and the appropriation of tribal funds for "The services under this contract have such purposes. been fully performed to the satisfaction of "18. And these defendants, specifically the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and answering as to the contract in dispute, say: the twenty-seven thousand dollars ($27,000) agreed to be paid is due and payable, if this honorable court determines that it is legally payable out of the 'Sioux trust fund' and the ‘Sioux treaty fund.'" "That it is a contract made between F. E. Leupp, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, for and on behalf of the United States of America, and the 'Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions,' executed as of July 1, 1905, for the care, education, and maintenance of 250 Indian pupils at the St. Francis Mission School, Rosebud reservation, South Dakota, at $108 per capita, *per annum, amounting to $27,000. The contract was approved by Jesse E. Wilson, Acting Secre- ESTATE OF GEORGE N. FLETCHER, Detary of the Interior. 66 'Application for the contract was made by the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions' on June 6, 1905. "On March 26, 1906, a petition duly signed and genuinely signed by 212 members of the Sioux tribe of Indians of the Rosebud agency, South Dakota, was filed, asking that the said contract applied for be entered into with the bureau. (210 U. S. 82) ALBERT W. BROWN, Plff. in Err., V. ceased. Judgments of sister state — effect. "The payments under the contract were to be made from the 'Sioux trust fund' and 2. A decree entered, after an order of rethe 'Sioux treaty fund,' as hereinbefore de-vivor, against the administrator with the scribed, in the discretion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. "There are 4,986 Indians on the rolls of the Rosebud reservation, and the amount of tribal income applicable to education, in the discretion of the Commissioner, is $250,047.90, or a per capita of $50.15. "The 212 petitioners represent 669 shares, or $33,550.35, and of this they ask that $27,000 be used for the education of their children in St. Francis Mission School. The following table will represent the pro rata shares in these tribal funds, and the per capita shares: 4,986 Indians, 669 shares $250,047.90 Tribal funds, $50.15 per capita. Tribal funds, $50.15 per capita. Tribal funds, $50.15 per capita. "The cost of the government school for the fiscal year was about $76,830. Since the shares of the petitioning Indians amount to $33,550.35, and the sum asked for the school is only $27,000 out of this share, and the petitions were genuinely signed, the terms of the executive order of President Roosevelt of February 3d, 1905, e. g., to see that any petition by the Indians is genuine, and that the money ap propriated for any given school represents only the pro rata proportion to which the Indians making the petition are entitled,' have been strictly carried out. will annexed of a nonresident, who had died pending suit, confirming an award in arbitration proceedings had in the suit under a rule of court, does not bind the nonresident executors and legatees, who did not appear and were not validly served with process, although the stipulation for submission to arbitration provided that the arbitration should continue in case of the death of either party, and that his successors and legal representatives should be bound by the final award.* On April 24, 1874, a bill of complaint in* a suit for an accounting was filed in the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, sitting in equity, against George N. Fletcher, of Detroit, Michigan. The latter personally appeared and defended the suit. Without going into the details of the protracted litigation in Massachusetts, or showing how the plaintiff in error became at last the 'Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 30, Judgment, § 1499. Messrs. John Miner and Harrison Geer for plaintiff in error. Mr. Henry M. Campbell for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: plaintiff in whose favor the Massachusetts | a claim against the estate. It was disalcourt entered judgment, it is enough to say lowed by that court, and, on appeal to the that on april 4, 1892, an agreement was supreme court of Michigan, the disallowmade between the parties for submitting to ance was affirmed. 146 Mich. 401, 109 N. arbitration all the claims and demands ei- W. 686. Thereupon the case was brought ther party might have against the other; here on error. providing that the arbitration should be under rule of court, and that it should not operate as a discontinuance of the suit. It was further stipulated that the decease of either party should not terminate the submission, but that the arbitration should continue, and his successors and legal representatives should be bound by the final award therein. On October 18, 1893, the Hon. William L. Putnam was selected as arbitrator. On May 22, 1894, he filed a preliminary award. After this, and before a final award, Fletcher died, leaving a will, which was probated in the probate court of Wayne county, Michigan. Letters testamentary were issued to his executors, citizens of Michigan, who qualified as such, and took possession of the decedent's estate in Michigan. His principal estate, as well as his domicil, was in Michigan, but he owned two small tracts in Massachusetts. The probate court of Middlesex county, Massachusetts, by proceedings, regular in form, appointed Frank B. Cotton, a citizen of that state, administrator with the will annexed. The Massachusetts property was afterwards sold by that administrator for $350. The Federal question presented is whether the Michigan courts gave force and effect to the 1st section of article 4 of the Federal Constitution, which provides that “full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state." That this is a Federal question is not open to doubt. