"Come, come, Dicky, that will not do for us," said cousin Peter 66 rouse yourself up, and tell us all you know about this matter. No one will do you any harm, lad."

Thus spoken to kindly, after some time, Dicky looked up and said: "Thee wants to know about the little chap, and if I tells thee, thee won't ask how that out there came by his death ?"

"If we do ask, it will not be to bring any harm on you, Dicky. You may be assured of that," said cousin Peter.

Dicky thought for some time, and then began to move off through the forest.

He is going towards his mother's cottage; I shouldn't be surprised if little Master Hugh was there safe enough," whispered Sam Barnby. 66 Bless you, bless you, Sam Barnby, for those words, and I believe that they are true," exclaimed Sir Hugh, as we all followed the idiot, except a couple of men, who were left with the dead body.

In a short time we reached a wretched tumble-down hut of mud, with a roof of thatch, green with age, and full of holes, in which birds had built their nests. There at one end we found a bedridden old woman, the idiot's mother, and on a little pallet-bed in the further corner lay a blooming child fast asleep. Sir Hugh stepped forward, signing to us not to make a noise, and lifting the child in his arms, bestowed a kiss on its brow. The boy awoke, and seeing his father -for it was our dear little Hugh-threw his arms round his neck and exclaimed,

glad s

"You've come, papa, for Hugh at last; Hugh is so so happy!" It was a happy meeting we all had at the Hall that evening, and grateful were the hearts of Sir Hugh and Lady Worsley at the recovery of their darling boy. I remember that afterwards there was an inquest, and that the magistrates met; but, except from the ravings of poor Dicky Green, there was no evidence how the deceased gentleman who was found in the forest came by his death. He was accordingly buried quietly in the parish churchyard, and as little fuss as possible made about the matter, though of course it had the usual run of a nine days' wonder. I am happy to say that little Hugh grew up, and as he is the father of a number of boys, there is not much chance of the property going out of the old line for want of a male heir.

NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

THE PRUSSO-AUSTRIAN WAR.

THE war of 1866 has only recently been concluded, the treaties of peace between Prussia and the states with which it was at war have been scarcely signed, when already several histories of that brief but decisive campaign have been published, all written by Prussian authors anxious to proclaim the glory won by their army.

Instead of criticising so natural an anxiety, we have reason to congratulate ourselves. Nothing can be more interesting than to have it so soon in our power to study the details of this brief but decisive campaign, and, if possible, to eliminate the causes of successes so rapid and so complete as to take the whole world by surprise, and to add six millions of souls to the Prussian sovereignty in the space of six weeks.

Many persons who anticipated very different results to the war have, with the best possible faith, sought for these causes in lucky chances, and especially in the superiority and destructive effects of the needle-gun, whilst all the Prussian chroniclers labour to show that nothing can be more erroneous than these ideas, and that it is solely to the excellence of its strategic combinations, and to the moral superiority of their soldiers, that the Prussian generals were indebted for their victories.

It is not for us to enter at the present moment at length upon the causes of the war, or as to who was the aggressor. The joint invasion of the Danish duchies of Holstein and Schleswig by Prussians and Austrians was an act of violence so little justifiable in the eyes of most impartial observers, that a misunderstanding in subsequent arrangements caused less surprise than did the course of the sharp and retributive war that followed. If Prussia claimed the lion's share of conquests jointly effected, it at least manifested in the most unanswerable manner its resolution and its power to substantiate its claims by force of arms. There is no appeal against the sword but by the sword, and, although it has been said by high authority that all they that take the sword shall perish by the sword, we have not yet arrived at that perfection of civilisation which enables us to supplant results thus obtained by human wisdom no more than to anticipate the events of the future.

We have to do simply with the facts of the case. Prussia had long since looked upon the influence of Austria in Germany as an obstacle to the development of the fatherland. By the constitution of the Zollverein the more German states emancipated themselves from the supremacy of Austria in commercial matters, but the political supremacy of the latter April-VOL. CXXXIX. NO. DLVI.

