "the philosophical patriarch,"

44

Armstrong's Miscellanics, vcl, ii., p. 133

and "his disciple of noble birth and lofty genius," are the only names by which he condescends to designate Homer, Socrates, and Plato. This method of distinguishing persons is extremely affected, but it is not so contrary to precision as the frequent circumlocutions which he employs to express the powers and affections of the mind. In one passage, he denominates the moral faculty," that natural affection and anticipating fancy, which makes the sense of right and wrong." When he has occasion to mention self-examination, or reflection on our own conduct, he speaks of it as "the act of a man's dividing himself into two parties, becoming a self-dialogist, entering into partnership with himself, and forming the dual number practically within himself."

In the following paragraph he wishes to shew, that by every vicious action, we injure the mind as much as a man would injure his body by swallowing poison, or inflicting on himself a wound.

Now, if the fabric in the mind or temper appeared to us such as it really is; if we saw it impossible to remove hence any one good or orderly affection, or to introduce an ill or disorderly one, without drawing on in some degree, that dissolute state which, at its height, is confessed to be so miserable; it would then undoubtedly be confessed, that since no ill, immoral, or unjust action can be committed, without either a new inroad and breach on the temper and passions, or a farther advancing of that execution already done; whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his integrity, good nature, or worth, would of necessity act with greater cruelty towards himself, than he who scrupled not to swallow what was poisonous, or who with his own hands should voluntarily mangle or wound his outward form or constitution, natural limbs or body.-Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue.

Such superfluity of words is offensive to every reader of a correct taste, and produces no other effect than that of perplexing the sense. To commit a bad action, is first, "to remove a good and orderly affection, and to introduce an ill or disorderly one;" next it is, "to commit an action that is ill, immoral, or unjust; and then "to do ill, or to act in prejudice of integrity, good nature, or worth." Nay, so very simple a thing as a man's wounding himself, is, "to mangle or wound

his outward form or constitution, natural limbs or body."

Dr. Crombie has justly remarked, "that a due attention to accuracy of diction is highly conducive to correctness of thought. For, as it is generally true that he whose conceptions are clear, and who is master of his subject, delivers his sentiments with ease and perspicuity, so it is equally certain that, as language is not only the vehicle of thought, but also an instrument of invention, if we desire to attain a habit of conceiving clearly, and thinking correctly, we must learn to speak and write with accuracy and precision.'

SYNONYMOUS WORDS.

MANY words are accounted synonymous, which are not so in reality; and indeed it may reasonably be disputed whether two words can be found in any language, which express precisely the same idea. However closely they may approximate to each other in signification, the discriminating eye of the critic can still discover a line of separation between them. They agree in expressing one principal idea, but always express it with some diversity in the circumstances; they are varied by some accessory idea which severally accompanies each of the words, and which forms the distinction between them.

As they are like different shades of the same colour, an accurate writer can employ them to great advantage, by using them so as to heighten and to finish the picture which he gives us. He supplies by the one what was wanting in the other, and so adds to the force, or to the lustre of the image which he means to exhibit.

Crombie's Etymology and Syntax of the English Language, p. 429, 3d. edit.

But, with a view to this end, he must be extremely attentive to the choice which he makes of them; for the generality of writers are apt to confound them with each other, and to employ them with promiscuous carelessness, merely for the sake of filling up a period, or of diversifying the language. By using them as if their signification were precisely the same, they unwarily involve their ideas in a kind of mist.

Many instances might be given of a difference in meaning between words reputed synonymous. The following instances may themselves be of some use; and they will besides serve to show the necessity of attending, with the utmost care, to the exact significations of words, if ever we would write with propriety or precision.

To abandon, forsake, relinquish, give up, desert, leave, quit. -A man forsakes his mistress, abandons all hope of regaining her lost esteem, relinquishes his pretensions in favour of another; gives up a place of trust which he holds under government, deserts his party, leaves his parents in affliction, and quits the kingdom for ever.

To abhor, detest.-To abhor, imports, simply, strong dislike; to detest, imports also strong disapprobation. A man abhors being in debt; he detests treachery.

Active, assiduous, sedulous, diligent, industrious.-The king is happy who is served by an active minister, ever industrious to promote his country's welfare, por less diligent to obtain intelligence of what is passing at other courts, than assiduous to relieve the cares of his royal master, and sedulous to study the surest methods of extending the commerce of the empire abroad, while he lessens all burdens upon the subjects at home.

To avow, acknowledge, confess.-Each of these words. signifies the affirmation of a fact, but in very different circumstances. To avow, supposes the person to glory in it; to acknowledge,* supposes a small degree of de

* Confess implies a greater amount of spontaneity than acknowledge. We acknowledge a fault when we are taxed with it; we confess it when we admit it without being taxed.

linquency, which the acknowledgement compensates; to confess, supposes a higher degree of criminality. A patriot avows his opposition to a corrupt ministry, and is applauded; a gentleman acknowledges his mistake, and is forgiven; a prisoner confesses the crime of which he stands accused, and is punished.

Austerity, severity, rigour.-Austerity relates to modes of living or behaviour; severity of thinking; rigour of punishing. To austerity is opposed effeminacy; to severity relaxation; to rigour clemency. A hermit is austere in his life; a casuist severe in his application of moral principles; a judge rigorous in his sentences.

Authentic, genuine.-No two words are more frequently confounded, though their signification is sufficiently clear and distinct. Authentic refers to the character of a document; genuine, to the connexion between any production and its reputed author. We speak with correctness of the authenticity of Buchanan's history, and of the genuineness of the poems ascribed to Ossian; but the authenticity of Ossian's poems, properly denotes the authority of those poems in an historical point of view. Several works have however appeared under the title of dissertations on the authenticity of Ossian's poems.

Capacity, ability.-Capacity relates to the mind's susceptibility of receiving impressions; ability to its power of making active exertions. The earl of Clarendon, being a man of extensive capacity, stored his mind with a variety of ideas; which circumstance contributed to the successful exertion of his vigorous abilities.

Custom, habit.-Custom respects the action, habit the actor. By custom, we mean the frequent repetition of the same act; by habit, the effect which that repetition produces on the mind or body. By the custom of walking often in the streets, one acquires a habit of idleness.

A difficulty, an obstacle.-A difficulty embarrasses, an obstacle stops us. The first generally expresses something arising from the nature and circumstances of the affair; the second, something arising from a foreign.