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 666, 36 L. ed. 1123, 1127, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224, and cases cited. The constitutional provision does not preclude the courts of a state in which the judgment of a sister state is presented from inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the court by which the judgment was rendered. See the elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, in Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897. That opinion has been followed in many cases, among which may be named Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 448, 34 L. ed. 1054, 1059, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 265, 35 L. ed. 464, 467, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 773; Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 44 L. ed. 500, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446. Even record recitals of jurisdictional facts do not preclude oral testimony as to the existence of those facts. Knowles v. Logansport Gaslight & Coke Co. 19 Wall. 58, 61, 22 L. ed. 70, 72; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 730, 24 L. ed. 565, 571; Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555, 566, 43 L. ed. 808, 811, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506. After the death of Fletcher the principal suit was revived, the administrator entered his appearance therein, and an order was made by the Massachusetts court that the executors and the children and residuary legatees of the decedent be notified to appear, and that in default thereof the arbitration proceed. They were notified by personal service of the order in the state of Michigan, but did not appear. The arbitration proceeded in their absence and a final award was made. It should also be stated that, on his death, Fletcher's counsel withdrew their appearance in the case. On April 14, 1903, the Massachusetts supreme judicial court confirmed the awards of the arbitrator, and adjudged that Albert W. Brown recover from Frank B. Cotton, administrator with the will annexed, the sum of $394,372.87 and $4,495.85 as interest and the costs of suits, afterwards taxed as $5,385.40. It was further adjudged and decreed that the "To quote the language of Mr. Chief JusMichigan executors of the last will were bound by the final award of the arbitra- tice Marshall, in Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, tor, and liable to pay to Albert W. Brown 241, 277, 2 L. ed. 608, 619: 'It is repugnant the aforesaid sums; that the legal represen- to every idea of a proceeding in rem to act tatives of George N. Fletcher were likewise against a thing which is not in the power of bound by the award and liable for any de- the sovereign under whose authority the ficiency. Thereafter the decree of the Massa-court proceeds; and no nation will admit chusetts court was filed in the probate court that its property should be absolutely of Wayne county, Michigan, as evidence of changed, while remaining in its own posses Every state has exclusive jurisdiction over the property within its borders. Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214, 44 L. ed. 741, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603. We make this extract from the opinion of Mr. Justice White in that case, p. 222: sion, by a sentence which is entirely ex parte.' "As said also in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 722, 24 L. ed. 565, 568: 'Except as restrained and limited by the Constitution, the several states of the Union possess and exercise the authority of independent states; and two well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent state over persons and property are applicable to them. One of these principles is, that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. Story, Confl. L. chap. 2; Wheaton, International Law, pt. 2, chap. 2. The several states are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one state have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. "Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit," says Story, "is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in any other tribunals." Story, Confl. L. § 539.'" * Fletcher, at the time of his decease, was the owner of property, some of it situated in Massachusetts and some in Michigan. Each state had jurisdiction over the property within its limits, and could, in its own courts, in conformity with its laws, provide for the disposition thereof. Massachusetts exercised its jurisdiction over the property within its limits and disposed of it by legal proceedings in its courts. The contention now is that the proceedings in the Massachusetts court can be made operative to control the disposition of the property in Michigan. In support of this contention, counsel for plaintiff in error state two propositions: Considering first the latter proposition, we are of opinion that there is no such relation between the executor and an administrator with the will annexed, appointed in another state, as will make a decree against the latter binding upon the former, or the estate in his possession. While a judgment against a party may be conclusive, not merely against him, but also against those in privity with him, there is no privity between two administrators appointed in different states. Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 639; Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. 467, 11 L. ed. 1059; Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. 