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was ensured in the Germanic Diet by its influence on the minor states. The first struggle for political supremacy led to the affair of Olmutz and the humiliation of Prussia, but this very reverse also led to that reorganisation of the army which culminated in the battle of Königsgratz. So great were the political divergencies of the two countries, that Francis Joseph preferred sacrificing, in 1859, Lombardy by the treaty of Villafranca rather than permit Prussia to take high military position in Germany by coming to its aid. If also in 1864 Austria joined Prussia in the war against a small power like Denmark, it was not so much to overawe other powers as to uphold its own position in Germany, and to prevent its rival reaping all the advantages of victory. The result could not be otherwise than disastrous. Austria favoured the claims of the Prince of Augustenburg, and wished to constitute the conquests into little German states, with sovereign rights as they are, or used to be, understood in Central Europe. Prussia, on the contrary, aimed at creating a strong northern frontier to a united or Prussian Germany.

The evacuation of Holstein by the Saxon and Hanoverian troops charged with what was called the Federal execution, that is to say, to represent the interest of the lesser states, left Prussia and Austria face to face, and a temporary arrangement was come to by the treaty of Gastein by which Holstein was handed over to Austria, and Schleswig to Prussia, until matters should be definitely arranged. This was in 1865, and, nothing coming of it, Count Bismarck notified in January, 1866, that Prussia would act according to its own free will, and form other alliances, if Austria declined to come to such arrangements as it proposed. Nothing could be more clear. It was like a shell bursting amid the complicated political questions of the day, and events then succeeded one another with great rapidity. Austria saw at once in this notification a declaration of war, and an alliance with its mortal enemy, Italy, if it refused to concede; it therefore forthwith commenced its armaments. Benedek was called to the command, and by the 10th of March war may be said to have been, if not determined upon, at least looked forward to as the probable solution of existing complications. Austria underrated its enemy, and, calculating upon the alliance of the lesser states, considered itself strong enough to carry on a successful war against Prussia on the one side and Italy on the other. It was not, however, until after much negotiation on both sides with the Germanic confederation, and the interchange of numerous recriminatory notes as to the armament going on, that Austria, on the 26th of April, proposed to Prussia to refer the Schleswig-Holstein question to the Germanic confederation, and place the duchies in the hands of Prince Augustenburg. This Prussia refused to do, repudiating at the same time the competency of the Diet, and demanding a general reform of the confederation. When Prussia thus intimated its decision on the 7th of May, it had mobilised an army of 490,000 men to back its imperious resolves. This had been accomplished in the space of a fortnight, and by the 19th of May the different corps had taken up their respective positions on the frontiers. The Austrians, on their side, had begun to concentrate their forces in Bohemia, and Marshal Benedek assumed the command on the 18th of May. Italy, on its side, began to arm also early in the same month, and on the 8th of May the raising of twenty battalions of volunteers, under Gari

baldi, was decreed, and so popular was the movement that the number voted had to be doubled before the end of the month.

The European powers made a last attempt to avert the coming struggle. Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the German confederation were invited on the 28th of May to meet France, Russia, and England in a conference to settle the Holstein-Schleswig question, the question of Venetia, and the question of Federal reform. The blame is laid on Austria for the failure of these negotiations, but both Prussia and Italy knew full well that a conference on the two latter questions was as life or death to Austria, whilst they could acquiesce in that which the House of Hapsburg could not concede.

Austria, after submitting the question of Schleswig-Holstein to the Diet on the 1st of June, and thus obtaining the adhesion of a body whose functions were openly disavowed by Prussia, took the initiative by ordering General Gablenz to convoke the states of Holstein that they might take the opinion of the people as to their future. Accordingly, the general summoned the states on the 5th of June to meet on the 11th at Itzehoë. Prussia, on its side, declared that the treaty of Gastein, which provided for divided rule in the states, but mutual sovereign rights, was annulled by this proceeding. Prussian troops were ordered to occupy the Austrian province of Holstein, but to avoid any conflict with the Austrians. Gablenz evacuated Kiel in consequence, and concentrated his forces, which were numerically utterly insufficient to cope with Prussia, at Altona, where he was followed by Prince Augustenburg and the government of Holstein, showing that the latter were not, at all events, in favour of the high-handed proceedings of Prussia. The latter proclaimed the dissolution of the hostile government as it had done that of a hostile Diet, and appointed Baron Scheel Plassen to the presidency of the two duchies. Austria made, under these circumstances of just provocation, Prussia openly manifesting her resolve to annex the two provinces, a last appeal to the Diet, and demanded the mobilisation of the army of the Germanic confederation.