44, 12 L. ed. 337. In this latter case, on page 58, it was said: "Where administrations are granted to different persons in different states, they are so far deemed independent of each other that a judgment obtained against one will furnish no right of action against the other, to affect assets received by the latter in virtue of his own administration; for, in contemplation of law, there is no privity between him and the other administrator. See Story, Confi. L. § 522; Brodie v. Bickley, 2 Rawle, 431." See also McLean v. Meek, 18 How. 16, 15 L. ed. 277; Johnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 156, 35 L. ed. 112, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525, in which the question is discussed at some length by Mr. Justice Gray. This doctrine was enforced in Massachusetts (Low V. Bartlett, 8 Allen, 259), where a judgment had been recovered in Vermont against an ancillary administrator appointed in that state, whose appointment had been made at the request of the executor under the will probated in Massachusetts, and it was held that the administrator was not in privity with the executor, because the two were administering two separate and distinct estates; the court saying, p. 262: "If we look at the question of privity between the executor here and the ancillary administrator in Vermont, it is difficult to find any valid ground on which such privity can rest. The executor derives his authority from the letters testamentary issued by the probate court here; he gives bond to that court; is accountable to it for all his proceedings; makes his final set"The supreme judicial court in equity for tlement in it, and is discharged by it, in Suffolk county, Massachusetts, having had conformity with the statutes of this comjurisdiction in Fletcher's lifetime over the monwealth. The administrator derives his subject-matter and the parties to the suit, authority from the probate court in Verand, on his death, the suit having been | mont, and is accountable to it in the same duly revived, the decree is conclusive evi- manner in which the executor is accountdence of debt in this proceeding. "Fletcher's Michigan executors and the administrator with the will annexed of his estate in Massachusetts are in such privity that the decree is conclusive evidence of debt in this proceeding." able to our court. The authority of the executor does not extend to the property there, nor to the doings of the administrator. Nor does the authority of the administrator extend to the property here, or to the doings of the executor. When the tion of the suit in equity against Fletcher; this his death prior to a decree did not abate the suit, but only temporarily suspended it until his representative should plaintiff commenced his suit against the, all domiciled in Michigan, did not appear, administrator, the executor had no right and were not validly served with process. to go there and defend it. If he had been The argument of plaintiff in error is that, found in Vermont, he could not have been by personal appearance during his lifetime, sued there. The judgment rendered in the the Massachusetts court acquired jurisdic suit was not against him, or against the testator's goods in his hands; but was simply against the administrator and the testator's goods in his hands. The courts of Vermont had no jurisdiction of the ex-be made a party; that, if a decree had been ecutor or of the goods in his hands, any more than our courts would have over the administrator and the goods in his hands. It is this limitation of state jurisdiction that creates a necessity for an administration in every state where a deceased person leaves property; and each state regulates for itself exclusively the manner in which the estate found within its limits shall be settled." The Massachusetts statutes proceed along this line. Secs. 10, 11, and 12, chap. 136, Mass. Rev. Laws 1902, provide for the probate of foreign wills in Massachusetts. Sec. 12 reads: rendered against him in his lifetime, it "After allowing a will under the provisions of the two preceding sections, the probate court shall grant letters testamentary on such will, or letters of admin-equity rule that a suit in equity does not istration with the will annexed, and shall proceed in the settlement of the estate which may be found in this commonwealth in the manner provided in chap. 143, relative to such estates." With reference to the first contention of counsel, we remark that, while the original suit against Fletcher in the Massachusetts court was revived after his death, yet the revivor was operative only against the administrator with the will annexed. Neither the executors nor the residuary legatees were made parties, for it is elementary that service of process outside of the limits of the state is not operative to bring the party served within the jurisdiction of the court ordering the process. Such also is the statutory provision in Massachusetts. Section 1, chap. 170, Mass. Rev. Laws 1902, reads: abate by the death of the defendant, and that the jurisdiction of the court is only suspended until such time as the proper representatives of the deceased are made parties defendant, but also a special agreement in the submission to arbitration that it shall be made under a rule of court, and that the death of either party shall not terminate the arbitration proceedings, but that they shall continue until the final award. It is urged that, on the death, a revivor was ordered; that the representative of the decedent's estate in Massachusetts, to wit, the administrator, was made a party defendant and appeared to the suit, and notice was given by personal service upon the executors and legatees in Michigan of the fact of the revivor, and that they were called upon to appear and defend. But it must be borne in mind that this "A personal action shall not be main- arbitration was made under a rule of court. tained against a person who is not an in- Not only that, but special provision *was habitant of this commonwealth unless he made for the action of the court in deciding has been served with process within this questions of law arising upon the report commonwealth, or unless an effectual at- of the arbitrator, so that the arbitration tachment of his property within this comwas not an outside and independent promonwealth has been made upon the orig-ceeding, but simply one had in court, for inal writ; and, in case of such attachment the purpose of facilitating the disposition without such service, the judgment shall be valid to secure the application of the property so attached to the satisfaction of the judgment, and not otherwise." The Massachusetts court, therefore, proceeded without any personal jurisdiction over the executors and legatees, who were 28 S. C.