Manteuffel having, in the mean time, occupied the town of Itzehoë and dispersed the chambers, Gablenz withdrew on the 12th of June to Hamburg, whence he proceeded by railway to the central German states. The first political victory of Prussia was thus won without firing a gun. The withdrawal of Gablenz gave to the army of the north a reinforcement of five battalions of infantry, two squadrons, and one battery, whilst it placed twelve Prussian battalions, eight squadrons, and twenty-four guns at liberty to act on any other field. As to the proposition of the Diet to mobilise the Federal contingents, carried by a small majority, Prussia declared that it had simply completed the breaking up of the confederation, and that the Federal pact being broken, it was no longer obligatory. Thus it is that old institutions, treaties, and alliances, often held together by a mere thread, are blown to the wind by the mere breath of power whenever it pleases it so to do, or whenever their action becomes embarrassing or hostile.

The aspect of Catholic Austria and of Protestant Prussia was very different at this momentous crisis. In the first, bellicose ardour was raised to the pitch of fanaticism by the papers. Nothing was spoken of but the defeat of Prussia, and a peace dictated at Berlin. The Prussians, on the

contrary, were serious and silent. They had confidence in themselves, but they did not underrate their enemy, and they knew that the existence of Prussia as a nation depended upon the issue of the conflict in which they were about to engage. The Prussian army, it is to be observed, was in reality the people of Prussia in arms. Every condition in life, science, arts, commerce, and industry, had its representatives there, and the result has shown that an army so constituted is as favourable for action as one in which the wealthier classes are permitted to purchase substitutes, although no doubt the losses sustained in war weigh far more heavily on a country than when its battles are fought by an army of proletarians.

Prussia, by mobilising its army and concentrating it with an almost unprecedented rapidity, averted the danger of any surprise on the part of Austria. The regular troops were at once pushed forward to the frontier, while the landwehr garrisoned the great towns and the strong places. The Austrian forces under Benedek presented a total of from 230,000 to 250,000 men, divided into seven corps, disposed in a semicircle, from Cracow, in Gallicia, along Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and Bohemia, chiefly keeping to the lines of railway, and only pushing forward a few regiments of cavalry to the frontiers. Every confidence was placed in Benedek, who, commanding the right wing of the Austrian army at Solferino, had held San Martino for a long time against a superior force. The Prussian army, commanded by the king in person, numbered 256,000 men, and was divided into eight and a half army corps, grouped in three distinct bodies, the right wing, 40,000 strong, under Herwarth, between Hall and Torgau; the centre, about 100,000 strong, under Prince Frederick Charles, between Hoyerswerda and Görlitz; and the left wing, 116,000 strong, in Silesia, under the Prince Royal. There was a reserve of 24,000 men at Berlin, so that in reality there were 280,000 where the decisive battles must be fought, against 250,000 Austrians, who had another enemy to combat on the Adige. A division some 36,000 strong was left at the same time in the west, in the provinces on the Rhine, under Vogel von Falkenstein.

Previous, indeed, to entering upon hostilities with Austria, Prussia had resolved upon the military occupation of Hanover and Electoral Hesse, which interrupted communication with the provinces on the Rhine, as also of Saxony, which presented as many facilities to Austria to assume the offensive in Brandenburg as it presented difficulties to Prussia to operate in Bohemia. The open hostility of the one, and the dubious neutrality of the other two states, presented an excuse for taking action, and it must be admitted that in these preliminaries, as in the whole subsequent conduct of the campaign, the movement was carried out with a rapidity and energy which took the parties concerned altogether by surprise. In the brief space of four days, three of the most important secondary states in Germany were occupied, and three German sovereigns were driven from their capitals and their country as if they had been carried away by a whirlwind, and that without shedding a drop of blood, so great was their consternation and so utter their discomfiture!

It had been generally supposed that Austria would, as a first step in the war, advance by the railroad and the steam-boats on the Elbe to