-45. of the case. And we may remark in passing that we do not have before us the case of a simple arbitration contract, executed independently of judicial proceedings, and express no opinion as to the rights and remedies of one party thereto in case of the death of the other. The validity of the *508 For majority opinion, see ante, p. 585. The CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting: decree must depend upon the proceedings | States for the Eastern Division of the Eastsubsequent to the death of Fletcher. On ern Judicial District of Missouri to remand his death the jurisdiction of the Massachu- a case to the state court from which it had setts court was not wholly destroyed, but been removed. Denied. suspended until the proper representative of Fletcher was made a party. The Massachusetts administrator was made a party and did appear, and the decree rendere un- The right of action was not vested in the questionably bound him; but the executors, next friend, and the citizenship of the inthe domiciliary representatives of the dece- fant controls. The case is one, therefore, in dent's estate, did not appear, and were not which the plaintiff was a citizen and resibrought into court. The Massachusetts ad- dent of the state of Illinois, and the deministrator was not a general representa- fendant a corporation created and existing tive of the estate, and could not bind it under the laws of the state of Kentucky, by any appearance or action other than in and a citizen and resident of that state. respect to the property in his custody. If The action was brought in the circuit court the home estate was to be reached, it had of the city of St. Louis, Missouri, of which to be reached by proceedings to which the state neither of the parties was a citizen. home representatives were parties. The The fact that the next friend, who also actagreement of the parties that the arbitra-ed as attorney at law for the minor, was a tion should continue in case of the death citizen of Missouri, is immaterial. of either, and that the legal representatives of the party should be bound by the final award, was an agreement made in the course of judicial proceedings of the suit in the Massachusetts court. It did not operate to make the home representatives of the decedent parties to the suit on the death of Fletcher. It did not bring his general estate into court. We concur in the views expressed by the supreme court of Michigan in the close of its opinion that "It must be held that the proceeding in the Massachusetts court abated with the death of Mr. Fletcher, that its revival was possible only because there was brought into existence, by the exercise of the sovereign power of the state, a representative of the decedent, clothed with certain powers with respect to the estate of decedent within the state, and that the decree thereafter rendered in the suit so revived is without effect save upon the administrator of the estate, who was, in accordance with the law of the place, brought upon the record." We are of opinion that the Supreme Court of Michigan did not fail to give "full faith and credit" to the decree of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, and therefore the judgment is affirmed. The question is whether, where neither of the parties is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought, the jurisdiction of the circuit court can be maintained if both parties consent to it. Jurisdiction of the circuit courts depends upon some act of Congress (Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 167, 49 L. ed. 142, 143, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8, 10, 1 L. ed. 718, 719; M'Intire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504, 506, 3 L. ed. 420, 421); and I quote at length from the opinion of Mr. Justice Gray in Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. (Ex parte Shaw) 145 U. S. 444, 36 L. ed. 768, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935, because he therein examines the statutory provisions bearing on the question before us, saying: "In carrying out the provision of the Constitution which declares that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies between citizens of different states,' Congress, by the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, chap. 20, § 11, conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court of suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state,' and provided that 'no civil suit shall be brought' 'against an inhabitant of the United States,' 'in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ.' 1 Stat. at L. 78, 79. "The word 'inhabitant,' in that act, was apparently used, not in any larger meaning than 'citizen,' but to avoid the incongruity of speaking of a citizen of anything less than a state, when the intention was to cover not only a district which included & whole state, but also two districts in one state, like the districts of Maine and Massachusetts in the state of Massachusetts, and the districts of Virginia and Kentucky in |